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Abstract 
The proliferation of microfinance worldwide has been due to its claimed impacts on 
poverty reduction and women's empowerment. Conversely, it has been criticised for 
furthering the neoliberal policies of external agencies by using poor women's 
entrepreneurship and mutual trust as a joint liability mechanism to reduce the costs 
and risks for the capital provider. Set against this, Indian microfinance exhibits a 
wide spectrum of delivery models, from subsidized to unsubsidized and commercial 
credit. Microfinance impact literature considers its impact to be neutral to the process 
of delivery and therefore contains few cross model comparisons. It privileges the 
dominant policy model of primarily positive impacts, and has overlooked rather than 
examined differing worldviews. This research questions external perspectives and 
explores actor perspectives. 
This research is located in a semi-arid livelihoods context, i.e. the Koppal district in 
Karnataka State, India. It takes a critical and interpretive approach and adopts a 
longitudinal case study methodology to examine use of money from women's own 
perspectives. The field work shows that loan demand is context dependent and low in 
a semi-arid region with uncertain and risky investment opportunities. Microfinance 
provided by informal sources was used for survival and social needs: Three models 
of formal microfinance delivery emerged, of which two relegated the poor to the 
margins but the SHG-Bank linkage model combined poverty focus and market 
orientation to offer a stable borrower lender relationship. 
The field research also considered the social learning process that takes place among 
Self Help Groups (SHGs) in the utilisation and repayment of microfinance. The 
women differentiate money delivered in different ways, and social relationships 
determined financial relationships. This research reveals multiple meanings of 
money, recognises new opportunities and vulnerabilities created by formation of 
SHGs, and highlights that microfinance models which provide women access and 
control over money enhanced their decision making ability and so were the most 
empowering. 
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PRADAN 
PSI 
RBI 
RLS 
RMP 
Glossary 
Government of India 
Government of Karnataka 
German Development Cooperation/ German Technical Cooperation 
Head Count Ratio 
Housing Development Finance Corporation 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus I Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
Income Generating Activity 
Integrated Rural Development Programme 
Institute for Rural Development and Education Society 
Karnataka State Women's Development Corporation 
Less Favoured Areas 
Mutually Aided Cooperative Society 
Mahila Arthik Samavrudhi Yojane 
Microfinance 
Micro Finance Institution 
Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
Non Banking Financial Company 
Non Government Organisation 
National Institute of Mental Health and NeuroSciences 
Natural Resources Management Programme Andhra Pradesh 
National Social Assistance Programme 
Other Backward Castes 
Overseas Development Administration 
Poverty Gap Index 
Participatory Rural Appraisal 
Professional Assistance for Development Action 
Pastoral Service Institute 
Reserve Bank of India 
Rural Livelihood Systems 
Registered Medical Practitioner 
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RRB 
Rs. 
SAA 
SAPAP 
SBH 
SBI 
sc 
soc 
SDMC 
SEWA 
SFMC 
SGSY 
SHG 
SIDBI 
SITRA 
SLF 
SNRM 
ST 
TB 
TBF 
TGB 
TN 
TRYSEM 
TV 
UK 
UNDP 
UNOPS 
US AID 
ZP 
Regional Rural Bank 
Indian Rupees 
Service Area Approach 
South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme 
State Bank of Hyderabad 
State Bank of India 
Scheduled Caste 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
School Development and Management Committee 
Self-Employed Women's Association 
SIDBI Foundation for Micro Finance 
Swarna Jayanthi Gram Swarozgar Yojane 
Self Help Group 
Small Industries Development Bank of India 
Supply of Improved Toolkits to Rural Artisans 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
Sustainable Natural Resources Management 
Scheduled Tribes 
Tuberculosis 
The Bridge Foundation 
Tungabhadra Grameen Bank 
Tamil Nadu 
Training ofRural Youth for SelfEmployment 
Television 
United Kingdom 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Office for Project Services 
United States Agency for International Development 
Zilla Parishad 
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Allige alii, poojege pooje 
Amavase 
Amrith Amavase 
Avaralli Hechu Rokka ithi 
Baddi 
Badigar 
Basava Jayanthi 
Basavi 
Baksa 
Beedi 
Bhagya Jyothi 
Block/Taluk 
Bund 
Coolie 
Dai 
Dalal 
Da/it Seva Sangha 
Dalit 
Dasar 
Deepawali 
Devadasi 
Deerga A vadhi Sa/a 
the amount the farmers give meets only the expenses 
on food and clothes while on migration: meaning that 
they return empty handed with no savings 
new moon night 
new moon night in February 
he has lot of money 
interest on loan 
carpenter 
a festival in May 
the local term for devadasi, meaning a woman with 
no restriction for having sexual relations 
box money 
local cigarette 
a government scheme, for free electricity to the poor 
families 
a group of 40-80 villages, which form an 
administration unit of 6-8 panchayats. 
soil and water conservation structures, usually two to 
three feet high walls built of stone and soil 
casual human labour 
local nurse and midwife 
broker 
a society with membership of dalits 
people belonging to lower caste 
hindu sub caste 
festival of lights 
women who have been dedicated to the local deity 
and are not allowed to marry, but can have sexual 
alliances with men 
long term loan 
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Duddu, Rokka, Hana money 
Finance Sa/a short-term loan 
Galeamma hindu goddess 
Ganga Kalyana Yojane a government scheme 
Gouda, Gowda landlord/ head of a village 
Gram Panchayat a group of 6-10 villages forming an administrative 
unit and having elected local representatives at 
village level 
Hamali porter 
Hamali Sangha porter's union 
Hani Hani Koodidare Halla, small drops of water make a mighty ocean 
Thene Thene Koodidare 
Rashi 
Hareavayi pain 
Hechu Rokka Beku need lot of money 
Hingari late monsoon 
Holige sweet made with flour and jaggery 
Janatha Mane house constructed as a part of government-subsidised 
scheme for people living below the poverty line 
Jangamaru hindu sub caste (grazing cattle and trading milk is the 
main occupation ofthese people) 
Jathre Mela, fair 
Jawar food grain 
Kaigada a loan with no interest on it; can be repaid whenever 
there is money in hand 
Kankana thread tied during marriage around the bride/groom's 
forehead 
Karthik Amavase new moon night in December 
Kasuti hand embroidery 
Keri . street 
18 
Kuruba Hindu sub caste (general caste of shepherds, rearing 
sheep and goats) 
Lingayat general caste 
Luncha commission 
Madar hindu sub caste (SC) 
Madhyama Avadhi Sa/a medium term loan 
Mahanavami festival 
Mandala universe 
Mannethina Amavase new moon night in July 
Manthras charms 
Maratha hindu sub caste (OBC) 
Mungada cash advance without interest 
Mungari early monsoon 
Nagar Panchami a festival to worship snake god 
Nammaduddu our money 
Nan age Ondu Savira Rupai give me a loan of Rs.1 000/- ($ 22.22) 
Sa/a Kodi 
Nanna Maga Nanage Hola my son is my biggest property, like land 
Iddahange 
Oddaru stone-cutter 
Oni street 
Paddathis practices 
Panchayat a group of 6-10 villages forming an administrative 
unit and having elected local representatives 
Pinjar sub caste of muslim 
Puja worship 
Pujari priest 
Rashi wealth 
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Rathikuli 
Reddy 
Rotti 
Rupai 
Sajje 
Sa/a 
Sampathu 
SC keri 
Shavkar 
Stree Shakti 
Sulagi 
Taluk Panchayat 
Talwar 
Ugadi 
Undi 
Vat hi 
Vathi Sa/a 
Vijayadashmi 
Vyapara 
Yellu Amavase 
family granary 
Hindu sub caste (general caste) 
a bread, made with jowar flour 
rupee 
millets 
loan 
wealth, asset 
street of the SCs 
landlord in a village 
women's empowerment project funded by central 
government 
a local derogatory term, meaning prostitute 
a group of 6-10 Panchayats forming an administrative 
unit and having elected the representatives at Taluk 
level 
hindu sub caste (ST) 
new year celebrated by hindu people 
a sweet,prepared with Jaggery, groundnut, oil and 
rice 
mortgage 
loans given against security of land, jewels etc. 
a hindu festival, in which people worship goddess 
Durga 
business 
new moon night in January 
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Chapter 1 
Overview of the Research 
The proliferation of microfinance worldwide has been credited with impacts on 
poverty reduction and women's empowerment, as well as enabling establishment of 
sustainable microfinance organisations (CGAP, 2002). At the same time, 
microfinance has faced criticism regarding its deployment of poor women's 
entrepreneurship as their 'instrumentalisation' to meet the ends of neoliberal capital 
expansion (Fernando, 2006; Rankin, 2006). Set against these contradictory 
perspectives, the Indian microfinance scenario, with its widely varying models of 
microfinance delivery, does not lend itself to simplistic impact analysis. 
Microfinance literature considers its impact to be neutral to the process of delivery 
and therefore contains few cross-model comparisons, with most studies confining 
themselves to the specific model they examine, often that funded by specific donors. 
This research questions the dominant institutional views and studies women's own 
perspectives regarding the use of money. It concentrates on a semi-arid livelihoods 
context, and explores the meaning of money through longitudinal case studies with 
ten women participants. It explores how social relationships determine and influence 
financial relationships. As microfinance is delivered through informal self help 
groups (SHGs) of women, the thesis studies group dynamics, money management and 
social learning processes in the SHGs. In exploring how women use money, and how 
they differentiate money delivered in different ways, this research reveals multiple 
meanings of money from the women's perspectives, and highlights models of money 
management that they consider the most empowering. 
This Chapter presents an overview of the key research issues. Section 1.1 explains 
the questions, rationale and justification of the research, in relation to women and 
their groups. Section 1.2 explains the key terms used in the thesis, and Section 1.3 
outlines the process of development of the research, from institutional to actor 
perspectives. Section 1.4 elaborates the conceptual underpinnings of the meanings of 
money. Section 1.5 outlines the structure of the thesis and provides a synopsis. 
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1.1 Overview of the Research 
1.1.1 Research Context 
India accounts for 15% of the globai population and 27% of its 1.3 billion absolute 
poor (Satyamurti and Haokip, 2002) with up to 360 million in absolute poverty 
(DFID, 2004). Microfinance is increasingly being seen as an effective means of 
poverty alleviation, and is combined with various official schemes (NABARD, 1999). 
Compared to Bangladesh, Indian microfinance has however taken a different 
trajectory, partly due to its early efforts in development banking, banking 
infrastructure and legal framework, and strong NGOs able to experiment with 
different models. There are thus different models of microfinance delivery based 
upon several approaches; grassroots diversity defies a standard delivery model and 
frame for analysing microfinance impact. 
In this research, any coherent policy model of microfinance, which mostly privileges 
positive impacts, was challenged by evidence emerging from the field, which 
highlighted divergent stakeholder perspectives. An in-depth exploration of these 
differing perspectives calls for a better understanding of the differential meanings of 
money and an appreciation of how these multiple meanings develop. 
1.1.2 Research Question 
This thesis attempts to understand what money means to poor women living in 
backward areas by studying the livelihoods context in which such women live, 
and by exploring how they actually use money, and how their groups manage 
both money and their internal group dynamics. It incorporates the diversity and 
differences in women's perspectives and actions, as well as those of the intervening 
agencies. This research takes· a women-centred approach, where poor rural women 
are the key actors in demanding and bringing about livelihoods changes, and in 
assigning meanings to the different monies they choose to access or reject. 
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Previously, large rural development grants were observably routed through male-
dominated forums, e.g. watershed development programmes (Seeley, 2002; Girija, 
2004; Palanna, 2004), while credit was routed through women on the understanding 
that they were good repayers (Harper, 1998; Kalpana, 2005; Rankin, 2006): This 
highlighted a deep-rooted bias of donor and other support agencies, which held 
women responsible for results, whether this was related to population control, 
environment protection, income generating activities or microfinance (Lingam, 2006), 
while men determined programme implementation, in relation to expenditure and 
repayment (ODA, 1996). 
Formal policy pronouncements paradoxically did not recogmse the gender bias 
inherent in demanding accountability from women in an arena where they have little 
or no control - finance and poverty reduction - and responsibility for impacts which 
had hitherto proved elusive in mainstream government programmes targeted towards 
poor households. 
It was difficult to discern the real impact of microfinance on poverty reduction. The 
first phase of this research included an analysis of the historical development of 
poverty alleviation programmes and microfinance in India, and issues related to 
policy as well as practice. Extensive field visits during the first two years of research 
showed deep divergences between expectations of external agencies and how they 
expected the money to be received and used, and the perspectives of the women users 
themselves. Evidence contradicted the dominant assumption that there is vast unmet 
demand for credit which takes little consideration of the cost (Mahajan et al, 1998; 
Harper, 1998a). 
Clients were situated m vastly varying livelihoods contexts, with geographical, 
ecological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional specificities that influenced how 
money was used. However, these contextual factors are not always addressed in 
orthodox impact studies, which sequentially track the use of money from suppliers to 
women, into micro enterprises and the resulting benefits. In following this 'impact 
ch~ip', studies find it rjiffi,_cult to determirys th~ bel}efits due to fungibility of9~sry,_,and 
to attribute impact to certain specific interventions alone. Another factor is that poor 
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women first access microfinance through groups, which are used as mechanisms for 
delivery, but the gender dynamics inherent in such use are not always understood 
(Johnson, 2003), and women's work could be 'instrumentalised' through their 
participation in SHGs (Rankin, 2006). An understanding of how these groups both 
use and manage money (their own savings as well as external) is necessary to 
appreciate social relations and learning about the use and management of money. 
Microfinance impact studies are concerned with the outputs of such programmes. By 
contrast, this study explores how women themselves, especially some of India's 
poorest and most marginalised women, e.g. the devadasis, regard microfinance and 
their perspectives as clients (and their self help groups) are likewise analysed. Given 
the multiplicity of models and the spread of microfinance in several parts of India, 
one particular livelihoods context was specially selected for the in-depth research at 
the grassroots level, covering all the microfinance delivery models in that location. 
This exploration was done through research questions at three levels, depicted in 
Figure 1-1, which together help to understand the multiple meanings women assign to 
money. 
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Figure 1-1: Research Question 
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The use and impact of microfinance, and the differentiated meanings of money are 
influenced by three factors: the livelihoods context in which women live, how 
women use money and the processes by which groups managed money. Thus, the 
three critical issues were: 
1. How does the livelihoods context of women influence their actual use of money 
and what is the impact of microfinance? The livelihoods context comprises of 
ecological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional elements . Women ' s own 
livelihoods were observed with respect to their assets, incomes and life histories. 
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2. When do women access money and how do they use it? Women's perspectives 
of the different sources from which they access money, the terms on which they 
take it, the purpose for which they use it, and their reasons for repaying or 
defaulting were observed. 
3. What is the impact of the social learning processes as a result of externally 
introduced SHGs on the one hand and the internal pre-existing social setting, 
on the other? As women's SHGs are the forums for microfinance delivery, how 
groups sought and used money was observed. This included how social learning 
takes place and how impacts were generated through group processes. 
1.1.3 Research Strategy 
Since the research strategy involved understanding actors' perspectives and meanings, 
it draws upon the disciplines of sociology/anthropology as well as development 
studies. The research sought to understand how women use different resources, 
through in-depth and longitudinal analysis, which demanded working with them in a 
participatory way over two years. Primary data was obtained in two phases. In Phase 
1, between 1998 and 2000, macro level sector scanning was undertaken to provide an 
overview of the micro-enterprise and microfinance sector. Visits to 25 NGOs spread 
over nine states and discussions in workshops with donors and 25 NGOs, provided a 
meso level understanding of institutional issues (see Appendix 1 ). 
The grassroots work in the second phase involved a two-year longitudinal study of 
women (2001-2003), and maintaining contact with the women for validation 
purposes, for a further one-year period. The research explored narratives of women's 
lives and followed financial and non-financial aspects of their livelihoods. As 
external microfinance was introduced to women through SHGs, the mechanism and 
processes generated were important for understanding the impact of this intervention. 
The research process was not linear, but connected the three issues, at the macro level 
(microfinance at country level), meso level (issues for NGOs implementing 
microfinance projects and programmes) and micro level (understanding individual 
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women's perspectives through livelihoods analysis and understanding perspectives of 
groups), which were explored right through the period 1998 to 2003. The Figure 1-2 
below shows the focus of attention in each phase at each level. 
Figure 1-2: Three Levels of Work in Two Phases 
1 Macro Level: Sector 
~Scanning 
Meso Level 
Micro Level 
The secondary sources included publications and documents relating to banking, 
microfinance, and development partnerships from banks, government, NGOs and 
donors. Information about Koppal district and villages was collected from secondary 
sources, and supplemented with group discussions and social mapping exercises with 
the villagers. 
1.2 Key Terms 
The research addresses four broad monetary concepts that can be defined and 
interpreted in different ways: poverty, microfinance, SHGs and livelihoods. It is 
important, therefore, to discuss how these terms are used and defined . 
1.2.1 Poverty 
An understanding of poverty is central to the thesis , because poverty alleviation is the 
most important goal of development interventions. The first formal and widely 
accepted definitions of poverty in India relate to the daily calorie intake recommended 
for people in rural or urban areas, i.e. 2,400 and 2,100 calories respectively (Planning 
Commission, 200 1 ). The money that was required to buy a basket of food and non-
food goods that would enable this level of caloric consumption was considered the 
money ' poverty line,' below which people would not be able to obtain minimum 
sustenance. This money poverty line was first estimated at 1973 prices (Ozier, Datt 
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and Ravallion, 1996) and the poverty line in 1999-2000 was set at Rs. 327 ($7.26) per 
month for rural and Rs. 454 ($1 0.08) for urban areas (Saxena, 2001 ). 
The limitations of the income concept of poverty (Head Count Ratio) and it's 
'materialist bias' have been well recognised (UNDP, 1996; Douglas and Ney, 1998). 
Social indicators of development, e.g. life expectancy at birth and infant mortality 
rates, indicate poor performance, with India being classified low on the Human 
Development Index by UNDP. Gender dimensions included education and 
employment of women, and development of the Gender Development Index 
(McGuire et al, 1998). 
Several measures addressed the distribution of income, and relative deprivaton and 
suffering. The Poverty Gap Index (PGI) measures the distance of the poor from the 
poverty line, but may not provide any more information than the traditional Head 
Count Ratio (HCR) (Datt and Ravallion, 1998; Meghani, 2003). Other measures 
include Capability Poverty Measure (UNDP, 1996), Human Deprivation Measure 
(Haq, 1997), Human Poverty Index (UNDP, 1997) and Capability Failure Ratio 
(Majumdar and Subramaniam, 2004). These measures give importance to infant 
mortality rates, health of children under five years of age, and adult literacy as 
additional indicators depicting well being, and bring in distributional aspects by 
analysing rural/urban, gender, and caste grouping, but are all constrained by a lack of 
data. 
Researchers have refined measurements of poverty through use of several alternative 
measures, e.g. percentage share of food in the household income, and adjustments for 
household size and composition (Meenakshi et al, 2000). Using sophisticated poverty 
measures on offical poverty line data, have revealed that poverty rates are higher (35 
to 40%) among Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) households, while 
female-headed households are relatively more impoverished than the average poor 
household (Meenakshi et al, 2000). Landholding is an important determinant of 
poverty (Appu, 1996; Meghani, 2003) and gender aspects, which go beyond income 
arid basic needs to capabilities approaches are also important (Sen, 1999; bingam, 
2006). 
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Poverty can also be understood with reference to vulnerability to fluctuations in 
income. These fluctuations may be predictable (e.g. seasonal) or unpredictable, if 
they result from unexpected shocks (Montgomery, 1996). Johnson and Rogaly (1997) 
outline three parameters for defining poverty: lack of income, vulnerability to income 
fluctuations, and powerlessness. Vulnerability can be heightened by the lack of assets 
or by indebtedness. Interventions that reduce vulnerability and protect livelihoods are 
also seen as reducing poverty. Financial relationships, e.g. those of debt, are one way 
in which the powerlessness of poor people becomes entrenched. Vulnerability is 
different from poverty. While the latter reflects lack or want, the former emphasises 
the exposure to risk, shocks and stress, and the defencelessness in dealing with them, 
leading to insecurity (Chambers, 1989). Drought is a collective shock experienced 
regularly, and is a chronic condition in semi-arid regions. Thus groups in north 
Kamataka are more vulnerable to collapse. Vulnerability is seen in terms of three 
basic coordinates: risk of exposure, coping with inadequate capacities, and the severe 
consequences arising from crises, stresses and shocks (Watts and Bohle, 1993). 
Moser (1998) further emphasises that aspects of insecurity and resilience are 
interrelated, thus indicating the importance of inputs like microfinance, which have 
the potential of creating resilience and therefore of reducing the vulnerability of the 
rural poor. 
The multi-dimensional nature of poverty is now better recognised. The poor 
experience not only a lack of food, or material well-being but also the psychological 
effects of lack of education, poor health and illnesses. These include powerlessness, 
voicelessness, dependency, shame and humiliation. This results in severe 
vulnerability, which may also be gender related (Narayan eta!, 2000). In India poor 
women are disadvantaged in the type of work they do (low status) and also experience 
social marginalisation throughout their lives (Jain, 2002; George et a!, 2005). 
Douglas and Ney (1998: 5) emphasise three ideas, "one is lack, the second is an 
asymmetry of possession and the third is the person who is in poverty" in highlighting 
the actual experience of poverty itself. 
This research therefore sees poverty as geographically, socially, culturally and 
institutionally 'embedded' and analyses the livelihoods context to understand the use 
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and meaning of micro finance. It does not adopt any one single definition of poverty, 
e.g. income poverty. The finding that socio-cultural placement, i.e. caste, is strongly 
related to the economic positioning in defining poverty, is critical for those purposes. 
Further, certain women, namely the devadasis, who are deprived of basic human 
rights, experience social exclusion and extreme marginalisation. The intention is to 
understand the experiences of women who live in poverty, in its economic, spatial, 
social, cultural and gender dimensions. Vulnerability assumes importance, as it is 
both the cause and the effect of poverty. The research relates the concept of income 
poverty with other development dimensions and elaborates the experience women 
have, which is better explained in terms of multiple dimensions of 'vulnerability' that 
may prove more useful and relevant for development interventions. 
1.2.2 Microfinance 
Micro credit refers to providing very poor families with very small loans (micro 
credit), for productive income generating activities and expanding of their tiny 
businesses. Subsequently, a broader range of financial services have been provided to 
the poor, including credit, savings and insurance; known as micro finance (F AO, 2002; 
Satyamurti and Haokip, 2002). 
In the Indian context, the NABARD1 Task Force officially defined microfinance as: 
"Provision of thrift, credit and other financial services and products of very 
small amounts to the poor in rural, semi-urban or urban areas for enabling 
them to raise their income levels and improve living standards. The emphasis 
of support under micro finance is on the poor in 'pre-micro enterprise' stage for 
building up their capacities to handle more resources" (NABARD, 1999: 2). 
No specific limit for how 'small' an amount of financial services is envisaged. 
However, an informal upper limit was put at Rs. 25,000, which is the equivalent of 
$568 at 2004 rates (Satyamurti and Haokip, 2002). 
I. The National Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development is an apex institutionproviding 
development finance to banking sector and cooperatives with the objective of supporting 
agriculture and rural development. 
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Different terms are used to define the ways in which microfinance is offered. The 
term 'traditional' microfinance is used for subsidised credit (Johnson and Rogaly, 
1997; Harper, 1998; Robinson, 2001 ), whi le microfinance offered on commercial 
terms is considered as ' sustainable'. These authors refer to subsidised finance as the 
old paradigm and commercial finance as the new paradigm2 for providing 
micro finance services. Others refer to commercial micro finance as ' traditional' and 
see the needs of pro-poor microfinance as different (Dunford, 1998; Nissanke, 2002). 
The terms 'traditional', 'sustainable', 'old paradigm' and 'new paradigm ' have 
normative orientations inherent in the vocabulary used. 
This research does not distinguish between sustainable microfinance and subsidised 
microfinance, as these studies refer to 'sustainability ' from the point of view of the 
financial institution. In keeping with the perspective of the recipients and users of 
funds, it uses the terms on which the credit is offered to select the adjective, of which 
there are three: subsidised, uilsubsidised and commercial. Subsidised microcredit is 
that which carries a subsidy on principal repayment, meaning that the clients pay back 
50% of the principal, and do not need to pay back the rest. Unsubsidised micro credit 
is that which requires the full principal amount to be paid back with the interest rate 
being 12 -18%, the repayment period being 1-3 years, and the instalments at monthly 
or quarterly intervals. Commercial microcredit is the practice of providing loans with 
a one-year repayment period and regular repayment instalments, per week or per 
month. The interest on commercial microfinance ranges from 18- 24% per year, or 
even higher (Table 1-1 ). 
Table 1-1: Terms and Conditions for Different Types of Loans 
Subsidised Unsubsidised Commercial ~ 
Principal to be repaid Part, normally 50% Full Full 
Repayment period 3 years 1-3 years I year 
Instalments Monthly and half Monthly Weekly or monthly 
yearly 
Interest rates 12% 12- 18% 18 - 24% sometimes 
higher 
2. The interpretation of the term paradigm, and its application in research frameworks is 
discussed in chapter 3. 
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Women's preferences and use of money provided through these delivery models then 
reveals the meanings they attach to different 'monies'. 
1.2.3 SelfHelp Groups 
A Self Help Group (SHG) is defined as "a group of people having a common goal of 
socio-economic sustainable development, discussing their problems and resolving it 
through appropriate participatory decision making" (NABARD, 1998: 1 ). In the 
context of microfinance, an SHG is formed by a group of 15 to 20 people, (often 
women only) meeting once every week/fortnight/month. SHGs usually pledge to 
some informal rules, then open a bank account in the group's name, select two or 
three leaders and conduct savings and credit activities. They are characterised by 
homogeneity and affinity, commonality of interests, voluntarism and self-help, and 
participatory decision-making (NABARD, 1998; PRADAN, 1999; MYRADA, 2001 ). 
In most cases, the members pool funds to create a common fund, which may be used 
to access loans from this fund or from banks. In the latter case, the groups act as a 
collective guarantor for the loan (PRADAN, 1998). 
This research is concerned with women-only groups, formed on a voluntary basis, but 
with the encouragement of an external agency (e.g. NGO, government, MFI), which 
are engaged primarily in savings and credit activities. It explores money 
management, group dynamics and learning processes in these groups and, in this 
context, discloses how the perspectives of external intervening agencies and women 
SHG members often diverge in practice. 
1.2.4 Livelihoods 
Poor women do not see finance in isolation, but as one of the resources they use in 
order to improve their livelihoods. Women may not regard economic development 
(or availing microfinance) as a goal, but see it as a limited means of improving their 
immediate livelihoods. Actors can have different worldviews and assign varying 
priorities to the different means of improving their livelihoods. Thus there was a need 
to go beyond economic, financial or organisational perspectives to understand actors' 
own perspectives on their livelihoods. 
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Earlier references to 'livelihoods' referred to how people made a living. Long and 
Long (1992) conceptualised the concept as one where both individuals and groups 
strive to make a living in order to meet their consumption and other needs. In doing 
so, they cope with many uncertainties, as well as respond to opportunities available, 
according to their value systems. 
The most widely accepted definition encompasses this but introduces the concept of 
sustainability: 
"A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and 
access) and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable 
when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or 
enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood 
opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to 
other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short and long term." 
(Chambers and Conway, 1992: 7-8) 
This research uses the above definitions, and also considers the values of actors in 
designing their respective livelihoods strategies. 
1.3 From Institutional to Actor Perspectives 
1.3.1 Development of Micro finance 
The earlier welfare approach to subsidised microcredit was criticised on grounds of 
unsustainability and wrong targeting (Karmakar, 1999; Mahajan, 2005; Shylendra, 
2006). The current approach which would deliver microfinance through development 
of social capital in the form of women's SHGs is credited with both poverty reduction 
and empowerment impacts (Rankin, 2006) and was thus the most preferred 
programme of government, donors and NGOs, in pursuit of financially viable 
microfinance institutions (MFis) (Cohen and Gaile 1997; Dunford, 1998; Nissanke, 
2002; UNOPS, 2002; Fernando, 2006a). 
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Subsequent studies reveal that while microfinance departs from more conventional 
development practices, its emphasis on individual entrepreneurship, which can detract 
from redistributive approaches to poverty reduction, makes it less of a departure from 
past practices, than a reconfiguration in line with power and governance relations of a 
neoliberal nature (Brigg, 2006; Fernando, 2006a). This critique alleges that even 
rights-based thinking, as elaborated in the concept of 'entitlement' (Sen, 1999), has 
allowed neoliberal leaning institutions to ~eek microcredit-led empowerment in ways 
that contradict its stated goals by marginalising any consideration of class relations 
and other social mobilisation for the reduction of economic and social inequalities 
(Fernando, 2006a). 
The focus on the benign qualities of social capital and on the poor's own 
entrepreneurship has arguably allowed the state to further minimize its role and 
responsibilities for poverty reduction (Weber, 2006). Thus microcredit 
accommodates the language of multiple interest groups (feminists, human rights 
activists), through its claims to simultaneously address both economic and social 
inequalities. This can be exposed in politically committed analyses of the processes 
through which impact is claimed to occur, and how the subjectivity of poor women is 
framed in the very projects that would address gender inequalities (Fernando, 2006a). 
Microfinance is an increasingly integral part of development projects and only 
recently has its positioning as a major poverty reduction and empowerment tool, 
especially for women, been challenged by those who see it as an instrument to 
advance competing capitalist ends. This begs the question as to where Indian 
microfinance sector could be positioned, which requires an overview of the Indian 
microfinance models. 
1.3.2 Leading Indian Microfinance Models 
Rural credit has been prioritised in India since pre-independence, and promoted in the 
cooperative sector, later followed by formal banking. Banks have been required to 
_ ~xtend credit to 'priority' sectors since the 1960s, with full fledged 'development 
banking' emerging in the 1970s. Official efforts at poverty reduction prioritised the 
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poor with 'schemes' that aimed to increase their skills and assets through 'subsidised' 
credit which was only partly repaid, the rest being grant. 
Internationally, the 'traditional' (classical) model is considered to be one of 'credit 
provision' by formal institutions. In India, the banking sector has long targeted the 
poor, and 'subsidised' credit was the first model. Recent research has found the 
'banking sector outreach' of this model to be very low (Beck et al, 2005). By 
contrast, a 'new' model of 'commercial' credit has been provided to the poor at a high 
cost judged necessary for financially viable MFis to flourish and proliferate. Though 
the model seeks to meet a perceived gap, (i.e. in supply of credit), it most suits the 
'economically active poor' who can pay the costs, and thus bypasses the very poor. 
Indeed, the latter may opt not to use such credit, and thereby exclude themselves 
instead (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). The commercial model approaches the 
'economically active poor' via 'savings and credit groups' or 'self help groups'. Thus 
where the poor assure the MFI of repayments, they also ensure the viability of the 
latter. It is between these two extremes that the Indian model of SHG-bank linkage 
has evolved. It provides 'unsubsidised' credit from the Indian banking sector to 
women's SHGs, at a relatively low cost, usually at 11-12% per annum. The formal 
financial institutions (Regional Rural Banks in particular) thus treat poor women's 
groups as 'clients' rather than as 'recipients' of money. It thus goes beyond the 
subsidised/welfare approach of the 'subsidised credit' model and the 'neoliberal' 
approach of the 'commercial' model to one where poor women, by coming together 
as 'informal' SHGs, can hope to form new relationships with formal financial 
institutions. 
Microfinance supply through the three models is depicted in the following diagram: 
Figure 1-3: Spectrum of Credit Supply 
Subsidised Non-subsidised credit, bank rates Commercial microfinance 
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This research classifies and refers to these three microfinance models, which are 
subdivided into many models of delivery involving partnerships between government, 
banks, NGOs and donors, as described later. 
The proliferation of Indian microfinance has meant that measures of Indian 
microfinance have varied, depending upon the objective of the model and the 
agencies promoting it. A review of microfinance impact literature should reveal 
whether external expectations and/or critiques are applicable to Indian microfinance. 
1.3.3 Microfinance Impact Literature 
A review of impact assessments of microfinance, internationally and in India, reveals 
issues of both approach and methodology. Two basic approaches have dominated the 
study of impact: the financial systems approach and the impact assessment approach, 
also referred to as the institutional and welfarist approaches respectively. The first 
assumes that if the microfinance delivery institutions are sustainable, then impact 
must be positive, making further assessment unnecessary. Conversely, the welfarist 
approach questions the assumption of a direct and positive link between 
organisational sustainability and poverty impact, and recognises tensions between the 
two factors, thereby necessitating further study of poverty impact. 
Studies have emphasised the 'proving' motive for conducting impact evaluation, 
wherein the primary concern is to convince donors about efficient and effective use of 
funds. This is contrasted with the 'improving' motive, whereby the conduct of impact 
studies is aimed at enhancing learning, so that programme delivery may be improved 
to achieve better impact. Thus, literature has characteristically highlighted its most 
positive impacts, where contrary evidence would have questioned assumptions about 
self-reliance and drawn attention to other models of empowerment (e.g. social 
movements) that question dominant neoliberal economic and political ideologies 
(Rankin, 2006; Fernando, 2006b). The determination of success or failure is also 
influenced by interpretations of the complexity and confusion of practice which 
endorse prevailing policy, irrespective of other difficulties (Masse, 2006). 
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Recent microfinance impact discourse has been therefore dominated by neoliberal 
thought, without recognising other issues emerging from practice. The normative 
nature of such research is questioned by feminist critiques that the claims of the 
neoliberal model regarding poverty reduction are not yet empirically proven (Lingam, 
2006). This critique claims that the consolidation of neoliberal ideology has led to the 
marginalisation of radical socialist feminism in gender and development debates. The 
ideology only framed women as neglected resources, both as labour and as 
consumers. As another 'gender equality' agenda became necessary, especially to 
forge a compromise with feminists, its vocabulary was adopted when microfinance 
evolved. Microcredit was thought to provide a platform for different feminist 
ideologies to come together, and thus 'women's empowerment' became a periodic 
rallying point for feminists, governments, World Bank, commercial banks and NGOs 
(Kalpana, 2005; Weber, 2004). This critique of microfinance has further questioned 
the use of concepts such as empowerment, stakeholder participation and partnership 
to interpret problems and solutions in ways that serve sectional interests and need to 
be linked with larger debates on accountability and democracy (Bendell, 2005). 
Given the primacy of donor initiatives, impact assessments tend to be top-down, using 
a methodology developed and approved in line with dominant donor interests (Dale, 
1998). Methodological challenges include variability of approaches, issues and 
indicators, and a lack of comparability across different studies (Sebstad and Chen, 
1996; Cheston and Reed, 1999; Cheston et al, 2001 ). Participatory methodologies 
have gained credibility, as ifthese might also empower (Rubin, 1995; Mayoux, 1997; 
Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Edwards, 1998; Blankenberg, 1998; Akhtar, 2003). 
However, even where participatory approaches have been adopted, they can still 
conceal certain contradictions and also be used to promote donor-dominated 
perspectives. Mosse (2005) considers that these models are then presented and 
communicated in a way that secures development projects/ programmes/ strategies 
which confirm scenarios already projected by policy models beforehand. 
Political economists have argued that the impetus for the dominant microcredit policy 
is strategically ·oriented to facilitate financial sector liberalisation and the "social 
disciplining of women is aimed at commanding compliance for neoliberal 
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restructuring" (Weber, 2004: 356). Anthropologists find that globalisation has 
imbued capital with the properties of 'financial derivative' by which it carries an 
'abstract risk' rather than one 'grounded' in production based labour, and thus allows 
it to be autonomous from real socio-economic structural relations (LiPuma and Lee, 
2005). Such literature maintains that spontaneous diffusion of industrial development 
to backward economies is limited by the unwillingness of leading capitalist 
economies to allow outsiders any claim upon their wealth. This poses a formidable 
barrier to authentic development strategies being formulated under a neoliberal 
context (Patnaik, 2006). 
At first, the notions of self-determinacy, autonomy and people's power appear as a 
counter ideal to neoliberalism, but this is challenged by Foucault (199la; 199lb) in 
his conceptualisation of 'govermentality' and 'normalisation' wherein self-regulation, 
becomes another instrument of control as well. 
Thus, impact studies address aspects of microfinance which may not necessarily 
concern the poor themselves. Such 'planned' knowledge is mostly donor-driven and 
economically evaluative, and often produced by a top-down, formally structured, pre-
determined research process which draws connections between large-scale inputs 
into microfinance initiatives set against outputs resulting from those initiatives. The 
intervening work of microfinance-in-action is not always treated as an independent or 
relevant variable for evaluation purposes, yet it intermediates both inputs and outputs. 
In this way, 'planned knowledge' can leave questions of implementation and 
management unasked and unanswered, unless there is more knowledge of actual 
microfinance-in-action (Ritchie, 2006). 
This study seeks to shift the present balance of knowledge about microfinance 
towards more knowledge of the particular development issues emerging right now, 
which could have further bearing upon how else microfinance might develop in the 
future. It highlights the need to identify other/additional variables, or else change the 
balance between them, in order to evolve existing knowledge. Emergent knowledge 
ne-eds to capture these 'other' variables better, in a 'live'"(and'therefore still changing) 
situation, through well chosen/executed methods from which fresh 'findings' should 
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result, which the actual actors concerned would confirm, using language they find 
meaningful for those in their life situation. This study will particularly emphasize the 
roles of local context, livelihood, and the gendered meaning and use of money as 
necessary variables for explaining actual microfinance-in-action, and the research 
would elicit the actors own definition of their situation, which may then redefine the 
questions for further research. 
1.4 Exploring Meanings of Money 
The discourse and meanings of development have changed over time, mirroring 
changing economic and social capacities, priorities and choices. These are ultimately 
related to the changing relations of power and hegemony (Pieterse, 2001 ). 
"Hegemony" implies a domination that derives its legitimacy from shared values and 
meanings (Friedman, 1992). Each development theory can be read as promoting or 
challenging hegemony, as a theory may not only explain, but also be used for agenda 
setting, mobilising and coalition building (Pieterse, 2001). The prevalent theories 
reflect currently available social science perspectives, thus highlighting the 
importance of culturally mediated meanings (Friedman, 1992; Pieterse, 2001 ). 
Earlier in the 1990s, a leading paradigm in development studies and practice credited 
microfinance with poverty reduction and empowerment impacts. However, the 
financial systems thinking which was then applied across microfinance programmes 
emphasised modes of delivery that did not necessarily fit into the livelihoods contexts 
and preferences of the poor in remote and poor regions, although this divergence was 
not then widely acknowledged (Premchander, 2004). The issue of divergence 
between external perspectives (suppliers of microfinance) and local perspectives 
(users of microfinance) was important for framing further research questions. This 
meant being aware of 'multiple realities', meaning that various stakeholders may have 
diverse and incompatible worldviews (Long and Long, 1992). The research therefore 
accords importance to agency, i.e. the belief that actors have the capacity to effect 
social change (Pieterse, 2001). 
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The research approach emphasises gender and gender relations. It recognises that 
women-headed households may place an additional obligation on women which is at 
once physical, material and psychological. Women's agency, i.e. what they may or 
may riot do, can be severely restricted by their gendered identity, and their formal 
entitlements, e.g. property rights (Agarwal, 1994). Women may have unequal access 
to information and limited control over their own bodies (Friedman, 1992). Gender 
roles are thus deeply embedded. Values, roles and capacities are all influenced by 
social and institutional structures (Jackson, 1996; 1998), and women and men can 
negotiate social and institutional structures 'in a different voice' (Gilligan, 1993; 
Wilber, 2000). 
At first sight, interventions in matters of credit and enterprise need not call for raising 
consciousness. However, an attempt to include the marginalised stakeholders of 
development, i.e. poor women, into other economic and political spheres of their lives 
also implies empowering these actors. Friedman adopts a feminist agenda regarding 
empowerment, and this research acknowledges an empowerment agenda for the poor, 
and women in particular. 
Post structuralist feminism would challenge the notion of "fixed meanmg, unified 
subjectivity and centred theories of power" to allow for "previously marginalised 
narratives, and new interpretations, meanings and values" (Weedon, 1999: 4). It 
seeks to move away from analysing in 'categories' to representing the multiplicity and 
diversity of individuals (Linstead and Thomas, 2002). In keeping with these 
approaches, this research therefore explores microfinance impact from the 
perspectives of different women, through a deeper understanding of the meanings that 
money holds for them. Discourse analysis likewise treats development as a story, a 
narrative, and a text (Pieterse, 200 1) and can be used to ground the theory of 
microfinance. It highlights major paradigm shifts in the available understanding of 
microfinance. Deconstructing existing paradigms has both advantages and 
disadvantages, as indicated thus: 
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"While a paradigm shift implies a revolution in relation to past work it means 
routinisation in relation to future work. It would fix a practice of 'normal' 
development. In view of the diversity and flux of the development field such 
routinisation may precisely not be what is desirable. In other words, the urge 
towards paradigm renewal may itself be inappropriate" (Pieterse, 2001: 93 ). 
This research challenges the dominant paradigm but does not propose another in its 
place. Instead, it recognises the multiplicity and complexities of different 
worldviews. The choices that development workers, NGOs, governments, donors, 
and indeed researchers make are derived from, and in turn influence, their own values 
and orientations. 
1.4.1 Meanings of Money 
It is argued that money is viewed differently by the disciplines of anthropology, 
economics, sociology, and organisational management. These differences evolve 
around what is considered money, the relation between economy and society, the 
different uses of money, and meanings assigned to it (Baker and Jimerson, 1992). 
Another review of money distinguishes and analyses individual, institutional and 
social factors which confer different meanings upon money (Stookey, 2003). In terms 
of what money is, anthropologists focus on primitive forms of monies in non-
monetised economies. Economists, however, limit money to a medium of exchange, 
means of payment, a store of value, a unit of account and a standard for deferred 
payment (Dalton, 1967; Baker and Jimerson, 1992; Dos Anjos 1999; Gilbert, 2005). 
Other differences arise in relation to economy and society. Economists may 
conceptually separate economy and society and then treat economy as an independent 
autonomous sphere, whereby money supply can be used as a lever (Baker and 
Jimerson, 1992). Sociologists question this separation, treating the market as a social 
institution, and the economy as subordinate to society, as if economic action was 
inherently embedded within given social structures. Keister (2002) elaborates how 
classical sociologists (Marx, Simmel and Weber) considered financial markets, 
money and banking, but gave this less attention until Stinchcombe (1983) and 
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Granovetter (1985; 1995) revived this tradition, after which the study of money and 
financial markets has become more important. 
Sociologists typically emphasise that money has a social meaning. It is a "medium of 
exchange that has value because members of a society agree that it has value" 
(Keister, 2002: 40) while for Giddens the trust invested in money accounts for its 
social circulation (Zelzer, 1994). Simmel (190711978) maintained that the historical 
development of replacing the barter system by money economies was due to the shift 
of community from personal to impersonal relationships. Marx not only conceived 
money as impersonal, but emphasised its role in creating and maintaining such 
alienation, while Weber (192211978) recognised the use of money as power. Weber 
considered individual behaviour to be social insofar as "its subjective meaning [took] 
account of the behavior of others" (Swedberg, 1998: 5). Swedberg amplified Weber's 
term 'social economics' and developed terms like 'Sozialoekonomik' (Social 
Economics) and 'Wirtschaftssoziologie' (Economic Sociology) which have different 
meanings within current 'network theory' research. 
While Ingham (1996; 1998) traced the origins of this debate, network theorists such as 
Granovetter (1995) emphasized how economic relationships are embedded within a 
wider framework of social meanings and social relationships. Keister (2002) argued 
that in situations of high uncertainty, firms prefer to trade with known partners even at 
high costs, and that bankers rely on advice of those with whom prior ties of advice 
and support exist. Baker and Faulkner (2001) applied network theory to understand 
financial transactions. Considerable literature exists on how non-market relations 
underlie financial transactions, and how social relations of firms determine their 
economic character, and how the groups, in turn, shape firm performance and other 
outcomes (Keister, 2002; Biggart and Delbridge, 2004). 
Baker and Jimerson (1992) therefore distinguish structural and cultural perspectives 
of money, wherein the former accords priority to patterns of roles and relationships, 
while the latter focuses on cognitive classifications and evocative meanings associated 
with money. The cultural perspective refers to the criticism of modern money by 
Coleman, Giddens, Simmel and others who claim that it 'depersonalises' transactions 
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and 'disembeds' relationships and thus leads to 'objectified' social relation of 
production and further to oppression. By contrast, the structural perspective considers 
money to be a 'tracer' of social relationships and argues that "modern money and its 
uses are determined by the social structure ofthe market economy" (Ibid: 684). 
In analysing the role and functions of money in society, other theorists have debated 
the meanings of money. In neo-classical economics, money has the quality of 
homogeneity, quantifiability and neutrality. Thus "Money just "is", what varies is 
individual attitudes about money.... The naturalisation of money empties it of 
meaning" (Stookey, 2003: 2). 
The functionalist or the individual-difference perspective would define money by the 
function that it performs. In this perspective, the psychological treatment of money 
refers to money as income from employment, emotions about money, how meanings 
about money develop, and how money is related to self-concept and identity. Certain 
multi-attribute measures of money have been developed, e.g. the money-ethics scale, 
the money belief and behaviour scale, and the money importance scale (Mitchell and 
Mickell, 1999). 
The institutional approach to money takes into account the possibility of a conflict 
between social and private goals. It indicates that interactive processes between 
individual practices and institutional restrictions create norms and habits, which in 
turn dictate the organisation and forms of ·diverse financial instruments, thus 
emphasising the role of cultural dimensions (Dos Anjos, 1999). 
De Goede (2005) reveals how deeply - though not always recognisably - 'gendered' 
the concept of money originally was. Patriarchal society did not consider women 
'full', let alone economic citizens for some considerable time: they were amongst the 
ranks of those who were originally formally excluded, or assigned to the informal 
finance sector alone. Only in that sector were they judged controllable and/or 
trustable in matters of (pin) money and credit for example. By assuming finance a 
neutral science, this original gender bias ,has-effectively been ignored. The steadfast 
(manly) virtue of financial practice was historically contrasted to the wily (female) 
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character of fortune and hence risk. "Credit, from the Latin credere, signifies belief, 
faith, and trust", while the narrative of'the gentleman' was based on 'values ofhonour, 
integrity, courtesy and so on' (Ibid: 6). A Foucault led approach to 'the genealogy of 
finance' therefore suggests that 'initiation and education' (i.e. 'socialization') into the 
modes of financial rectitude was important from the start: finance was a form of 
'power relation' in this sense, and that relation has been contested for some time. 
Early modem credit thus had a particularly 'violent history' which is 'inextricably 
bound up with the violent histories of European state formation, colonial conquest, 
and slave trading' (Ibid: 21 ). Credit was represented 'as an inconstant, often a self-
willed but persuadable woman' (Ibid: 26) in the English classics, especially by Defoe, 
whose 'Lady Credit' 'displays a whole range of potentially unpleasant feminized 
characteristics'. 'Financial man' must master credit, and hence also 'woman', in this 
sense. 'Lady Credit requires first and foremost a mastering and submitting ofthe self' 
(Ibid: 35) in the manner of books and records 'of account' which can be duly 
scrutinized. However, 'the mastery of Lady Credit is never complete and financial 
man is never safe from her temptations and the internal desires and weaknesses she 
generates in him' (Ibid: 45) especially in times of crisis. 
This could have some bearing upon the possible deep-rooted gender bias of 
microfinance models. The subsidised and commercial models both have problems 
with giving independent agency to poor women themselves, while only the emerging 
model of unsubsidised bank credit consider them as 'customers' in their own right, 
and even here such status is only bestowed upon them where they exhibit 'joint 
liability'. Empirical impacts studies are also criticised, not only for their 
methodologies, but also for their normative bias towards legitimising the neoliberal 
model, which obscures the divergences that appear between grassroots realities and 
prevailing policy. 
Contemporary sociologists likewise seek to integrate the structural and cultural 
perspectives, by showing how, both at the micro (Zelizer, 1989) and the macro level 
(Baker, 1987), the distribution of power (within the family and among corporate 
actors) influences the use of money. Zelizer (1993, 1994, 1998) assigns multiple 
meanings to money, depending on the social context, and how it is used. She cites 
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Smelser in providing answers to the question of how new forms of money emerge, 
and specifically develops his concept of 'multiple monies' including 'charity monies', 
'death monies', and how differences occur between those who give and receive 
charity. Zelizer (2000) later explores meanings of money in intimate relations, while 
Carruthers and Espeland (1998) also use micro level work to show that the meaning 
of money is defined both by its source and use. The multiplicity of meanings of 
money are also highlighted by Guerin (2006). 
These multiple meanings again correlate to the social, cultural and structural 
embeddedness of the meaning of money, which is the perspective developed through 
this research. 
1.4.2 Social Meaning of Money 
Much remains to be learnt about salient features of money and its use, in terms of its 
cultural, political, and social context and content (Weenerlind, 2001). Pixley (1999) 
argued that although explanations of trust are well elaborated and linked to risk, they 
are taken for granted in finance organisations, as in Keynesian links of money with 
future uncertainty, which needs to be elaborated through a sociology of emotions, 
risk, confidence, fear, and trust thereby necessitating interdisciplinary studies of 
money. Gilbert (2005) points to a gap regarding how people use money, and what 
meanings money conveys when it circulates, and recommends "case studies to take 
into account of the social and cultural meanings in specific contexts and through 
distinct networks of social relations" (Ibid: 366). 
This research therefore seeks to develop a better understanding of money in a given 
economic-ecological, socio-cultural and institutional context. It takes a social and 
structural perspective by viewing government, banks, NGOs and SHGs as actor 
groups who have separate values, interests and behaviour relating to money. It 
considers values and culture as influencing how SHGs, as financial organisations, 
manage money. It seeks to integrate structural and cultural perspectives by viewing 
money both l).S)l cause _and an ~ffect. It ex~mines th_e n>le and efficacy of money as a 
means of poverty alleviation, and emphasises that it is not just economic but social 
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and structural aspects that define the use and meaning of money for any individual, 
household or group of people in a given context. 
By using an actor-oriented approach, and treating the state, NGOs, banks and SHGs 
as actor groups, the research specifically endorses the sociological perspective of 
financial markets. It acknowledges each of these groups to be important actors in the 
market, along with donors and moneylenders. It brings out several factors of power 
and control over decisions relating to sanction, use and repayment of loans conducted 
on the basis of the social relationships formed between the money-provider (banks, 
government), mediator (NGOs) and user (SHGs) organisations. It sees not only the 
"stable exchange ties among buyers and sellers of financial resources" (Keister, 2002: 
40), but also explores the breakdown of these relations. It shows that inappropriate 
social relations will not provide the foundation for stable finance, and therefore leads 
to a form of financial behaviour (non repayments of loans) that undermines 
relationships. The research discloses more about when, whether, and on what terms 
the money is borrowed, and also how it is spent. It also considers whether the money 
is returned, which is related to who is the source of money, and what is the 
relationship with that source. It develops the concept of multiple monies in the 
context of rural credit for the poor, and a combination of charity and credit (with 
subsidised credit), but goes one step further by going beyond the use of money to the 
relationship with the lenders, to differentiate between credit alone and a credit/charity 
combination. This supports both the phenomenon of 'earmarking' of funds and of 
'inventing' currencies, and extends Zelizer's (1989) concepts by showing how people 
label different sources of money and relate differently to them. It also takes the 
perspectives of different actor groups (women, banks, NGOs, government) into 
account and therefore explains how they differentiate the external and local meaning 
of money. 
In so doing, it follows three important steps for critical management research 
(Aivesson and Deetz, 2000). It started with a critical approach, in a context where 
discourse still privileged dominant perspectives. Other perspectives were then 
explored with interpretive work focussing primarily on women and with the empirical 
exploration of meanings from actor perspectives. The third step was to critique Indian 
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microfinance models along the proposed spectrum of 'traditional', 'emerging' and 
'new' models without using normative labels such as subsidised, unsubsidised and 
commercial microfinance. This research goes beyond the 'outputs' and 'outcomes' of 
microfinance and explores what money means to actors 'in situ', how they opt to use 
money, and how the outcomes are then accounted for. It questions any approach to 
microfinance impact which only highlights whether the poor 'have been reached' or 
'have been left out' as if they do not have any choice. By contrast, it recognises 
women's agency, and also analyses how they· continuously differentiate existing 
models of delivery, evaluate them according to their social relationships, make 
specific choices, and thus adapt the money available. Thus, the thesis considers 
problems of local, national and global relevance, and does this by focussing on issues 
of values and power, so to use social science for transformative purposes (Fiyvbjerg, 
2004). 
1.5 Individual Chapter Synopses 
Chapter 2 provides a macro perspective of microfinance and the rationale for 
focussing on the selected research issues. The evolution of microfinance is traced 
historically to reveal the engagement of different players including government, 
NGOs, bankers and donors, and the differing motivations they each had for 
partnerships, resulting in a wide spectrum of models by which microfinance services 
are delivered. It analyses impact approaches and finds a predominance of supply side 
and economic frameworks, which do not accommodate the diverse livelihood 
contexts in which microfinance actors and recipients are themselves situated. It 
elaborates on the first phase of extensive field research, including evidence about 
divergent perspectives about use of money. It reveals limited understanding about 
those women's SHGs which have been introduced as the forums to carry the task of 
taking and repaying the loans. The chapter thus establishes the three issues to be 
explored in the thesis and highlights the need to understand meanings that women 
themselves attach to money, and therefore, for working with actor-oriented 
perspectives. 
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Chapter 3 examines the concept of money as seen by anthropologists, economists and 
sociologists. Different perspectives of money are analysed, in terms of what 
constitutes money, how money is used and how actors create and assign multiple 
meanings to it. It elaborates the identification of multiple perspectives and 
livelihoods frameworks that came about from personal engagement with these in the 
course of development research and action. An orientation towards gender and 
development issues and principles informed the applications of these frameworks. 
The research is based upon a critical theory and an interpretive and reflexive 
approach, applied through participatory methods with particular attention to ethical 
implications of such engagement of external with local actors. The rationale for the 
choice of the region, NGO, research participants and methods are elaborated, along 
with a discussion of the challenges faced. 
Chapter 4, 5, and 6 contain the main findings, which are supplemented with findings 
from the data sets from Sampark and in phase-1 research done in Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh and Orissa. Chapter 4 elaborates the specific livelihoods context in which the 
research participants live, in terms of ecological and economic, institutional and 
socio-cultural contexts. It analyses the potential/constraints in the use/impact of 
microfinance on the livelihoods of people in a specific regional context. 
Chapter 5 introduces the socio-economic profile and asset base of the case study 
participants. It analyses the use of money by women, and highlights that women 
differentiate between sources of money, and how this is linked to the terms on which 
money is offered and influences how women return these loans. Women's own 
regard for risk influences their demand and utilisation of money as a resource. The 
analysis outlines the factors influencing women's strategies for utilisation and 
repayment of loans. The chapter highlights the importance of social relations as a 
foundation for determining the strength and nature of financial relations and ofthe use 
and impact of microfinance, and differentiates how these vary across different models 
of microfinance delivery. 
Chapter 6 analyses and interprets the findings about how women's groups use money, 
and the implications of borrowing from different sources. The use of own savings is 
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analysed in depth. It interprets money management strategies of self-help groups of 
women. It identifies group processes of leadership and trust as factors that lay the 
foundation of long-term relationships among the women and with other organisations 
such as banks, NGOs and government. The analysis shows how social capital can 
help augment (or deplete) financial and physical capital, and how the existence or lack 
of the possibility of long term relationships influences the way financial relations are 
established between women's SHGs and the agencies supplying microfinance. 
Chapter 7 synthesises the lessons from the case studies into key findings, and places 
them in the context of contemporary research. The meanings reflected in actor 
strategies have epistemological interpretations in terms of the use of language in the 
debates on microfinance practice and impact. The unique situation of Indian 
microfinance delivery models in presenting a countervailing force to the extreme 
neoliberal model is highlighted. The chapter also reflects on the contents of the 
research, provides some recommendations, and analyses the implications of this 
research on impact assessment frameworks and methodologies. The thesis is rounded 
offwith a critical reflection on the process ofthe research. 
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Poverty, especially in rural India is widespread, and women bear the brunt of it. 
Many rural women are self-employed in very small-scale activities, but their 
contribution is often unrecorded, with few statistics (MHHDC, 2002). Further, their 
income cannot lift them out of poverty, as they lack money, land and property (Ibid). 
Poor women lack work opportunities, are under-employed with casual work, have 
limited skills and education, feel undervalued, and lack access to better technologies, 
tools and productive assets including credit and other services which could improve 
their productivity and income (Berger, 1989; Bhatt et a!, 1988; Barry, 1995; Bhatt, 
2006). 
Officially there is a multi-pronged approach to poverty reduction, ranging from policy 
support to agriculture and industry, through to enterprise promotion. High rural 
indebtedness has long concerned the Indian government, and measures have been 
taken to provide institutional credit (RBI, 1954) to households below the poverty line. 
This chapter profiles the poverty reduction measures, provides a short history of the 
micro credit movement, and summarises the different partnership models employed, 
mostly through the group lending method. Debates about these are set against the 
different behaviours and perspectives observed during the first phase of field research. 
These are elaborated to form the key research questions. 
2.1. Past Poverty Reduction Interventions 
The estimates of people below the poverty line have ranged from 34.7% during the 
period 1990-2002 (UNDP, 2004), and 35% in 1993-94 (McGuire et al, 1998), to 26% 
showing that over 260 million live below the poverty line in 1999-2000 (Planning 
Commission, 2001 ). Poverty has concerned social workers, government and banks, 
and while their responses differ, there are now institutional partnerships unique to 
India. 
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2.1.1. NGOs in Development: The Road to Microfinance 
The foundations were set during pre-independence among social reform movements, 
which were largely concerned with educational and cultural matters, as well as 
'women's upliftment', albeit with limited focus on poverty per se. Later, a social 
welfare approach dominanted, encompassing education, relief and employment, while 
the Gandhian approach combined social reform with village development. Inspired 
by Freire (1970), the 1970s viewed poverty as a structural phenomenon to be tackled 
through active mobilisation of the poor (Riddell and Robinson, 1995). From the mid-
1980s, NGOs emphasised participation of the poor in integrated development 
programmes (Premchander, 1999) and development agencies formally recognised the 
importance of socio-cultural factors (Kottak, 1985). Now there is a convergence of 
approaches, with more NGOs seeking to combine organisational work among the 
poor with economic improvement (Riddell and Robinson, 1995). 
With a focus on support for income generating activities and enterprise start-ups since 
the early 1970s, women were targeted not only as the poorest and most vulnerable 
segment, but were also considered critical to ensuring household welfare. Women 
researchers like Karl, Jain and Hoskin challenged the assumption in development 
programmes that increased men's incomes translate into increased incomes for 
households (Karl, 1997). They argued that the contrary holds true: that an increase in 
women's income contributes directly to a family's food and basic needs, as compared 
to men's income, which is spent on personal consumption. Research further suggested 
that women's employment also led to reduced fertility rates, and therefore, better 
population control (Mukhopadhyay and Savithri, 1998). Such income generating 
activities were often NGO-managed. By the 1980s, with a lack of other employment 
opportunities for women, support for self-employment and women's enterprise 
became a viable option for realising their economic potential (Kraus-Harper, 1998). 
Enterprise start-up programmes, entrepreneurship development programmes (EDPs), 
and microfinance programmes all increasingly targeted women clients. However, 
certain NGOs lacked expertise in business promotion, and their programmes became 
expensive (Harper and Finnegan 1998; Otero, 1999). Thus, even as there was a shift 
from provision of 'welfare' services (e.g. health, education) to a more 'structural' 
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approach, the ideal of economic upliftment with women as the primary clients of 
projects was common to different approaches (World Bank, 2001). Development 
programmes in the 1980s were increasingly group based, and savmgs were 
encouraged as a way of providing grants of equal amounts (matching grants). Later 
programmes providing matching grants were tapered down and merged with 
microcredit programmes. With the success of microfinance and pressure to cover 
their costs, NGOs took to 'minimalist' microfinance, which only provided financial 
services (Quinones, 2000; Premchander, 2003a). These shifts are depicted in 
Figure 2-1. 
Figure 2-1: Changing Focus of Donors and NGOs 
Income Generating Enterprises 
Group-based Financing: Matching grants 
Minimalist Microfinance 
The emphasis on financially sustainable microfinance institutions increased 
significantly by the mid 1990s (Otero and Rhyne, 1994 ). 
The prevailing Indian microfinance systems are a mix of minimalist, 'credit plus' 
(including BDS or other capacity building services), and integrated approaches. 
Various market-oriented, partially and fully subsidised credit products were delivered 
through a range of organisations from professional, private, non government and 
formal banking institutions. Most NGO/MFis were fully or partially grant-based, 
with few examples of poverty focussed microfinance organisations capable of 
sustaining themselves without substantial donor support (Dunford, 1998; Hulme and 
Mosley, 1996; Fernandez, 2005). 
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2.1.2. Government Attention to Rural Credit 
Official planning in India began in 1938, and industrial policies with socialist leanings 
accorded priority status to agriculture, which supports over 60% of the Indian 
population. The economic reforms introduced in 1984 were further strengthened in 
1991 due to intervention by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and 
have been criticised for increasing the numbers falling below the poverty line 
(DANIDA, 2004). 
2.1.3. Banks and Poverty Lending 
Policy framers in pre-independence India considered that market imperfections led to 
local monopolies whereby moneylenders charged exorbitant interest rates. The first 
estimate of rural debt in India made by Mclagan in 1911 placed rural debt at Rs. 300 
crores ($66.6 million). The Central Banking Enquiry Committee estimated rural debt 
in 1931 to be Rs. 900 crores ($200 million), and the All India Rural Credit Survey 
calculated a debt level of Rs. 315.8 ($7 .01) per family in rural areas, yielding an 
estimate of Rs. 1800 crores ($400 million) in 1950-51. Over 90% of the credit was 
from informal sources, and over 70% from landlords/moneylenders and traders (RBI, 
1954). The allegedly exorbitant rates led to the loss of land of small cultivators, 
increasing their debt and overall poverty (Thorat, 2005). The situation deteriorated for 
peasants as recurrent natural disasters and low productivity compounded the problems 
of the existing exploitative land revenue system (Karmakar, 1999). Land 
improvement loans were introduced in the late nineteenth century. 
The structure of institutional finance for the poor is depicted in Figure 2-2. The 
historical development of credit was based on the concept of 'development banking', 
whereby credit is an instrument for mitigating poverty and promoting agricultural and 
rural development. Government enabled formation of cooperative credit societies in 
the early twentieth century, with the aim of building an institutional finance system 
for agriculture and of relieving farmers from indebtedness to moneylenders 
(Karmakar, 1999). Later long term credit for reclaiming agricultural lands was 
introduced through cooperatives and the cooperative credit system was linked to the 
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central banking system. However, local elites could use their position to solidify their 
power and control over the poor. (Baviskar and Attwood, 1995; Woolcock, 1999). 
When cooperatives failed to make inroads into informal credit, the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) introduced long-term support for agricultural credit and also revamped 
the structure to increase state support to cooperatives. 
Alongside these cooperative developments, government also influenced commercial 
and other banks to extend credit to priority sectors (agriculture, small and micro-
enterprises). The State Bank of India and its eight subsidiaries opened 415 rural 
branches between 1959 and 1964. On the nationalisation of 14 banks in 1969, the 
banking sector became more involved in providing rural credit through 'social 
control' (Satyamurti and Haokip, 2002) which had three main strategies: promotion of 
institutional expansion, direct lending to disadvantaged borrowers and priority 
sectors, and subsidised interest rates. 
By the 1970s, weak financial management of cooperatives was recognised and a new 
experiment to meet rural credit needs was conducted through Regional Rural Banks 
(RRBs). By 1982, the Agricultural Refinance division of the Reserve Bank was 
constituted as a separate entity - an apex bank - the National Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (NABARD). 
In the 1980s poverty alleviation programmes were implemented in tandem with 
district level credit plans drawn up by banks and coordinated by NABARD. By 1990, 
Service Area Approach (SAA) was· introduced whereby RBI required banks to 
estimate and meet the credit needs of defined 'Service Areas' - groups of 20-25 
villages. In this way, a large and expanded structure of financial services through 
cooperatives, RRBs and commercial banks at local level and support systems at 
district, state and national levels sought to meet rural credit needs. The banking 
structure in 2001, which prevailed at the time of this research, appeared thus: 
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Figure 2-2: Banking Structure 
Resemre Bank of India (1934) 
Development Financial In•tltutions 
State Levellndustr1al Flnaodog Organisations 
(28) Purposes: 
Agriculture, land develop~ent, hQusing, business and oth'crs 
This gave a total of 41 development finance institutions, and a total of 187,230 branch 
banks. The total number of commercial bank branches was 67,929 in March 2001, of 
which 74% were metropolitan and urban, and the rest rural. Cooperative banks had 
105,000 branches, including 92,628 primary agricultural credit societies and 728 REI-
approved non-banking · financial companies (NBFCs). There were 191 RRBs, 
sponsored by 29 commercial banks, in 484 districts with 14,300 branches. By 2001, 
49 commercial banks extended credit through SHGs (Seibel and Dave, 2002; 
Malhotra, 2002; RBI, 2003). Apart from NABARD and SIDBI, two housing 
corporations and several private banks considered financing through SHGs. 
Government initiatives in microcredit were part of the Integrated Rural Development 
Programme (IRDP) of the Ministry of Rural Development of the GOI. IRDP was 
launched in October 1980 and involved skill training and subsidised credit support for 
the poor, which frequently never reached them (MHHDC, 2002). IRDP experienced 
problems of grant disbursal, and was plagued by low rates of repayment and poor 
quality of assets (SOC, 1997). 
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Government and banking logic for poverty lending thus conflicted. In addition, the 
government had a targeting approach; the poor were administratively targeted through 
a system which classified the poor by issue of cards as certification of their being 
below the poverty line. Corruption meant that some never obtained, and others 
bought them instead. In addition, there were loan me/as; loan disbursement events 
that were politically motivated, wherein loans were given for agricultural and other 
purposes without due appraisal. This led bankers to believe that the poor were high 
credit risks (Harper, 1998; Satyamurti and Haokip, 2002; Premchander, 2003a). 
Although banks were expected to extend 40% of their credit to the priority sector, 
during the first half of 1990s they reached a maximum of 35% (Sinha, 2001 ). 
In the early 1990s, the experiences in subsidised credit to rural areas were not positive 
and, such credit was seen as one of the major reasons for the non-viability of RRBs. 
In the 1990s, the government sought to reform state-owned banks and many donors 
(e.g. GTZ, IFAD, USAID, SDC) invested money in the turnaround of the RRBs, 
which were seen as instrumental in providing rural credit (Zeller, 2003a; Srinivasan, 
2004). 
Acknowledging the success of SHGs in channelling benefits to women, government 
then merged all major economic programmes into a single self~employment 
programme in 1991. This programme, the Swarnajayanthi Gram Swarozgar Yojana 
(SGSY), was delivered through SHGs, at least half of which would be women's 
SHGs (NABARD, 1999). The programme sought to cover 30% of all poor rural 
families in the five years following the reforms. 
2.2. Partnership Models 
The gradual acceptance of micro finance led to the emergence of partnerships between 
donors, government, banks and NGOs. The resulting models, based on inter-
institutional partnerships, are characterised as 'relationship' banking or linkage 
banking compared with the Bangladesh model of 'parallel banking' (Seibel, 2000; 
Banerjee, 2002; Chavan and Ramkumar, 2002). 
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2.2.1. A Typology of Credit Programmes 
One classification is according to whether the organisations are national or 
international, whether multi-purpose or minimalist, and the extent of their linkages 
with external donors (Christen et a! , 1994). Another is based on whether the 
institutions are in the formal or informal sector (Robinson, 2001 ). The typology of 
credit programmes1 developed here for comparing the models of microfinance in 
India, alludes to the different types of emerging partnerships as depicted in 
Figure 2-3: 
Figure 2-3: Characteristics oflndian Microfinance Models 
Institutional Form 
Bank NGO MFI 
Role Played 
Facilitator 
Nature of Partnership: 
Combination of form of institution and role played 
The main differences occur in: 
• The form, or constitution, of the institution, which defines its ownership, 
management and services offered; 
• The nature of delivery, i.e. , ' provider' of microfinance; or another organisation 
is used as an intermediary for promoting SHGs and building their capacities, 
SHPI (SelfHelp Promoting Institution), or ' facilitator ' ; and 
• The partnership of different types of organisations, and the roles and 
responsibilities of each. 
An application of the three-dimensional typology suggested above is presented in 
Table 2-1. 
1 This is inspired by a typology outlined by Berger ( 1989), which considered institutional 
forms but did not consider the nature of partnership between the different types of 
organisations. 
57 
Chapter 2: Poverty in India and Role ofMF 
nstitutional Bank 
Form 
provider 
Bank as SHPI 
(Figure 2-5) 
Bank as provider 
taNGO 
NGO as provider 
to SHG 
2.2.2. Bank Linkage Model 
Cooperatives MFI 
MFis as 
providers, to 
individuals of 
SHGs, so may 
also be SHPis 
(Figure 2-8 
and 2-9) 
The mainstream model involves an SHG of 15-20 women, formed for mutual benefit, 
and able to access basic financial services. Members begin by saving small amounts 
of money, which are pooled, and then collective savings are converted into credit so 
that women can borrow from within the group at an agreed interest rate. 
After the SHGs are nurtured and trained by the NGO, the local RRB or lead bank can 
lend directly to these informal groups. As a result SHGs are seen as grassroots 
structures to be promoted as channels for lending by the formal banking system. 
Due to the success of a pilot project launched in 1992 by NABARD and NGOs, the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) formally established the SHG-Bank linkage program in 
1996 as a mainstream lending activity of the banks under priority sector lending. 
Under its scheme, NABARD provides refinancing to commercial banks at an interest 
rate of 8.5%. The banks, in turn, lend to SHGs at a rate of 11% to 12%. The SHGs 
are free to set their own interest rate when they lend to individual members; they 
usually set it around 24-36%. 
In the most common model of SHG-bank linkage, depicted in Figure 2-4, the bank 
provides the finance directly to the groups, the facilitator works in the community to 
promote and train, and the NGO is the facilitator, also known as the SHPI. In 2003, 
this model accounted for 72% ofthe SHG-bank linkages (NABARD, 2003) . 
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Figure 2-4: SHG-Bank Linkage Model (NGO as 'Facilitator') 
~-B_;_~-~--~----------~•:L __ S~H~G-s--~----------~•:L __ w_o_m_e_n~ 
t 
Variations in this model include an RRB, or a Farmers' Club in the local area, or a 
local rural volunteer as the SHPI (Figure 2-5). Twenty percent of the SHG bank 
linkages in 2003 were made this way. 
Bank 
Figure 2-5: SHG-Bank Linkage through RRB 
SHGs 
Facilitator-
RIW 
Farmer's Olub " 
Rural Volunteer, 
Women 
Another type of partnership involved NABARD/Banks providing funds to NGOs who 
act as intermediaries for lending to groups (Figure 2-6). In 2003 , funding provided 
through NGOs reached 8%. 
Figure 2-6: SHG-Bank Linkage through NGO 
L--8-a-nk--~~ •I~ __ N_G_o __ ~i ·~~--S-H_G_s~~--~·~1 -W--om_e_n~ 
In addition to funds and refinance provided through the banking sector, NABARD 
also provided funds to second-tier institutions to further lend to other NGOs, e.g. 
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Friends of Women's World Banking (FWWB) (Banerjee, 2002). NABARD provided 
funds to groups or federations of women that function as SHPis and MFis e.g. 
federations ofDHAN, Madurai (Puhazhendhi and Satyasai, 2000). 
In the bank linkage model, the facilitating NGO plays the vital role of strengthening 
the groups' institutional capacities, with the intention of developing their capabilities 
to manage resources, including credit, and offering opportunities to acquire new 
productive skills. It also helps to link SHGs with local banks, markets, and/or private 
sector enterprises. The NGOs thus worked as 'brokers' enabling the poor to become 
more bankable, and the banks to be more poor-friendly. Because SHGs have a record 
of high repayment rates, the banks only require social collateral - the promise and 
expectation that group members will pay back on behalf of any defaulters, so the 
SHGs function as joint liability groups. At the same time, the facilitating NGO may 
achieve the objective of transforming livelihoods. Organisations such as MYRADA, 
PRADAN, LEAD, Outreach and Sampark all follow this framework. These 
institutions contend that it is not merely the provision of credit which is empowering, 
leading to a transformation of livelihoods for the better, but that proper self-
management will empower as well (Fernandez, 2003; Joshi, 2003; Premchander, 
2003). However, the relatively slow expansion of SHG-Bank linkages (Banerjee, 
2002) in comparison with that of SHGs and the corresponding increased demand for 
credit necessitated development of alternative credit delivery methods to fill the 
'credit gap'. Commercial banks only dispensed micro credit to fulfil minimum 
official obligations. NGOs could not attract enough funding to continue their capacity 
building and facilitating roles (Premchander, 2003a). 
2.2.3. Microfinance Cooperatives Model 
An alternative to the SHG model was the registered cooperative, which preceded the 
SHG model for provision of short and long-term agricultural credit in India. The 
main sources of funds include members' savings and loans from NABARD or RRBs 
(Figure 2-7). 
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Figure 2-7: Cooperative Model 
Funding Rural Coop/Urban SHGs/ Individual 
Agency I 
'> Cooperative Bank :> Women Bank/Member's ... 
savings 
0-11% interest rate 18-20% interest rate 
(on reducing balance/flat) (on reducing balance) 
A cooperative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet 
their common economic, social and cultural goals and aspirations through a jointly 
owned and democratically controlled enterprise. Most cooperatives include member-
financing and savings activities in their mandate. Historically, while cooperatives 
were established channels for organising rural producers, they were largely state-
backed and politicised accordingly (Fisher and Sriram, 2002). In May 1995, the 
Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies (MACS) Act was passed in the Andhra 
Pradesh state assembly to enable cooperatives to reduce state patronage. Similar Acts 
were subsequently passed in Bihar, Rajasthan and Karnataka, to this effect. 
2.2.4. NGO-MFI Model 
The bank linkage model was slowly accepted, then proliferated by the early 1990s. 
As donor interest grew, more NGOs became financial intermediaries. NGOs 
registered as charitable institutions and engaged in micro credit provided they did not 
collect savings (Figure 2-8). 
Figure 2-8: NGO-MFis as Financial Intermediaries 
Funding 
Agency I NGO/ 
Bank MFI 
... 
11-14% interest rate 
(flat or reducing 
balance) 
SHGs 
... 
.... 
18-21% interest rate 
(flat or reducing 
balance) 
Women 
"> ... 
24-36% interest rate 
(flat or reducing 
balance) 
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As their costs increased, they responded by charging higher interest rates. For 
instance, while a wholesale lending organisation like Friends of Women's World 
Banking (FWWB) or SIDBI Foundation for Micro credit (SFMC) provided refinance 
at II to 14%, NGOs/MFis in tum on-lend to the SHGs at 18 to 20%, and the SHGs 
then charged individual members between 24 to 36% per year. Even with increased 
interest rates, optimal scale was still problematic, however. 
Another institutional form was that of the Section 25 Company, which was a not-for-
profit company registered under the Companies Act. Again, this allowed for micro 
credit activity but not for collection of deposits. These companies needed access to 
loans to expand outreach, which was difficult unless the equity base was augmented. 
Thus, not-for-profit institutions sought different institutional forms, which would 
ostensibly enable them to reach more borrowers and achieve financial sustainability. 
A number of apex refinancing institutions for development then converged towards 
on-lending through NGOs and SHGs to women. Approximately 300 to 400 NGOs 
were engaged in financial intermediation with Rs. 800 million of credit ($17.7 
million). However, these institutions had a 'credit first ' approach which focused on 
credit delivery and reduced empowerment to secondary status (UNOPS, 2002). 
Donor-funded projects encouraged NGOs to become independent MFis. A few 
adopted a method by which they established a set of three organisations (Figure 2-9). 
Women members first deposited their money in a Mutual Benefit Trust (MBT) or a 
Mutually Aided Cooperative Society (MACS), technically a member-owned 
institution, which is permitted to collect savings from members. Money was then 
routed to an NBFC, to raise further capital, both in the form of equity and loans. This 
augmented 'stock' of money was then channelled to women as loans to generate 
profit for NBFCs. Such NBFCs were not always permitted to take public deposits. 
Figure 2-9: MBT/MACS-NBFC Model 
NBFC Women 
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In addition to routing the member's savings, some NBFCs also encouraged women to 
take shares. Members were required to contribute one or two percent of the loaned 
amount to them, at one stage or over 50 instalments in a year, to be taken as equity. 
This raised legal complications because the law did not then specify whether Mutual 
Benefit Trusts and MACs could route their member's money to NBFCs. If NBFCs 
were not authorised to take deposits, such routing could be interpreted as jeopardising 
the security of the women's deposits (UNOPS, 2002). Women did not necessarily 
understand the difference between savings and equity; it was considered a compulsory 
charge for taking a loan. Normally NBFCs would have considered compulsory 
charges as 'fees,' and then book revenues and pay taxes. By booking these charges as 
women's equity, NBFCs not only avoided tax but also augmented their own equity 
base, so they could raise more loans. However, the question remained whether it was 
right to create a stake for women without then giving them a voice. But NGO staff 
and senior management managed these NBFCs, and women's direct board 
representation was nominal at best. These operations were niether covered by deposit 
insurance, nor controlled by bank supervision agencies, and covariant risks were 
judged high as members were from the same locality and community (UNOPS, 2002; 
Rutherford and Staehle, 2002). As a result the "tenuousness of the NGO position was 
even more dangerous to the saver" (Padhi, 2003: 4). 
This raised the research question of whether ownership and control of their own 
finances was actually important to women, and whether it had an effect on how they 
managed money. Literature does not prioritise protection of women's savings in the 
agenda for building people's own organisations, nor does it recognise that stakes in 
the organisation must be substantial enough to hold their leaders accountable 
(Rajagopalan, 2003; 2005). This is further explored later. 
2.3. Challenges and Impact Approaches 
International donors encouraged NGOs to enter microfinance as an effective entry 
point for credit, other development work and livelihoods support (Joshi 2003; Vyas 
2003). Larger NGOs act as facilitators (MYRADA, P.RADAN, CYSD, Outreach, 
DHAN) or as providers (SEW A Bank, BASIX, SHARE, Spandana, CASHPOR) 
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while still attracting significant donor funding, as occurs elsewhere (Tvedt, 2002; 
Hermes and Lensink, 2004; Masse, 2005). 
The distinctive character of Indian microfinance, where NGOIMFI interventions co-
exist with those of the government, paralleled with several multi-partner 
collaborations, leads to a complexity arising from the different goals of the 
intervening organisations and the roles they now play. 
2.3.1. Competing Approaches to Microfinance Delivery 
Two broad schools of thought have emerged about this. The first pursues unmet 
demand for credit through new supply institutions (Mahajan et al 1998; Mahajan, 
2003; Sinha, 2001) and advocates transformation of NGOs into MFis, believing that 
NGOs with little or no previous experience as MFis reach the poor quicker than the 
commercial banking network (Bose and Ranjani, 1998; Jenkins and Goetz, 1999). 
The second calls for more 'social engineering' as the strength ofNGOs, and of banks 
in banking (Dunford, 1998; Padhi, 2003; Otero and Rhyne, 1994; Rutherford, 2000; 
Fernandez, 2003; Gibbons, 2003). A risk of NGO transformation into MFis is 
shifting from investing in human and social capital at the grassroots towards 'pure' 
financial intermediation (Fernandez, 2003; Berenbach and Churchill, 1997; McGuire 
et al, 1998; Quinones, 2000; Premchander, 2003). Those who advocate new MFis 
hold that credit needs to be supplied, even at high cost (CGAP, 2002), whereas the 
second school sees the problem in terms of providing credit to users at reasonable 
costs. 
To the second school, the NGO sector is not yet equipped to become fully fledged 
MFis. New MFis were allegedly slow and expensive to develop (Harper, 2002), and 
their success was based on intensive grassroots monitoring, which increased costs, but 
improved outreach as well as sustainability (Nair, 2001 ). Their rationale is not to fill 
the gap between demand and supply at high cost, but rather to create competition 
among suppliers that would then resolve the cost of credit (Fernandez, 2003; 
Ramanathan, 2003; Narendran, 2004). 
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The move towards minimalist commercial microfinance excludes provision for non 
credit financial services which is variously attributed to the high cost of delivering 
and measuring these inputs, and fear of so eroding financial sustainability of 
organisations that they lose potential donor funds (Dunford, 200 1; Cheston and Kuhn, 
2002). Other agencies believe that capacity building of clients is an NGO 
responsibility (thus externalising of the issue), which they cannot yet meet (UNOPS 
2002). Townsend et al (2003) further attribute the trend towards minimalist 
microfinance to a situation where southern NGOs have become a transmission 
channel both for donor fashions and for 'new managerialism', making it more 
difficult to 'listen' to and prioritise the poor. Townsend (2003) argues that 
development trends, as evidenced in practice and vocabulary, tend to transfer quickly 
from donors to NGOs generally creating the phenomenon of' donorspeak'. 
Another extension of the differentiation of roles of NGOs has been to assign priority 
to people-owned institutions with implementation processes that empower the poor as 
a key means of development of 'social capital' (Fernandez, 2001; Satyamurti and 
Haokip, 2002; Srinivasan and Castro, 2003). Such an effort is perceived to need long-
term partnership approaches (Zeller, 2003a; Wilson, 2003; Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; 
Dunford, 2001; Sharan, 2000; Hendricks, 2002). However, in India, while the 
establishment of financially sustainable MFis is currently well supported through 
donor programmes, funding support for MF programmes that seek to empower people 
and build people-owned MFis is less widespread (Dichter, 1999; UNOPS, 2002; 
Chidambarnathan and Premchander, 2003; Premchander, 2003; Premchander, 2005). 
Social capital is used to place the financial health of the microcredit programme 
before the welfare of its members. Rankin (2002) and Holvoet (2005) argue that 
social capital of women is used as if free of cost, to conduct financial intermediation 
rather than liberate their transformation potential. 
The strategic role of microfinance sector still needs to be addressed before the 
questions about its internal structure can be resolved (Fernandez, 2003). Berger 
( 1989) conceptualised credit as a system of financial intermediation that 
allocated/transferred resources over time, and from one household or firm to another. 
Financial development interventions look towards improving intermediation (through 
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creating institutional structures, mechanisms and policy instruments), with the further 
goals of development of certain sectors (agriculture or industry), economic 
diversification, job creation and further political empowerment (Berger, 1989: 10 18). 
Given its history, a well-developed rural banking infrastructure with a choice of 
microfinance delivery models, has produced much debate which has limited 
connection to its poverty reduction impact. 
2.3.2. Current Approaches to Impact 
Although the microfinance sector grew rapidly, issues have been raised about its 
effectiveness. There are challenges to the argument that self-financing is a cost 
effective tool for both the delivery agent and client at the same time. Doubts have 
also been raised about other outcomes for the poor (Dunford, 1998). Impact is 
hereafter defined as " the systematic analysis of the lasting or significant changes -
positive or negative, intended or not - in people's lives brought about by a given 
action or a series of actions" (Roche, 1999: 21). Figure 2-10 depicts an understanding 
of impact, with immediate results of activities termed outputs, and medium term 
effects termed outcomes. 
Figure 2-10: Understanding of Impact 
Impact hypotheses & impact indicators 
•• • • • • • • Perfonnance Impact Indicators 
Indicators 
TIME 
(Source: Herweg and Steiner, 2002) 
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Certain studies only focus upon long term impact but it is difficult to link 
interventions to specific effects, and there may be more attribution error over time 
(Herweg and Steiner, 2002). Donors initiate and fund most impact studies (Dale 1998), 
including those about microfinance, with a perspective of tracking the use of money 
invested. A supply perspective is often the result of such top-down impact 
assessments, whereby donors lead the approaches and technology development in this 
field (Sebstad and Chen, 1996; Kamal, 1999; Cheston et al, 2001; Nissanke, 2002). 
Donor appointed consultants typically undertook the impact assessments. 
There are three different perspectives to microfinance impact assessment (Figure 
2-11 ). One debate is polarised between the financial systems and the impact 
assessment approach. Another questions the rationale of conducting impact 
assessments just for ensuring effectiveness of money use (proving) and advocates 
measures to augment it (improving) (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). Yet another 
contrasts service delivery with its ability to empower (Johnson, 2005). 
Figure 2-11: Spectrum of Different Perspectives on MF Impact 
Financial Systems 
Approach 
Proving 
Service Delivery 
Approach 
Impact Assessment 
Approach 
Improving 
Empowerment 
Approach 
In the 1980s, when loan repayments were taken as proxy for good repayment 
performance, repayment rates were manipulated (Woolcock, 1999). By the early 
1990s, there was pressure to show real and sustainable returns (Robinson, 1995; 
Morduch, 19?8). The financial systems approach drew upon Yaron' s ( 1992) model, 
which considered independent financial sustainability of MFis, in the absence of 
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domestic or foreign aid, as the new benchmark (Woolcock, 1999). This held that if 
the financial institution delivering the services was financially sustainable, then 
repayment rates must be high, indicating increased income flows, which made further 
impact studies unnecessary. The market provided a proxy for impact, repayment rates 
being a proxy for client satisfaction and positive impact (Rhyne, 1994), and the 
financial health of the microfinance institution was adopted as a proxy indicator of 
positive change (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). Hence, the scale and sustainability of 
the MFI was an indicator of impact. 
Those who challenge the financial systems approach, emphasise the need to audit the 
MFI users, and differentiate them accordingly. In the impact assessment approach, 
impact on poverty reduction is continually assessed rather than taken-for-granted 
(Ibid). Further, while MFis do not have funds to assess financial sustainability based 
on indicators like subsidy dependent index, they do use less formal methods such as 
PRAs instead (Chambers, 1991). 
The two approaches are depicted in Figure 2-12. 
Figure 2-12: Approaches to Impact Assessment 
Financial Systems Approach 
MFO sustainable 
Repayments must be high 
Businesses must be profitable 
Incomes must have increased I 
1 
Impact must be positive in terms of 
income and assets 
Impact Assessment Approach 
Actors can pay from other loans, and 
become indebted 
I 
Loans may not reach the poor at all, 
but the non-poor 
I 
Important to verifY who is reached, 
who is excluded, and who drops out 
I 
Important to measure what change has 
taken place 
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The paradigm shift is related to the movement from 'proving' to ' improving', or 
' planning' impact (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Goyder, 1998; Cheston and Reed, 1999; 
Copestake, 2000; Simanowitz, 2003b), emphasising the role of monitoring and impact 
audits, and client feedback (Cohen and Gaile, 1997; Garcia, 1998; Copestake, 2003) 
through learning approaches and constructive dialogue (Dale, 1998; Barrientos, 2003 ; 
Dand et al , 2003). Some experts advocate further dissemination of findings about 
these improvements (Aibu et al, 2003). Others recognise that, despite the potential 
benefits, collaboration is often inhibited by competitive rivalry which reduces genuine 
information sharing (Mosley, 2000). The change from ' proving' to ' improving' 
impact can overemphasise short-term projects (Premchander, 2003c; Dand et al, 
2003) . As a result "research on outreach and impact on poor people has not 
contributed significantly to better product development" (Rutherford, 2000; cited in 
Fisher and Sriram, 2002: 1 09). 
The dichotomy between the supply-led financial systems and the demand-led 
empowerment approach manifests itself first in different beliefs about the best 
methodologies and approaches to impact assessment, the former emphasising delivery 
and the latter female empowerment, therefore assessing different aspects using 
multiple indicators. This research reviewed several impact studies with regard to 
their approach, methodology, tools and indicators. These are listed in Appendix 1. 
The units of assessment are listed in 
Table 2-2. The first indicators were 
related to financial sustainability ofthe 
delivery organisation (Varon, 1992). 
Later, impact for the institution and 
Table 2-2: Units for Impact Assessment 
Client lnstitu.tions ,, 
• Individual MFis / NGOs 
• Household 
• Enterprise 
• Group 
• Community 
clients was distinguished (Otero and Rhyne, 1994; Chen, 1997; Cohen and Gaile, 
1997) and poverty measures were developed so donors could check poverty outreach 
of MFis (Hatch and Fredrick, 1998). Impact studies usually assess impacts for a 
subset of six units: individual, household, enterprise, group, community, and MFII 
NGO. Impact indicators have been classified here using the framework of Chen 
(1997) and Cohen and Gaile (1997), in terms of whether the change was material, 
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cognitive, perceptual or relational reflecting the multiple indicators used. The 
classification that emerges is depicted in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3: Aspects and Indicators for Impact Assessment 
Aspects.of Impact: Client Level (Individual, Household Impact: Institution 
()b~nge ·;m· and Enterprise and Community) Lenl (MFI5,~GOs 
and Groups) 
Material • Income- increased security, reduced poverty Income: Financial 
and contribution to household (individual, sustainability of 
household and enterprise level) MFI/NGOs 
• Resources - increased access, control over 
and ownership of assets and income Resources: increased role 
(individual, household level) of groups in accessing 
• Basic needs - improved health care, child basic needs through state 
care, nutrition, education plus housing, food services 
security or reduced food shortages, reduced 
infant mortality, school drop outs paid clinic 
health clinic subscription, access to fuel, 
drinking water, and toilets drainage 
(individual, household and community level) 
• Earning capacity - increased employment 
opportunity (household and enter~rise) 
Cognitive • Increased knowledge (individual) 
• Improved skills (individual) 
• Increased awareness of wider environment 
(individual) 
• Ability to interact in public sphere- increased 
new contacts and new ideas (enterprise) 
Perceptual • Self esteem -(individual level) Leadership- increased 
• Self confidence -(individual level) the strengths of local 
• Vision of future- ability to think ahead and organisations and local 
plan for the future (individual level) leadership (group level) 
• Visibility and respect for individual's values 
(individual level) Management capacities -
• Status - increased (household and community increased leadership and 
level) management capacities of 
groups.(group level) 
Relational • Bargaining power- (individual, enterprise 
level) 
• Participation- in non family groups, local 
institutions and government and political 
process (individual, enterprise, community 
level) 
• Self reliance- reduced dependency for access 
to resources, markets, public institutions 
(individual, enterprise and community level) 
• Decision making - increased (household and 
community enterprise level) 
• Solidarity- increased solidarity (community 
level) 
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Some authors expressed concern that integrating women in the development process 
was "harnessing women's labour for development", rather than "development for 
women" and stated that "the question of women's participation in credit programmes 
have a distinctly political light- raising issues of power, not just productivity" (Goetz 
and Sen Gupta, 1996: 4 7). Women's own leadership and accountability, therefore 
does not even appear as a concern: 
"Much of the debate around women's financial services organisations is on 
what 'else' women are doing, apart from the savings and credit - as if the 
savings and credit activity is strong, and as if women are managing these 
services well, and as if these services have resulted in their economic 
bettennent" (Rajagopalan, 2004b: 3). 
Another recent critique of microfinance impact studies alleges that impact studies take 
a 'narrow' perspective, limiting themselves to households/enterprise (or micro level) 
impacts, whereas 'wider' impacts would include meso and macro level impacts. The 
differentiation is thus made between 'types' and 'levels' of impacts, where the types, 
or 'domains' of wider impacts are categorised as cultural, economic, social and 
political, and the 'levels' are categorised as local, regional and national, thereby 
giving the 'levels' a spatial dimension. Impact studies are also narrow in the sense 
that they consider impacts of individual programmes or comparisons across them, but 
do not include impacts arising due to the presence of several MFis in the same area 
(Zohir and Matin, 2004). 
Lately, the coverage of impact studies has increased vastly. One example of a 
behavioural approach emphasises the potential for integrating interests of stakeholders 
(governments, beneficiaries, donors, MFis) and argues that MFis best balance client 
needs with donor rules (Graziosi, 2002). Another approach outlines the need to study 
not only the physical, social and economic aspects but also the spiritual-social aspects 
like solidarity, service, cooperation and justice, and espouses the values of unity, 
development and peace for humanity (Zahrai, 2001 ). Finally, there is greater 
openness in acknowledging that there are negative impacts (Singh, 2003; TBF; 2002; 
Garikapati, 2003). Guerin (2006) cites several studies with results that show inability 
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of microfinance in reducing inequalities (Fernando, 2001; Weber, 2004; Copestake, 
2002), in reducing gender inequalities (Johnson, 1999; Kabeer, 200 I; Mayoux, 1999) 
and in creating over-indebtedness (Huq, 1997; Sunil, 2005). At the same time, there 
remain the unanswered questions about the selection of appropriate methods, 
simplistic attributions and the fungibility of cash, which made it difficult to track the 
use of money from one application to another. Further, even with combined 
quantitative and qualitative methods, the costs of assessment are high (Nissanke, 
2002). 
2.3.3. Findings of the Key Impact Studies 
Introducing the Studies 
The first landmark study to critique microfinance was Hulme and Mosley (1996) who 
studied 12 organisations in 7 countries (India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, 
Kenya, Malawi and Bolivia), which provided microfinance through private, NGO, 
formal banking and cooperative institutions. Another impact study (EDA, 2003) 
covered ten MFis in India supported by a project implemented by SIDBI and 
supported by DFID, UK and IF AD, Rome. It was a cross sectional study intended to 
serve as a baseline for further work, and questioned whether the project was meeting 
its objectives of "substantial poverty reduction and reduced vulnerability in India 
amongst the users of microfinance services, especially women" (Ibid: 4). A third 
recent study, Burra et al (2005), presents a set of case studies which specifically 
examine the extent to which different microfinance initiatives achieve women's 
empowerment. The programmes/ organisations covered included Andhra Pradesh 
South Asia Poverty Alleviation Programme (SAPAP) (Murthy et al, 2005), SHARE, 
AP (Rajivan, 2005), DHAN Foundation, TN (Padia, 2005), Swayam Shikshan 
Prayog, (Parthasarthy, 2005), Lokadrushti, Orissa (Rajagopalan, 2005), and ASA 
Trust, TN (Sharma, 2005). These three studies covered 28 microfinance programmes, 
of which 17 were located in different states of India; the first two aimed to measure 
poverty reduction impacts, while the third one emphasised women's empowerment 
impacts. 
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Orientations of the Studies 
Hulme and Mosley (1996) recognised that microfinance schemes were 'idealised' and 
'traditional' state-subsidised finance was denigrated in the then dominant paradigm, 
and sought to go beyond these to seek evidence regarding financial viability, 
productive impact and poverty impact of microfinance. An important aspect of this 
study was the recognition of the role of politics in financial intermediation. They 
highlighted the tendency of donors, (especially in projects supported by USAID, 
ADB, and World Bank), to use the money to promote their own ideologies, 
demonstrate a commitment to poverty reduction, and/or simply a pressure to commit 
and disburse their funds. The NGOs and MFis in the study, which collaborated in 
these programmes, did not challenge the donors. 
Poverty Outreach 
One case study (Mosley, 1996) found that of the 37% below the poverty line 75% had 
never borrowed before, while others had only borrowed from family, friends, and 
traditional moneylenders. RRBs were successful here in expanding savings services, 
and in reaching those hitherto not served by credit institutions, and had survived as 
organisations despite low repayment rates. Hulme and Mosley ( 1996) found that 
impact on borrowers was positive compared to non-borrowers, but benefiting the 
'middle' poor more than the 'core' poor, while the institutions that pursued their own 
financial viability had a tendency to concentrate on the former, and the latter needed 
'protective' rather than 'productive' credit. 
The EDA study did not report poverty outreach by the different organisations, but 
found that, in total, 30% of the members were from SCs and 39% were poor, with 
others on the borderline or non-poor, and 14% were women headed households which 
were particularly vulnerable. 
Context 
Hulme and Mosley ( 1996) found that loans for agriculture had lower repayment rates~ 
The EDA study showed that in the North and East, where poverty was more 
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concentrated were under-represented, and that the poorest were not really being 
served. Though context is seen to be related to poverty, this study takes a supply view 
when arguing for a supply gap, but does not question or specify how contextual 
factors affect demand for credit. 
Women's Use of Money 
A study covering impact of microfinance through SHG-bank linkage facilitated by an 
NGO in Orissa highlights how women did not borrow for productive purposes from 
their own savings in the bank, keeping them for 'emergency purposes' (Rajagopalan, 
2005). It also highlights the risk of women's capital being mobilised and used outside 
the district. 
Group Dynamics and Processes 
Another study found how group leaders had taken more loans and had acquired 
greater access to panchayat leadership compared to other group members 
(Parthasarthy, 2005). Beyond this, few studies investigated SHGs in detail, nor did 
they dwell upon group dynamics, though they did observe that groups served only as 
mechanisms of cost and risk reduction for the institutions. "The most significant 
political empowerment that our work revealed was not that of borrower or member 
empowerment, but of the financial institutions and particularly their leaders and senior 
managers" (Hulme and Mosley, 1996: 153-154). 
Caste Discrimination and Further Impacts 
Though reduction in caste based discrimination was not addressed by the studies, they 
do note that the issue was not addressed by any of the projects, and while some 
occasional anecdotal evidence exists about groups members meeting one another, 
caste continues to be a major determinant of social relationships (Rajivan, 2005). 
Hulme and Mosley ( 1996) also held out little hope that financial intermediation for 
the poor would be able to influence local or national socio economic structures or 
political relationships. 
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Gender 
Hulme and Mosley ( 1996) did not cover gender aspects directly, but they did caution 
that female participation cannot be treated as an indicator of female empowerment, on 
the basis of other studies. The EDA study found that women were targeted for 
'pragmatic reasons', as they were willing to attend group meetings and comply with 
savings and loan terms, whereas men preferred larger, individual transactions. 
Sharma (2005) points to negative effects, as new economic enterprises may increase 
the work burden of children, particularly girl children, through increased enterprise 
related work, domestic work and child care responsibilities. The studies do point 
towards several leakages from microcredit, on alcohol and tobacco consumption, 
dowry, puberty rites and death ceremonies. Other studies that showed negative 
gender-related impacts include increased workload, husband's control over the 
income (Mayoux, 1997), increased inequalities among women (Mayoux, 200 1; 
Rankin, 2002), pressure to repay credit from programme staff (Rahman, 1999), and 
increasing domestic physical and verbal abuse (Rahman, 1999; Goetz and Sen Gupta, 
1996; TBF, 2002). 
Figure 2-13: Conflict of Objectives 
"It is clear that, despite the rhetorical claims of poverty reduction and 
empowerment the main motivation for female targeting in many microfinance 
programmes is higher female repayment rates. The main motivation for group 
formation is cutting costs through demanding that women contribute their own 
time and resources for routine programme administration. Micro-finance services 
for men rarely make such demands and where they do so are generally 
unsuccessful. Changes in products and complementary services currently 
introduced to increase financial sustainability often have negative impacts on 
poverty reduction and empowerment objectives. This is not because there is an 
inherent conflict between sustainability aims and these broader development 
objectives. It is rather because the gender and poverty implication's of the 
mechanical ways in which sustainability 'Best Practice' has been imposed have not 
been thought through." 
(Cheston and Kuhn, 2002: 6-7). 
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Empowerment related aspects include improvements in leadership and management 
capacities (PRADAN, 1997), the creation of savings, and the development of assets 
linkages with mainstream financial institutions (Wilson, 2003). Burra et al (2005) 
showed a large range of empowerment impacts, both for the individual woman and 
collectively, arising from microfinance interventions. Again, these studies adopt an 
outcome perspective, rather than a 'process' perspective, offering few insights into 
processes that inhibit or enhance women's empowerment. 
Cross Model Comparisons 
Studies cover outcomes and impacts rather than processes. Although the NGOs and 
MFis covered in all three sets of studies above examined different microfinance 
delivery models, they did not employ cross model comparisons or clarify differential 
impacts. 
All these studies take an institutional perspective and largely cover those who take 
loans. The coverage of those who did not opt to take loans is also from the supply 
perspective, as a control group to measure outcomes and impacts. They leave a gap in 
understanding from the perspective of the poor themselves, for instance, in finding out 
why the latter did not participate in the NGO/MFI microfinance programmes. 
2.4. Multiple Perspectives about Microfinance Use 
During the first phase of research, divergences emerged between institutional 
(external) and actors' own (local) perspectives about money and its use. These are 
now discussed. 
2.4.1. Use of Money 
Earlier microfinance literature considered loan products - their purpose, interest rate, 
source and size but paid less attention to the linkages between financial products and 
resulting impact. 
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Role of Savings 
The use of savings ranges from supply-oriented uses (risk coverage) to demand-
oriented (emergency needs). For women, the latter offers a safe place for savings 
which husbands cannot access, and this can also earn a reasonable return, which helps 
during lean periods or times of crises (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). A major reason 
for saving was to collect significant sums when needed (Rutherford, 2000; Wright and 
Dondo, 2001 ). 
In the supply perspective, 80 percent of the world's poor and 90 percent in developing 
countries have no access to institutional savings and credit facilities beyond that 
provided by friends, family and money lenders (Robinson, 1995). Further, savings 
options offered by MFis extend over a spectrum. At one end are fixed sums to be 
saved compulsorily every week/ month, against which loans are given, and which 
cannot be withdrawn. At the other end are options for flexible savings and 
withdrawals (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Wright, 2006; MicroSave Africa, 1998; 
Mutesasira, 1999). This view that the poor need a safe place to save has been 
contested in the Indian context where credit is viewed as the more critical function 
needed from formal institutions: "It is quite common to hear people grumble that the 
bank which willingly keeps their savings is not so forthcoming when it comes to 
advancing loans; it is rare to hear them grumble that the MFI that gives them loan is 
not collecting savings" (Fernandez, 2005: 2). 
MFis insist on regular savings in order to screen out potential defaulters, build up 
financial security, augment financial resources for lending, and encourage members to 
appreciate the financial health ofthe institution (Johnson and Rogaly 1997; Getubig et 
al, 1998). Researchers recognised that MFis offer savings services to gain a cheap 
source of funds for further lending, resulting in more sustainable financial operations. 
Savings are therefore seen as the "sustaining half of microfinance" (Otero and Rhyne, 
1994: 9). UNDP asserts that savings are not offered as financial services, but rather as 
a precondition for getting loans; they are blocked without interest, and are difficult to 
reclaim even after full repayment (UNDP, 1999). An additional aspect is the safety of 
poor women's savings. Deposit taking institutions are expected to comply with 
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banking regulation and supervision regimes that protect their depositors (Otero and 
Rhyne, 1994; NABARD, 2002). 
During a visit to an interior village in Orissa, group members claimed that they had 
been depositing all their savings with the NGO, in the hope of getting loans in 
multiples of their collective savings. As a result, there was no cash balance retained 
at the group level. In one village, a child fell into a well, and needed to be taken to a 
hospital immediately. The women approached five groups, but none had enough 
retained cash, and the child died. There were at least three other cases of women 
needing to take relatives for medical treatment, and not being able to get financial 
support from their groups. The pooling of money with the NGO, which was based on 
the financial logic of keeping savings as a basis for distributing loans, was clearly at 
cross-purposes with the need to retain their savings, to cope with emergencies and 
medical needs. 
Further divergence between model and practice of microfinance in relation to savings 
and loans is given in Tables 2-4. 
Table 2-4: Divergence in Microfinance Savings: Model and Practice 
I~ Claim of Commercial Model I '~; If" Oblerved ·Practice of Mi'(1rofinance sfi' "" ~~ 
" 
1. 
Sua:mly (!ers(!ective 
Cost reduction for MFI Offered nil or low interest on savings 
Risk reduction for MFI Retained control over savings with MFI rather than 
women, creating low access and high risk for women 
Demand (!ers(!ectives 
Easy Access Access limited 
Returns Returns nil or low 
Safety Safety risks 
While models acknowledge that savings help smooth consumption during crisis, 
impact studies do not cover either the management or the impact of savings. It is 
acknowledged that "hot money" that comes from women's savings will probably be 
used better than 'cold ' money from external sources (Mask, 2000: 23). There are 
instances where a support institution establishes a revolving fund that makes group 
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loans to collectives ('cold money'), whereas collectives blend this cold money with 
their own savings ('hot money') to fund loans (BRCS, 2002). 
An economic perspective on savings considers it a sacrifice of present consumption 
for the. future, and surmises that savings channelled into productive investment leads 
to material progress (Keynes, 1936). Desai (1967) elaborates on the role of savings in 
fulfilling social obligation (e.g. education and marriages of children, maintenance of 
dependent relatives, performance of religious ceremonies and festivals), and thus 
highlights the use of social and cultural aspect of use of savings. The actuality of 
access to savings may therefore differ from what many expect, and there is limited 
research into the value that women's own savings have for them. For instance, the 
amount and impact of savings were not even mapped in the impact study of SEW A 
Bank (Chen et al, 1999). 
Purpose of Loan 
Most microfinance organisations visited provided loans for 'productive' rather than 
'consumption' purposes. The former included investments in income generating 
activities and businesses, seen as desirable as they led to increased cash flows later 
used for repayments. The latter, for the same reason, often resulted in further 
indebtedness instead. The women members of SHGs, especially the poorest who 
lived in Charbhati, a remote village, did not share this perspective. During one field 
visit, a cluster meeting was observed where over twenty groups came to one central 
place to deposit their savings and take loans against it from an NGO. Five groups 
from this cluster, all belonging to the same village, did not attend. When I invited the 
women members of groups to a discussion, in a large open space at the entrance of the 
village, only a few were in the village at the time; but nearly twenty joined the 
discussion. The NGO staff explained that these women were 'not regular' in their 
savings, were not 'disciplined', and therefore did not 'qualify' for loans. Women who 
had borrowed from the group savings explained the amount and purpose of their loan 
thus: 
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"Rs. 50 ($1.1 1) for own fever" 
"Rs 40 ($0.88) for child's fever" 
"Rs. 190 ($4.22) for own medical treatment" 
"Rs. 60 ($1.33)for ownfever" 
"Rs 400 ($8.88) for son's fever" 
"Rs. 100 ($2.22) for son's fever" 
"Rs. 80 ($1. 77) for own visit to hospital during pregnancy" 
"Rs. 80 ($ 1. 77) for purchase of medicines" 
"Rs. 200 ($4.44) to cover the shortfall needed to buy a bull" 
They were disappointed that despite saving in the group, the NGO had not given them 
a group loan. One son complained: "My mother gave Rs. 130 ($2.88) as savings in 
the group already, but she has not yet got a loan. Why should she continue to 
contribute more savings?" 
The NGO expected women to save and learn the discipline of taking and repaying 
loans before they 'qualified' for the NGO loans. These women lived in a mosquito 
infested village where malaria was rampant and most group members were landless, 
with only agricultural labour to depend on. They needed small loans, first to meet 
their consumption needs, and only as a next step, for small income generating 
activities. The difference in understanding their situation and need for money created 
a situation where the NGO and women were not able to meet mutual expectations. 
In another group, members had regular savings and took loans from savings, but 
emphatically stated that they would not like NGO loans, because the interest rate of 
2% per month was too high and inconvenient to repay in equal monthly instalments 
spread over a year. They claimed that they could get loans at that interest rate even 
from local sources, and even gave details of loans they claim to have actually taken. 
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Table 2-5: Debts of Women SHG Members in Orissa 
No. of Loan In Rs. Loan In$ Purpose Source, repayment 
''Mem• 
¥lrtiets 
'" E 
I 2,000 44.44 Agriculture Coop. Society 
2 2,50,000 5,556 Truck, medical expenses 40,000 returned, local 
sources 
3 3,000 66.66 Agriculture Coop. Society 
4 20,000 444 Agriculture Coop. Society 
5 2,00,000 4,444 Daughter's marriage Local sources 
6 30,000 667 Death ceremonies Local sources 
7 1,00,000 2,223 Daughter's marriage, Local sources 
housing 
8 2,00,000 4,444 Marriage of children Local sources 
9 6,000 133 Agriculture Local sources 
10 40,000 889 Agriculture Bank 
11 20,000 444 Agriculture, medical Coop. Society, Local sources 
expenses 
12 20,000 444 Agriculture Local sources 
13 40,000 889 Agriculture Coop. Society, Local sources 
14 22,000 489 Agriculture Coop. Society, Local sources 
15 10,000 222 Daughter's marriage Local sources 
16 60,000 1,333 Daughter's marriage, Coop. Society, Local sources 
housing 
17 30,000 667 Agriculture, daughter's Bank, Local sources 
marriage 
Total 10,53 ,000 23,400 Note: All loans from cooperative societies were at 6% 
per annum, from bank at 6 to 8% per annum and from 
local sources and NGO at 24% per annum 
These women explained that the NGO did not offer them money to meet their social 
needs, e.g. marriages and death ceremonies, nor did they offer the size of loans 
needed . They could get loans according to their needs in the village, at the same cost, 
and could repay it in a lump sum or in instalments spread over longer periods. They 
did not wish to take loans from the NGO, and would not deposit their savings with the 
NGO. This example also highlights a mismatch in the perspectives of the users and 
suppliers of loans, about the sizes, purposes and terms at which loans are dispersed. 
Divergence between ' production' and ' consumption' loans (Premchander, 2003a) is 
summarised in Table 2-6. 
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Table 2-6: Divergence between Theory and Practice: Purpose of Loans 
Topic Theory ofMicrofinance Practice of Microfinanc'e 
Supply perspective Productive loan is less risky Only production loans 
permitted 
Demand perspective or Poorer people need Productive loans too small; 
women's perspectives consumption loans therefore used for 
consumption 
Several observers pointed that poor use savings or credit for consumption, as an 
integral part of livelihoods strategy. The poorer the target group, the more the 
emphasis that needs to be placed on financial services contributing to consumption 
stabilisation (Marr, 1999; Pitt and Khandker, 2004). Empirical research shows that 
MFis expect their loans to be used immediately for certain purposes, usually 
productive investments that yield additional incomes out of which repayments can be 
made (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). The attitude of MFis is explained in terms of the 
fear that if loans were used for consumption purposes, they were less likely to be 
repaid. The small size of loans made productive use difficult so they were used for 
consumption needs. Women also preferred multipurpose rather than production-only 
loans (UNDP, 1997). Certain studies observe differences between supplier and user 
perspectives. "If the definition of productive purposes is limited only to income 
generating activities, then clients who may want access to loans for socially 
productive purposes such as improving their education or health are likely to be 
excluded" (F AO, 2002: 49). Further, where MFis provide loans only for 'income 
generating' productive purposes, poor clients may then propose bogus 'productive 
activities' as a front for accessing loans (Sampark, 2000; FAO, 2002). While models 
recognise that MFI perspectives and poor people's needs differ, this is not always 
realised. Impact assessment studies tend to capture increases in loan size (assuming 
that funds are employed in micro enterprises) and use increased participation in 
borrowing and fund use as a measure of impact. This perspective is limited to 
'outputs' and effects, and often does not track long-term impact of use of money for 
different purposes. In order to reconcile the differences in local and external 
perspectives, this research therefore examines the purposes for which women take 
loans, and the reasons why different types of loans are used for different purposes. 
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Interest Rates 
There are opposing views about the cost of money. One believes that borrowers are 
more sensitive to the availability and convenience of taking credit than to the interest 
rate (Christen, 1989; Harper, 1998). This implies that interest rates should be set to 
cover costs of providing financial services (Berger, 1989) and, as it is assumed that 
people invest in productive activities, the expectation is that they can also afford to 
pay high interest rates (Harper, 1998). Another perspective is that although interest 
rates should cover costs, NGOs do not want to be seen as 'exploitative 
moneylenders', so interest is a political issue (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Fernandez, 
2005). Though evidence is limited, some impact studies show that high interest rates 
affected repayments adversely (CETZAM, 1999; Fernandez, 2003). While 
proponents of commercial microfinance perceive high interest rates as necessary, 
impact studies show that clients prefer low rates of interest. 
The thesis examines the reasons whether and why women use loans of varying costs, 
and the repayment ethic related to different loan products. 
Amounts and Sources of Loans 
MFis tend to offer small loans in the beginning, increasing the amounts in subsequent 
loans (FWWB, 1997; Sampark, 2000). Loan sizes are useful indicators of poverty 
and the risk-taking ability of microfinance clients (Matin, 1998). The financial 
perspective prefers small loans as a measure of risk coverage. On the other hand, 
evidence shows that small loans were not appropriate for productive use (UNDP, 
1997; CETZAM, 1999; Sampark, 2003). 
Models recognise that the source of funds determines the terms of the loan, which can 
then have a variable impact. Those facing shortages may have only their employers 
and local moneylenders as sources of credit. The employer may agree to give credit 
only on the promise of work at lower than market wage rates. Such arrangements can 
maintain and exacerbate inequalities in power and position. By contrast, user-owned 
funds may be more supportive and less exploitative, even though they may widen 
83 
Chapter 2: Poverty in India and Role ofMF 
inequalities between users and non-users of credit. Hence, loan products need to be 
analysed for suitability to the poor and designed especially to meet their needs 
(Dunford, 1998; Mosley, 2000). However, impact studies may not differentiate 
between impact of loans according to the different sources or terms on which loans 
have been given. This research therefore examines the links between the different 
characteristics of loans (sources, amount, purpose, cost, and repayment terms) and 
their repayment and impact. 
Poverty Reduction and MFI Sustainability 
The debates about provision of financial services question both outreach and impact 
of micro finance on poverty reduction. While repayment rates attract banks to extend 
credit to women, actual outreach to the poor is not known (Conroy et al, 1998). The 
lack of attention to the poor in impact studies has been explained away by the their 
being remote, 'risk averse' and heterogeneous, and therefore difficult to study (Hulme 
and Mosley, 1996; Remeneyi, 1997). 
One analysis of the size of loans shows that the typical client of subsidised 
programmes with a clear focus on poverty alleviation had a loan balance of Rs. 4,500 
($1 00). By contrast, the typical borrower from financially self-sufficient programmes 
had an average loan balance of Rs. 19,350 ($430) and even higher loan amounts 
(Morduch, 1999). Yet another factor is peer monitoring, whereby groups may reject 
the poorest as members (Montgomery, 1996; Tankha, 1999), as this may increase the 
risk of non-payment and reduce group creditworthiness. It is found that microfinance 
enabled the poor to cope better with seasonal income fluctuations (Montgomery, 
1996; Guerin, 2006). Such microfinance is increasingly viewed as providing income 
protection rather than promotion (Dreze and Sen, 1989). There is recognition that 
microfinance programmes, particularly those aiming for financial sustainability, find 
it difficult to identify, reach and meet the needs of the poor, especially in remote 
areas, and therefore also have a relatively low impact on the incomes of the poor 
(Dunford, 1998; Siebel and Torres, 1999; Marr, 1999). Further, the development of 
successful enterprises or of financially sustainable MFis on the one hand, and 
improving incomes of the very poor on the other, can conflict (Hulme and Mosley, 
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1996; Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Mahajan, 2005). However, some maintain that 
there is little evidence that the poor are left behind as loan sizes grow (Christen, 2000) 
and that sustainable microfinance organisations are able to reach the poor (Aguilar, 
1999). 
2.4.2. Issues Relating to Groups 
An emerging feature of current microfinance practice in India is the introduction of 
women's SHGs as a medium through which credit is provided. This is a new forum, 
which did not exist in villages in this form prior to the introduction of microfinance 
projects. It is therefore useful to understand the role of the SHGs in the delivery and 
impact of microfinance. 
Group Processes 
SHGs have cost and risk reduction benefits. As members have better information on 
the character and creditworthiness of potential borrowers, they shift loan processing 
and approval tasks to groups, thereby reducing transaction costs (Stiglitz, 1990; Otero 
and Rhyne, 1994 ). The expectation about repayment is that, if one member is unable 
to pay an instalment, others will repay the NGO/MFI, thus creating 'joint liability' 
(Stiglitz, 1990; Jain, 1996; Seibel, 2000). In practice however, the joint liability 
characteristic of the group may not occur. Those who do not repay have a 
'demonstration' effect, which may lead to increasing non-repayment (Matin, 1998). 
Members may not force one another to pay, especially if they fear breaking of social 
ties (Montgomery et al, 1996). There is also concern about the social costs of group 
processes i.e. constraints to group borrowing and joint liability approaches. These 
include coercive peer pressure, loss of trust and the likelihood that the poorest and 
most vulnerable will be excluded or further stigmatised (Marr, 1999; Montgomery, 
1996). Banks also judge their credibility by amount of savings pooled, ability to 
manage these, and solidarity and cohesion among members. The difference in 
perspectives is also evident here by the finding that women themselves attributed low 
repayments to drought conditions while external agencies considered it "lack of 
systems" (Reddy and Prakash, 2003). Attention has also been drawn towards 
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'disciplining' the poor and bringing them under the 'gaze' of new control and 
productive mechanisms, and thus isolating them in the Foucauldian sense and using 
them as 'productive mechanisms', and thus in fact reducing the possibility of their 
making joint representations (Bhuiyan et al, 2005). 
When groups are not seen only as a means of delivering savings and credit services 
but as a broader strategy for empowerment, collective action is viewed as an 
important aspect in bringing about change (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). Otero and 
Rhyne (1994) view group methodology as having three main features: means of 
providing financial services, training and technical assistance, and the promotion of 
organisational and social development. In a context where conventional lenders are 
seen to neglect poor and minority communities, offer less information and time, 
charge higher interest rates and deny loans more often than they do to majority 
communities, and so to maintain social and wealth inequalities (Keister, 2002), access 
of low income families to financial institutions, and to financial education to promote 
savings is seen as a way out of the distributional outcomes of financial markets 
(Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; Keister, 2000b ). This theory would envisage a positive 
role for SHGs, as forums which facilitate such access. In practice, however, doubts 
have been raised about whether savings and credit groups promoted by outsiders can 
achieve long-term independence (Rutherford, 2000), thereby cautioning that a forum 
established through motivation of external agencies may not sustain longer than the 
external interventions (Hendricks, 2002). Rankin (2006) emphasises that 
anthropologists (Geertz, 1962; Mintz, 1961) have documented informal credit groups 
and lending arrangements with a 'cultural' perspective earlier, and argues that the 
term social 'capital' assigned to such groups is not neutral, but reflects neoliberal 
economic ideology, which works to 'instrumentalise' women and the poor. 
In contrast, there are examples in India from SEW A Bank and CARE, CREDIT 
project, Ranchi, who view capitalisation of groups as an important indicator of their 
sustainability (Vyas, 2004; Girija, 2004). They recognise the role of own savings as 
capital, and collective and profitable financial transactions at the group level in 
sustaining groups as viable local forums (Rajagopalan, 2004a). The ability of groups 
to manage finances, however, can be limited, especially where many are illiterate. 
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Recent studies of SHGs in the State of Andhra Pradesh claim that group members 
have poor book keeping ability, no leadership rotation, and unsound loan management 
practices, which put the savings of members at risk (APMAS, 2001; 2003, 2005). 
Robinson (200 1) also observed that groups are liable to collapse when managers are 
corrupt, members indisciplined, or when collective shock occurs. 
Group cohesion breaks down due to indiscretion or member misfortunes (Woolcock, 
1999). Grassroots studies in Andhra Pradesh attribute the end of money transactions 
and dissolution of groups to a fundamental lack of trust (APMAS, 2001 ). Trust was 
an important element of the relationship between banks and the poor (Robinson, 
200 I). The role of national and international NGOs as those who advance values of 
civil society and democracy is emphasised by Bhagwati (1997). Other studies 
emphasise role of groups and "recognise that high repayment rates of SHGs is not an 
inherent structural feature of SHGs but a commitment to group values" (Padhi, 2003: 
8). Researchers emphasise the need to go beyond economic reasons to explain the 
role of groups and processes as embedded in a theory of social relations (Granovetter, 
1994; Lyon, 1999), and highlight networks, and norms as factors that enhance social 
capital through social organisation (Putnam, 1993). 
Woolcock (1999) draws attention to the 'how' questions, which examine how "human 
and material resources are assembled and maintained in the process of trying to attain 
a goal, exploit an opportunity, or correct a problem" (Woolcock, 1999: 2). This 
contrasts the 'transactions cost' approach to organisational issues with the alternative 
sociological approach. The former assumes that needs, demands or problems create 
their own solutions (Williamson, 1995), while the latter regards all organisations as 
social accomplishments (Woolcock, 1999). The evaluations of microfinance 
programmes have been preoccupied with impact assessments, replication and 
sustainability issues, and theoretical perspectives have not always been informed 
about organisational issues e.g. "the construction of economic institutions to assist the 
poor" (Ibid: 3). Woolcock takes a socio-economic perspective and case study 
approach to examine the failures of group-based microfinance programmes which 
highlight the importance of how human resources are mobilised, assembled and 
maintained across four key institutional junctures: replication, a branch in crisis, a 
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group in crisis, and ineffective guarantors and staff. In the case of a group in crisis, 
women had indebted themselves to the moneylender to pay the Grameen Bank. All 
this suggests that analyses of micro finance programme impacts have focussed on why 
the programmes work, rather than how they work, and that the latter questions are 
important to future programmes, because they provide not only financial lessons but 
call for more social sustainability as well (Woolcock, 1999). There are few studies of 
role of groups and group processes from Indian and external researchers (Hulme and 
Mosley, 1996; Rao and Hashemi, 1999; Shylendra, 1998; Fernandez, 1994). In 
general, many impact studies only regard groups as a forum or delivery mechanism 
without studying their actual processes or the way groups manage money and how 
social and financial capital can support or contradict each other. In this respect, where 
the positive impacts of social capital are privileged, this research provides deeper 
insights into group processes and dynamics, and explores these with respect to 
potential opportunities and constraints within local economies and social organisation. 
The full complexities and dynamics of SHGs are not fully captured any more than the 
distributional impact of groups, or the impact of their placement in local social 
structures. In therefore studying learning processes in groups, and analysing how 
women manage savings and loans in groups, this research seeks to understand groups 
as institutional mechanisms for development interventions. 
2.4.3. Livelihoods Contexts and Strategies 
There is recognition that the place where people live has a definite implication for the 
potential of income generating activities and micro enterprise, both in terms of 
ecological factors and institutions that form the enabling environment (Richardson 
and Howarth, 2002; Edwards, 1998; Oakley et al, 1998; Schmid, 2003). 
Trends towards migration are related both to ecological decline and social relations of 
dependence and indebtedness (Masse et al, 2004). There is evidence of the link 
between the geographical context, e.g. drought-prone areas, and other dimensions of 
poverty, namely social and economic exclusion, combined with low literacy, 
numeracy and other skills of employability, resulting in roughly one million Indian 
households where either parents or the children are engaged in bonded labour (Parr, 
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2005). The relation of ecological conditions with poverty and strained livelihoods is 
also emphasised. Poverty studies recognise that poverty and calorie and protein 
deficiency in India varies across States as well as agro-climatic zones (Jha and Gaiha, 
2004; Gaiha, 2000). There are risks including seasonality, unfavourable terms of 
trade, high volatility of prices of agricultural commodities, distorted credit markets, 
changes in domestic and international policies, and a high incidence and depth of 
poverty in rural areas, especially in those dependent largely on agriculture. 
Agriculture is recognised as the most important sector supporting the rural population, 
with strong linkages to the inter-state differentials in both growth and poverty 
reduction (Datt and Ravalli on, 1998; Osmani, 200 1 ). However, agriculturally 
underdeveloped and poorer environments are too hostile to absorb currently offered 
microfinance for productive investments in agriculture or other economic activities, 
without preceding improvements in other sectors (Fafchamps, 1997; Jha, 1999; 
Woolcock, 1999; FAO, 2002; Zeller, 2003b). This is not always reflected in the 
original design of microfinance programmes that apply a single-product model to all 
the States in which they operate (Fernandez, 2005; Guerin, 2006). 
In tribal regions like Bastar in Chhatisgarh and Lohardaga in Jharkhand, women 
group members were able to save one or two rupee per week, or five or ten rupees per 
month. Similarly, in the remote coastal regions of Kerala, women organised by an 
NGO, were from families of fishermen, and were able to save only Rs. 2 ($0.04) per 
week. By contrast, in Ranchi, Jharkhand, where lands were fertile and markets of 
Ranchi town were accessible, the women saved amounts varying from Rs. 10 to 20 
($0.22 to $0.44) per week. The regularity of savings differed widely across groups; 
some groups, e.g. those in the economically active regions, had regular savings from 
all members, while others, e.g. those in remote areas and within less monetised 
economies, stopped savings for a few months during lean periods. 
The tribals lived in remote forests, with an average of two to three hours to walk to 
the closest weekly shandies to buy small provisions like salt, oil, kerosene, onions and 
potatoes. The weekly sale of minor forest produce came to Rs. 10 ($0.22) per 
woman, with which she purchased her weekly ration. In Bastar, typically, each tribal 
woman walked six to eight kilometres from her home, carrying a child on her hip and 
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carefully balancing a basket of minor forest products on her head or hip, and maybe 
even trying to hold a bamboo umbrella to save her child from a drizzle or rain. This 
journey was taken on slippery paths, usually with two or three streams to cross, with 
at least knee or waist deep water. Given that the weekly transactions were about Rs. 5 
($0.11) or Rs. 10 ($0.22), women rarely saw even a note ofRs. 50 ($1.11), and few 
had seen a note of Rs. 100 ($2.22). When they began to save money, bringing Rs. 1 
or 2 ($ 0.02 to $0.04) to the group meetings, they did not know who should keep the 
money in between meetings. When savings reached Rs. 100 or 200 ($2.22 or $4.44), 
they usually divided it between two or three women for safekeeping. Locally women 
took credit in kind, paying back in kind, with interest. The money equivalence was 
never established. The economy was highly non-monetised in this region. They could 
have used credit, but it could be a long-drawn process, requiring increased awareness 
about the creation of concept of credit, and then to provide small amounts of credit for 
existing micro-businesses that women were already engaged in. It was more 
important to create the confidence and skills to bargain in the weekly markets, for a 
fair price for the forest produce they brought, to prevent exploitation by traders. 
Credit could have been better utilised ifthe NGOs also facilitated collective action (in 
the form of cooperatives, or federations, etc.), for trading in non-timber forest 
produce, with the government agencies or external markets. Other ideas that suited the 
tribal context included grain banks, joint purchase and sale of products, and other 
similar collective economic activities, which could help women get higher bargaining 
power and higher returns for the goods they traded in. Other interventions that would 
have worked related to raising agricultural productivity of the small pieces of land 
that the tribals cultivated. 
Set against this, the credit project of the intervening agency was designed to support 
the tribals through microfinance. It was a replication of another project in Jharkhand 
and the assumptions about the latter had been applied in the tribal regions of Bastar, 
and expected women to take in multiples of $100 (Rs. 4,400) as loans, and the NGO 
to make credit operations sustainable in three years. Those assumptions were 
unrealistic and needed reformulation. The role of money in the local economy was 
insignificant. Most transactions in the project area were non-monetary, excepting 
those that took place in weekly markets, and for some large financial outflows. The 
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quality of life in the project area was not linked directly to money alone. The NGO 
partners saw this dichotomy and resisted a project that would demand financial 
sustainability of credit operations, in a context where the feasibility of rooting a cash-
based credit system was suspect. The supporting agency was, however, wary of 
expressing this strongly, as it feared losing the grant for the project, and continued to 
project compatibility between project objectives and tribal women's needs instead. 
This demonstrates self- perpetuating policy in action (Masse, 2005) and pointed to the 
need to explore the meaning and use of money with reference to a specific livelihoods 
context. 
The socio-cultural embeddedness of poverty and vulnerability is recognised in 
development literature, which attributes lack of power to social placement, gender, 
age, caste, ethnicity or wealth (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Narayan et al, 2000). The 
attitude towards 'low' castes is negative, and women are denied entitlements of equal 
concern, respect, status and libertarian rights in general, described as constituting 
'negative freedom' for these women (Majumdar and Subramaniam, 2004). 
Studies on the Dalit movement in Karnataka provide some evidence of caste, class 
and gender struggle (Batliwala, 2001; 2003). The community is not one homogenous 
whole but formed of different groups, some ofwhich experience 'social exclusion' in 
the economic, social, cultural and religious practices, where external agencies 
(government/NGOs) are unable to make large-scale entry (de Haan, 1999). Other 
studies also emphasise that because of the trans-disciplinary and political character of 
the caste and gender struggle, it has not spread among NGOs, who have made the 
opposite move: from activists to contractors (Townsend et al, 2003). 
There is suspected corruption among government schemes, and collusion between 
bank and government officers (Sinha, 2001; Satyamurti and Haokip, 2002). In this 
scenario, villagers expect NGOs and community leaders to access external resources 
(Karanth et al, 2000). In addition to the ecological issues that influence livelihoods, 
geographical contexts encompass other enabling factors that protect or expose 
households to vulnerability: socio/economic, or political. Similarly, the institutional 
context, encompassing structures and processes of government, private sector, NGOs 
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and other civil society organisations, create possible livelihood options or disable 
people from accessing them (Richardson and Howarth, 2002). Thus, the enabling 
environment or the contexts in which livelihoods are located has an important bearing 
on the way microfinance is used and the resulting benefit or harm. 
Of the impact studies reviewed, none have considered the livelihoods context in 
which the microfinance programme was situated, except for Hulme and Mosley 
(1996). While the overall impacts of microfinance programmes were positive, 
questions were raised about whether gender issues were actually influential. 
This research considers how the 'marginalised' live within their society and how their 
basic human rights were infringed upon in the current context. The institutional 
relevance of different actors is explored in the thesis. The research examines how 
relations among different actors influence the supply of money and shape their 
financial behaviour. This research recognises the context-embeddedness of poverty, 
and vulnerabilities arising from geographical, socio-cultural and institutional contexts 
in which they live. This called for emphasising actor-oriented methodologies, which 
assign priority to agency and embed actions in wider social relations and structural 
settings (Lyon, 1999). "The interconnectedness of gender, class, ethnicity and 
nationality" (Fernando, 2006b: 175) also called for an emphasis on gendered 
livelihoods context, developed further in the next chapter. 
2.4.4. Multiple Meanings of Money 
The different uses of money from different sources is internalised differently by 
women. For instance women used their 'own' savings differently from the loan 
provided by the external agencies and they assigned different meanings to the two 
sources. They experience greater freedom in using their own money for their own 
needs and preferences. NGOIMFis on other hand, perceive uses differently from 
women, and apply concepts of 'efficiency', which provide a different basis of 
thinking as compared to that of women. The tensions between development thinking 
and financial systems thinking draw attention to a conflicting pecuniary interest, 
which could be the underlying reason for the differential meaning of money and the 
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language used by the SHGs and the intervening NGO/MFI. The above instances from 
the field visits show how the perspectives were different, as regards the perception 
and use of savings, use of money, and how women's groups perceive and utilise 
money. The divergence arises not only from the meaning of money, but also from the 
purpose that microfinance is to serve, for the suppliers and the users, although there 
are certain commonalities between external and local perspectives. 
In analysing use of money given by charities, Zelizer (1994) showed how the 
institutional notion of "proper" utilisation of money was quite different from that of 
those who received the charity money. This phenomenon also appears in the 
perspectives of agencies who use money as a development tool, and therefore a loan 
has a different meaning for the suppliers of microfinance. At the same time, the 
women who receive it, regard it differently, thereby giving it a different meaning and 
use. This research explores differential meanings, by analysing uses of money by the 
different actor groups, and the different rationale that forms the basis of such use. 
2.5. Implications for Further Research 
Many project evaluations are not fully accessible. Impact studies available in the 
public domain provide limited information about their objectives, methodology, and 
assumptions. They mostly present findings related to financial and empowerment 
indicators which do not provide sufficient detail for understanding the methodology 
employed. 
This reveals important divergences between 'theory' and 'practice~, and the difference 
in local and external perspectives by which microfinance was delivered and assessed. 
These differences include the role of savings and credit, the size, purpose, costs and 
sources of savings and loans, and the implications of the different ways in which this 
money is delivered with the intention to reduce poverty. All these topics are 
subsumed under the theme of 'use of money'. Women are the main targets of 
microfinance services and SHGs are the main means of delivery. These groups have 
been viewed as mechanisms of delivery on the one hand, and as agents of 
empowerment on the other. Economic studies highlight the importance of 
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frameworks of trust involving information on the reputation of others, establishment 
of long-term relationships and networks based on customer friendship and 
intermediaries (Lyon, 1999). However, microfinance impact studies do not contain 
sufficient emphasis on trust, nor do they analyse the processes by which groups 
manage microfinance and the ensuing impact of these processes. There is a need for 
analysis of SHGs as local institutions through which not only microfinance services 
are delivered, but also as institutions which have their own character and processes 
that are relevant to understanding the impact of microfinance. Traditional impact 
analysis concentrates on the use of money, whereas more insight into group processes, 
like leadership or group learning processes, is needed for a deeper understanding of 
how actors actually deal with finance. Further, microfinance projects are situated in 
specific geographical/regional contexts, which have an important bearing on the 
economic development of that region. The socio-cultural and institutional structures 
and processes also determine the space within which different groups of people in the 
community can realise their livelihoods aspirations (Sen, 1981; Dreze and Sen, 1985). 
Economic studies identify people living in remote, resource poor regions with low 
infrastructure and belonging to scheduled castes as those for whom poverty is almost 
a permanent condition (Gaiha, 2000). The identification of such groups is considered 
important, as they are likely to suffer the most in a situation of a community-wide 
shock (Gaiha and Imai, 2003). Once more, microfinance impact studies do not give 
sufficient attention to the livelihoods context and its link with poor and marginalised 
people. 
Hence, the three themes that emerged as important in understanding the perspectives 
ofthe users of money are: 
• Women's livelihoods 
• Use of resources (Money) 
• Groups (Learning Processes) 
The research gaps identified from the divergence between field observation and 
discourse analysis (a wide ranging review of microfinance literature and impact 
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studies, listed in Appendix 2) yield the issues on which this thesis is focussed. These 
are organised into three broad themes, as illustrated in Table 2-7 below: 
Table 2-7: Critique of Practice of Impact 
Critique Implications For Research 
1. Use of Money Who takes the credit, what amounts, for what 
Outreach to poor not tracked purpose, from which source, on what terms 
Impact of savings and credit not and which type of credit women refuse and 
differentiated why 
Social impacts under-emphasised 
Impact of different financial models not The role of savings and the factors 
differentiated influencing the management of savings 
Inadequate attention to negative impacts 
Over-emphasis on financial in comparison The different sources of loans and their social 
with other forms of capital and financial impacts. The impacts of 
different types of capital and their 
interrelationships 
2. Groups Role of groups in management of money and 
Inadequate emphasis on the impacts of the the processes involved. The impact of groups 
forums (like SHGs, banks) through which in terms of economic, social, and ecological 
these money is transferred and at individual, household and community 
levels 
3. Livelihoods Impact in relation to livelihoods context in 
Inadequate attention to the livelihoods which micro credit programmes are 
context in which the money users are situated implemented and situated 
Many inconsistencies and differences are a result of the impact being studied from 
supplier and 'objective' perspectives based on ungrounded assumptions. This 
resulted in meanings of external agents getting precedence over those of the users of 
microfinance, namely poor women. It highlighted the need for client-focussed 
demand perspectives that makes minimal assumptions and tries to map and 
understand what people do and why. Thus, an actor oriented approach was required 
that would enable greater participation of local actors, especially poor women. In 
giving priority to women's perspectives as users of money, this thesis focuses not on 
looking at impact from the point of view of organisations, at macro or meso level, but 
on viewing it from women-user's point of view, at the micro level. A longitudinal 
perspective has helped to gain an in-depth understanding of when and how poor 
women in rural India utilise microfinance for alleviating their poverty. 
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There is a need to give priority to actors' own perspectives in order to move away 
from a supply-orientated approach towards understanding the actual users of money. 
This requires an interpretive research approach that would give insights into the 
meanings people attach to different phenomena. In studying how microfinance is 
delivered through women's SHGs, this research has prioritised gender and 
development issues, and used actor orientation as its theoretical underpinning, using 
three different livelihoods frameworks to gain context-embedded perspectives. It is 
an inter disciplinary endeavour, drawing from disciplines as diverse as banking, 
finance, economics, management, sociology and anthropology which have a large 
reservoir of development literature. 
3.1 Research Paradigm 
The world-view of the researcher (ontology) and understanding of how knowledge is 
generated (epistemology) are informed by theoretical perspectives, which in turn 
influence choice of methodology (Leermakers, 2003). This approach assumes that the 
world is in part a construction and an interpretation and that meanings are context 
dependent (Wilber, 2000; Flick, 2003). This implies some acceptance of subjectivity 
and relativism, which is different from radical constructivist belief that there is no 
possibility of reflection of external reality (Heylighen, 2000). This research takes the 
critical perspective, that knowledge production itself can be associated with power 
and oppression (Yueng, 1997; Patomaki and Wight, 2000). 
The idea of 'objectivism' as an appealing framework for determining the nature of 
rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness or rightness (Bernstein, 1983), was 
challenged by Thomas Kuhn (1970). Relativists asserted that, as judgements are 
necessarily based in subjective epistemological and moral positions, no one position 
could claim privilege over another truth or morality. Subjectivists denied the existence 
of any 'objective reality' outside of the agents' perceptions and constructions of it, 
while others emphasised the social construction of 'reality' (Williams, 2004). 
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Realists sought to create a middle ground by accepting that the world is socially 
constructed but once it comes into being, then it exists as an objective reality 
independent of any individual conception of it. Bordieu (1977) proposed that a 
dialectic relationship existed between subjective and objective factors in the practice 
of construction of social reality (Williams, 2004). 'Interpretivism' accepts that any 
socio-scientific account of social life is restricted in terms of time and space (Biaikie, 
2004), as access to the past is always mediated by the present, and that story-telling, 
involving 'emplotment', helps the actor create an identity which becomes stable over 
time, (Lawler, 2002), so that identities are created by the narratives people use to 
explain and understand their lives (Spivak, 1998). 
In this research, reality is considered multi-layered, with physical, emotional, mental 
and spiritual dimensions (Wilber, 2000). This affirms an interpretive methodology, 
which acknowledges that specialist knowledge production occurs in the context of 
diverse epistemic cultures (Giddens, 1991; Knorr Cetina, 1999). Culture, in tum, is 
understood as a "historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in 
symbols ... by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their 
knowledge about and attitude towards life" (Geertz, 1973: 89). This calls for 
reflexivity, acknowledging the researcher's role in constituting the narrative text, and 
also entails self-questioning, so it may lead to social learning and social feedback, yet 
still be politically enabling (Pieterse, 200 I; Kleinman, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2004). 
Reflexivity enables a dialectic approach especially where local actors have diverging 
interpretations (Van Manen, 1979). This research uses a methodology that "strives to 
unmask hegemony and address oppressive forces" (Crotty, 1998: 12), and is alert to 
the same tendency in the research process itself (Thomas, 2004). 
Critical discourse focuses on how language figures in the constitution and 
reproduction of social relations of power, domination and exploitation, and how social 
constructs tend to acquire intransitive properties that make them resistant to the 
intemalisation of new discourses (Fairclough, 2004). This thesis pays attention to the 
constitutive role of language in advancing social and political debates in the public 
sphere, through' prevailing 'paradigms. In the social sciences, the term paradigm is 
often used to denote a coherent and consistent set of ideas about development, and 
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especially rural development practice. This led to researchers' "preference for growth 
over people, for increase in income over distribution" (Chambers, 1986: 24). The 
relevance of this former paradigm was questioned due to the rising scale of 
deprivation among the rural poor. A new paradigm then emerged emphasising the 
following aspects: 
a. Normative, meaning that development should be people centred; 
b. Conceptual, where development is not progress in a single direction, but a 
process of continuous adaptation and problem solving use of opportunities; 
c. Empirical, recognising the diversity of physical conditions, ecological 
change, knowledge of poor people and their capacity for self-reliant 
organisation; and 
d. Practical, emphasising decmuentralisation of resources and empowerment 
(Ibid). 
This encouraged new interdisciplinary research to be more user-oriented and invited 
participation directly from the poor. These paradigm shifts took place in all aspects of 
development work. 1 
Choices of approach need to recognise how gender is an important issue from both the 
supply and demand perspectives of microfinance. Women are viewed positively as 
good repayers and good contributors to family welfare, but are also treated as silent, 
and their voices, views, and needs are thereby socially marginalised (Mayoux, 1997; 
Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; Johnson, 2003). It was imperative to develop a new 
approach that would acknowledge their voices, while also recognising that women are 
not homogeneous, and often speak with different voices (Underhili-Sem, 2001; Pini, 
2003). An important feature of new participatory approaches has been the scope they 
provided for recognition of the differences between women and men's roles in the 
production process. When assumed homogeneity of farm households was 
deconstructed, space was also created for 'intra-household dynamics'. As the belief 
that more gender issues should be voiced then gained ground, their importance for 
1. Paradigm shifts related to microfinance practice and impact assessments are discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
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rural development was further emphasised. With more consultation with 
disadvantaged groups, the inclusion of women's perspectives gained acceptance 
(Premchander and Mueller, 2006). I have applied principles of feminist research 
(detailed in section 3.5). My position is post-colonial in that it questions the 
hegemony of western knowledge and models and considers the experience in India 
and Asia as valid and relevant in its own right. 
This research is also a qualitative study seeking to explore the meaning of money, by 
analysing the social relationships created when women use money and explain why 
they use it as they do, 'earmarking' money from different sources. It is based on the 
premise that "human experience is the main epistemological basis for qualitative 
research" (Van Manen, 2004: 579). Human activity was seen as 'text', as a collection 
of symbols expressing layers of meaning, and interpretations of meaning could be 
made both by the social actors and by the researcher (Dilthey, 191111977, cited in 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). "Qualitative data, with their emphasis on 'lived 
experience' are fundamentally well suited for locating the meanings people place on 
events, processes and structures of their lives ... and for connecting these meanings to 
the social world around them" (Miles and Huberman, 1994: l 0). The belief that 
qualitative and quantitative inquiry are so different because they are based on 
different paradigms has led to a dichotomous presentation (Yin, 1994 ). This is 
contested by those who argue that the linkage between paradigm and method are 
overstated, and that combined use of quantitative and qualitative methods enhances 
both (Filstead, 1979; Campbell, 1979; Cooke and Rieckhardt, 1979; Alevesson and 
Deetz, 2000). 
To sum up, this research adopts a reflexive and interpretive approach to qualitative 
inquiry, which emphasises: 
1. Value reflection: asks whether the researcher IS advantaged over the 
participants; 
2. Subjective voice: asks whether the voice of subjects is heard, legitimised or 
obliterated by research procedures; 
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3. Collaborative participation: asks whether subjects share in the generation of 
knowledge and the benefits of the research outcomes; 
4. Multiple standpoints: asks whether many different viewpoints and values are 
represented; and 
5. Representational creativity: asks whether the representation and 
communication of research can be in forms other than formal writing (Gergen, 
2004). 
It therefore prefers discourse analysis, narrative inquiry and participatory 
ethnography. As narratives are "social products produced by people within the 
context of specific social, historical and cultural locations", they are not "transparent 
carriers of that experience", but "interpretive devices", where "people produce their 
own stories", in a "social world that is itself storied" (Lawler, 2002: 242). This 
highlights the issues of identity and a "radical questioning of the conventional 
binarisims of sociology: structure and agency, individual and society, self and other" 
(Ibid: 245). Thus attention is paid to the relationships between the individual and 
collective narratives from which they draw, and the two are not necessarily 
harmonious. 
The key to understanding rural livelihoods here lies not in the documenting of what 
actions people take but in their own interpretation of why they acted thus. Such deep 
probing requires joint exploration with the actors themselves using a multi-
perspective, client-centred approach, ·here achieved by the use of three different 
research frameworks. Thus this research is closest to the abductive research strategy 
outlined by Blaikie (2000). This strategy reveals the concepts and meanings 
contained in the actors' own accounts ofthe activities related to the research problem. 
These accounts are then redescribed in social scientific terms, providing an 
understanding of the phenomena usable for more elaborate theorising, and uses 
interpretivism to answer both the 'what' and the 'why' questions (Blaikie, 2004). 
This is also a longitudinal research, i.e. data collected at different time periods, 
permitting an analysis that involves measurement and, analysis of change within the 
same cases, and using the changes women expressed in the interpretive analysis to 
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place money as one of the many resources that women access, use and manage. This 
longitudinal study also involved creating 'retrospective' data, as when women 
recalled their loan histories (Menard, 2004 ). 
3.2 Actor Network Theories and Livelihoods Frameworks 
Historically, the mediating discourse between theory and practice was led by the 
action research approach propounded by Lewin, but as other experiments introduced a 
new rationality into the workplace, this did not link back clearly with earlier theory, 
thereby calling for new strategies (Gustavsen, 200 1). Habermas (1984) argued that 
the relationship between theory and practice was not direct, but rather discursive, 
involving a discourse on theory, on practice, and a mediating discourse about how to 
link them, thus developing a theory of 'communicative action'. This went beyond 
any single organisation to the society, as the 'mediating discourse' involved social 
relationships conducted through actor networks, which varied according to their 
number, complexity and quality of relationships (Gustavsen, 2001). An actor-
oriented perspective therefore challenges the conventional understanding of 'micro' 
and 'macro' levels, believing that they cannot be ontologically differentiated, and are 
"grounded in the meanings accorded them through the on-going life experiences and 
dilemmas of men and women" (Long and Long, 1992: 6-7). This calls for a 
discussion of actor network theories and related frameworks that facilitate insights 
into livelihoods. 
3.2.1 Actor Network Theories 
The need to study actors and their groups necessitates an understanding of actor 
network theory. Actor-network theory (ANT) is concerned with the processes by 
which scientific disputes become closed, ideas accepted, and different tools and 
methods adopted (Van House, 1999; Hanseth, 1999). This theory evolved from the 
work of Call on (Bardini, 1997). 
Akin to actor networks, network analysis claims roots in anthropology, sociology, 
psychology and applied mathematics. It was developed from Moreno's work and 
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sociometry and sophisticated mathematical models were developed later. Radcliffe-
Brown used it to understand migration from tribal villages, and Levi-Strauss 
introduced formal notions of kinship and algebraic equations, while Rapoport 
proposed an elaborate model of social ties and flow of relations through nodes. In the 
1960s and 1970s, concepts like transitivity, structural equivalence, the strength of 
weak ties, and centrality were developed by Davis, Leinhardt, Holland, White, 
Granovetter and Freeman (Wasserman and Pattison, 2004: 720). 
Network analysis conceives of social structures in relational terms. Its most 
fundamental construct is that of 'social network', using a set of 'social actors' as 
building blocks, who can be groups, organisations or individuals. The primary 
assumption is that social actors are interdependent, connected by a set of 'relational 
ties', and that the ties among them have important consequences for each social actor, 
as well as for the larger social grouping that they comprise (Ibid). Resulting data sets 
can be multi-dimensional or longitudinal and often include information about such 
'actor attributes' as gender, ethnicity, attitudes and beliefs. The basic premise of the 
social network paradigm is that knowledge about the structure of social relationships 
enriches explanations based on knowledge of the individual actors alone. The 
paradigm provides concepts, theories and methods to investigate how informal 
organisational structures intersect with formal bureaucratic structures, and the 
evolving sets ofknowledge and beliefs (Ibid). 
Miettinen (1997) argues that the modem constitution or worldview uses one-
dimensional language operating in the framework of opposite poles of nature 
(realism) and culture (social constructionism), and this dualism needs to be resolved 
to explain networks. In addition: 
"All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the life worlds of existing 
individuals and social groups affected, and in this way they are mediated and 
transformed by the same actors and structures. Social actors are viewed as 
active participants who process information and strategise in their dealings 
with various local actors as well as with outside institutions and personnel. 
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The precise paths of change and their significance for those involved cannot 
be imposed from outside ... The different patterns of social organisation that 
emerge result from the interactions, negotiations and social struggles that take 
place between several kinds of actors." (Long and Long, 1992: 13) 
This need to understand the experiences of the 'beneficiaries' of development 
interventions raises the question of the appropriate means by which to 'capture' this 
knowledge. An important change in the field of development thinking has been the 
realisation that local actors need to be consulted before any programme that seeks to 
positively impact their lives can actually do so. This willingness to consult with the 
'marginalised' has also increased awareness about the contexts in which these groups 
live. 
Recent elaborations of actor-oriented perspectives have also incorporated a human 
rights perspective, which argues that as actor perspectives are shaped by their actual 
struggles, and are informed by their own understanding of their needs and priorities, 
they need to acknowledge and challenge hierarchical relationships in society from the 
point of view of the subordinated (Nyambu-Musembi, 2005). The normative claim 
transcends the radical cultural relativism which would explain human rights violation 
in terms of culture, and therefore deny the very agency that fuller rights and 
citizenship should enable (Kabeer, 2002). Systematic enquiry of development 
organisations and programmes thus needs to ask how the rights based approach would 
"do development" work differently (Kabeer, 2005: 44). 
One indication of attempts to study livelihoods from people's own perspectives is the 
development of many frameworks for studying livelihoods systems since the 1990s. 
Livelihood systems cannot be viewed as the simple sum-total of their various 
components - economic, social, and cultural. Rather, they need to be viewed as 
multidimensional 'wholes', which include all the forces and constraints that determine 
group life in its entirety (Hogger, 2003). The selection of the three frameworks arose 
from concern for a holistic understanding of rural livelihoods. These three 
frameworks are the result of the joint action taken by researchers and development 
activists at work. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) originated from the 
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commitment of the Department oflntemational Development (DFID), UK, to support 
policies and actions that promote sustainable livelihoods with the overall aim of 
poverty elimination. Wiesmann developed the Actor Oriented Perspectives (AOP) 
framework in response to the development crisis in South Africa caused by extreme 
poverty (Wiesmann, 1998). Hogger (2005) conceived the Nine Square Mandala, as a 
tool to undertake holistic research on rural livelihood systems in India. SLF provided 
an overall link between the situations of the actors, outlined in terms of assets. When 
combined with an external set of structures and systems, these links determine 
livelihood strategies and their outcomes. 
3.2.2 Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
A study of any intervention's impact on people's livelihoods needs to recognise the 
broader context in which actors develop their livelihood strategies. The Sustainable 
Livelihoods approach defines secure livelihoods as the existence of sufficient stocks 
and flows of food and cash to meet basic needs (Chambers and Conway, 1992). It 
was developed through DFID's field-based work at both the macro and household 
level aspect of livelihoods. It has since been utilised in planning several development 
projects and for assessing development impacts (Farrington et a!, 1999). Its key 
assumptions are that actors pursue a range of different livelihood outcomes (e.g. 
health, income, reduced vulnerability) by drawing on a range of assets as they pursue 
a variety of activities. It assumes that both choice of the activities, and also 
reinvestment in assets, are determined by the actors' own preferences and priorities, 
while recognising the different vulnerabilities they face, including shocks (e.g. 
drought), wider trends (e.g. resource stocks), and further seasonal variations. 
The five types of capital assets identified are: financial, human, natural, physical and 
social. These 'building blocks' for livelihoods are considered to have limited 
substitutability for each other. Improved livelihood outcomes are conceptualised in 
terms of: increased income, increased well being, reduced vulnerability, improved 
food security and/or more sustainable use of the natural resource base of an area. A 
diagrammatic presentation is given in Figure 3-l. 
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Figure 3-1: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
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However, this framework did not explain the perspectives of the actors and why they 
followed the strategies they did, which was aided by the AOP framework. 
3.2.3 Actor Oriented Perspectives Framework 
The AOP framework has its origins in peasant and actor network theories, and uses 
rational economic theory as an entry point It assumes that actors always try to do 
something that fulfils their livelihoods aims (Wiesmann, 1998). 
perceives actors as: 
This approach 
"Actors in an arena of interdependent and interacting individuals or categories 
of actors . They interpret specific features of the ecosystem and the socio-
economic and socio-cultural systems, and they act competently and rationally 
on the basis of their specific knowledge, as a function of their values, motives 
and expectations of utility. An understanding of regional dynamics and 
potential conflicts in rural development and environmental care must 
consequently be approached in connection with divergent strategies, 
perceptions and assessments of the respective individuals and collectives" 
(Kuenzi et at, 1998: 54). 
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Figure 3-2 depicts this framework: 
Figure 3-2: Actor Oriented Perspectives Framework 
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The framework is based on a theory of action, and is heuristic in that it permits 
formulation of new questions, hypotheses and meaningful indicators. It is also goal 
oriented in addressing the political goals of societies and actors, and ethical in that it 
respects the societies and contexts to which it is applied. The framework was 
originally developed and adapted in different contexts, e.g., African smallholder 
regions, Madagascar and Ethiopia, to give insights into sustainability from the 
perspectives of both local population and researchers. It highlighted the need for 
reconciling ethnographical and geographical perspectives, by looking for negotiation 
spaces wherein people have liberty of action (Ludi, 2004; Messerli , 2004) . In this 
research, AOP framework enabled consideration of women ' s SHGs as groups of 
actors using local resources . 
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The AOP framework lies alongside the SLF, prioritizes the actors themselves, and 
also provides conceptual links with social, ecological and political contexts. It goes 
beyond SLF in conceptualising actor groups as units that devise strategies together. 
However action-theory frameworks can also neglect: 
"The orientations and preferences that inform whole sequences of action, the 
structures built from combinations of such sequences, the ways in which the 
actors themselves are configured. The action theory framework offers little 
purchase for establishing the patterns on which various actions converge and 
which they initiate and dynamically extend. It shines the analytical torch upon 
the strategies and interests and interactive accomplishments of individuals, and 
sometimes groups. While this yields important insights into how agents 
generate and negotiate certain outcomes, it offers no dividends on the 
machineries of knowing in which these agents play a part." (Knorr Cetina, 
1999: 9) 
Although this framework recognises the social and ethical dimension of action it can 
leave the emotional or affective (psychological) dimensions relatively unexplored. 
3.2.4 Nine Square Mandala Framework 
The above two frameworks - SLF and AOP - assume bounded rationality where 
human beings are often driven by self-interest, a premise that is questioned by those 
who cite examples ofthe role of non-economic motivation in development and human 
action (Raju et al, 2000). This underlines the need to recognise 'non-rational 
behaviour', or behaviour not motivated exclusively by material self-interest, here 
made possible through the use of the Nine Square Mandala. The aim was to use the 
different research tools available with greater sensitivity so as to understand the 'inner 
realities' of the system. It combines a rational approach with an intuitive sensing of 
the situation that increases understanding of rural livelihood systems (Baumgartner 
and Hogger, 2004). The Mandala is based on a home, which is used as a metaphor to 
study the broader, more abstract notion of a livelihood system. It may employ 
different symbolisms in different cultures but is like a lens with nine-focal points 
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through which the actualities become more distinctly visible. The Mandala 
conceptualises livelihoods in nine squares, each denoting one aspect, as depicted in 
Figure 3-3 . 
Figure 3-3: RLS Nine Square Mandala Framework 
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The bottom row represents its foundation. This includes the physical, emotional, 
knowledge and activity bases. The physical basis refers to all the resources, economic 
and natural, available, the accumulated wealth, and remittances from migrant 
members etc. The physical basis includes the natural environment and resources, and 
knowledge and activity basis refers to the crafts, trades, skills, and traditional 
knowledge of the actors themselves. The emotional basis encompasses the feelings, 
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emotional attachments, and the sense of belonging actors feel toward their home. The 
knowledge and activity basis refers to the crafts, trades, skills and traditional 
knowledge. 
The interrelated nature can be illustrated by the probability that, in times of economic 
necessity, the decision whether to migrate or not, is governed by both emotional as 
well as physical necessities and not merely by economic considerations alone. 
Similarly, while the skills and crafts of a society may have an economic function, they 
also contribute to self-esteem and emotional fulfilment, and thus bind the physical and 
emotional aspects of the system. The middle row delineates the different spaces in 
society; Indian socio-economic space comprises the several caste hierarchies, the 
panchayat, and relations with government, neighbourhoods. The family space deals 
with gender relations, seniority within generations, distribution of workload, and 
finally the inner human or intimate space encompassing personal awareness, integrity 
and responsibility. The uppermost row deals with all the mental/collective 
perspectives that shape and guide actor strategies, including the collective, family 
and the individual orientations. While societal rules and family values govern general 
behaviour patterns, revolutionary change could originate from one strong leader only. 
The Mandala depicts the 'outer' and the 'inner', creating an awareness of both the 
physical and psychic constituents of all livelihood systems. From the bottom to the 
top of the Mandala is the transition from the physical and emotional basis to the 
mental apex, making it a heuristic tool that recognises the multidimensional reality of 
a livelihood system and alerts a researcher/ practitioners to certain conflicts which 
arise in development (Ibid). 
This approach was applied in the mountain commune ofFeldis (Switzerland), Mahudi 
(Gujarat), and in Karnataka, India. The topics explored using the Mandala have 
ranged from understanding gender and leadership issues, to adoption of technology 
and the analysis of farming practices and change in semi arid village contexts 
(Aurora, 2000; Hiremath et al, 2000; Premchander et al, 2003; Gnehm, 2003). It has 
also been used for understanding rural livelihoods in order to plan development 
interventions (Sampark, 2001; NRMPA, 2001; Jones, 2004). 
109 
Chapter 3: Multi Perspective Impact Assessment 
3.2.5 Applying the Frameworks 
The use of three frameworks allowed for person-centred, multi-levelled and flexible 
process based approaches to help understand the complexity and diversity of rural 
livelihoods, and also enable movement beyond rational economic thinking to in-depth 
analysis of inner realities of women and their experiences. All three approaches 
explicitly acknowledge that to minimise or avoid risk, actors tend to develop multiple 
strategies for their livelihoods. They take cognisance of the dynamic and holistic 
nature of the processes and structures that influenced and shaped livelihoods. Thus 
the frameworks are potentially flexible, adaptive and relational. The frameworks 
were applied primarily at different levels, as indicated in Figure 3-4. 
Figure 3-4: Application of Analytical Frameworks 
Linking external structures with 
local strategies 
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Analysing actor strategies with 
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The SLF therefore linked macro level structures, conditions and institutions with 
household assets and strategies. A similar linkage was facilitated by AOP, which also 
provided the means to study strategies of different groups of actors, by assigning 
importance to values and meanings. The exploration of values and meanings was 
deepened further by the use of the Mandala, which accorded significance to 
emotional orientations. 
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Thus, the three frameworks helped to address deficiencies in the existing 
understanding of impact. This is not simply a methodological issue of tools and 
techniques. The differences in understanding arose due to the underpinning 
philosophy about the sources of knowledge. The attention to actors' experiences, and 
a gender perspective were lacking in earlier studies. The three frameworks address 
this by linking macro-micro factors, and by focusing on women's perspectives, and 
how livelihoods were impacted by microfinance interventions. 
3.3 Research Design and Context 
Previous impact studies show that cross sectional research has highlighted key effects 
of microfinance delivery, but could often overlook how women users, suppliers, and 
intervening agencies all had different perspectives. Moreover, where divergences 
were identified, they often endorsed and validated external perspectives, with less 
emphasis on women's own perspectives. 
Visits to several NGOs in the first phase identified issues that highlighted the different 
meanings of money. Microfinance project designs did not really differentiate between 
the various local contexts, whereas loan off-take between different types of regions 
(e.g. irrigated, un-irrigated) made a difference to what loan women took, and also the 
purpose for which they used it. The major divergences of perspective related to the 
uses of money, and understanding ofthe new forum: SHG. So by the end of phase 1, I 
perceived three divergent perspectives, which made a difference to the impact of 
microfinance, and the uses and meanings of money. They were: livelihoods contexts, 
how women use money, and what happened in SHGs. 
The goal was to understand how women perceive and use money, what money meant 
to them, and how this compared with other assets. The second phase of research 
therefore focussed on a semi-arid region, dwelling on its cultural and context 
specificity to study the interplay of external structures. The focus on ten women 
helped to delve deeper into actor perspectives. 
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3.3.1 Case Study Approach and Life Histories 
The case study approach employs various methods including interviews, participant 
observation and field studies. "The case study has proven to be in harmony with the 
three key words that characterise any qualitative method: describing, understanding 
and explaining" (Hamel et al, 1993: 38). Case studies can provide narrative accounts 
of events to help analyse how outcomes may be reached by multiple pathways. The 
conclusions built from case studies are not easily detachable or decontextualised (Van 
Manen, 1998: xx), which raises the question of their wider generalisability. Some 
scholars suggested that the generalisation from specific to the general could be done 
through subsequent replications (Lincoln and Guba, 2000), while others held that 
generalising is not severely compromised by the use of case studies, as it is essentially 
the same as generalising from non-probability samples (Biaikie, 2000). 
The case studies in this research focus on how women at the household level use 
money over an entire year. In addition, they contain women's life and loan histories 
over a five-year perspective. A life history is a fairly complete narration of an entire 
life experience; it is a 'first person' account of a life (Plummer, 2004). Long life 
stories cover many years, while short life stories may require a series of in-depth 
interviews. Life stories serve as a good means for understanding how actors see their 
own experiences, lives, and interactions with others (Atkinson, 2004). This research 
used short life stories, but with a whole life cycle perspective, and these needed to be 
reflexive and recursive stories, where the process generated self-consciousness and 
awareness of their own situations. 
The ethics of conducting life stories demand that the researcher be fair, honest, clear 
and straightforward, and ensures that women's interests, rights and sensitivities are 
protected. "Setting out to help people tell their own stories gives the researcher a very 
clear intent.... Honour the personal meanings the life story-tellers give to their 
stories ... In most cases and disciplines, the way to best understand a life story is to 
find the meaning that comes with it, emerges from it, or is waiting to be drawn from 
it" (Atkinson, 2004: 569). Life story telling is a process of personal meaning making. 
Often, the teller of a story can bring new knowledge, and the text can carry its own 
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meaning. In this way, this research tries to understand how a specific context 
influences the use and impact of money, how women use money within their 
households, and finally how they use money (own money, i.e. savings, and external 
money) in other groups, how they manage those groups, and the problems arising 
from their participation in them. This study records not only financial flows but also 
women's attitudes towards money, credit, debt, SHG membership and peer group 
relations, the emotional content of different money transactions, and the power of 
money as a social obligation. 
3.3.2 Research Site and NGO 
Most SHGs are in the southern states (NABARD, 2003). The SHG-based Indian 
model of microfinance was piloted in Karnataka and Tamilnadu in southern India. I 
was stationed in Karnataka and was familiar with the local microfinance institutions. 
As southern India has many microfinance institutions and SHGs, this research was 
conducted in a poor district in Karnataka which has a predominantly agricultural 
economy. Only 20% of the cropped land in the state is irrigated, and agriculture is 
mainly rainfed. Of the 19 million hectares, under cultivation nearly two-thirds 
receives less than 700 mm of annual rainfall. The dry zones are "in a vicious cycle of 
denuded vegetation, soil erosion, depleted soil and groundwater, low biomass 
productivity, imbalance of human and livestock numbers with the exhausted natural 
resource base" (ODA, 1996: Annex A: 1) and have a higher proportion of the poor. 
Semi-arid regiOns are classified under 'Less Favoured Areas' (LFAs), which are 
marginal and arid lands. These LF As are characterised by low agricultural potential 
because of their poor soils, shorter growing seasons, lower and uncertain rainfall, 
widespread degradation of natural resources, and also past neglect, leading to limited 
infrastructure and reduced market access. Crop-shocks for a continued period of two 
to three years are not uncommon, so poverty is prolonged and the non-poor are also 
vulnerable (Gaiha and Imai, 2003). Given the high vulnerability of semi-arid 
regions, research in this livelihoods context should add value in terms of future 
strategies for growth and poverty..;reduction. Hence, in-depth research was located In 
Koppal, a drought-prone region, and in the rain-fed areas ofthis district. Koppal is a 
113 
Chapter 3: Multi Perspective Impact Assessment 
newly created district, which was split from the district of Raichur in 1994, and lies in 
northern Karnataka, as shown in Figure 3-5. Within relatively 'developed ' Karnataka, 
its northern region is semi-arid and poor, and has many demeaning social practices. 
The research focused on the Koppal taluk of the district. The five study villages had a 
total population of313,898 people in 2001, ofwhich 50% were women and 80% lived 
in rural areas (GOK, 2004). 
Figure 3-5: Location of Research Area 
Karnataka State in India Koppal District in Karnataka 
Villages Studied 
1. Bahadurbandi 
2. Chukkankal 
3. Mudhaballi 
4. Hosagondabala 
5. Bikanhalli 
a 
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The research called for a high degree of participant commitment. The data needed 
about finances and life events assumed high trust. Women spoke a particular dialect 
and required assistance with language. Finally, the location needed to be one where 
an NGO had a microenterprise lending programme. Thus, a critical factor for access 
was a good NGO promoting groups, which would permit longitudinal research along 
its development and microfinance project. 
There were 17 NGOs in Koppal engaged in implementing projects for government or 
donors, of which I 0 implemented microcredit projects. Once the project period of 
two to three years was completed, their support ended too. Only two NGOs had long 
term commitments to working in specific villages, and one only concentrated on 
education. The other NGO, Sampark, worked with microfinance services and was 
selected because it had over four years of engagement with SHGs, a significant 
presence in the district (through facilitating 22 percent of all its groups), and a long 
term commitment to those they worked with. An important methodological flaw can 
arise from the systematic sampling bias towards successful borrowers in large mature 
programmes (Woolcock, 1999). This bias was avoided as Sampark was a medium 
sized NGO with an average outreach of 2000 to 3000 women. As a personal member 
of this NGO, I was already known to its staff. Relationships already existed between 
the staff, women and their SHGs, which provided a good foundation for the in-depth 
research work that was required for longitudinal analysis. 
3.3.3 Selection and Profile of Research Participants 
The case study approach allows for investigation of a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, which is highly pertinent to the phenomenon under study. 
Further, multiple cases allow the consideration and elaboration of different meanings 
and strategies, the evidence from which can be considered more compelling, even 
though more resource intensive (Yin, 1994 ). Yin advocates the use of each case as an 
'experiment', applying the replication logic, (rather than the 'sampling' logic) which 
may produce similar or contrasting results. This needs a theoretical framework 
stating conditions under which similar/different conditions may be found, and to this 
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extent the grid of social/economic differences 1s here based upon the 
economic/caste/gender characteristics of the women selected. 
The rationale for selecting the women followed the criteria expounded by Yin (1994) 
that they be of general public interest (poor women) and also unusual (devadasis, 
poorest of the poor), and that the underlying issue be of due national importance, 
either in theory, policy or practical terms. The case studies were also ' complete ' m 
that they gave special attention to the phenomenon being studied and its context. 
Other economic research classifies rural households on the basis of ownership or lack 
of physical or human capital (Sundaram and Tendulkar, 2003). The social 
embeddedness of poverty is recognised, as is the feminisation of poverty (Johnson 
and Rogaly, 1997; Narayan et al, 2000; Majumdar and Subramaniam, 2004) . 
Following this understanding, the women case study participants were selected on the 
basis oftwo main criteria: economic and social status, as detailed in Figure 3-6. 
High 
caste 
Figure 3-6: Criteria Used for Selection of Research Participants 
I 
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caste 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
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I 
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I 
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I 
............................. ··········• 
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There were, however, several variations within these categories, and these were 
intended to ensure that each case was different, so that wider insights could be gained. 
These variations were across the following criteria: 
• The poor without landholding, and little land (1 or 2 acres), and more land (5-
1 0 acres) 
• Those who had taken bank or The Bridge Foundation (an MFI) loans and 
those who had taken no loans besides those from group savings 
• Those who exercised leadership in groups/community, and those who did not 
• Dedicated devadasis and others 
The devadasi practice is prevalent in Koppal. Devadasis are women dedicated to the 
local deity. Although the reasons were once based on religious ideals, current practice 
relates to economic insecurity and emanates from the poverty syndrome and lack of 
other opportunities. Such women are not permitted to marry, but instead are inducted 
into a life-world where they have to forge sexual alliances with men. In return, the 
men are expected to pay for the household expenses of the devadasis and their 
children, though research shows that some male partners did not provide much 
support (Sampark, 2002). 
The women selected for case studies included five from the devadasi community. As 
their social (kinship) situation is unusual it was harder to generalise from their cases 
alone. However, it afforded an insight into the perspectives of the socially 
marginalised, and devadasi presence was significant because 23% of the scheduled 
caste households in these villages had devadasis. Of the 1817 households from the 
five villages, the number of devadasi households is presented in Table 3-1 below: 
117 
Chapter 3: Multi Perspective Impact Assessment 
Table 3-1: Total Number of Devadasis from the Five Villages 
Village ~arne Total NoofSC Total % De~adasi out 
Houses Households No. of of. total SC 
!{Census 2001) devadasis households 
Bahadurbandi 422 23 7 30 
Chukkankal 177 30 13 43 
Mudhaballi 387 47 11 23 
Hosagondabala 700 61 10 16 
Bikanhalli 131 35 6 14 
Total 1817 196 47 23 
Source: Census (200 I) and Social mapping exercises with villagers 
The devadasi families mainly belonged to SC and a few to ST households . The total 
of devadasi families from these villages was 47 and the average number of devadasi 
families per village was nine. The maximum devadasi families per village was 13 
and minimum was six. Among these, five had both mother and daughter devadasis. 
This was the rationale for including five devadasis among the ten women studied. 
They belonged to the lowest caste and class in the socio-economic structure, and an 
understanding developed from these households was likely to help improve the design 
of microfinance programmes aiming to reach the poorest. Some devadasi women 
were very poor, but others did have assets, and differences between them were further 
reflected in different livelihoods strategies. Studying five devadasi women provided 
insights into their particular kinship situation, which also allowed for comparison with 
other women-headed households, and those with men as part of the household, in 
terms of their respective strategies for money use. The selection of devadasis also 
raised the issue of whether the inclusion of ' deviant ' or ' extreme ' cases is justified on 
the ground that they are more likely to stimulate theoretical development (Kendall and 
Wolf, 1971). The intention was also to obtain different perspectives from within this 
category, i.e. 'within group ' variations (Harding, 1992; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
The situation of the devadasis shows that not only the were economic aspects of 
poverty important, but also social and cultural embeddedness of issues such as gender 
inequ ities, and lack of ent itlements were important too. 
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Case comparison permits a grounded understanding of each single case, by specifying 
how, where and why it carries on as it does, and helps to investigate relationships and 
create constructs ((Miles and Huberman, 1994). This research considers female 
diversity, and does not treat rural women as just one category. Different life 
experiences arise from their social (whether devadasis or not), as well as their caste 
and economic status. In addition, several other factors made for variations, and which 
restricted their choices. They were spread over different age groups from 26 to 50 
years and had family sizes varying from three to thirteen. Some were in nuclear and 
others in joint family households. The diversity of their situations and experiences is 
difficult to generalise, but does help to develop an understanding of the socio-
economic spectrum that they represent, and also highlights their asset-base as a key 
determinant ofthe vulnerability/security of their respective livelihoods. 
The diversity of women's households in terms of their size, composition, asset 
holding, occupations, incomes and expenses is represented in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2: Profile of the Research Participants 
Name Caste No of No of Landholdings Catt ~ SkiDs of. .. 'Fotal 
Memb member -le ~ · earning annual 
ers s Total Total Total members lncomil 
earning/ Dry wet land In Rs. 
'' educated land land ($) 
Lakshmavva Madar 5 1 
- - -
2 Coolie 5,765 
(SC) Grazing (131) 
Cow 
Nagavva Madar 5 2 - - - 4 Coolie 15,282 
(SC) (Semi- (347) 
Tailoring 
Shivavva Madar 13 7 (2) 
- - -
6 Drives 46,050 
(SC) Tractor ( 1047) 
Fishing 
Parvathamma Madar 3 2 
- !12 !12 - Coolie 12,324 
(SC) Work in (280) 
Hotel 
Yellamma Madar 6 6 4 - 4 2 Coolie 28,860 
(SC) Grazing (649) 
Sushi! a Badig 5 2 {2) - - - - Tailoring 36,976 
ar Kasut/ (840) 
(OBC) Bangle 
Trading 
Electrical 
work 
Sangavva Madar 5 5(1) !12 !12 2 Coolie 37,489 
{SC) Embroidery (852) 
Rangamma Mar at 10 7 (5) 2 
-
2 - Petty 94,580 
a Trade shop (2150) 
(OBC) Driving 
Coolie 
Kaveri Reddy 9 5 (5) 12 2 14 4 Panchayat 1,09,300 
Seeds (2,484) 
Company 
Tailoring 
Mariyamma Kurub 3 2 {2) 5 3 8 2 Field Work 96,353 
a Farming (2190) 
(OBC) 
Four women, Lakshmavva, Nagavva, Shivavva and Parvathamma lived below an 
income level of Rs. 4,500 ($1 00) per person per year, as the poorest of the group. At 
the next level, in the range of Rs. 4,500 to 9,000 ($1 00 to $200) per person per year, 
were Yellamma, Sushila and Sangavva who could educate their children. At the 
higher end were Rangamma, Mariyamma and Kaveri, who had incomes exceeding 
Rs. 90,000 ($2,000) per year, and were reasonably affluent by local standards. The 
2. Traditional embroidery ofthe north Kamataka region 
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Income 
Per 
person 
per year 
1,153 
(26) 
3,056 
(69) 
3,542 
(81) 
4, 108 
(93) 
4,810 
(109) 
7,395 
{168) 
7,498 
(170) 
9,458 
(215) 
12,144 
(276) 
32,117 
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household income of Kaveri was under-estimated due to non-availability of income 
figures from different family members. In addition to the women participants, 
discussions were held with family members, SHG members of the seven groups to 
which these ten women belonged, villagers from the selected five villages and local 
NGO staff. There were 15 women's SHGs, and only those groups to which 
participants belonged were selected. 
All women were given a choice about their participation; out of the twelve who were 
contacted, ten participated. The research was introduced to each woman personally. 
They already knew that Sampark worked in twenty villages (35 villages in 2004) in 
Koppal with 120 women's groups (160 by 2004), and provided a range of support for 
group formation, training in management of groups, skill training, credit linkages, and 
linkages for government grants. They were informed that if Sampark was to make a 
positive impact on the lives of rural people, it needed to understand rural people 
better. As it was not possible to work with 1000 women for an in-depth 
understanding of their lives, only a few had been approached for this purpose. It was 
important that women did not feel obliged to participate because they would need to 
commit time for discussions. 
It was important that this research was not thought to be about 'getting information' 
or the women 'providing information'. The intention was to learn together about their 
lives through close mutual dialogue. The research began with visits to individual 
homes and farms and extended towards other family members too. If women felt a 
need to meet other participants, workshops were organised accordingly. 
The women who participated are referred to as 'research participants' and as 'women 
case study participants'. The names of all the women have been changed to protect 
their real identity. Latterly, most were more comfortable with their 'real names' and 
photographs being used; however, given the sensitivity of working with devadasis, 
the more ethical (and also conventional) option was chosen. 
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3.3.4 Time Scale 
The first phase had provided insights into those issues which needed in-depth study, 
and these called for work of an exploratory nature, with few women, committing time 
on a regular basis. Understanding actors' perspectives about impact and allowing for 
seasonality of cash flows also required long-term association, and a period of one year 
was the minimum required. It actually took longer (200 1-2003) as several events 
intervened in data collection, so the collection period was extended to ensure more 
continuity. Repeat visits were made through 2005 to update information. 
The time scale ofthe various phases ofthe research is depicted in Table 3-3 . 
Table 3-3: Time Scale of the Research 
Phases of the Research Year 1-2 Year3 Year4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7-9 
(1998-99} (2000} (2001} (2002} (2003} (2004-6} 
Exploration of research topic 
Methodology development I and first phase of field work 
Longitudinal case studies 
Analysis and validation of 
results 
Writing of the thesis -C' ·ff fi' . 
3.4 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
The monographic approach employs vanous methods including interviews, direct 
observation, participant observation, diaries, notebooks, maps, study of documents, 
physical artefacts, and discussions with key 'social authorities' (Hamel et al, 1993; 
Yin, 1994). The detailed information sought included financial transactions as well as 
other aspects of livelihoods not related to money. Secondary information was 
collected from local government and NGO offices. This section now discusses the 
research methods used for primary data collection, and how it was analysed. 
3.4.1 Methods of Data Collection 
The primary methods of in-depth case studies were semi-structured interviews with 
women, including questions covering the key issues derived from the three analytical 
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research frameworks (Appendix 2) . These were supplemented with insights from 
earlier field discussions. The participatory methods used are described in Table 3-4 
below: 
Table 3-4: Methods Used for Data Collection 
Methods 
Participant observation 
Women self recorded several aspects of their daily lives, such as travel, festival 
celebrations, illnesses, and other special events, with a specific focus on collecting 
detailed financial flows (incomes and expenses) to analyse sources and uses of money 
within the household over the year. 
Interviewers are necessarily implicated in creating the meanings attributed to research 
participants. As both parties participate in the interview process, meaning is 
' communicatively assembled' during the interview, and respondents are seen not as 
providers of information, but as ' constructors of knowledge in collaboration with 
interviewers' (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). Periodical validation meetings with the 
women participants helped to understand their attitudes towards money, credit, debt, 
SHG membership, relations with their peers, their means of reckoning fund-flows, 
and what is revealed and concealed from NGOs, the emotional content of different 
money transactions, and the power of money as social obligation. 
Caste-based practices of untouchability and ostracism were analysed in each village 
through open-ended group discussions. In addition, data on the socio economic 
profile of the villages was collected from Sampark records. This information was 
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supplemented through interviews with key informants and group discussions to focus 
on topics of interest (Krueger and Casey, 2000). 
The time line of data collection with the ten women is given in Table 3-6: 
Table 3-5: Time Line of Data Collection 
Data Collection Period (August 2001 to July 2004) 
r------r---
Name of the I Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Quarter 5 Quarter 6 Qtr 8-12 
Participants 
Lakshmavva 
Nagavva 
' -· ---
I Shivavva 
Parvathamma 
Yellamma 
Sushi Ia 
Sangavva 
Rangamma 
Kaveri 
Mariyamma 
(Aug-
Oct.Ol) 
-
-
-
(Nov.OI- (Feb- (May- I (Aug- j (Nov.02-
Jan.02) Aprii.02) July.02) Oct.02) Jan.03) 
I 
-
-
-
The thickness of the line indicates the intensity of the data collected 
April. 
03) 
* Gap filling and validation of results with participants were done during this period 
(May 
While contact was maintained throughout the period, there were several intervening 
phases when women were not ab le to maintain written records about all the 
livelihoods aspects under study. However, overall substantial data collection was 
possible due to use of multiple methods and periodic meetings with the entire group 
together. 
Women were visited once every three months. It soon became clear that women 
needed support to record data. My unfamiliarity with the local language called for in-
depth interviews to be done by local actors more familiar with the dialect. Five 
researchers of Sampark were therefore enrolled for data collection, which was 
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invaluable as language proficiency improved the quality of data collected. The field 
researchers met each woman once every two to three weeks, over a period of 18 
months. They had earlier training in participatory research methods including in-
depth interviews. As the research progressed, more training was provided e.g. in 
making seasonal calendars. They were briefed about the nature of the research and its 
objectives and hence the importance of adopting a consistent non-directive approach. 
They followed the principle of being unobtrusive, and did not insist on interviews 
when women were busy, and always fixed appointments with women beforehand. 
Many interviews took place on the farms when women were at work on their land. 
They worked on the details of the diary together with participants, and wrote down 
analysis and explanations that women gave, as well as the major events in their lives. 
Interviews were supplemented with the use of the additional research tools (e.g. 
activity profiles, open -ended discussions). This yielded more longitudinal data about 
women's access and control over resources and management of the different 
resources at their disposal. As time progressed, my own proficiency in Kannada 
increased and I needed other investigators less, but they continued to visit the women 
and accompanied me, in the interest of continuity and trust building. 
3.4.2 Limitation of Longitudinal Studies 
One limitation concerned the volume of data, which needed to be put into perspective. 
Lack of bounding and focus can lead to indiscriminate data collection resulting in data 
overload, and therefore some distillation is needed (Hamel et al, 1993). Even after the 
use of longitudinal studies and mapping of all inflows and outflows at the household, 
cash and non-cash, there were limits to the depths of analysis based on the data 
collected. For instance, the case studies do not provide conclusive data regarding 
whether rainfed farming or high input agriculture is profitable. 
3.4.3 Analysis and Validation 
As a first step, the data was put into the A TLAS.ti programme and analysed using 
different themes and various livelihood approaches and inter-relations (the codes used 
for analysis are listed in Appendix 2). The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework was 
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used to analyse various aspects of livelihood systems, particularly the vulnerability 
context of women's lives as well as the five types of capital. The Actor-Oriented 
Perspectives approach was used to analyse actions within a rationality and value 
based framework. The Nine Square Mandala was used to analyse issues such as inner 
realities, collective orientations, individual orientations, family space and socio-
economic space. The supply side factors (NGOs, banks, regulations and MF 
practices) outline the external dynamics. Women's own actions (arising from 
perceptions, household conditions, feelings, gender division of work, access and 
ownership of resources, livelihood strategies, aspirations, etc.) constitute internal 
dynamics. How these factors interact gives an in-depth understanding of women's 
livelihoods as well as the role of credit and other resources in forming their livelihood 
strategies. Group data was analysed without coding in A TLAS.ti, but validated 
through group assessment exercises with members of all the seven groups. 
An analysis of the data was presented to the participants individually and in groups. 
They met five times during the three year period of research to discuss the findings. 
Workshops were conducted to review the data collection process, analyse the data, 
and consolidate and validate the findings with participants. Findings at the macro 
level were written and circulated to managers of those projects that were covered 
during the first phase of the study period. These included officers of CARE India and 
their NGO partners, UNOPS (through whom the IF AD projects were visited) and 
IF AD representative for India. The perspectives emerging in the research were shared 
with them, as well as permission obtained for citing the project documents. This two-
stage process of analysis, followed by validation and feedback, enabled seeking 
alternative views of the data and competing interpretations (Brewerton and Milward, 
2001 ). 
3.5 Challenges of Participatory Research 
The research was longitudinal and participatory and involved intensive interactions 
with women on emerging issues. This section describes the difficulties that arose 
during the process of data collection, and how they were managed. The application of 
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principles of gender sensitive participatory research as they translated into action, is 
then discussed in detail. 
Post-colonial literary critics have questioned the ethics of 'giving voice' to others 
(Spivak, 1990, 2000), thus warning that the claim of reflexivity should not be to 
authorise the writer. Others acknowledge unequal exchanges and argue that empirical 
research should learn from, and not exploit others, and therefore practice greater 
reflexivity (Skeggs, 2002). Several means are suggested for this, which include 
treating participants fairly, showing them respect at all stages of research, keeping 
agreed appointments, fulfilling promises and agreed expectations, and not 
compromising their anonymity without their consent (Brewerton and Milward, 2001; 
Pini, 2003). 
3.5.1 Critiquing Objectivity and Participation 
A tenet of scientific research is its claim to objectivity, which in turn is seen as 
necessary for wider generalisation and applicability of the results. However, mere use 
of technology (statistical or analytical packages and use of computers) does not in 
itself constitute 'objective' research. The way research topics are selected, the 
research is designed and conducted, who participates and who gets left out may all 
increase subjectivity in research (Lin, 1976), and the values applied in these choices 
need to be recognised and stated. The use of hermeneutics helps to approach 
interpretation more cautiously, and allows a discovery of deeper meaning (Giddens, 
1991 ). Therefore, it can be more ethical to state one's own position in the research 
than to claim pure objectivity in research (Lin, 1976). Even if the researchers believe 
that they are neutral, other views and sympathies may be assigned to them by those 
whom they study, so it may be important to be 'neutral in the informant's terms' 
(Dexter, 1971 ). 
'Ontological objectivity', as applied to research findings, may apply to a process of 
inquiry or an inquirer (Hammersley, 2004b ). This does not imply that the 
researchers' own motives, interests, social background, political and religious 
commitments have no influence over the research process, only that they should not 
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have a systematic negative effect on the research. Harding (1992) goes a step further 
and in fact argues in favour of "strong objectivity", advocating the "privileging the 
perspectives of those who are socially marginalised, on the grounds that they are more 
capable of gaining genuine knowledge about society because they are not blinded by 
any commitment to sustaining the status quo" (Hammersley, 2004b: 751). Thus, one 
of the ethical implications here becomes the rational pursuit of other goals besides 
knowledge, such as social justice or gender equality. At the other end of the 
spectrum are those interpretive social scientists who argue that researchers should 
immerse themselves in the lives ofthose they study, and thus should be as subjective 
as possible to be able to achieve an account that is faithful to their point of view 
(Brewerton and Milward, 200 I; Blaikie, 2004). 
My being a member of Sampark raises the issue of objectivity of the research 
findings. To begin with, I was located in Bangalore and responsible for fundraising, 
while a field manager located in the Koppal office headed the field project. 
Participants did not associate me with the credit programme of Sampark. The 
research was not conducted as an assessment of the impact of microfinance but as a 
joint learning exercise about women's livelihoods. The two-year long field contact 
had more of an anthropological than financial perspective. Open-ended interviews 
with someone associated with the NGO that organised their groups helped women 
share their beliefs, experiences and . emotions rather than just giving 'desired 
responses' to predetermined questions. 
Experience of qualitative research, like in the longitudinal studies described above, 
engages the researcher intensely in the lives and livelihoods of local partners, which 
provides the motivation to enhance developmental research and brings out findings 
that particularly contribute to new learning. Researchers constantly use the 
interpretations of research participants; at the same time they offer their own 
interpretations too (Knorr Cetina, 1999). 
Uphoff (1985) suggests that degree of participation needed must be made clear, there 
should be realistic objectives for participation, funding organised for participation, 
responsibility sharing and participation in knowledge gathering. However, unequal 
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social relations may be reinforced and community elites may co-opt the development 
programme for their own benefit. Mosse (2004) warns that this is indeed possible and 
that the rhetoric of 'participation' may reinforce existing donor, project, and people's 
hierarchies and biases. 
Chambers (1985) 
highlights biases m 
development research 
that under-estimate rural 
poverty and prevent 
deeper understanding of 
its nature. Certain anti 
poverty biases in 
research are caused by a 
preference for selecting 
villages that are situated 
near urban areas and 
Figure 3-7: Avoiding Bias towards PRA Participants 
In the first phase of field visits I met with over sixty 
groups. As a practice I gifted Rs. 500-1000 ($11-22) to a 
group based on the local need. During a discussion in 
remote tribal village in Orissa Kalahandi district, I was 
aware that all the women were poor and I could not 
decide whether to offer the money. After the 
discussion was completed, I asked the leader that if I 
wanted to give something to the most needy among 
them, whom could I give it to? She immediately said 
that the person was absent and asked me to go with 
her. She took me to an old dilapidated hut where a 
woman was lying on the floor, with fever and an 
infected wound on her foot. She had been unable to 
along 
There 
mam roads. move for the past three days and was the only one who 
can be a 
preference for villages 
where projects are 
had not come for the group discussion that day. If I 
gave cash to her, it would help her to get treated. This 
underlined the importance of good leaders, and the 
need to care not only for those who are present for 
implemented, as against discussions but also for the missing ones. 
those where there are 
few/no intervention projects. Again, the actors are usually those who are available, 
rather than those who have been forced to migrate. The seasons selected are those 
that are more convenient to external visitors (dry or cool months) rather than those 
when people experience greater vulnerability (hot/wet months). 
This research attempts to counter these biases, by following the precepts of 
participatory research. It selects rural, poor, remote areas, and such localities' most 
marginalised women. It involved taking time, being unobtrusive, respecting women's 
time, listening to and learning from them (Chambers, 1985). 
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Feminist scholars have increased the researchers' awareness of the unspoken gender 
roles (Angrosino, 2004), and have advocated 'giving voice' to women. This is by no 
means a contested position (Hammersley, 2004a) and is challenged on grounds ofthe 
multiple perspectives people have, requiring 'multiple voices' as also whether it is 
possible for outsiders to give voice to the 'subaltern' (Spivak, 1998). 
Actors may change their behaviour when they are being observed, and longer stays 
can overcome this so that any feeling of being observed by a stranger is reduced 
(Angrosino, 2004). In this research, I dealt with this problem by visiting and 
interviewing the women regularly, and also through the involvement of field workers 
of Sam park as researchers who had long-term contact. As it is unreasonable to strive 
for a completely neutral presence, observational data has to be supplemented by 
triangulation (Ibid), done here by talking to other group members and family 
members, and this was another rationale for including as many as five devadasis in a 
group often women participants. 
Sometimes actors are not in a position to decide whether to consent until after their 
participation (Seiber, 2004). This was combined with validation meetings, to offer a 
chance to the research participants to give their informed consent after the data had 
been collected, and were sufficiently satisfied with the data and its interpretation. 
3.5.2 Dependence on Women Writers and Providers of Information 
Those women who agreed to share information about their livelihoods, were provided 
with chart paper, notebooks, and pens to record incomes, expenditures cropping 
patterns, travel and other life events. Yet their lack of literacy was an important factor 
in their inability to maintain written records. They had to depend on others who knew 
how to write, such as their children, neighbours' children or other relatives. It was 
difficult to take the children away from their play to do this 'work'. Finding this 
tedious, most requested the researchers to visit more often, so that they could record 
the data regularly and fill in gaps while they still remembered the details. One 
woman, Mariyamma, managed to write all details meticulously, and mustered 
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resources in terms of four scribes, her husband, brother-in-law, and two young girls 
from the neighbourhood. 
In several cases, expenditure appeared 
higher than income, and no corresponding 
sources of credit had been recorded. 
Tracking cash outflows (expenses, debt 
repayments and savings) triggered the 
women's memory and helped them recall 
"Why are you writing all the 
information about our expenses 
and income for others? Will you 
get money for writing all this?" 
- Shivaji, iR.angamrna's son 
incomes and other inflows. Thus, outflow tracking enabled further approximation of 
income levels. This confirmed the well-known phenomenon of fungibility of money, 
and that it is difficult not only for external agencies to track where their particular 
contribution went, for the fungibility of cash makes sources and uses of money 
difficult to track even by the women themselves. In large families, like that of 
Rangamma and Kaveri, where many members earned and spent the money, it was not 
possible to keep track of either the income or expenses on a daily basis. It was mostly 
done on a monthly basis, and seasonal calendars with each participant supplemented 
the picture of incomes and expenses. Further, the household member who earns 
sometimes bought only provisions for the family, or else incurred some other 
expenses, but was otherwise reluctant to disclose full income or savings potential to 
the rest of the family. Those who were uncomfortable with such disclosures 
dissuaded the women from writing the full information. For instance, Shivaji, 
Rangamma's son, became irritated when she asked him to write for her. It was only 
after a meeting with all the other family members that he participated again. She had 
stopped writing, but did remember and disclose further information again. On the 
other hand, the experience of writing their own incomes and expenses, and that of the 
household, gave family members a picture of overall family finances, and helped 
them improve the financial management of the family. Matching incomes and 
expenses is a common problem in surveys, often attributed to the respondents being 
poor and illiterate (PRADAN et al, 1998). However, here the problem was not 
resolved even though some respondents were more educated and wealthy. In fact, 
illiteracy posed more problems where it created a dependence on others for the 
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recording. The greater problems related to the paucity of women's time and a general 
reluctance of the non-poor families to share income data. 
While the research was primarily conducted with women, several interviews were 
conducted with their husbands/sons and other family members. It is important to 
recognise that men often have financial and other livelihoods information about the 
household . It is therefore not easy or possible to get all the relevant in formation from 
women alone. The situation of devadasis was different, as their male partners were 
not part of the household at all. 
Kaveri's husband, Lakshmana Reddy, 
was uncomfortable about her trying 
to be a good leader, which had come 
about through her contact with 
Sampark-initiated women's groups. 
He was also uneasy about her asking 
for more information about 
household finances. Sushi la's 
husband was extremely concerned 
when she wrote about his expenses 
on alcoho l and beat her for doing so. 
"It is a learning experience for me to 
write down all my expenses, I never 
used to do it before. Now I know my 
income and expenses very well. I used 
to waste too much money; I try to 
reduce expenses now. It was also 
good for me to talk with people who 
are educated and have studied so 
much, and involving in the research 
decisions has been my major 
learning." 
- Mariyamma 
Some women had more cooperation from the men in the household. Rangamma 's 
husband Mailarappa, who is also illiterate, partic ipated fully in the writing and 
provided information for interviews, and her son Gururaj encouraged her too, and 
helped with keeping the charts. Similarly Mariyamma's husband Siddappa, and her 
brother-in-law Nagappa, both helped with the recording. 
Other family members cooperated a great deal during the study. Yellamma's 
daughter-in-law Lakshmavva ensured that whenever Yellamma was away from the 
village, she called the scribe, Maruti , to write the charts or notebook. Mariyamma's 
daughter Mariyavva helped her with the writing whenever she could. The mothers of 
devadasis also helped in providing information, and always cooperated. Discus ion 
about caste dynamics, farming, cropping practices and natural resource management 
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were always inclusive of men from the five villages, supplementing the data on 
ecological and other aspects of the local context. 
3.5.3 Valuing and Respecting Women's Experiences 
The attention to women was 
translated through the methods 
used, whereby first unstructured 
interactions took place, then in 
each interview sufficient space 
was provided for women to 
shape the direction of the 
interview. 
In all cases, the women openly 
participated in the research. 
Some were willing to 
participate, as they felt that they 
"You cannot interview all the 2000 women 
in Sampark's SHGs. q understanding my 
household helps, I am happy to join this 
one year research and share all the details 
of my family., 
-Rangamma 
"My life is completely different from 
another devadasi, and our experiences are 
not the same, you cannot generalise for all 
devadasis from my story. I can only talk 
about myself and no one else." 
- Shivavva 
were representatives of other women like them. Yet others were clear that they only 
talked about their own lives, which to them were quite unique and not representative 
of anyone else. Each claimed that they had never talked about themselves and their 
lives; no one had ever asked them before but they were keen to talk. Some said it 
would also be an opportunity for them to learn, not only from themselves, but also 
from what the researcher was herself interested in. They said they were also keen to 
see the analysis and the conclusions of the research. 
Yet, difficulties arose in the two-year period of data collection. Shivavva went away 
for six months to her daughter's place to help her with her delivery and was not 
available to record her livelihoods information. Her husband then developed a 
swelling, and she took him for treatment but he did not survive. When he died she 
was supposed to stay within her house and not come out for three months. Her writer, 
Maruthi, a boy of 12 years was scared of entering her house when her husband was ill, 
and also during the mourning period. She declared her interest in the study, though, 
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and whenever the researcher met her, she effected to remember and reconstruct and 
gave all the relevant information. Sushila, being literate, wrote down all the expenses 
on her chart and diary, including those of her husband 's alcoholism. He beat her for 
this, and eventually she stopped keeping the diary, but still she provided the data, and 
was never deterred by the beatings. Kaveri stopped providing much detail , primarily 
because when she questioned her husband about family finances, he became angry 
and withdrew information. She also shared her frustration about her husband being 
corrupt, and when he became aware of this, she stopped keeping all records and felt 
that any home interviews would be difficult because other family members would be 
present. She came for some interviews to the Sampark office, but sometimes her 
husband accompanied her, in which case she could not disclose much. 
Vulnerabilities were created in 
sharing the data as the women 
revealed their strategies of 
money management. Yellamma 
was given money for household 
expenses by her son, from which 
she saved small amounts for her 
daughter's marriage. When he 
came to know this, through the 
record keeping, he became angry, 
and took over the management of 
"My son always had a doubt about the 
way I used money. He thought that I 
spend the money remaining from 
household expenses on ornaments for my 
daughter or things for my grandchildren. 
When all the information was available 
on the chart, he stopped fighting with me 
about this. 
Now I am very happy that my son has 
taken up the responsibility of the family.'' 
- Yellamma 
household expenses, so she lost control of family finances. Later on, he 
acknowledged that her strategy was in the interest of the whole family, and also a 
good one, and gave the responsibility back to her. Initially, she was upset, but later 
happily related the story of how her care and concern for every member of the 
household was recognised and accepted. Such difficulties in divulging sensitive 
information or those arising out of lack of information or memory are considered a 
common feature of qualitative studies (Mayoux, 1997). Despite these difficulties, the 
women continued their participation in the study, welcomed visits to their homes, and 
came for as many group discussions as they could (the participation in these was 
never less than eight out of the ten women participants). 
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At first, when the data was not recorded regularly, or when it was difficult to meet a 
woman regularly, one response was to consider dropping the particular woman from 
the research and select another. This concern arose from the need to have ' good data 
sets ', and an orientation that differed from the lives of women whose being 
represented. Attention was therefore paid to ' why' women were not able to record, 
and why they were not available for the interviews regularly . There were issues about 
the tools and their appropriateness for illiterate women, but more importantly, there 
were problems in their lives that needed greater attention. The analysis of these 
events provided valuable insights into their livelihoods. The women participated 
despite these problems and research was completed with the same set of women for 
the entire period of research. 
3.5.4 Relating to Research Participants 
One issue in feminist research methodology is the split between the subject and the 
object (Pini, 2003). There needs to be an acknowledgement of how researchers relate 
to women, what data was generated, how it was used, and who has the ownership of 
this new knowledge that is created through the process. Initially, as the woman who 
was approaching them for collaboration, I was dependent on their agreement (or 
denial) and this position continued over the next two years, when I depended on their 
writing and sharing of information about their personal lives. If the research was 
regarded as mine, and thus external to them, the data might have been recorded more 
for me than for themselves. The quality of data depended on their participation, 
involvement and ownership. My dependence gave them some power and helped the 
research to be more sensitive in giving attention to their life events and perspectives. 
These processes also fulfilled a "broader feminist aim of facilitating women ' s 
empowerment" (Ibid: 425). 
The five devadasi wonien, who had 
experienced extreme subjugation, had 
repressed several emotions which they 
had never before voiced, and this 
research provided them an opportunity 
"I was earlier not comfortable about 
expre,ssing my life story. Now I have 
understood this research is very 
important. You can go ahead and use 
my real name if you want- It's alright 
now." 
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to do so. They shared feelings, sadness, happiness, hopes and dilemmas. They 
sometimes broke down during the interviews as they recalled painful experiences. 
This was difficult to deal with, as certain interviewers did not have the formal training 
to deal such situations. Was it appropriate to open up discussions, which then one 
does not know how to close? Was it right to open up conflicts that one would not 
know how to resolve? The research team often grappled with these difficult 
questions. 
Sampark requested training from the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro 
Sciences (NIMHANS) (with whom Sampark had conducted research into devadasis). 
Interviewers learnt how to open and close discussions that brought back difficult 
memories, on a more positive note. Often the women's courage in difficult situations 
made a deep impression and they too learnt from relating, sharing, analysing and 
consolidating their own experiences. 
3.5.5 Tangible Benefits of Participation 
The participants later claimed 
several benefits from the research. 
The most important was an 
improved understanding of their 
own situation and the research 
process. In most cases, the 
participation was not confined to 
the woman; her family members 
actively participated too. When 
Yellamma Hosagondabala was out 
of station, her daughter-in-law 
"We were not getting an account of 
earning from coolie work, nor of any of 
the expenditure. But now we have the 
accounts of everything, we know the 
income and expenditure and everyone 
knows, so there is no fight among us. 
We know where we spend more, so we 
have also reduced expenses on beetle 
leaves, nuts and tea, tobacco, and snuff 
powder. Instead, we spend more on 
vegetables. " 
- Yellamma's daughter-in-law 
took the responsibility of calling the boy who was the scribe, and giving him all the 
details of income and expenditure to write down. The scribes felt that they had 
benefitted too. The little boys said that they had understood household finances for 
the fir t time, and al o that they had learnt to form letters well, got good practice and 
improved their handwriting. The most important benefit that women claimed was 
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that they had become aware of, and were therefore able to reduce their expenses. The 
interviewers learnt more about women's lives, participatory learn ing methods, and 
seasonal calendars. They stressed that the relationships with women were most 
important in determining the quality of the information, and that the understanding of 
rural livelihoods gained from involvement in this research would help them a great 
deal in their work as field staff of a development organisation. 
There was only one indicator of women 's ownership of the information, and this 
concerned their own use of informat ion. In most cases, women began to use the 
information soon after they started recording it. It generated conversations w ithin the 
fam ily. The whole fam ily did an immediate analysis of income and expenditure 
regularly and discussed where they could reduce expenses, or how they could manage 
the finances of the household better. Mariyamma's husband wanted to analyse the 
farming expenses. They were keen on see ing the consolidated figures on the 
spreadsheets, and helped to clean up the anomalies. 
"We ourselves understood our life situation." - Shivavva 
"We learnt a lot about our difficulties, expenses, income, food and other things 
like the way we spend our time and others in the family earn and use their time." 
-Rangamma 
"It takes time to understand a question clearly." - Nagavva 
"Earlier I could not explain to my son how I spent the money which was given by 
him, and used to get scolded by him. But now when he asks for details of 
expenses I do not say anything, I just point my finger towards the brown sheet on 
the wall where everything is written. He can see how even one paisa is spent and 
on what item!"- Shivavva 
Some were able to share emotional experiences. Sushila explained how talking about 
her life had allowed her to relive and express her pride in the way she had grown and 
improved her life: 
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"I feel my burden is lighter after sharing my bad experiences. When I was a 
child, there was not enough food at home and I used to go to school with an 
empty stomach. When I grew up my father arranged my marriage with a 
person who was already married and did not have any work. At the time of 
the wedding my husband borrowed a sari from his uncle and told him that he 
will return It In one year, which he was not able to do because of lack of 
earnings. One day his uncle came and took away that sari from my body, 
because I was wearing the same sari that day. From that day onwards, the 
Incident has been in my mind, and always disturbed my concentration on 
work, now I feel good after talking about It with you and Sampark staff. Now 
I have improved financially by working hard, and having two to three 
businesses, I can say so proudly that I can buy, five such saris with my own 
earning and give to my husband's uncle." 
- Sushila 
It is important to establish a role 
that can be assimilated by the 
society under study (Dexter, 1971 ), 
as participatory and longitudinal 
studies tend to raise expectations 
of local people sharing their 
knowledge and experiences, which 
"We feel so proud to be part ofthesf! ease 
studies. If our life stories help in making 
and getting suitable projects to help poor 
women like us we will definitely try to do 
our best and share about our 
livelihoods." 
-Rangamma 
is problematic if the research is unlikely to link with problem-solving mechanisms 
(Gerritsen, 2003). The research was conducted in the field project of an NGO, where 
women knew and trusted the organisation, and therefore did not hesitate to provide 
information. The negatives were that there were expectations from the field worker in 
terms of loan, grant or job. In managing these expectations, the skills, sense of 
humour, personality of the researcher and relationship with the women come into 
play. The expectations were later fulfilled in a different way by assisting the NGO to 
initiate new action programmes based on women's needs and preferences. 
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''In my :field experience, I have been 
involved in many research studies, I never 
came across even one case where a woman 
expected money for her time. But definitely 
there is an expectation among women that 
this study will help them in some way in the 
future. Nagavva, Parvathamma, 
Rangamma and many others want at least 
one desire that they have for many days to 
be{uljllled: that they get electricity 
connections through the Bhagya Jyothi 
scheme. Rangamma wants a loan for an 
auto-rickshaw for her son. Sangavva and 
Nagavva want loans to buy buffaloes. 
We are working with them regularly, we 
keep in touch, through our research we 
understand their concerns and desires, so 
they want us to attend to fulfil their 
livelihood needs; they do not want cash 
from Samparkl" 
- Jeyaseelan, Manager of Sam park, Koppal 
get anything directly, but poor people like you, somewhere in the country or in other 
countries, will get the benefit of this research'. The assumption behind this assertion 
is that new knowledge generated through research leads to changes in policy that 
positively impacts the poor (Prameela, 2004; Premchander, 2003a). 
Policy change seemed too distant a promise to make to these actors. Discussions 
were held with the Sampark team about possible options: The first one was to pay the 
case study participants for their time. After all, the interviewers would derive 
benefits, directly (money) and indirectly (through publications, recognition and 
therefore greater status). This proposal was not acceptable for several reasons. To 
begin with, the case study women drew a certain pride from participation in this 
study. Money was not one of the rewards they were looking for; they had originally 
agreed to contribute their time free. To pay them for their time would have been to 
devalue their commitment to the research and deny their ownership of it. Secondly, 
as a development organisation, Sampark is engaged in many research projects, and a 
practice started on one project would have to be followed by all. A new practice 
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would change the basis of common collaboration, a change viewed by staff as 
negative. Finally, there could be competition for participating in research activities as 
compared with other development activities which would give wrong signals at the 
field level. So, direct compensation to only research participants was impractical 
while indirect benefits were too remote. Initiators need to plan for how the whole 
community can derive tangible benefits (Maselli et al, 2004). 
Sampark later reflected on the appropriate response to the question about what 
research can contribute to improve the livelihoods of local research partners? One of 
the most revealing explorations of livelihoods of women lay in their expression of 
their aspirations and hopes for the future. Invariably, these were not related to more 
money or assets, but to the future and security of their children's livelihoods, for 
which they perceived 
education to be a priority. 
Women in the poorest 
households, especially 
devadasis, were unable to 
earn enough through 
agricultural labour and 
tended to use the children to 
help with household chores, 
child care, sitting in the shop 
or grazing cattle. Children in 
"I get Rs. 10-12 ($0.23) as wages. It is not 
enough for rice for the family. I took a loan 
and started a petty shop, now I sit there and 
earn Rs. 25 ($0.57) a day. But when someone 
is ill, and we need money, I leave my twelve-
year-old daughter to sit in the shop and I go 
for labour work. She is good at studies, and 
when I make her miss school/ike this, she gets 
upset. If she stays with me, she will lose 
interest in studies. But if you take her away, 
she can concentrate on studies and I will still 
somehow manage the rest of the family." 
- Member of a devadasi group 
these households were engaged in meeting livelihoods needs and tended to drop out 
of school. For these reasons, women wanted Sampark to invest in the education of 
their children, which they felt was their most important livelihood need. Sampark 
decided to respond to this need, not only for the research participants, but also for all 
the group members in all Sampark's villages. A survey was conducted to identify 
how many children dropped out of school and why. A full plan of education was 
prepared for children, whereby grants were to be raised for children of the poorest 
women, and a credit fund for education was created for the group members who 
needed loans, not grants. Sampark decided to raise funds to educate about 200 
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children, for a period of five to seven years, until they completed Class 10, i.e. 
secondary education. 
Another important contribution to the livelihoods of case study participants and others 
in the Sampark villages was made through the follow up ofthe discussions on natural 
resources. Sampark engaged in a learning exercise with the villagers about 
sustainable management of their natural resources, helped to form a farmer ' s forum , 
and facilitated their access to state funds to implement soi l and water conservation 
measures in the village. This was set up as a credit fund managed by the farmers' 
forum. It was thus possible to raise issues and give voice to local people, which led 
development practitioners to consider other local livelihoods issues. 
3.5.6 Recognising the Limits 
There were, however, instances of the limits to external support. Sushila's ten-year-
old daughter has a slowly growing tumour in her brain. Sampark committed the 
money for her treatment, and Sushila brought her husband and child to consult the 
best specialists in Bangalore. The doctor advised the parents that an operation was 
essential for the chi ld's survival, but carried a risk of losing some of her mental 
faculties. The parents decided against the operation, and the researcher and NGO 
respected this decision. 
Lakshmavva, Parvathamma, Yellamma and Shivavva's children had dropped out of 
school. Shivavva sti ll hoped that her chi ld would continue his studies. She said: 
"My son studied till the 51h class and stopped going to school. If we had forced him 
he would probably have continued. He has not gone to school for the past three 
years; he used to keep his bags and books at home and go to play marbles. He is not 
at all interested in studies. I had given him a school bag on which I did Kasuti work 
and look here, the bag and books are lying unused. " When the son was asked, he 
said: "My mother took me out of school when I was in 3rd class, after which I have not 
been to school. " When asked if she would send the son to school if someone 
sponsored his education, she said : "I will definitely send him if he is interested ", but 
he intervened : "No, I won 't go .. . I don 't know how to read and write but I know how 
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to write my name, that's all." It was the same with Lakshmavva's children, they are 
unlikely to join school again. There was a realisation that in these cases there is no 
way of turning the clock back, and that the livelihoods improvements and security for 
children who have already left school must be approached in other ways, e.g. through 
vocational training for employment or enterprise. 
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Livelihoods Context 
Chapter 4: Livelihood Context 
The three main themes investigated here are: the livelihoods context where the actors 
live ; women ' s own needs, preferences and strategies for the use of money; and the 
processes of SHGs, as the main forums utilised for delivering micro finance. 
Micro 
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This chapter explores how the context in which women live influences the use and 
impact of money, and outlines several factors in the macro-economic context, at the 
district and taluk level. The meso perspective is provided in the village level 
findings, which are based on focus group discussions with women's SHGs and other 
villagers. The micro perspective, of individual women's land/livelihoods 
management, supplements the meso (village) and macro (district) level data, to 
provide insights into how women determine their strategies in given livelihoods 
contexts. 
Orthodox microfinance studies take a financial perspective, and usually track the use 
and impact of money in a more limited way, with little attention to contextual factors. 
These factors are all interrelated, but, for ease of discussion, are classified under three 
broad categories: the ecological and economic context, the socio-cultural context and 
the institutional context. 
4.1 Ecological and Economic Context 
Karnataka stands seventh among 15 major states ranked by their human development 
indices (GOK, 1999), yet Koppal is one of the poorest and lowest ranked districts on 
human development and gender indices (George et al, 2005), and this can be 
attributed to certain native constraints. The primary livelihoods constraints affecting 
demand and supply of credit are imposed by the ecological and economic context, 
which are now discussed. 
4.1.1 Agriculture in the Drought-Prone Region 
Koppal district is spread over 5559 square kilometres and comprises four taluks1, with 
Koppal taluk covering 1375 square kms., 25% of its total area. The district houses a 
total population of about 10 lakhs spread over 488 villages. Each taluk has varying 
agricultural potential depending on its access to water from a local dam. In total 
82,702 hectares (60%) is the net area available for farming, amounting to 32,351 
landholdings, as shown in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1: Distribution of Landholdings 
Size of Landholdings No of Percentage Area Percentage 
holdings (%) (Hectares) (%) 
Marginal and small (less than 15 ,530 50 28,711 19 
two hectares) 
Semi-medium (2-4 hectares) 10,044 30 28,123 28 
Medium sized (4-10 hectares) 5,584 17 33,056 34 
Large holdings (> 10 hectares) 1,193 3 18,443 19 
Total (Koppal taluk) 32,351 100 98,323 100 
Source: GOK, 2004 
Eighty percent of landholdings were marginal, small or semi-medium, i.e. less than 4 
hectares. The district level Census data did not disclose how many households were 
landless. Land is an important asset, though earning from land was primarily rain 
dependent, with only 24% of all households owning irrigated lands. 
Koppal is a semi-arid and drought-prone 
district. The average normal rainfall in the 
district is 572 mm per year spread over 28 
days; the district experienced drought in the 
years 2001 to 2003, with an average annual 
rainfall of 367 mms (GOK, 2004). There was 
good rainfall in 2004, ending a period of four 
years of continuous drought. 
Low rainfall, has led to depletion of ground 
water, further aggravated by the digging of 
deeper tube-wells, from which only saline 
water is available. Land conditions in the 
study villages (all belonging to Koppal taluk) 
are thus poor. The fields are uneven, stony and 
lack protection from rainwater. Most have no 
"I have spent my entire 
lifetime in search of water. In 
search of water, my hair has 
become white." 
- Rudrappa, a farmer from 
Bikanhalli Village 
(Premchander et al 2003: 21) 
"I have four acres of land but 
it is near the river-bank and 
so it is flooded by the river 
water for more than half of 
the year. I cannot grow 
anything on that land when 
the situation is so." 
- Yellamma 
1 Each State in India is divided into districts, subdivided into blocks, called taluks, the next 
level of administrative units, which comprise between 40 to 80 villages. 
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bundi or any other arrangement to irrigate water and the more fertile topsoil has been 
so eroded that farmers use chemical fertilisers and hybrid seeds to obtain even a 
moderate yield. Some lands provided by the government for the devadasis are 
unproductive because they are rocky with thorny bushes, and need extensive clearing 
to be farmed and are regularly submerged by the waters of the nearby Tungabhadra 
dam for several months every year. The villagers of Bikanhalli claimed that there 
were 5000 trees in the 1960s, compared with 
just 2500 now. Trees have been depleted not 
only from private lands but also from 
common lands and forests. This has created 
a deficiency of firewood and biomass 
availabi lity in the area, and has also 
accelerated soil erosion from wind and water 
(Premchander et al, 2003). 
"There was a forest at that 
time and I was getting the raw 
materials (bamboo) for basket 
weaving from the forest, but 
now the forest has been cut 
down and they use the lands 
for farming." 
- Yellamma 
Farmers in this region continuously experiment with their cropping pattern, balancing 
cash and food crops (the result of two PRA exercises with farmers is depicted in 
Figure 4-3). Crops are planted in both red and black soi ls and in irrigated as well as 
dry lands. PRA exercises showed that agricultural incomes were subject to significant 
seasonal variation and also depended on the type of land . Farmers with irrigation 
facility, e.g. through borewells, did not keep the land fallow at all , and took three 
crops in a year. The farmers who had more than one piece of land, used it at different 
times, always based on water availability. Cropping on irrigated land was more 
expensive as it needed regular weeding, usage of pesticides, and fertilizers and also 
electricity charges. The average expenses of cropping on irrigated land were Rs. 
4,000 ($89) per acre to obtain an income of Rs. 5,000 to 6,000/- ($111 to133). The 
average expenses on dry land were Rs . 1,500 to 2,000 ($333 to 44) per acre and 
income was Rs. 4,000 to 5,000 ($89 to 111 ). 
2 Soil and water conservation structures, usually two to three feet high walls built of stone and 
soil. 
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Figure 4-2: Cropping Pattern 
in Koppal Taluk 
Crops Grown in Early Crops Grown in Late 
Monsoon Season Monsoon Season 
"Mungari" Or Rainy "Hingari" Or Winter 
Season (June to October) Season (November to 
March) 
• Groundnut • Sunflower 
• Hybrid Jowar, Maize • White Jowar 
• Sunflower • Cotton 
• Bajra, Minor millets • Maize 
• Red Gram, Bengal • Ground nut 
gram • Wheat 
• Toor Dal, Cow pea • Kusibi (oil seed) 
• Vegetables, Onion, • Vegetables and chillies 
Chillies 
ten women studied, six had land, of between one half to three acres of irrigated land 
and half to twelve acres of dry land. Income per acre from land is presented in Table 
4-2. 
Table 4-2: Income from Land (per acre) 
Name Early Monsoon season Late Monsoon Season 
Irrigated Dry Irrigated Land Dry 
Land Land Land 
1. Mariyamma Rs. 3,375 Rs. 755 Rs. 3,366 Rs. 899 
(3 acres irrigated and 6.5 ($75) ($16.77) ($74.8) ($19.9) 
acres dry land) 
2. Rangamma Rs. 3,325 
( 2 acres of dry land) ($73.88) 
3. Sangavva Rs. 2,044 Rs. 10,000 
( 112 acre of irrigated land) ($45.42) ($222) 
4. Yellamma Rs. 733 
( 4 acres of dry land, near the ($16.28) 
riverbank). 
5. Kaveri Rs. 2,000 No data Rs. 4,500 Rs. 1,209 
(2 acres of irrigated and 11 ($44.44) ($1 00) ($26.86) 
acres of dry land) 
6. Parvathamma Rs. 3,340 
(1/2 acre of irrigated land) ($74.22) 
In a year of good and evenly distributed rainfall , income from dry land could be equal 
to that from irrigated land. Variation in net earnings also depends on the management 
of the land. Rangamma managed her dry land such that she earned Rs. 3,325 
($73.88), close to the Rs. 3,375 ($75) per acre that Mariyamma earned from her 
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irrigated land. Kaveri was able to earn only Rs. 2,000 ($44.44) per acre from her 
irrigated land. Sangavva earned Rs. 1,022 ($22.71) on her half-acre plot of land, and 
could only cultivate it for the four months when it was not submerged. As she was 
able to go for coolie labour during the same months, she divided her time between 
labour work and working on own farm, thereby balancing her earnings from land and 
labour. However, in the late monsoon season, when there was less demand for labour, 
she worked on her own land and planted commercial crops like vegetables (which can 
be plucked more often than food-crops like jowar and millets, which are harvested 
only once), earning as much as Rs. 5,000 ($111) on that crop. Irrespective of the size 
of land holdings all the women followed a cropping pattern that allowed them to get 
food grains for household consumption and also commercial crops which provided 
cash to purchase other items like clothes, detergents and meet their medical, travel 
expenses, etc. 
The difference between yield on dry land and irrigated land depends on several 
factors such as: amount and distribution of rainfall, cropping pattern, incidence of 
pests, technical management, and human labour invested. The micro-level details 
highlight that several factors influence earnings from land, which are related as much 
to ecological conditions as to economic and management factors. Again, these figures 
are only for one year, and land utilisation and annual returns vary for every 
household, making it difficult to generalise about overall earnings. If rains are scanty, 
which was often the case in this drought-prone region, there was little or no income 
from dry land cultivation. 
Kaveri, who had 14 acres, left 9 uncultivated over the study period because of no rain. 
Similarly, Mariyamma cultivated only 2.5 acres of dry land, leaving 4 acres fallow, 
claiming that she did not have the resources, and would not risk investing in it. Only 
24% households had irrigated lands they could cultivate in dry years. Thus, the 
earning potential depends, not on the total ownership of land, but on land where there 
was irrigation. As irrigation is so important, borewells, which are the main source of 
irrigation, are important and as their numbers multiply, there is further depletion of 
ground water resources. The following statements of women illustrate this: 
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"I managed to sink a borewe/1 in this land through the Ganga Kalyan Yojane. I had 
to spend Rs. 1,500 ($33.33) on this, for the dalal (broker), and getting the relevant 
papers from the tehsildar (local revenue officer). We had a good crop of groundnut 
and had some money in hand, so were able to pay for these expenses ourselves 
(without taking a loan). It used to yield a lot of water, but this has reduced over the 
past six months. My neighbour saw the quantity of water I was getting, so he has 
sunk a borewe/1 very close to mine."- Parvathamma 
"Twelve years ago the government provided one borewe/1 for about 50 families in 
Bikanhalli. It was in Yamunavva 's land, who was a member in the Gram Panchayat. 
All the 50 families took water for cultivation from there. I also got water from this 
borewe/1 for ten years. For the past two years, Yamunavva has forbidden everyone to 
take water from this borewell, as her land is getting spoiled by people coming to use 
the motor. There are now two groups, 20 families support Yamunavva and others 
reported to the police but no action was taken. Then an officer from the Agriculture 
Department came and enquired about the issue. The two groups argued and fought, 
and the officer went back without solving the issue. The groups then asked for the 
borewell to be closed. Yamunavva then separated from the group. Eventually the 
borewell was closed. Then the groups invested Rs. 30,000 ($652) each and made 
separate borewells, one covering 20 and another covering 30 households. Now I am 
getting water from the new borewe/1 for cultivation. " - Sangavva 
The macro-level information thus showed increasing groundwater depletion and 
salinity of lands. At the household level, farmers adopted high input agriculture. The 
availability of water was a critical determinant of earnings, and the sinking of a 
borewell was the first and single most important investment land-owning households 
made. There was little evidence that agriculture was profitable3, yet, land was a 
coveted asset and agriculture the main occupation. A Sampark field manager 
explained: 
3 Agriculture and non~agriculture expenses were difficult to separ;lte because of fungible 
monies, labour payments received or agricultural inputs obtained in cash and kind, and 
produce shared in kind or sold, and even when women faithfully recorded many transactions 
they did not consider many of these distinctions worth recording. 
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"Although agriculture is risky and appears unprofitable, it is the main occupation. 
What else do people have to do here? They want at least some land, so that they can 
cultivate. Farmers have a cultural and psychological attachment to farming; they do 
not like to leave their lands fallow. In the end, of course, they live on hope: every 
year, they hope for good rains. " 
So, while land is important for household food security, it is also important for 
livelihood purposes. On the other hand, agriculture is risky, and not always 
profitable. Farmers realised that it did not give satisfactory incomes, as Mariyamma 
explained: 
"By the time we pay off the loans for seeds and fertiliser and pesticides, there is 
nothing left to carry forward to the next year, and we need to borrow again for the 
next cycle." 
Many marginal and small farmers, therefore, were only slightly better off than the 
landless households, and also depended on casual farm labour to enhance their 
meagre incomes. 
4.1.2 Agricultural Wage Labour 
The landless and small/medium farmers with no irrigation facilities particularly 
depended on casual labour in the irrigated lands of their own or neighbouring villages, 
where too work was limited and seasonal. A typical seasonal calendar is presented in 
Table 4-3. 
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Table 4-3: Seasonal Calendar - Agricultural Labour Work 
Seasons/ Work Time Wages 
Months 
August- Women go for weeding Morning 9 to 2 Get Rs. 15-20 ($0.33 to 
October pm 0.44) per day 
If they continue Get Rs. 5 ($0.11) more, 
from 3 to 6 pm i.e. Rs . 20-25 ($0,45 to 
0.57) 
November- Women go for harvesting work From 10 am to Get Rs. I 0-12 ($0 .23 to 
February 6pm 0.27) per day 
March-May Little work for women in this Full day (9 am In case women are called 
season to 6 pm) for work, they are paid 
Rs. 8-10 ($0.18 to 0.23) 
Men get more work: land- per day 
levelling, spreading manure and 
cleaning the land Men are paid Rs. 25 
($0.57) per day 
June- July Monsoon sowing work begins. Full day (9 am During this season they 
Women get seeding and to 6 pm) get Rs. 12-15 ($0.27 to 
fertilising work 0.34) per day 
If the monsoon fails in June or 
July, women can only collect I 0 Neem seeds are sold at 
kg neem seeds per day the rate of Rs. I ($0.02) 
per kg 
Women ' s wages are lower throughout the year. Though men work more for three 
months a year, women do some farm labour all through the year, except March to 
May which are the lean months for farm work. Wage labour is paid for in cash and 
kind. Not having any animals herself, Rangamma allowed her workers to take away 
fodder. The practice of giving fodder (in addition to wages) for labour is common 
among the vi llages in the taluk, especially during the harvest months when labourers 
work longer hours. In certain villages, jowar is bartered in the grocery store for 
provisions, and also taken instead of money as wages. When she needed jowar she 
worked as an agricultural labour on neighbouring farms, not for cash but to get food 
grain. 
Whether in cash or kind, the total earning from wage labour depended on the season, 
as well as the number of members in the household, and the latter is analysed in detail 
in Chapter 5. 
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4.1.3 Non-Farm Employment and Skills 
Koppal district has a population of 11 .93 lakhs (GOK, 2002) and the employment in 
different sectors is given in the following table: 
Table 4-4: Sectoral Distribution of 
Employment in Koppal district 
Sector Persons employed Percentage 
Agriculture 3,48,535 89 
Small Business 12,768 3 
Professionals 11,822 3 
Government 12,428 3 
Banks and LIC 761 1 
Teachers 3,798 I 
Total 3,90,112 100 
Industrial development of Koppal ta/uk is particularly low. There are 233 small 
industrial units (GOK, 2004). They employ 1,231 people from a population of 
3, 13 ,898. Female literacy is particularly low with 5% of women being literate (group 
discussions data) . The only life-skills participants and their families had were farm or 
contract labour, although a few were able to do traditional embroidery and tailoring. 
There were also several stone cutting units in the informal sector, whereby groups of 
people blast and cut rocks, convert them into one-foot cubes or stone jelly, and supply 
them to contractors (Premchander et a!, 2003). Koppal has over 300 small units 
where human hair (donated to temples) is brought, sorted, cleaned, sized and 
exported. The units are in the informal sector, and employ about 3,000 women 
(Sampark estimate), but there are no recorded statistics. Thus, not only is the 
potential earning from agriculture uncertain, the potential for non-farm activities in 
Koppal is also limited by low industrial development, and the employability/ self-
employability of people is further limited by their low skill levels. 
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4.1.4 Migration as a Means of Survival 
As a result of this there is an increasing pressure to migrate . 20% of households had 
one or more family members migrating within and outside Koppal district for labour 
work, as described in Figure 4-3. 
Figure 4-3: Observed Migration Pattern 
I Migration Pattern 
I 
1 
Within Koppal District Outside Koppal District 
(Koppal Town, t;angavathi) (Ratnagiri, Goa, Shimoga and Mangalore) 
l 
~ ~ 
Agriculture Fishing work at Construction work at 
Labour work Ratnagiri and Goa Shimoga and Mangalore 
I I 
~ People: Family of2-3 members ~ People: Group of 15-30 ~ People: Team of 15-20 
-women & men from all castes people (young men) members 
~ Period: 3 months ~ Period: 9 months ~ Period: 6-9 months 
~ Nature of Work: Plucking of ~ Nature of Work: );> Nature of work: 
chi llies, cotton and harvesting Fishing on steamboats Construction of building 
of paddy ~ Income: Net earning of and digging for telephone 
~ Income: No net savings Rs. 7,000 - 10,000 and electricity cabling 
brought back to village ($159- 227) per person ~ Income: Net earning of 
Rs . 6,000- I 0, 000 ($136 -
227) per person 
In villages with relatively high irrigation levels, as in Bikanhalli, farmers did not 
migrate but obtained labour on nearby farms. Nagavva said: 
"A bout 10 to 15 people from our village go to Sidhamannahalli near Gangavati for 
plucking red chilli and cotton. People get a shed to stay from the landlord. They get 
wages of about Rs. 25 to 30 ($0.5- 0.6) per day. They stay for about 3 months and 
come back. The amount the farmers give meets only the expenses on food and clothes 
while on migration: Allige alii, pujege puje (meaning that they return empty handed, 
with no savings). 
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Some go to another village for maintaining coconut trees. Both women and men go 
together to these farms. Men get daily wages of Rs. 30 ($0.6) and women Rs. 20 
($0.4) for this work. They also work in brick kilns. This work is available not only to 
the SCs but also to those from other castes. " 
By comparison, in Hosagondabala, where lands were submerged for most ofthe year, 
there was more out-migration. When migration was to nearby areas for agricultural 
labour, those who migrated survived the lean months but did not bring back any 
savings. When they went for fishing or for high skilled work, they could save Rs. 
6,000 to 10,000 ($133 to 222) a year to bring back home. In four cases, sons migrated 
to the nearest towns for seasonal labour work in construction, cabling and driving. 
Shivavva's son migrated to a distant place in the neighbouring state of Maharashtra 
for more than nine months every year for fishing. Yellamma said: 
"The money brought back as savings from the fishing work helps a lot. People are 
able to redeem the lands they mortgaged, repay loans taken for provisions, repair 
their homes, purchase bullocks or gold, dig borewells, and spend for marriages. 
After they have finished the amount they brought, they go back and work in 
Ratnagiri. " 
Migration is thus an important coping strategy followed by several study households. 
The ecological context could not sustain livelihoods, which depended on 
unpredictable rainfall, availability of wage labour, and on the quality of the natural 
resources to which they had access or control (Premchander et al, 2003). The 
livelihoods constraints and resulting coping strategies are thus summarised in 
Figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4-4: Ecological and Economic Context 
Over-
exploitation of 
ground water 
Unproductive 
saline land 
Saline Water-
crisis for 
agriculture 
Poor human/ 
animal health 
Limited 
agricultural 
labour 
Lack of skills and 
limited non-farm 
opportunities 
Low Household Incomes 
Source: Adapted from Premchander et al, 2003 
To summarise, despite degraded land and soils, farmers tried to access water through 
bore-wells whenever they could afford, and switched from crops to a combination of 
food and cash crops to earn money. If they got lower yields they stopped growing 
commercial crops and switched back to food grains, as these provided cattle fodder. 
However, as the soil had already lost its productivity due to salinity, they still did not 
get good yields, and eventually tried to find labour elsewhere. This livelihoods 
strategy was, however, based on a household perspective, and further exacerbated the 
degradation of natural resources. 
This research shows a clear limit imposed by the overall livelihoods context on the 
demand for credit. This finding can be compared with the data sets available for the 
other states covered, i.e. Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa. In the forest regions of 
Bastar district in Madhya Pradesh, there were sufficient natural resources (i.e. forest) ; 
however, inadequate infrastructure and markets restricted further economic 
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development. The institutional context was one wherein government, police and 
traders colluded to exploit forest resources without any positive impact for local tribal 
people. Low literacy levels and differences in tribal and mainstream language 
privileged urban traders and middlemen over local (Premchander, 2000). One district 
in Orissa (Kalahandi district) and another in Bihar (Lohardaga), were remote and non-
monetised, and had a similar livelihoods context to that of Madhya Pradesh. In 
another district of Bihar (Ranchi), the microfinance project was located close to the 
city or small town markets and, given high soil fertility, provided options for women 
to earn through vegetable and fruit cultivation and trading. In Madhya Pradesh, as in 
Koppal, the local livelihoods context inhibited the use of credit for development 
purposes. In Bihar, where there were market opportunities, there ~as greater use of 
credit (Sampark, 2000). 
4.2 Socio-Cultural Context 
The main factors include demographic profile, literacy, and caste. The norms 
regarding marriage particularly affect women's lives. The prevalence of the devadasi 
system in Karnataka makes lower caste women singularly vulnerable, as this practice 
is in tandem with gender, social and cultural norms. 
Demographic Profile 
The demographic profile of the villages where the longitudinal research was 
conducted is given in Table 4-5. 
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Table 4-5: Demographic Profile of the Five Villages Studied 
Village · Total Population .. o/o ofST ·o/o ofSC4 Literac v,Level 
Name House Male Female Total Pop. Pop. Total Female 
holds 'tc Literacy Literacy 
Chukkankal 177 514 495 1009 183(18%) 273 (27%) 528 (52%) 217 (44%) 
Mudhaballi 387 1044 1044 2088 147 (7%) 333 (13%) 1047 (50%) 392 (38%) 
Hosa- 700 1998 1976 3974 23(1%) 347 (7%) 2261 (57%) 896 (45%) 
gondabala 
Bahadur- 422 1300 1245 2545 104 (4%) 158(11%) 1149 (45%) 388(31%) 
bandi 
Bikanhalli 131 360 337 697 28 (4%) 197 (39%) 353(51%) 128 (38%) 
Total 1,817 5,216 5,097 10,313 485(5%) 1,308(13%) 5,338 (52%) 2,021(40%) 
Average 363 1043 1019 2063 97 262 1068 
Data for 1,59,114 1,54,784 3,13,898 23,800 8,300 58.53% 
Koppal taluk Sex ratio: 7.58% 2.64% 
982 
Source: Census of India, 2001; GOK, 2002 
The village size varied greatly, with the number of households ranging between 131 
and 700. The female population was 49%. The overall literacy level was 52%, 
ranging between 45% and 57%, and female literacy was 31% to 44%. These census 
figures may well have been overstated, as group discussions with Sampark staff and 
in PRAs and SHGs showed that women ' s literacy levels varied between 5-10% in 
general, and 2% among SHG members belonging to the poorest categories. 
A recent study recorded low gender and human development indices in Koppal, thus: 
Table 4-6: Gender and Human Development Indices (Koppal) 
Sel~.ted Key· ilndicator (Koppal District) Pe11'centa1e 
Female literacy 40.76 
Girls married below 18 years 57.10 
Current users of FP Method 45.40 
Birth order 3 & above 52.80 
Safe delivery 48.00 
Complete immunization 37.20 
Decadal population Growth rate 24.57 
Composite Human and Gender Development Index 53.09 
Source: liPS, 2002 
4 SC/ST- castes which are included in Schedule of the Constitution, whereby reservations are 
granted to these castes for education and government services 
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Castes are the basis of social stratification in Kappa! and classified as higher, middle 
and lower castes. The general castes are venerated as ' higher ', while the scheduled 
castes perceived as the ' lower ' castes, are often ostracised. About 18% of the village 
population belongs to the SCs and STs in the study villages. Six case study 
participants were from the SCs, three were other backward castes (OBCs), Kuruba 
and Marata, and one from the general castes, Reddy. 
4.2.1 Caste and Economic Levels 
Information on Kappa! district revealed significant overlap between caste and class 
categories, whereby the SCs formed the majority among the landless and casual wage 
earning categories as compared to the general castes, and the district average, 
evidenced by the data from a household survey covering 15,000 households in 56 
villages of Koppal district, detailed in the accompanying table (George eta!, 2005). 
Table 4-7: Landholdings Distribution in Koppal 
Caste Proportion Landless Casual Owning Owning Owning Owning 
Categories of all (%) wage <5 acres 5 acres or <5 acres 5 acres 
households earning (Unirrigated more (irrigated or more 
(%) households land)(%) (U nirrigated land) (irrigated 
(%) land)(%) (%) land) 
(%) 
Upper 28.3 13.3 24.7 28.6 29.1 8.5 20.2 
castes 
Middle 37.8 11.4 36.9 35 .2 28.0 9.8 15 .6 
castes 
SCs/STs 26.7 20.9 59.2 45.8 14.3 11.7 7.2 
Muslims 4.1 29.6 39.9 31.2 17.1 8.5 13 .6 
All 100 15.9 39.8 36.0 24.0 9.8 14.3 
households 
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The PRA exercises also show that in every study vi llage the highest proportion of 
land ho ld ings belonged to the Reddy and Lingayat communities. Agriculture is the 
main occupation of the general caste (Reddys, Lingayats and Kurubas) who own on 
an average of 10 to 30 acres of 
land per household which is 
partly irrigated by bore wells. 
The OBC households own 
between three to I 0 acres each. 
The SC/STs have the smallest 
landholdings or are landless. 
50% of the Madar community 
are landless agriculture 
labourers, while 50% have 
between 0.5 to 3 acres of land; 
most are dry lands, and some 
obtain water on a shared basis. 
The Oddaru caste work as 
labourers in house construction 
and bake the limestone used for 
whitewashing houses. The 
"I was 8 years old when I got married. None 
took me to coolie work as I was too small, but I 
used to go and pile cow-dung from roads and 
fields. I would collect it in one place, and later 
we would sell it for Rs. 25 ($0.55) per cartload. 
I also used to cut firewood and we would sell 
this too for Rs. 25 ($0.55) per cartload. My 
parents used to go to coolie work. When I 
wanted to go to school they did not send me, 
because nobody is sent to school in our caste 
(SC Harijan). Even our children are not sent 
to school because they are born 'to a poor 
person from a low caste'. Neither I nor my 
children have had any pleasures in life and till 
now I am facing difficulties. 
Both my daughters-in-law and sons are 
illiterate, even my grandchildren are not 
willing to go to school. Although we pushed 
them to school they are not willing to go." 
Jangamaru caste grazed cattle, and took milk, curds and vegetables to Kappa! town to 
trade. The Harijans and Talwars are engaged in construction, contract, and coolie 
work. The Madar castes were among the poorest, in each study village. 
4.2.2 Social Stratification at the Margins 
In the vi llages, the caste system is followed quite strictly. Discrimination against 
those from the Schedu led castes, especially the Madars, takes diverse forms. In the 
vi llage, the SC dwellings are separate from the houses belonging to people of other 
castes, and are usually huts or 'Janatha Mane5 ' . Their houses are located on the 
village periphery as separate settlements referred to as ' SC Keri ' or ' SC Oni' 
5 A house constructed under a government scheme for the poor, where the walls are made of 
bricks with an asbestos or tin sheet for a roof. 
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(meaning street of the SCs). The higher castes do not allow the SCs inside their own 
homes. This separation is maintained even in local teashops, which do not serve tea 
to SCs in their cups, with the latter having to bring their own cups and glasses. 
In all the v illages, the SCs and 
STs have separate temples. For 
instance, there are six temples 
in Bikanhalli, of which four are 
located in streets where the 
general castes live. Temples in 
the SC streets had Madar 
Pujaris and were open to all 
"My mother is a Dai, meaning midwife. The 
general caste people allow her to enter their 
homes to deliver their babies. Later, usually 
after three weeks, when she stops going to 
bathe the mother and child, they offer 
prayers through a priest, and light a fire, to 
purify their home because she entered it." 
- Sangavva 
from within and outside the village, but the SCs could not enter the four temples in 
the non-SC streets, and worshipped from outside. 
There were some caste-stratified youth groups, but they did allow friends from other 
castes to join them. In Mudhaballi there were four youth groups of this type. Most 
marriages were from within the caste groupings. SCs and general castes lived in 
separate places, and did not regularly socialise. In Mudhaballi a Brahmin boy who 
went to Bangalore fell in love with a Muslim girl, married her and brought her back. 
In the same village, an ST man fell in love with an SC girl, and she became pregnant 
with his child, he accepted responsibility at a community meeting, then married her 
and moved into the SC streets with her. He was widely regarded as an example of 
how a higher caste person (STs are considered higher than SCs in these villages) was 
loyal and kept to his commitment. In the five study villages there were only two 
cases of inter-caste marriages involving the lower castes. This phenomenon was 
totally absent among the higher castes. In fact, one participant from Hosagondaba la 
voiced the majority opinion: "We don't like inter-caste marriages, it is good to marry 
within the caste and community." 
In a discussion in Bikanhalli village, with women and men from SC community about 
pra tice of untouchability, Sangamma Pujari, a 60 year old prle t of the village SC 
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temple, would not question this tradition. He explained: "These "paddhatis "6, have 
been coming down from the ages; the ancient people must have had something in 
mind when they made these practices." A younger man, standing near a tree outside 
the temple, then came forward and stood close to the discussion group. He said: "In 
the villages, this chance is not provided: of sitting together, eating together, moving 
together with the general castes." When the older man was asked: "Do you feel that 
you really are a lesser human being than the higher castes? He lowered his eyes and 
head, and said: "Yes, I am lower than them. I feel that." The younger man came 
forward and in response to the same question, said: "No, I do not feel lower than 
them. I feel that we are equal. We are the same. I want to do something about it. " 
When asked: "Do you discuss it in the Ambedkar Sangha then?", he replied: 
"In the Sangha we discuss how these caste issues are affocting us, and how to tackle 
them. We spend more time in discussing the different schemes available to us from 
the different departments, and how to avail of these benefits. We meet once a month 
to discuss this, and in between if necessary. " 
The participants in these group discussions claimed that when the villagers went 
outside they behaved differently: "We sit together, eat together, share, touch, make 
friends. " The Hosagondabala villagers recalled that two Dalit men were murdered in 
Hallkeri village of Yelburga taluk of Koppal district when they opposed and fought 
against the local caste system. They said: "Let the changes come on their own, we 
wait for that. Demanding and opposing creates fights." This does not mean that 
there is total lack of resistance. Ostracisation was challenged in some villages often, 
with serious consequences like being jailed or fined, for the scheduled castes. In one 
group discussion in Bahadurbandi, the villagers related: "Four years ago, some 
people from the SC community went to a tea shop owned by a muslim, sat where other 
customers sit, and asked him to serve them tea in the same cups used for serving the 
other customers. The owner refused, and said that SCs could not sit in the same place 
and could not use the same cups as those of other castes. That night, some SC people 
burnt the teashop; the muslims filed a police case, and the police came and arrested 
many men in the middle of the night. Women came to know of the whole story only the 
6 Traditional practices 
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next morning. Twenty SC men and eleven muslim men were arrested. There are no 
jails in Koppal, so the men were taken to Bellary jail. The muslims were kept for 10 
days and then released. The SC people were kept in jail for three months. " 
One SC man continued: "When we were in jail, we faced a lot of problems. There 
was not enough food for the family members as men who were earning were in jail, 
and we also had to borrow money to come out from the jail. We borrowed nearly Rs. 
35,000 ($778) from friends, relatives and moneylenders to spend on this police case, 
and our health was also spoiled due to the bad quality food that was served in the jail. 
The police case is still continuing and we still have to go to the police station in 
Bellary from time to time, but there is no 'hearing'; we just go, salute the police 
officer and come back (we waste bus charges though). After we were released and 
came back to the village, there have been no problems or fights. We have stopped 
going to the teashop and to the muslim 'colony'. We used to go to their festivals and 
death ceremonies earlier, to play drums in front of their homes, but now we do not 
go. 
SCs in Mudhaballi claimed that they voluntarily kept away from the teashops, 
restaurants and temples of the general castes, and said: "What is the use of demanding 
equal treatment and creating an argument, when we have to line up the next morning 
in front of their doors looking for labour?" The SCs were aware that they had few 
resources, were dependent on the landed farmers of the general castes for work, and 
hence did not resist ostracisation practices. 
One old man cited another incidence of ostracisation: "One of us had started a liquor 
shop. They forced us to close it. 'Will we now have to buy and drink from the hands 
of SCs? ', they said', referring to the general castes. When the researcher asked him: 
"But you, personally, run a kerosene supply business for ten years now, don't you? 
They have allowed that, haven't they?" He replied: "They don't have to eat 
kerosene!", with bitterness and relief. There is more profit in the liquor business than 
in kerosene, and the general castes had two liquor shops. In this village, in 2001, 
women's groups had protested and got the liquor shop moved outside the village, but 
it was moved back into the village two years later. In all the study villages, the 
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general castes and OBCs dominate economic activities and restrict the SCs from 
owning food and provision shops. For the most part, caste discrimination remains 
unchallenged, as SCs clearly perceive the link between economic depriviation and 
social discrimination. 
This raises the question about the organisations of Dalits that can challenge such 
norms. Each village had a forum for SCs called the Ambedkar Sangha, comprising 
mostly of members of the Madar community and other SCs. The Ambedkar Sangha 
met regularly, usually at least once a month, to discuss how to benefit from official 
schemes. The village Sanghas had links with similar Sanghas in neighbouring 
villages, and with the Dalit Seva Sangha at the district level. The Dalit Sangha fought 
for their legal rights, against harassment and to stop the devadasi system. The district 
Sangha was also connected with the State level association. The Sangha met twice a 
month, usually with an agenda to conduct political rallies. The Sam park staff did not 
expect much from the district level Sangha. One explained: "The Sangha organised 
events like mass-marriages. One such one-day-event was conducted with the local 
politician bearing all the expenses of the marriages, 40 marriages were conducted 
that day, but all the girls were less than 13 years of age! Politicians just don't 
question existing norms that should be changed, instead, they perpetuate these. In 
any case, the politician did not even find out the age of the children before he 
organised the event." 
There were a few leaders among the scheduled castes in four study villages who 
resolved conflicts within or among SC households. The most critical issues of 
ostracisation, and untouchability, are however not resolved at the leaders' meetings 
described above. 
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Discrimination was found 
in women ' s SHGs too. 
SC women brought their 
glasses from their homes 
for tea, even for SHG 
meetings. When they 
came to Sampark, for 
training programmes, they 
ate together, but when 
they were in the village, 
they did not dare to break . 
the caste system. The 
Matangi group m 
Bikanhalli village, at first 
had members from SC and 
general castes. The 
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"When we come out of the village, and we are 
in Sampark, we follow the rules set by 
Sampark, where everyone is equal, and we do 
not mind this. However, when we are in the 
village, we have to follow the rules set by our 
religious leaders. There is a priest who comes 
to the village and who has given a special 
status to me. We have to follow what he says. 
If people do not keep the rules of separation 
between the higher and lower castes, it is my 
duty to teU him, and then he will ostracise not 
only them but me as well. See, I wear a 1thali' 
(pendant) given by him. Every evening women 
come and touch my feet because he has given 
me the thali. We have to respect his wishes. 
So, in the village, we keep to our customs, 
when we come to Sampark, we follow your 
customs." 
- Neelamma, leader of an SHG 
meetings were conducted usually inside or in the veranda of someone's house. SC 
women either had to sit on the floor while others sat on the raised platform, or they 
had to sit on the floor of the house opposite the street, and after a few meetings, the 
groups separated on the basis of castes. 
Thus, the practice of untouchability continues in these villages, and SCs appear to 
accept it, with few inter-caste marriages. The caste institutions do not challenge 
untouchability practices, or are relatively ineffective in doing so, because of economic 
dependence and fear of strong reactions from the general castes. The Dalit 
institutions at the district and state level restrict themselves to political rallies and 
events, and accessing official resources and benefits for fellow caste members, with 
less direct concern for social exclusion. 
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4.2.3 Marriage Norms 
Other examples of collective orientations include the child marriage custom arising 
from the concern that, if girls are not committed to a socially valid sexual partnership 
soon after puberty, they are at risk. Parvathamma, who got her daughter married in 
2000, explained: 
"My daughter was married away when she was eight years old. Huligavva from 
Bhagyanagar brought a match for her. Everything went well so I fixed her marriage. 
In our custom we do not lose a good opportunity to marry off a girl. Three years after 
marriage, she attained puberty, and one year after that I sent her to her husband's 
house. I took a loan·of Rs. 3,000 ($67) at 10 percent per month for her marriage, and 
paid it over four years. " 
Lakshmavva likewise stated: 
"In our community, if the girl stays at home three years after puberty, then it is 
difficult to get her married and we have to give a lot of dowry and spend more money. 
We can't give dowry as we live a hand to mouth existence, how can we save? My 
sons have to work and save, only then I can give her to a better place (family with a 
better economic position), else we just have to give (marry) her to a place which 
matches our own economic conditions. " 
Similarly, customs of joint marriages arose due to high social expenses during 
marriages, which could lead families into either debt, or bonded labour, which took 
several years to resolve. Sangavva recalled: 
"When I got the elder son married, I decided to get the second son married too; he 
was 13 years old. This is the custom among us. Moreover, if I delayed the marriage 
of the second son, I was not sure that we would be together: if the elder one has 
separated by then, it would be difficult for my younger son and me to bear the 
marriage expenses. 
Sangavva's younger daughter-in-law was 3 years old at the time of marriage. These 
customs of child marriage, devadasi system and bonded labour persist in many 
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villages despite legal bans, and are associated with the social and economi<? situation 
ofthe families. 
Though girls from general castes marry at a higher age (usually after 14 or 16 years), 
other conventions are still a constraint, e.g. norms of widow remarriage. Gangamma, 
daughter of Rangamma, lost her husband at the age of 16 and returned from her 
husband's house to her parental home. Even though the law permits remarriage, caste 
norms did not. Her parents did not challenge it, largely because they feared the that 
they may not then get offers for the marriage of Rangamma's son. Even though the 
mother was concerned about settling her daughter and looked for vocational training 
and jobs for her, she did not dare defy caste norms to get her married a second time. 
4.2.4 The Devadasi System 
The old custom of offering young girls to the service of village deities persists in 
many villages of North Karnataka. These girls were traditionally called basavis, or 
devadasis. Originally female dancers and singers attached to temples, the term 
devadasi literally means 'female 'servants' of the deity.' While devadasis were 
dedicated or 'married' to the temple deity and not allowed to marry mortal men, in 
fact the practice involved sexual partnerships with men outside marriage. 
Although the devadasi system is illegal, it continues due to a confluence of economic, 
social and cultural factors. Girls were made into devadasis for many reasons. First, 
because parents saw this as a solution to their insecurities, thus ensuring that the girls 
would live with them and support them and their family. Second, if the family 
experienced ill-health of a child or adult or if a number of childhood deaths occured, 
the parents promised to dedicate one girl child to the god in return for an end to the 
illness or child deaths. Third, families dedicated unmarried girls who had attained 
puberty, usually due to social pressure or fear for their daughters' continued virginity. 
Further, girls who belonged to devadasi families were at greater risk of being 
dedicated (Chidambaranathan, 2002). 
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Shivavva and her sister were 
both made devadasis . When 
Shivavva said: "/ do not 
71nderstand why my parents 
could not have married at 
least one of us, I was too 
young to know at that time ", 
her aunt explained: "Your 
parents already had the 
experience of one of their 
children dying. Even if one of 
the girls had died, the other 
devadasi daughter would still 
have been with them. Also 
they wanted grandchildren to 
be with them, which would not 
be possible if both of you were 
married." Thus, villagers 
explain devadasi dedications 
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"I don't like this life. If I had got married, I 
would have been someone's wife, and would 
have stayed in the husband's house. I have 
been made a 1basavi' so I have to stay here, it 
is both husband and mother's house. In 
husband's house, he would have held the 
responsibility, here I am like a man and all the 
responsibility is with me. I have to invite all 
my sisters and their family members during 
festivals and other functions. If I omit any 
one, that person blames me for denying her 
and treating others to the family property. 
They feel they have the right to question me. 
When my sisters come to my house, they ask 
me to give gold, silver, clothes, etc. Sometimes 
when I get new clothes, they take these away, 
saying 1We are staying at husband's place, you 
are here, why do you want new clothes?' If I 
had gone to my husband's place, I could also 
have come and made demands like this. When 
they come or send their children, I have to do 
all the work, and I feel tired. If I had got 
married, I would also have had a chance to 
come and stay in my mother's house and get 
some rest." 
- Sangavva 
on both cultural and economic grounds. 
The relationships of a devadasi with her children and parents are very deep. The 
relationships with a partner begins on a transactional basis - he provides economic 
support to her family and in return has sexual relations with her. When he gives 
economic support and emotional support to children she then affirms the relationship. 
However, it is rare for a partner to care both for her and her children's health, and also 
spend time with children, for example giving advice about their work. Most partners 
nevertheless have long-term relationships with devadasis. When they have a 
particularly good relationship, the devadasi typically feels that they are like husband 
and wife. When he does not provide support, misbehaves, beats or speaks badly and 
extracts money from the devadasi, she can terminate the relationship, even though 
few actually do so, despite extreme hardship (Ibid). 
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Parvathamma elaborated the difference between devadasis and married women: 
"Devadasis have relationships with many men, so they cannot fight or argue, they 
have to take a lot of abuse from the partners and cannot retaliate. Married women, 
on the other hand, may do all this without fear of the man walking away. You know 
there is a popular saying that 'the quarrel of a man and his wife lasts only till they 
sleep together'. This is true. They console each other and they do not face the kind of 
problems that we do. The wife can bravely ask for what she wants and it is the 
husband's responsibility to fulfil the request. We devadasis have no such rights. Our 
commitments increase, that is all. 
Talking about myself, my father is working hard now, but in the years to come, as he 
grows older, I will have to look after him. I also have to look after relatives who visit 
us, however difficult it is to do so; we devadasis have to do these things. Now, if I 
think of my children, how shall I get them married when they grow up, I wonder. Who 
will come forward to marry them? People may think: 'They are after all, children of 
devadasis, who knows what bad morals the daughters might have picked up from their 
mother?' When I think of all this, how easy life is for married women!" 
Sangavva said, with evident sadness: "Very few devadasis get good partners who look 
after them well. In many cases our lives are very tough, there is no moral or 
economic support from partners. They doubt us unnecessarily as though they give us 
everything. We have to stay in our house permanently and the complete responsibility 
is with us. In married life, even if they have problems, their life is much better as they 
have status. People know that we are devadasis, so any man can approach us without 
thinking; we can't fight with them, we simply keep quiet. " 
Lakshmavva, too, believed that it was important to stay in a long-term relationship 
with one man: 
"I had no brothers and sisters, and I had to look after my mother, so from a very small 
age I knew that my mother would make me a devadasi, and I never thought of 
marriage. That is why I had the relation with Shivappa. A married girl has to leave 
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her mother 's home, listen to mother-in-law and father-in-law; but in devadasi life all 
the responsibility is with me. I have no fear, for these days parents-in-law give a lot 
of trouble to a woman. Devadasis live in the same place till they die. I have a 
relation with only one man, and plan to keep this in future , too. There is no use in 
having relations with many men, as people look down upon you. The only thing is 
that when one is old, there is no one to look after a devadasi, while a married woman 
would be looked after by her husband." 
The devadasis felt deprived of the right to have a husband, and having a traditional 
home like the married women. A devadasi has several disadvantages: belonging to a 
lower caste, parental dependency, being single parents themselves, and having no 
right to land or property of 
partners. In 1982 Karnataka 
banned the dedication of 
women as devadasis, yet several 
women were dedicated for the 
next 15 years. The government 
does not recognise any 
devadasis dedicated after the 
previous census of devadasis, 
taken in 1975, yet there has been 
no social campaign against this. 
"Both my mother and my partner asked me 
to wait until I get a female baby, but I did 
not listen to them. I knew what it is to be a 
female, that is enough; my child should not 
go through a similar fate, so I decided to 
stop after two boys. In case I had a 
daughter, I can get her married, because 
devadasis can get their daughters married, 
but even then she would only identified as a 
'basavi's daughter'. So I took a strong 
decision not to have a female child' 
- Sangavva 
The women have no recourse to law or to any social forum, as the devadasi practice 
has social sanction. They realised that economic insecurity of their parents com pined 
with caste-related institutions had denied them a right to marriage, and thought their 
situation was unchangeable. Even though some married when an official scheme for 
marrying devadasis was announced, they are still socially criticised for defying 
religious oaths. Many believed that their parents, including their mothers, had 
decided in their own self-interest rather than that of their daughters, to make them 
' basavis'. These women felt strongly about it and thus ensured that their own 
daughter would get married. The devadasi dedication topped almost completely 
nine years ago in the study villages, when SCs themselves decided to stop it. Women 
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said: "It is not good for the girl, and for the houses in the street, if someone just visits 
her from time to time. It's not a good life. It's better if a woman is married. " 
Later, Dalit institutions also took it up as a political issue and held rallies in the 
districts of northern Karnataka. There was a 'street-order' that in every street, every 
girl should be married and not dedicated as a devadasi, and SC households themselves 
began to monitor this order. The Sangha tries to arrange the marriage of girls who 
have been dedicated despite the order. However, in the two villages of Kavalur and 
Sindhogi in Koppal, one or two women continue to be dedicated as devadasis every 
year. 
To summarise, the demographic profile of the study villages showed high levels of 
illiteracy. Eighteen percent of households belonged to lower castes and caste 
discrimination was practiced in rural homes and temples. Child marriages were a 
norm and marriages made major calls on household finances. In social terms 
devadasis were ranked lowest, and suffered the most as they had a low cap!tal base, 
and little support from their partners to meet livelihoods needs. Social, cultural and 
gender denominations were thus critical to economic and other forms of deprivation 
and oppression. Often formal legal frameworks and the enforcement mechanisms, 
including the police, did not seek to protect the victims of the devadasi practice. 
Microfinance agencies did not address these socio cultural issues, and refer economic 
and finance related interventions instead. 
4.2.5 Gender Related Issues 
Gender inequities were inherent in the local household and family space. The male 
contribution to the household could not be taken for granted. For these case study 
participants, the situation varied from household to household, but women were 
usually the primary caregivers, responsible for providing family sustenance. 
The devadasi partnership was akin to a polygamous situation. If the partner was 
married, his first responsibility was to his wife and children. He was expected to 
provide for the devadasi and her family, but this obligation was not socially enforced. 
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If the partner was not married or not responsible to his own family or separated, he 
sometimes retained the partnership with the devadasi for a long period and maintained 
her family. He experienced little social pressure or legal obligation to stay with the 
devadasi; he could terminate the relationship whenever he desired. Usually partners 
(single or separated) from the same caste as the devadasis were more responsible and 
bonded more with them and their 
children (Chidambaranathan, 2002). 
In general, in the study villages, the 
support that devadasi women 
received from their partners was nil 
or minimal, barring a few 
exceptions. Given the relative lack 
of assets of the devadasi 
households, this lack of support 
from male partners put a 
disproportionate burden on such 
women. 
Nagavva and Lakshmavva formed 
relationships with their male 
partners before the latter married. 
Their relationships were like those 
of married couples, yet social 
customs did not acknowledge them 
as such. Both women permitted, 
even encouraged, these men to 
marry other women. They felt that 
such 'selflessness ' was necessary if 
they did not wish to be admonished 
ttWhen Reddy's family members started 
looking out for a girl for him, he came 
and asked me whether he should get 
married or not. I said: tGet married, 
because you also need children and a 
wife.' He replied: ti have three children 
with you. Why should I marry for 
children?'. tMy children and I can't be 
your children and wife. Your caste and 
family members will not accept that, so 
you get married. If you don't want to 
marry, people will think that I told you not 
to marry. Then they will blame me saying: 
tThat sulagi got hold of Reddy and won't 
allow him to marry'. Also, your parents 
have lots of lands and assets. Only if you 
marry will you get them; otherwise they 
will not give you the assets. Why give up 
all this? It is better for you to get married' 
I told him. Because I forced him to get 
married, he got angry and fought with me. 
He said, t] loved you so much, stayed for 
more than 10 years with you, and we had 
three children. Now you are asking me to 
get married. You are not interested in 
living with me and are asking me to leave. 
Maybe you want to have a relationship 
with somebody else and that is why you 
are forcing me to marry.' Finally he 
accepted my suggestion and got married.,, 
- Nagavva 
as ' prostitutes' who ' cling on' to the men for ' selfish' reasons. After these two men 
married and had children, the two devadasis lost financial and emotional support, and 
were among the poorest in their villages. These two devadasis, still in their early 
thirties, and with small children, depended on their own earnings from wage labour, 
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and struggled very hard to meet their daily needs. Y e.t, devadasi women themselves 
exonerate their partners from the responsibility of providing support for their 
households. Nagavva says she feels sad that he does not care for her any more, nor 
does he provide as much financial support as he did earlier, yet she herself provides 
an excuse on his behalf: "Now he has a responsibility to his own wife, I should now 
earn for my father and children and not expect much from him." In a similar 
situation, Lakshmavva says: "He is a poor man, and his wife is just like me, how can I 
expect that he cares for me and my children more than for her and her children? 
After all she is his wife and I am a devadasi. I have learnt to earn and care for my 
mother and my children." 
These two women were the poorest women among the case study participants. The 
other three devadasi women had more than two partnerships and fortunately at least 
one of the partners supported them and their children well for long periods of time 
(15-25 years), even if the children were from an earlier partnership. With support 
from their male partners they were able to bring up their children and reached a stage 
where they could earn for their family. Yet, when asked why she did not marry her 
long-term partner, Sangavva responded: "Even if I get married, the label of 
'devadasi' will remain. Villagers will also accuse me of breaking the promise to God 
for just a little bit of money and material comfort." 
A related preference is for staying in one long-term relationship, and not to change 
partners. Parvathamma is 'practical' and also humorous, and said: 
"This man who I have taken on lease, let us see how long he stays and how he cares 
for me", reflecting the deep-seated fear they have of losing their partners, at the same 
time evaluating them and keeping a distance so that they can accept a break of the 
relationship if it should ever become necessary or inevitable. It is this precarious 
balance which these women deal with all their lives. Such women are not necessarily 
risk averse, they are just subjected to a constant risk of losing the most important 
relationship of their lives, and thus deep impoverishment. The risk of loss of status 
and dignity is as important to them as risk of material support. 
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Devadasis know and accept that they 'cannot expect to be treated like a wife'. Such 
gender inequality is socially sanctioned; the man gets a second wife, without bearing 
either the expenses or the negative socio-legal consequences. Among the non-
devadasi women participants, Mariyamma's husband supported her and the couple 
worked side by side on their own and in other people's farms. Mariyamma had 
decision-making power and control over money, too. Her husband let her participate 
in social forums and the group at the village level. Kaveri was dominated by her 
husband and less independent, as both a member of the family, and as a leader of the 
Taluk Panchayat. Men completely dominated the house by controlling cash and 
decision-making. She even felt that her house was 'like a jail', with no freedom to 
ask or share anything. In one interview she said: "I cannot even note the expenses 
and income of the household, if I ask my husband he shouts saying you are not the one 
to go and buy things so why do you want to know? I have now just stopped asking, I 
just cook whatever is there and serve him, and if he takes me anywhere I go with him, 
then come back and care for the children. I feel bad to talk about anything at home. " 
The family was 'politicised' in Kaveri's case. Her husband's political ambition 
dominated the family and she was frustrated as a result. This lowered her confidence 
and she could not lead either the group or the Panchayat. In one interview she 
complained: "It is impossible to help people, and simply leads to a fight at home. I 
am fed up with all the bickering about whom to recommend for government benefits. 
My life was much better before becoming a member of the taluk panchayat. Politics 
is very boring. " However, towards the later months, she became corrupt too, and in 
her own words, became part of "the system. " She also became a sales agent of a 
company selling utensils through an instalment system, achieved good sales, and got a 
mobile phone and some jewellery as incentives. This enabled her to have an income 
of her own, and she became more confident both at home and in public domains. 
Similarly, Sushila was the sole earner of her family, her husband did not earn, and 
used her money to drink and beat her each evening. She did not send him away as she 
believed that a woman needs a husband, just to maintain her dignity in society. 
The women who were solely responsible for the care of their parents and children 
particularly felt the burden of such responsibility, especially if they were poor. 
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Rangamma, Sushila, Lakshmavva and Yellamma's stories showed that they would in 
fact benefit from more contribution from their husbands and partners. In fact, 
Rangamma had been able to organise this and benefit from it. Among the higher 
castes and classes, women had more support from their parental homes, and their 
families were closely knit, so they did not suffer the same emotional isolation and 
exclusion as devadasi women. Yet, it was difficult to get men to contribute to family 
income and expenses when they did not want to, as in the case of Sushila, or if the 
men were not obliged to do so, as in the case of the devadasi women. The parents of 
the devadasi women took the decisions about dedicating them as devadasis, their first 
sexual relationship, and even terminating the relationships with partners. The 
devadasis had little control over their reproductive lives in their formative years. The 
major responsibility of maintaining the family stayed with the devadasis, though the 
children and other family members contributed their earnings. Those who had been 
through early sexual relationships, especially the devadasis, recalled the experience of 
lack of control on their reproductive lives. Lakshmavva said: 
"I didn't know about sex at that age, but my mother told me: 'He will have relations 
with you, obey him and stay together husband and wife'. My mother talked directly to 
him and demanded all that he was supposed to give, and asked him to look after me 
like his wife. I didn't talk to him; I was made to have sexual relations at the age of 13 
years, at that age what did I know? I did what my mother told me. " 
These women did not always see heading a household as a privilege. Sangavva's son 
was hoping to complete his studies and get a government job; instead he remained 
unemployed as he did not pass his exam. He said: 
"Everyone knows that I am the son of a devadasi, children in school did not look at 
me differently. My mother's name was given as the initial in my school. If I had 
passed the 1 01h class, I could have got a job as a clerk in a government office, as the 
son of a devadasi I would have had priority. I want to complete 1 dh and try for a 
job." 
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Sangavva intervened: "If I had got married, he would have had a father, who might 
have been strict and made my son study. The son would have also listened to his 
father's words and completed his 1 01h standard. He did not listen as I am his mother, 
and he failed. " 
The privileging of males was thus deep-rooted in the individual beliefs of the women 
themselves. Recent research in Koppal district has found variations in health-seeking 
behaviour based on caste, class, gender and age. Those who depended on self-
employment and casual labour, and had insecure household economic status, were 
more likely never to treat girls/women for short and long-term illnesses. Deeply 
ingrained gender norms were also considered to play a role in this, whereby women 
imbibed from an early age low self-worth, low recognition of their own needs, and "a 
value to suffering in silence" (George et al, 2005). The case studies of women show 
that this self-denial extends not only to health but also to several other domains, 
whereby they shoulder responsibilities but do not get the position in society that their 
work would merit. 
The village society is thus found to be highly caste-stratified with significant caste/ 
class overlaps. The lower castes and especially devadasis, are among the least 
resourced households. The caste organisations, were oriented towards accessing 
government grants, and did not challenge practices due to economic dependence. 
Seen in this way, the social capital in the villages appears weak, with high levels of 
social exclusion ofthe poor. 
4.3 Institutional Context 
The institutional context of Koppal district is examined in terms of basic facilities in 
the villages, government schemes, and the presence and activities of NGOs. The 
microfinance context is outlined in terms of the number of groups, facilitating NGOs, 
and the banks and their practices. 
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4.3.1 Basic Services Provision 
The physical infrastructure supporting people's livelihoods in the villages studied is 
presented in Table 4-8: 
Table 4-8: Infrastructure Facilities 
Facilities Chukka Bikanhalli Hosa- Mudhaballi Bahadurbandi 
nkal gondabala 
School Primary Primary school Primary, Middle Primary school Primary school 
school and high school 
with hostel 
Drinking water 4 public 3 public tanks, 3 public tanks, 6 3 public tanks, 5 2 public water 
sources tanks 2 borewells 7 borewells, borewells, tanks, 
I 0 public taps8 8 public taps 4 bore-wells, 
II public taps 
Sources of 10 bore- 29 borewells 20 borewells and 30 borewells 6 borewells 
Irrigation wells lift irrigation and li ft 
project from irrigation project 
government from 
government 
Local health ANM ANM9, RMP 10 ANM,RMP ANM,RMP ANM,RMP 
providers 
Women's 8 6 5 I2 8 
groups 
Youth groups/ 
- I I (Muslim 2 2 
Farmers 1 association) 
groups 
There are primary schools in each village, and a high school in one. SC children who 
pass the 4th class examination, are eligible for a scholarship ofRs. 75 ($1.66) per year 
at the middle school level and Rs. 100 ($2.22) per year at the high school level, with 
an additional incentive of Rs. 500 ($11.11) per year to complete high school. 
Scholarships of between Rs. 90 ($2) and Rs. 190 ($4.22) per month are provided to 
SC children who continued their studies beyond the 1 01h class. SC/ST children living 
in remote areas have provision of accommodation in residential schools; but as the 
facilities are limited, the selection is competitive. Such facilities and incentives are 
provided by the caste institutions for the general castes and OBCs. Koppal district 
7 The borewells for drinking water are dug by the government, inside the vi llages, and are for 
public use, whereas those on farms are dug by farmers for irrigation 
8 In the three villages w ith public taps, pipelines have been laid to take water from public 
tanks to different streets within the vi llage 
9 Auxiliary Nurse and Midwife 
10 Rural Medical Practitioner (though the term is also expanded as ' registered ' medical 
practitioner, they were in fact not registered at all. 
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has schools, colleges, hostels and a hospital established and managed by the higher 
castes. These organisations not only facilitate education, but also provide venues for 
employment. 
PRAs and Sampark reports, however, show that the quality of village school 
education was considered poor, which, combined with local poverty, led to dropout 
rates of 37% in pre- middle schools, and 61% in high schools. Sam park group 
statistics about group members' children found 29% in the age group of 6 to 20 had 
dropped out of school or pre-university college. Among the SCs, 22% of children 
did not even enrol in schools, with a further 43% dropout rate at the primary school 
level (Sampark, 2006). The official schemes to ensure high enrolment and retention 
created pressure on local officials to show that many dropouts were later enrolled 
back into schools, and they manipulate official records accordingly. The government 
established School Development and Management Committees (SDMC), but these 
meet only once a year to discuss fund allocation; monitoring of school functioning 
and education quality is weak. Only two local NGOs, Eklavya and Sampark, were 
investing their resources in children's education. 
The health infrastructure in Koppal district is based on population norms, with fewer 
health sub-centres in Koppal than suggested by these norms. Each village has an 
auxiliary nurse and midwife (ANM) visiting them periodically, primarily to attend to 
pregnant and lactating mothers, and ensure immunisation of children. Official health 
services are not adequate, making it imperative for citizens to travel to Koppal town 
to access them. Where villagers have to commute 15-20 kilometres to reach a 
hospital or clinic, they first depend on local and indigenous treatment, which is both 
affordable and more accessible, but only effective for common ailments. Four 
villages have RMPs, private doctors who provide door-to-door medical services every 
day or every alternate day. Chukkankal, which is close to Koppal town, has good 
transport connections so RMPs do not need to visit there. There were drinking water 
sources in each village, though many still experienced water scarcity in summer 
months. The government health system in Koppal was judged by the Karnataka Task 
Force on Health and Family Welfare (GOK, 2001) to suffer from problems of 
corruption, lack of equity and neglect of public and primary health care. The Koppal 
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health care market is dominated by informal providers, of whom many were 
unqualified men, leading to a "combination of an unaccountable government health 
system and an unregulated private health system" (George et al, 2005: 19). 
4.3.2 Official Poverty Reduction 
Officially, many schemes were implemented through NGOs with the SHGs as 
platforms to achieve their goals regarding women's empowerment, credit and income 
generation and health. During the research period, the Karnataka State Women's 
Development Corporation (KSWDC) implemented two microfinance programmes, 
from 1999-2001 (Mahila Arthik Samavrudhi Yojane, MASY) and from 2002-04 
(Women's Empowerment and Development Programme, Swashakti). Both were 
centrally funded, the latter by the World Bank, and both were implemented through 
NGOs specially contracted for the purpose. Central government was directly 
involved in promoting groups under a scheme named Stree Shakti. Government 
departments also worked on education, drinking water and sanitation, health, housing, 
electricity and irrigation facilities for agriculture through local government 
organisations, at the village and block levels namely Gram Panchayat and Taluk 
Panchayat. An assessment of these programmes was made based on focus group 
discussions with case study women, villagers and the staff of Sam park. 
The most important government scheme was the SGSY (Swamajayanti Gram 
Swarojgar Yojana), under which the government had merged all its previous self-
employment schemes like IRDP, TRYSEM, DWCRA, SITRA, Ganga Kalyan and 
Ten-lakh Wells programmes. The assistance from the scheme was provided to BPL 
families through SHGs, therefore group-formation and the link with banks were 
potentially critical. The former was divided between Anganwadi workers and NGOs, 
depending on which government department was engaged with the scheme. The 
credit link was monitored through District Level Credit Committees, as has been the 
case over the past three decades. 
The schemes found most beneficial were those that provided housing and electricity, 
namely the Ashraya and the Bhagya Jyothi schemes. Across all the research villages, 
178 
Chapter 4: Livelihood Context 
devadasis, SC/ST people and also the poor families from OBCs, could benefit from 
these schemes. Rangamma, Shivavva, Lakshmavva, Nagavva and Sushila got a house 
each under the Ashraya scheme, and Parvathamma got a house under the devadasi 
rehabilitation project. All got electricity connections under Bhagya Jyothi scheme. In 
a research study conducted by Sampark covering 31 devadasis, the women stated that 
the scheme for land distribution for SCs and devadasis has been the most beneficial, 
as the housing conditions improved the ability for other income generating work, 
including coolie labour (Chidambaranathan, 2002). Other schemes found beneficial 
were 'Ganga Kalyan' (assistance for digging for borewells), a~d scholarships for 
students. The Integrated Rural Development Scheme was generally known as the 
'buffalo scheme', the popular name for this scheme, as assistance under the scheme 
was given only for purchase of buffaloes. These poverty reduction schemes were 
based on a target-oriented approach, but targets under these schemes were not always 
met, as in the case of the District Industries Centre (DIC), which could not implement 
its major vocational training programme for women due to shortage of funds. 
Devadasis felt particularly left out, and Y ellamma narrated several incidents when 
leaders or brokers of government schemes had cheated her: 
"We haven't got any of these government schemes in our village, though the 
neighbouring villages have benefited. Our elders have done nothing for us though 
they know that Devadasis live here - if by chance something does come our way, they 
grab it first ... 
Recently, an MLA had come to our village and when we went as a group to meet him 
he said that he had received information that there were no devadasis in our village. 
He couldn't do anything himself, he said, as the Congress party had come into power 
now. He would have to go and meet some people to see what could be done. I have 
no hopes that anything will come of it. 
I know about the devadasis scheme, they get land and house but I don't know whom to 
contact and ask. Someone said that there is a woman called Swaravva who belongs to 
our caste, is a member in the municipality and she knows about the devadasis scheme. 
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Then all of us devadasis had a discussion about this and went to see her. When we 
met her she asked us which village we had come from. I told her that we were all 
from Hosagondabala, all 12 of us were devadasis, that we did not know about official 
schemes for us and had not received any schemes or loan facilities because our 
village elders are not good and if she knew any schemes to tell us . . She told us that 
she needed our documents and that this work would cost money. She said she would 
inform us when we met next time. So we met her next week and she said that it would 
cost Rs. 1,500 ($33) per person. We believed her: some sold their 'tha/i' (pendant) 
and some their cow and calf About 20 people gave her money and even I sold my 
cow for Rs. 1,000 ($22), which I gave to her. We have not yet received any benefits. 
We worry a lot about it; instead of giving her the money, we could have spent it on 
food. We simply wasted the money. After that, we have not discussed this with 
anyone; it would be of no use, so we have kept quiet. We won't break our head if 
anyone tells us about schemes now. No one will come forward to help devadasis. The 
Government and Panchayat always ignore us. No government scheme is available 
for us. 
In my house, the male members are not responsible, and we don't have many contacts 
so we have not received any benefits. One year ago, they told me that there was a 
toilet available in the name of my son so we went to the village head, who is a 
member of the panchayat, and asked him to build the toilet in front of the house where 
a little room was available. But the elders and the panchayat members told us that it 
is in the name of some other person and not for us. The one that was sanctioned in 
our name was given to some other person. What to do in this world where we find 
more cunning people who value only money? So I felt bad. Though we are devadasi 
we don't get any benefits. The mother of my daughter-in-law is a devadasis in 
Bahadurbandi, where three acres of land has been given to devadasis but nothing is 
available in our village. There is a person named Kapathappa who lives in our Keri, 
who has taken a loan of Rs. 20,000 ($444) from the bank and has built a house. He 
has taken a loan even in the name of his wife. Now we have formed a group and 1j 
there is any scheme we approach it as a group, so at least we can benefit from the 
scheme. All government schemes are available only for rich people and panchayat 
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members and not for us. So I feel angry about this scheme, I have nothing much to 
say about the scheme! 
Then Eshappa had come and he said that there are houses being given for devadasis 
so we went to him and gave him Rs. 50 ($1.1) and 4 photocopies of the bond paper, 
caste certificate and other documents, but till now, no scheme has come. My son 
Devappa went to take my photo and the caste certificate. I have wasted a lot of 
money and till now I have no benefit, so this is the last time I am trying with 
Eshappa." 
In the water and land management programmes, the Zilla Parishad (ZP) provided 25% 
of the cost of digging borewells in their lands under the irrigation scheme. The banks 
sanctioned this loan and the ZP released it to the farmers. The government 
implemented a watershed development programme covering certain villages. In the 
PRAs, villagers judged that: 
• The emphasis was on project implementation, not sustainable management of 
natural resources (SNRM); 
• The SNRM projects had a limited outreach and were limited to construction of 
'bunds' ; and 
• Government was able to implement plans that involved material and labour 
but they could not succeed in getting active participation, contribution and 
creating impact on livelihoods. 
Official soil and land conservation and rural development programmes were based on 
grants and projects executed directly by the departments and NGOs. Even where 
community level forums were organised for their implementation, the local 
contribution required ranged from 10 to 30%, based on household landholding, and 
eligibility to secure the balance as a grant. There were no community level revolving 
loan funds or credit programmes offered for farmers to collectively ensure soil and 
water conservation measures on their lands (Premchander et al, 2003). 
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Thus, discussions showed that official services were inadequate for meeting education 
and health needs. The local institutions do not demand official accountability, and 
government support to agriculture is ostensibly through land and water management 
programmes, which suffer from inefficiencies, as do the poverty reduction schemes of 
the government. Group discussions in the villages did, however, highlight certain 
positive changes. After Koppal was designated a separate district (from Raichur), it 
acquired the status of the district head quarters. The Deputy Commissioner and 
Sessions Court are now in Koppal town, while previously they were located in 
Raichur, six hours away by bus or train (190 kms.). Similarly, several government 
departments opened offices in Koppal, e.g. Education, the District Industries Centre, 
along with several banks. More credit became available because of a policy shift, 
which the District Level Credit Coordination Committee in Koppal had to implement. 
However, this was mostly channelled in ways that did not benefit genuine SHGs, and 
benefits were derived by unscrupulous NGOs. 
4.3.3 NGOs as Development Organisations 
Another factor influencing women's livelihoods concerned local development 
institutions. The institutions engaged with development or poverty reduction in 
Koppal include NGOs, government departments/organisations and banks. Local 
informal organisations include women's SHGs and youth forums. The villages had 
women's SHGs formed by the government and Sampark, a local NGO. Local youth 
forums existed in four villages, while Bikanhalli had a farmers' group organised by 
Sam park. 
Of the 17 NGOs located in the district11 , 10 were engaged in micro finance support, 
implementing various livelihoods activities such as education, skill development, 
income generation, health, watershed development, empowerment of women, 
agriculture and forestry development. These activities were implemented through the 
establishment of 550 women's SHGs. All NGOs worked with official schemes as 
well as their own small projects. Sam park had the objective of poverty reduction and 
empowerment, particularly of women, by promoting people-owned and managed 
11 A list ofNGOs in Koppal is given at Appendix I 
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forums, building their capacities and linking them with mainstream institutions for 
improving livelihoods. Its major focus was upon credit and income generation, 
education, empowerment of local forums, and agriculture and natural resource 
management. By 2005, it had promoted 120 groups and a farmers' forum to 
implement further activities, and it also worked with other organisations to provide 
training, research and advisory services. Only two NGOs, Sampark and Ekalavya, 
had long-term commitments to work in specific villages. NGOs were engaged in 
implementing a wide range of time-bound projects for government or donors. SHGs 
and other villagers expected NGOs, including Sampark, to make linkages for official 
support (Bhagya jyothi schemes, subsidised credit, etc.), so it was expected that 
NGOs would channel resources from external sources. 
In this scenario of external agents engaged with rural development, there were very 
few locally owned and managed organisations. An exception was a porters' union, 
known locally as the Hammali Sangha. The villagers explained that this organisation 
was registered in 1994 under the Indian Trade Union Act of 1926. The 450 founder 
members comprised workers who did loading and unloading of goods from lorries 
and trucks. The original membership fee was Rs. 11 and it grew to 1,000 members 
with a membership fee of Rs. 10,000 ($222). The previous President of the Sangha, 
who had admitted many members, had absconded with their membership fees, and so 
from April 2004, the Sangha only admitted one new member per month. Its 
membership fees have been used for members and their families' welfare. The 
Sangha purchased nine acres of land and built 500 apartments, which were sold to 
members at reduced rates. It disperses loans for marriages, festivals and other social 
functions. It provides Rs. 6,000 ($133) on the death of a family member, and has 
linked up with the Life Insurance Corporation of India to provide cheap medical 
insurance. The Sangha has an annual earning of Rs. 80,000 ($1, 778) from the fees it 
collects from lorries that enter Koppal carrying goods. The Sangha is well managed, 
with its own paid staff, and members posted in agricultural markets in the town to 
ensure that the members obtain work at the negotiated daily rate. The negotiating 
partner for the Sangha is the Traders' Association in Koppal, which fixes the 
'hammali' rate for the porters. All the 1000 members can get work every day, and 
there is a demand for yet more workers, which strengthens its bargaining position. 
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The Sangha is an example of a local member organisation but there are few others. In 
another sector in the informal economy, human hair processing, where Kappa! has 
over 300 units, the employees are mostly women, wages also paid on a piece- rate 
basis, and labour is not organised into a similar trade union. Most of the NGOs that 
have engaged in formation of women's groups have organised trade unions or strong 
federations, have only formed groups based on needs of externally funded 
programmes, most do not supervise SHGs after closure of these programmes, and 
most women's groups continue to be fragmented, unsupported and unregulated. 
4.3.4 Microfinance Organisations (Banks and Cooperatives). 
Cooperatives were a major source of rural credit, and Kappa! had 529 of them, of 
which 94 were credit cooperatives. The total loan to cooperatives was Rs. 51 crores 
(Rs. 510 million, $11.3 million). However, nearly a quarter of these cooperatives 
were defunct, and loan recoveries were low (SBH, 2004). The second source of rural 
credit was commercial and regional rural banks. Ten NGOs had promoted SHGs here 
and were involved in savings and credit activities for improving their income. Their 
groups were linked with banks for loans and also with government schemes. The 
linkage with subsidised programmes continued to be problematic, as illustrated in the 
following case: A farmer with 60 acres of land had 30 families of agricultural 
labourers working for him. On the advice of a local NGO, he sold a portion of it to 
government, which then granted a housing loan and developed a 'colony' for 
labourers, which essentially housed the agricultural labour employed on his lands. 
The NGO also formed a women's SHG with the labourers' wives and in the first and 
only meeting held by the SHG, a revolving loan fund of Rs. 25,000 ($556) was 
sanctioned under the DWCRA scheme12• The money actually went to the landlord, 
whose brother was a local politician, and not the women who had put thumb-
impressions for it. The NGO, on the other hand, gained a reputation for its own 
efforts in this respect, and was assigned the role of a facilitator for the 10 groups 
targeted under the scheme in Koppal district for the following year. When 
questioned, the local bank officer explained: "We have to meet the targets for credit to 
12 Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas: A government scheme that provides 
a grant to SHGs as working capital for businesses to be started by the women members 
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the priority sector. We also have to pay heed to local politicians. And if an NGO has 
political/inks, it will definitely get government recognition too. " 
This situation existed in 2002, but it changed significantly by the next year. In 2003 , 
when the banks and the government sanctioned subsidised loans to ten groups on 
political considerations, Sampark groups, who had also sent in their applications, 
protested. They wanted to know why their applications, despite the good financial 
operations of the groups, had been rejected, and why other newer and less accredited 
groups had been granted the subsidy. The then district official took cognisance of this 
complaint, resu lting in two of the Sampark-facilitated groups getting subsidised loans 
in 2004 and 2005. However, as a consequence of the protest by ' Sam park groups' , 
the NGO was dropped summarily from the membership ofthe DLCC, and this denied 
access to crucial information about credit policy intervention . 
At this time, the banks offered only government-subsidised credit to the SHGs. Local 
microfinance was dominated by customary attitudes. Credit coordination was done 
through the District Level Coordination Committee (DLCC), where decisions on the 
targets for priority sector credit were taken. The number of SHGs el igible for 
subs idised credit was limited, usually 8-10 SHGs per year for the who le district, with 
2-3 SHGs for Koppal tal'(.lk. A total of 44 SHGs in Koppal taluk had received bank 
credit, of Rs. 45,87,500 ($1 01 ,944). 
In 2003, the local RRB, Tungabhadra Grameen Bank (TGB), changed its attitude and 
started extending regular credit to SHGs. It provided non-subsidised credit to 42 
groups of Sampark between 2003 and 2005. The other banks continued to be 
conservative and limited in their reach to SHGs as shown in Table 4-9. 
Table 4-9: SHG-Bank Linkage in Koppal Taluk (2005) 
Banks Sampark SHGs with Sampark SHGs with bank 
bank accounts credit 
RRB (TGB) 32 42 
Commercial 75 2 
Banks 
Total 107 44 
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Thus, commercial banks did not provide non-subsidised credit, leaving the rural poor 
in Koppal taluk with only two SHGs linked for subsidised credit, and except for those 
who managed to link with TGB, rural credit needs were largely met by local informal 
sources of credit. The situation of Sampark promoted groups was particularly 
difficult, and when official subsidised credit was extended to over 40 groups of 
Koppal taluk in the year 2005-06, none of the Sampark-promoted were among those 
who benefited. 
High Cost Credit 
As their earning opportunities were 
limited, some people, particularly the 
devadasi families - depended on credit 
from their landlords. These loans were at 
high interest rates in exchange for bonded 
labour. Credit from the moneylenders 
was also expensive, and could be 
obtained only with hypothecation of 
assets. As Lakshmavva said: 
"We can get a loan from the 'shavkar ' 
"I took a loan of Rs.2500 ($57) from 
our landlord, without interest, for 
my sons' wedding. My son repaid 
this loan by working in their house 
from morning till evening for Rs.20 
($0.45) per day. We have to still 
repay Rs.JOOO ($23). My elder son is 
not here so my younger son has to 
work and repay it, but If he goes to 
do that work, we will have nothing 
to eat." 
- Yellamma 
(moneylender) only if we pledge something, land, buffalo, gold or silver ornaments, 
and if none of these, at least a brass or copper vessel. If we do not pay in time, we 
lose the asset. He just takes away the animal, or the jewellery, or the vessel. There is 
no mercy, this is the rule. " 
The institutional structures in Koppal district included government departments, 
NGOs and banks, which implemented a wide range of development programmes. 
However, official programmes did not really meet the basic human needs and poverty 
reduction. NGOs implemented projects for donors or government, yet had only a 
limited outreach and impact. Banks provided microfinance through official schemes 
that tht.!y were obligated to implement and only one bank- the local RRB- had what 
may be termed a market-led approach to micro credit for the poor. Thus, observed 
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1 structures and processes were not often conducive to long-term efforts towards 
poverty reduction or sustainable rural livelihoods. 
This reinforces the understanding that ecological, economic, institutional and socio-
cultur~l factors play an important role in determining the vulnerability or security of 
livelihoods in a specific regional context. 
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4.4 Summary 
The study of the livelihoods in Koppal, analysed through three broad categories, is 
depicted in Figure 4-5. 
Figure 4-5: Livelihoods in the Koppal Context 
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Institutional: (Gove11nment and NGOs) Context 
In the context of the semi-arid region made inhospitable by a degraded environment, 
farmers resorted to bore-well irrigation as household coping strategies, which resulted 
in overall unsustainability of natural resources. There were no community level 
188 
Chapter 4: Livelihood Context 
efforts to promote sustainable agriculture or sustainable management of natural 
resources. Those who possessed land had a greater feeling of security as compared to 
the landless; however, the profitability of agriculture was suspect, though people did 
get food grains and fodder from their lands. Wage rates had also increased, from Rs. 
8-15 ($0.17- 0.33) up to 2004 toRs. 20-25 ($0.44- 0.55) in 2005. The other 
options like animal-husbandry, trading, and non-farm sector employment had little or 
no scope given their bleak ecological and market conditions though new opportunities 
had opened up due to the growth of Koppal town. The relatively low literacy and 
skill levels, especially of women, were a limitation in using the new opportunities. 
With the local area not therefore providing enough sustenance, there was large-scale 
out-migration to other areas for differing periods of time. The type of work could be 
agriculture or construction labour, fishing, or loading and unloading of stones and 
other products. The major positive changes had come from out-migration, and growth 
of livestock (buffaloes, sheep and goats) among the SC communities, and increasing 
employment opportunities in Koppal district, and some benefits from official 
schemes. The caste stratifications shaped the interactions among people. They 
determined family lives of people, as well as their working lives. Devadasis remained 
among the most marginalized, with deprivation of their human rights. They were kept 
invisible by a need of government officers not to show their existence, the practice 
having been banned by law. This resulted in their being denied the government 
benefits they were entitled to. 
One may reflect on how changes may be initiated in the socio-cultural aspects of a 
livelihoods context, wherein the tendency is for social and power relations to 
perpetuate themselves. For instance, even women themselves do not question norms 
about expenditure on marriages. They fear that challenging this practice may result in 
their children not finding a marriage alliance in a well-off family. This would create 
family discord where the children may be disappointed that their parents could not 
even provide basic comforts. The issue was regarded as a household problem, and the 
inside-outside dichotomy operated to stop them from considering it a community 
issue, and questioning social conventions. The same analogy is drawn about the 
financial transactions that occur through corrupt practices among various groups 
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regarding disposition of public resources. Such practices are simply viewed as part of 
a 'system' to be followed rather than challenged. 
These insights echo Freire (1970) in that the poor need to move away from seeing 
themselves trapped within structures, and need to start questioning and changing 
whatever keeps them marginalised. The analysis of the institutional context showed 
basic facilities like schools and health were accessible, but statistics about school 
dropouts did not reflect the true situation. Several government schemes had benefited 
the villagers, e.g. provision of electricity, housing and subsidised loans. There were 
also corrupt practices, but as awareness had increased over the years, women had 
begun to question them and seek greater accountability. NGOs mostly worked on 
short-term projects with funding partnerships, and closed the offices when these 
projects ended. The dominant expectation about NGOs was related to their obtaining 
and channelling outside funds. 
Microfinance was extended through formal organisations like agricultural 
cooperatives and banks. The former had become largely defunct and the latter 
provided credit largely through programmes subsidised by the government. In these 
programmes, the assistance was mostly target-bound in terms of types of beneficiaries 
to reach, purposes and amount, and number of such grants to be given. The terms 
were not negotiable with the organisations administering these schemes. The analysis 
of livelihoods context first points to several constraints on the demand for credit, 
namely the ecological and economic contexts, which limit (but have also enhanced to 
some extent) the opportunities for productive use of money. The socio-cultural 
context highlighted the marginalisation and social exclusion of scheduled castes, and 
of devadasi women in particular, which affects asset levels of households. The 
relation between asset levels and loans will be explored in the following chapter, 
which details women's own needs, preferences and strategies for use of money. 
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Chapter 5 
Use of Money by Individuals and Groups 
Chapter 4 analysed how multiple contexts had an important bearing upon the supply 
of finance and its potential use. The elaboration ofthe topics discussed is as follows: 
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This chapter presents an analysis of the asset base, life and loan histories of individual 
women, showing how the asset base influences their earnings, which in tum 
determines their loan-taking capacity. The loans that women took yielded rich insights 
regarding sources of credit, which form the second section, and the third section 
presents detailed discussions about what influences their use of money. 
5.1 Women's Stories and Loan Histories 
Women's stories highlight the link between the level of land, human and cattle assets, 
(and the consequent income inflows and expenses), with the ability to take and repay 
loans. These are now discussed. 
s:t.t Precarious Livelihoods, Low Loan Taking Ability 
Lakshmavva's household included herself (28 years-old), her three children (8, 6, and 
4 year-old respectively), and her mother ( 45 years-old). She was dedicated as a 
devadasi as a 12 year old. At the time of research, her elder son had dropped out of 
school. She was landless, and lived in a 'Ashraya mane', a house given by the 
government, consisting of a small hall (1 0 x 10 ft), with a small partition to mark off 
the kitchen space. The walls were made of low cost cement bricks, the roof was a 
cement sheet, and the mud floor was polished with cow-dung. She had made a small 
bathroom outside using coconut leaves for walls. The open space in front and back of 
the house was part of the colony of devadasis in the village, in a low lying area, often 
slushy and not kept clean. She tied the cow and calf she owned outside the hut, and 
gave the unsold milk to her own small children. Her earning was primarily from her 
own casual farm labour, and sometimes that of her mother's, a meagre amount of Rs. 
480 ($10.66) per month. She explained the seasonal calendar of wages as follows: 
October: "In this month we have the festival of Vijayadashm/ We get work on cotton 
fields and weeding this month, we earn Rs. 20 ($0.44) per day for picking cotton. My 
mother went for this work for 10 days. I went for weeding for 15 days, and earned Rs. 
12 ($0.26) per day, so totally we earned Rs. 250 ($5.55) from cotton-crossing and Rs. 
300 ($6.66) from weeding. We also celebrate Mahanavami this month, for which we 
1 Vijayadashmi, mahanavami: hindu festivals. 
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spent Rs. 50 ($1.11), using half kg ofjaggery, half kg ofpulses and 1 kg ofrice and 
oil. We spent Rs. 375 ($8.33) for other days of the month, so total expenses this 
month were Rs. 425 ($9.44)." 
November: "We had weeding work this month and the wage was Rs. 15($0.33) per 
day. We had weeding work only for 15 days and I have earned Rs. 225 ($5) from 
coolie work. My mother worked for 9 days, and has earned Rs. 135 ($3) this month. 
So this month we have earned Rs. 360 ($8), we had no income other than this. We 
spent Rs. 100 ($2.22) on Diwali festival this month, buying 1 kg of jaggery, 1 kg 
pulses, half kg flour and 2 kg of rice, Y4 kg cooking oil, some ginger, cumin seeds, 
mustard, curry leaf garlic and coriander. We made holige (sweet chapattii) for this 
festival. I purchased cloth for children for Rs. 100 ($2.22) and paid Rs. 40 ($0.88) as 
stitching charges. The expenses for the rest of the month were Rs.262 ($5.82), so 
totally this month the expenditure came up toRs. 602 ($13.37), and the income was 
just Rs. 360 ($8) so I took a loan of Rs. 300 ($6.66) from the gowda. It is 'kaigada ', 
there is no interest on it, I can pay it back whenever I have money in hand. " 
December: "This month is known as Karthik Amavasya3. We did not have regular 
coolie work this month. My mother did coolie work for 10 days and I did not go for 
coolie this month4, so we had Rs. 120 ($2.66)from wages, and I sold one litre ofmilk 
per day and earned Rs. 235.60 ($5.22). We had Hanumappafair this month, I spent 
Rs. 50 ($1.11), and for food and ration we spent Rs. 370 ($8.2) this month. Apart 
from this I did not spend on anything else. " 
January: "This month we observe Yellu Amavase. Jowar is grown this month, so we 
have weeding-work, and harvesting jowar. We had weeding work for 20 days at Rs. 
12 ($0.26), so that was Rs. 240 ($5.33) and 8 days of harvesting jowar at R. 15 
($0.33), giving Rs. 120 ($2.66), so earned a total of Rs. 360 ($8) this month. We did 
2 Chapattis: unleavened whole wheat pancakes roasted on fire. 
3 Amavasya, Amavase: Night of the new moon 
4 All members of Durgadevi group got cows this month, from a subsidised loan, the animals 
needed to be acclamatised to new surroundings, so Lakshmavva stayed home to look after her 
cow. 
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not celebrate any festival this month, we had only food expenses and spent all Rs. 360 
($8) on food, not on anything else. II 
February, March, April: "February is the month of Amrith Amavase. In this month 
we do not get coolie work so we have difficulty in even getting one meal a day. We 
didn't have any income this month and for another three months we will not have any 
work. We take loans from villagers. I took a loan of Rs. 250 ($5.55) in February and 
Rs. 300 ($6.66) in March. The entire amount was spent on food expenses and nothing 
was left. In April we have monsoon, no income in this month, and we have the 
festival of Ugadi. I took a loan from the gowdaru, of Rs. 250 ($5.55) and spent it for 
Ugadi. II 
May: "May is recognised for Basava Jayanthi. We have coolie work for the whole of 
this month, or removing cowpea in the land near the river. The daily wage is Rs. 15 
($0.33) so this month we have earned Rs. 600 ($13.33). We spent only Rs. 25 ($0.55) 
for the feast, spent Rs. 250 ($5.55) on food and repaid loan of Rs. 300 ($6.66). II 
June: "We went for cow pea coolie work, work was available for just 15 days. My 
mother and I both went for this work, and earned 600 ($13. 33) from plucking cowpea. 
They gave Rs. 20 ($0.44) on days when we worked from 8.30 am to 6.30 pm. This 
month we did not spend anything on feast or 'jathre '. We spent Rs. 260 ($5. 77) on 
food and ration, saved Rs. 50 ($1.11) in the Sangha, and did not spend on anything 
else. Yes, I spent Rs. 25 ($0.55) for Amavase. II 
July: 'This is the month of Mannethina Amavase. We have weeding and harvesting of 
sajje5 this month. We got daily wages of Rs. 15 ($0.33) for weeding and Rs. 12 
($0.26) for harvesting; we earned Rs. 500 ($11.11) from weeding and Rs. 250 ($5.55) 
from sajje, a total of Rs. 750 ($16.66). This month I did not have any expenses other 
than household expenses, Rs. 280, ($6.22) I saved Rs. 40 ($0.88) in the SHG. I also 
spent on ration, rice, cooking oil, jowar and dal, and only Rs. 40 ($0.88) were left. II 
5 Sajje: A small millet type grain 
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August: "This is the month of Nagara Pancham1.6. We had coolie work of cotton-
crossing, for which the daily wage is Rs. 20 ($0.44). I did not go for work for 4 days 
this month; as we had the Panchami festival, we had to clean the house, and prepare 
for the feast. I earned Rs. 540 ($1 2) this month, we had to work from 6 am to 6 pm to 
be considered 'coolie' and get this wage rate. Since we had Panchami festival this 
month, I spent Rs. 400 ($8.88) to get items (groundnut, oil, jaggery, rice, etc.) for 
preparing sweets (undi-laddoo). Apart from this I spent Rs. 280 ($6.22) on household 
expenses. Adding Rs. 40 ($0. 88) of savings in the group, this month's expenses were 
Rs. 690 ($1 5.33)." 
September: "This month also we have cotton-crossing work. The coolie was Rs. 20 
($0.44) per day, so I earned Rs. 550 ($1 2.22) this month, in 27 days. We did not 
celebrate any festival this month so we spent just Rs. 280 ($6.22) on ration. I saved 
Rs. 30 ($0.66) in the group, so the total expenses were Rs. 310 ($6.88)." 
Lakshmavva has had one partner since she became a devadasi, who made no 
contribution to her household. She said about him: "What can I do? I selected a 
wrong life, I have no other option, whether he looks after me well or not, I must take 
care of myself and my mother. How much can she bear? Sometimes we did not have 
food, and Shivappa gave me jowar flour to make rotto (bread) during my pregnancy. 
Now I have experience and I can manage my life,. but at that time I was young, 
innocent and inexperienced. He avoided me during my pregnancy and always came 
back when I started regular work again. But even though I faced very tough 
situations, I did not look at another man. Whether he gave me anything or not, I 
could not think of another man. In case a husband does not give enough to the family, 
a wife does not go to another man; in the same way I have also not bothered whether 
he supports me or not. He has always been the same, he never brought anything for 
the house, never brought rations. He provides one dress for me once a year and twice 
for the children, that is all. But my in-laws sent ration to my house twice after 
delivery. They like me and support me. " 
6 Panchami: Fifth day of lunar month 
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She took repeated loans from the landlord, four times during the one-year's research, 
of Rs. 250 ($5.55) to Rs. 300 ($6.66) each time, totalling Rs. 1,100 ($24). These 
loans for household expenses were taken during the lean season from March to May, 
when there was low availability of agricultural labour work, leading her into a 
perpetual cycle of debt to her landlord. After she joined the SHG, she took five loans 
from the SHG, totalling Rs. 887 ($20), on which she paid an interest of Rs. 300 
($6.66) but had kept the principal amount outstanding. She acquired a cow under a 
subsidised loan scheme, which provided small additional income that helped the 
family survive, but she was not in a position to repay this loan. Even when formal 
loans were offered by the NGO, she did not take the option, as she could not afford to 
be further indebted. Over the four-year period spanning this research, Lakshmavva's 
elder son left school to graze the buffalo. Later, her second son also left and took 
over the grazing chore and her elder son graduated to coolie work. In 2005, her 
youngest daughter left school. These children had no time to learn, or for capacity 
building, and their mother had no way to sustain her family except through their 
earnings. In her case, the asset and income creation from financial capital (i.e. 
keeping the buffalo) was at the expense of her children's development. The loans for 
consumption helped her to manage difficult periods, and the buffalo taken on 
subsidised credit helped improve her asset position. 
The Story of Nagavva 
Nagavva, a 27 year old devadasi, stood thin and tall, with an oval shaped, sensitive 
face and wheat coloured skin. She was landless, with a parent (father) and three 
children to care for. Her two sons, aged ten and eight years, went to school, and the 
youngest, a daughter, was four year old. She had two houses, one house had tiled 
roof, walls made of bricks and the floor of mud, polished with cow-dung. It had a 
hall, a part of which she used as the kitchen. She had made another house with a roof 
moulded with wood and walls of mud, plastered with cement. She had a bathroom 
and a small kitchen in this house. She had made a small extension to both the houses, 
where she tied the cattle. She kept all the clothes in one house and cooking vessels in 
another. She kept her home very clean. 
196 
Chapter 5: Use ofMoney 
Nagavva was an only child, born after ten years of her parents' marriage, so her 
mother cared a lot for her and never allowed her to do any work at home, except for 
letting her graze the cattle. It was only after she was 12 years old that she went for 
farm labour with her mother, and if she was unable to finish, her mother completed 
her portion of the work, too. Nagavva was very close to her mother, and still mourns 
her mother's death two years ago. She has not yet recovered from the loss, and during 
the interviews, though she speaks with humour, her eyes are full of tears. 
Nagavva' s maternal uncle had three sons. Her eldest cousin grew in their home; he 
was ten years old when Nagavva was born, and they were very close. He returned to 
his parents' home after he was twenty. Nagavva's parents had decided to get them 
married. She explains: 
"My parents had decided that I would be married to him and we would live with them. 
Soon after I attained puberty, there was a marriage proposal for me, which they 
turned down. They thought that they would fix my marriage with my cousin, so they 
went to my uncle's home and asked if their eldest son could marry me. My aunt and 
uncle refused saying that they needed his earnings for themselves. My parents were 
very upset because they were really keen on having him as their son-in-law, and when 
we were young, my uncle had agreed to let him marry me and stay with my parents, 
so now they folt slighted. 
My uncle's son was also very interested in marrying me; he fought with his parents 
and came to my house immediately. He also said that he would not marry anyone 
other than me. I was also interested in him, he had lived for so many years in our 
home, and we were close then. 
My parents wanted to avoid him because my uncle had hurt them. They tried to send 
him away by telling him some lie. They said: 'We cannot have our daughter married 
now as we have many loans that need to be repaid. Can you wait till the loans are 
cleared?' He said: 'Tell me how much, I will clear the whole amount'. Then my 
parents said: 'Do that first, then we will think of your marriage. ' He told my father: 
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'Give me three months' time, I will go to Ratnagiri for work and will pay off all the 
loan/. Do not give her (in marriage) to anyone till I come back. 
After he left, my parents sounded out some people to look out for a match for me; two 
or three matches were suggested, but they did not want to let their son live in our 
home. Then my parents thought: 'Why get her married at all? Let her be a devadasi. ' 
When my parents started looking out for a match for me, I sent a message to my 
cousin through a person who works in Ratnagiri, but it took a few months for the 
message to reach him. This was the first time he worked with the contractor, so he 
had to complete the mandated nine months before he could take leave. He too sent 
me a message with someone who came back after a few months: 'I will come back 
after nine months and marry Nagavva - tell her parents not to give her to anybody'. 
But before that my parents had already made me into a devadasi and fixed me up with 
Reddy." 
Her partner Reddy cared for her until he married, and then the contact became limited 
to sexual relations and provisions for the house. Even when she was ill, and her 
children also fell ill in the rainy season, he gave only Rs. 100 ($2.22), which had to 
suffice for the children's treatment. Nagavva claimed her partner had stopped caring. 
She said: "Now he comes only in the night, finishes his work (meaning sexual 
relation) and goes off. I can't even talk to him about my feelings. I was ill for more 
than 15 days, he did not even turn back to look at me. If I were married my husband 
would have stayed with me and looked after me. He is not supporting me properly, 
my children are small; I don't know how many problems I have to face until they 
grow big enough. Now I do not have the confidence that he will support me. This is 
why I stopped with three children; I can earn and look after them. Whatever he can 
give us, and for whichever period, is fine, but I am clear that without doing coolie 
work my life cannot be, I have to depend fully on coolie work. Even later, if my 
children cannot look after me, I belong to this village, I can take a plate and beg for 
food for my stomach. " Her earnings were only from her own wages, and sometimes 
1 Men normally go for fishing, and work with contractors, they return after 6 to 9 months with a lump 
sum of payment between I 0,000 to 20,000 rupees, but they can sometimes manage to come home after 
three months, with an advance payment from the contractor. 
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her father went for coolie work, too. They took turns to look after the cattle. Her 
average monthly income was Rs. I ,274 ($28.3I ), to support a five-member 
household. At the beginning of the research, she had one cow, one calf, one goat and 
two chickens. All milk was used for household consumption. 
She had taken five loans, ranging between 250 to Rs. 300 ($6.66), a total of Rs. I ,932 
($43) twice from the SHG and thrice from the landlord, but made only one repayment 
to the SHG over the study period. She was sanctioned a loan of Rs. 5,000 ($II1) 
under the IRDP scheme, with a subsidy element of 50%. However, she was told that 
the subsidy amount would be Rs. 1,500 ($33.33) and she would have to pay back Rs. 
3,500 ($78). The amount released to her was only Rs. 3,500 ($78). She bought a 
buffalo-calf for Rs. 1,500 ($33) and used the rest for household expenses. After she 
reared it for one year, she sold it for Rs. 700 ($16) and put together some of her own 
savings to buy an adult buffalo. At this time, her son was ill and had to be taken to 
the hospital regularly. Being landless and dependent only on coolie labour, she could 
not earn enough to repay the loan. She said: "The buffalo loan was of great use to us. 
My son had fever since he was two years old; I could feed my son with the milk of the 
buffalo, and sell the extra milk to pay the hospital charges. My son survived because 
of that buffalo. His health was not good for three years. After that, when we wanted 
to repay, my mother fell ill; we took her to hospital but she died. Now the buffalo is 
dead. We could not repay because of all these problems. My son would have been 
dead without that buffalo. At least now I want to repay because the bank sends me 
notices. The interest has now become more than 50% of the loan. I don't know when 
I am going to repay this. " Clearly, the non-repayment of the loan was due more to 
her inability, than unwillingness to repay. Over the study period, however, she added 
a buffalo calf, from her savings, and another buffalo, from a subsidised group loan, 
and also two hens. 
The Story of Parvathamma 
Parvathamma's household of three comprised herself (35 years old), her mother (70 
years old) and a I3-year old son; her daughter was IS, married, with a girl child, and 
living with her husband in another village. Her mother and grandmother were also 
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devadasis, but she broke this custom when her daughter married at eight. 
Parvathamma was dedicated when five. After maturing at 12, her mother wanted her 
to have a relationship with a man, which she did not want. She would go into a trance, 
be 'possessed' by 'Galeamma' goddess, and her body would shudder and she would 
break into hysterical talk. Her mother wanted her to dedicate herself to this goddess 
to enable her to become normal again. After four years, Parvathamma was convinced 
to accept this life and relationship; her hysterical spells declined, and her mother 
arranged a partnership with a 38 year old Muslim man. Parvathamma would not talk 
about him, and became angry at his mention; for while he maintained the partnership 
for 10 years, he would also drink, use foul language and abuse her, and she felt that he 
had done nothing but exploit her and her mother by extorting money from them. She 
had two pregnancies during this period, and both the children died; she returned to 
work seven days after delivery, and finally, angry at his neglect, she told him: "Even 
ifyou do not live with me, someone else will, so you do not have to visit us. Please 
stop coming here", and when he got drunk and abused her, she said: "Go and die with 
your wife." Later, she found a partner in Yellappa, 48 years old, from the butcher 
caste, who has been more caring. Both her children are from him. He trades in sheep 
and goats, travels from village to village, has a reliable seasonal income, and provides 
whenever her family do not have sufficient earnings. Expressing her loyalty to him 
she said: 
"From the time I started my second relationship, my partner has been providing full 
support to the children and me. The son fell ill and we took him to several hospitals, 
he has spent more than Rs.' 25,000 ($556) over the past seven years for medical 
expenses. He takes care of all the food, clothes, and hospital expenses. He provided 
the money for the marriage of my daughter, and the delivery expenses of all her 
children. He has told me: 'You do not have to do coolie work, I will look after you, 
don 't ask anything of anyone else'. He is like my father, husband, and my everything. 
He also looks after my mother. Even though my son is earning from his job at a hotel, 
it is only a supplementary income to the family. I never had to take a loan from 
outside since this man came into my life. " 
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Parvathamma considers her male partner as the most important pivot of change in her 
livelihood. The financial details, though, were a little different, because the major 
portion (60%) of her monthly income of Rs. 1,027 ($23) was still from the salary of 
her 14 year-old son, employed in a shop in Koppal. She had half an acre of land, 
provided by the government, which was often submerged with dam water, and thus 
provided little additional income. She took two small loans of Rs. 100 ($2.22) and 
Rs. 200 ($4.44) from the group for medicines and clothes. As her household needs 
were met by her son's salary and her partner, and she did not have surplus labour to 
look after new assets, she did not take any further loans. She also left her group within 
two years and did not join another. 
Low Assets, Low Incomes, Small Loans 
Lakshmavva and Nagavva lacked human and physical capital, resulting in low 
incomes. They depended on the labour they committed to specific landlords against 
small advances ofRs. 250-300 ($5.55-6.66). They took loans at festival time to spend 
on food, and recorded them as 'festival expenses'. They did not have sufficient cash 
flows to cover basic survival expenses for the family, and festivals provided a reason 
for requesting advances from their landlords. Nagavva said: "When my parents were 
alive they did coolie work, my children were small then and we did not have any 
problems in 'running' the household. If at all we fell short of money, we used to take 
an advance from landlords and clear it within 15 to 20 days. If we take loan from 
outside, we will have the burden of interest, so we don't take any loan of a higher 
amount than Rs. 100 to 200 ($2.22 to 4.44). We have to earn and eat, and we don't 
have any land; if we take a loan it is difficult for us to repay it. Since we have the 
group now, we can take and repay the loan to the group. We don't find the need to go 
to 'outsiders' for loans. " 
5.1.2 Surviving at the Margins 
The Story of Y ellamma 
Yellamma's household comprised of six, including two sons, their wives and a 
daughter, with another two daughters married and living in other villages. Since my 
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children started earning, I have stopped going for coolie work. I don't have house or 
land so I have to do coolie work to eat. This is why I feel that 'health is wealth. ' 
Because of my leg pain, 'hareavayi '; I can't do coolie work any more. Maybe I can 
take loan from the group and do some sort of 'vyapara' (trading activity). I can do 
dairying now - this is what I want to do. I take the cows for grazing; leave them to 
graze then sit under a tree for some time so I don't feel the pain much. Earlier, I used 
to go to bring hay for the cattle, then a boy from the neighbourhood used to bring it, 
but now he died of snakebite, so I will have to go and get hay. 
There are three landlords: Chanappa, Sharanappa and Shekarappa. If an elderly 
person passes away they give cattle as a grant in remembrance of them. Since I don't 
go for coolie work, I take these cattle for grazing and bring hay for them. I gave one 
cow to my daughter, now it is one year old and my daughter takes it for grazing. 
There are two big farmers, I work for them, their names are Eshappa and Koiavaru. 
They give coolie wages on the day I work, while other farmers give wages 3 to 4 days 
after the work has been done. So I get provisions from the petty shop and pay him 
after I get the coolie wage. The landlords also give 16 to 20 kgs ofjowar, pulses and 
groundnut when these crops are harvested. I sell them in the Kappa/ market, and 
from the money earned I purchase clothes for my children and myself I also get some 
provision from the shandy during festivals. This time, two landlords gave me two 
bags of maize, which I sold in Kappa/ for Rs. 600 ($13), I gave my elder son that 
money to have an operation for his piles problem. 
I am the main earning member in my house. What to do? If one is born in a poor 
family, one has to think whatever one has is good. When my son Devappa does work 
of head-loading on the tractor, he earns Rs. 50 ($1.11) per day; he works for one day 
and stays home for another two days. My daughter Gayathravva goes to work 
everyday. Her brother told her to go to Kappa/ jathre ', but she refused to go, saying 
that the expense will be Rs. 400 ($8.88), and the same is better spent to get provisions 
for the house i.e. rice for one month. My daughter thinks a lot about the house, she is 
like goddess Saraswati. Other children demand things, but my daughter's only 
business is to work, earn, eat and sleep. 
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My elder son, Nagappa, does not g~for coolie work, he is sick, so if he wants money 
for petty expenses he asks me; even when he is sick, I have to bear the cost of his 
medical expenses. He is the cause of my worry. His wife is also sick, she is suffering 
from TB. Her parents do not take care of her as they are poor. We are poor too. If 
she comes here then I have to earn for her medical expenses, and moreover I worry 
that the disease may spread to my son also, I am very scared about that. Right now 
she has gone back to her mother's place. " 
About group loans, she said: "When the group had started, I had taken a loan of Rs. 
200 ($4.44), paid Rs. 10 ($0.22) as interest and Rs. 50 ($1.11) towards principal over 
four months. As my son was ill I took Rs. 150 ($3.33) from the group and am now 
paying the interest but have not yet paid the principal amount. There is no coolie 
work this month, so there is a difficulty in repaying it. I have not taken loan from 
anyone else because no one helps us when we are in need. That is why it is very rare 
that I ask for a loan from anybody. When my children got married, I had taken a loan 
of Rs. 1,200 ($2 7) at 10% per month. They ask us to give something, like gold, to take 
the loan. That is why I don't take any loans; after the group has been formed I have 
not taken any loan from outside. Also, nobody is able to give a loan. If anybody in 
our locality wants to take a loan, they take it from 'Baddi Chanappa '. He gives to 
anybody at any time but we have to repay him in the given time else he takes either a 
cow or a buffalo from the house - that's why his name is 'Baddi Chanappa' ('baddi' 
is the kannada term for interest). 
When I first took a loan it was for my daughter's wedding. Later I 'took out' a loan 
of Rs. 2,500 ($56) from our farmers, i.e. from our village farmers without interest. 
My sons repaid this loan by working in their house from morning until night for Rs. 
20 ($0.44) . That is why I don't take any loans from other people. We still have to 
repay Rs. 1000 ($22) because they had given us a bag of wheat during the wedding. 
My elder son is not here, and if my younger son goes to do that work to repay it 
(meaning bonded labour), we will have nothing to eat, even now all of us have to go 
to work to eat. 
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I took a loan for my son's marriage, I paid it back within two years by doing coolie 
work, but I still have to pay Rs. 2,050 ($46) by doing coolie work. I am afraid to take 
loans. We spend as we earn. We will spend as per our limit. Since we don't have 
land, gold, silver or a house, who will give us a loan? We are bonded labourers to 
farmers who have given us a loan. My eldest son works and pays it back. Still, part 
of the loan is yet to be repaid. 
People living in our street are very poor and there are a lot of children so they find it 
difficult to repay the loan. 
I have four acres of land near the river but we can cultivate it only once a year. We 
grow maize, cowpea, horse-gram and jowar. This year even that is not available, as 
there is no rain, and no water in the river. If we grow crops on our land, there is 
sufficient hay for the cattle, but as we could not grow hay this year, we will have to 
get it from outside for Rs. 300 ($46) per cartload. " There were three cattle in her 
house but one was given to her daughter in Shivapura village. 
The Story of Shivavva 
Shivavva shared a small home with her husband, two sons and a daughter-in-law, and 
three daughters (two others were married), and three grandchildren. During the 
course of the research, her husband died, her elder son's family separated and went to 
another house, one daughter got married and left home and her younger son got 
married and had a child, and also migrated, so the size of the family reduced from 
eleven to five during this research. She was unhappy with the elder son, and stated: 
"If my eldest son works for one day, he may not work for the next two days - his 
work pattern is extremely irregular. His wife, the eldest daughter-in-law, cares for the 
children and the home. The younger one does coolie work either in the house of the 
'gowda ', or other people. Each one of us has to work to be able to manage the 
household. " 
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Regarding education, Shivavva said "Both my sons and daughters-in-law are 
illiterate -even my grandchildren are not willing to go to school. Although we try to 
send them, they are not interested. " 
The main income came from the agricultural labour of seven members, for her family 
was landless and uneducated, and only earned an average of Rs. 3,500 ($78) to Rs. 
4,000 ($89) per month during nine months of the year. Earlier the inflow was lower, 
but from 2001 there was a lump sum contributed from the migratory income of her 
son. When the younger son visited home, he brought with him Rs. 15,000 to 20,000 
($333 to $444). If she needed money in the interim, he sent about Rs. 2,000 ($44) or 
more depending on her need. Shivavva used this to reduce her debts, while the 
money from the rest of the family's labour paid for regular household expenses. 
Shivavva had three cows and three calves, producing two litres of milk per day, sold 
at Rs. 7 ($0.15) per litre. They collected freejowar-hay for cows from other people's 
fields, and collected manure from cow dung, sold at Rs. 50 ($1.11) per cartload; four 
times every six months. The elder daughter-in-law got as a dowry a six-month old 
female calften years before, from which the rest of the stock was produced. 
Household expenses were high because of large family size. Shivavva finally repaid 
her son's marriage loan in May with her share of savings from the group. The peaks 
in her expenses were due to her husband's illness and death at a time when her eldest 
son and his family had also separated from the joint family (he had four girls and a 
boy). Shivavva regarded this as a sad loss, and a continuation of her responsibility as 
head ofthe household. 
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"1 take all the responsibility of the house. My younger son listens to me. I 
asked my eldest son to take responsibility for the family after my husband 
died, but he refused. He could not take care of such a large family and he 
separated. My sons and daughters have all been going for coolie work. The 
three daughters who were earning are now married, and the younger two 
have also continued to do farm labour. They earn Rs. 15 ($0.33) per day as 
wages; they get work for about 15 days every month. During the days when 
they do not get work, they fetch hay for the cows, collect firewood, and bring 
water". 
"I am happy about being in charge, but I feel bad too. I would have liked my 
eldest son to take the responsibility. I told my elder daughter-in-law to stay at 
home and care for the family and children, while I continued to go and work 
In the fields, and she did so. I told my younger daughter-in-law the same. 
But she told me to be at home instead. Now she goes for coolie work." 
- Shivavva 
Shivavva' s family had lived in a small hut for 15 years. When her younger son went 
to Ratnagiri , he gave her Rs . 6,000 ($133). She added to this and bought a house for 
Rs. 8,000 ($178), with no electricity. This was remedied when she paid a middleman 
to become beneficiaries of the government ' s Bhagya Jyothi scheme. She then got a 
house allotted to them under another government scheme, five years ago . When the 
whole family lived together, they would cook in the old (first) house, and some slept 
in the new one. 
Shivavva' s third daughter married two years earlier, and a loan ofRs. 3,000 ($67) was 
taken for this marriage at an interest of 5% per month. She made part payments 
towards this for two years. She had taken three loans from group savings ranging 
from Rs. 300 to 400 ($6.66 to 8.88) each time to meet expenses, visit the temple, and 
to repay the money lender. She had not yet paid the group loans, and explained: "I 
took loans three times, a total of Rs. 900 ($20) . I have so far paid interest of Rs. 750 
($17) . I do not have any loan outside the group. My daughter says that if she gets 
coolie work regularly, then we can repay the principal in monthly instalments. If I 
take a loan it is from the group not from anyone else. When my husband was earning 
I had his wages, now I have only the group savings to come to my rescue. " Later, in 
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2004, she purchased a buffalo through a loan from her SHG; the loan was linked with 
a subsidy scheme of the SC/ST Corporation, which required her to pay back half of it. 
The animal stock provided them with some cash inflow, and as family members 
laboured daily, the household position improved. 
About the loans she said: "I do not get loans from outside. If I get loans from 
farmers, then I would be bound to them until the amount gets cleared. I do not have 
land either at my parent 's or my husband's place. My sons are my biggest property, 
like land (Nanna mage nanage hola iddahange). I took a loan of Rs. 40,000 ($889) 
for their marriage expenses from the farmers ; it took five years for them to repay the 
loan, which was deducted part by part from their wages. During this time when my 
sons were kept as bonded labourers, my husband, my daughters and I went for coolie 
work to manage the expenses ofthefamily." 
Figure 5-2: Shivavva's Inflows Distributions (Rs. 46,050/ $1,023) 
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Figure 5-4: Total Inflows and Outflows of Shivavva 
I 
~--A...;.._* 
- ~ .:.:r-~~~------------------·---~~~---.. I 
-.-Total 
Income 
Month 
Total 
Expenses 
Over this research period, Shivavva lost her husband, her elder son moved away, her 
grandchildren dropped out of school, and her family was able to survive only because 
of combined factors like farm labour, the migration earning of her younger son, and 
minor inflows from the sale of milk. 
5.1.3 Struggles and Stability 
The Story of Sus hila 
For money, Sushila depended on her tailoring skill, and a small business, both of 
which, along with child care, occupied all her time. At the time of this research, her 
monthly earning was Rs. 3,081 ($68), for a five-member household. The first bank 
loan was taken by her husband for equipment to repair pumpsets. She explained: "The 
loan of Rs. 10,000 ($222) was sanctioned by Canara Bank Kappa/, but only Rs. 8, 000 
($178) were given to us. The bank manager asked me to make a Fixed Deposit of Rs. 
2, 000 ($44) in the bank. This will be returned to us, with interest, when the full loan 
is repaid. We have three years to repay the loan. I have repaid Rs. 1, 700 ($38) over 
the past two years. " Sushila did not take further loans during the research period. 
Later, in 2004, she took a loan from the group and expanded her stock to five goats by 
November 2005. 
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Sushila was once poor and isolated, with three young children, and subject to 
domestic violence from an alcoholic husband. Becoming a member of the SHG 
helped to build her confidence, develop leadership qualities and challenge her 
husband. She could take risks and diversify her business to earn more for her family. 
"Five years back we did not have food security and we used to have only one meal 
per day. Now I am able to earn more and give my children two meals per day, and 
clothes. All these changes happened because of my becoming a member in an SHG. 
After the formation of the group I was able to get the loan and expand the business. 
Not only the business, but my confidence also increased to such an extent that now I 
am able to say 'no' to my husband when he demands money for liquor. 
I am able to fulfil my dream of giving a good education to my children. I am sending 
my son to school and paying Rs. 50 ($1.11) per month for tuition. I do this so that he 
can get admitted in the Navodaya Schoof, which provides high quality education and 
also free boarding till 1 O'h standard. 
Another good thing that happened during the last jive years is that I did not get 
pregnant, because I decided to have the family planning operation. As a result I now 
have time to do businesses (tailoring and selling cosmetics). 
Overall, during the last jive years my tailoring has improved, my confidence levels 
increased and my children are studying well. These are all the things that motivate 
me to work hard and live in this world. " 
The turnaround in her life arose from NGO support for improving her tailoring and 
embroidery skills, and using these for income generation. 
8 Subsidised school provided by the government for meritorious children. 
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The Story of Sangavva 
Sangavva's household of five included herself (42), her mother (55), two sons (22, 
18) and daughter-in-law (17). The elder son and daughter in law did coolie work, 
while the younger son studied in secondary school. She had half an acre of land, 
along with others of her caste, and they had a common borewell for irrigating this 
land. She could grow two crops per year, of jowar, onion, chillies, groundnut and 
cotton. She kept jowar and chillies for home consumption, and sold the other crops. 
She has one house and one small plot of land (the former is in her father's and latter in 
her name); the walls of the house are made from stones and mud, and the roof with 
wood and mud. The mud floor is polished with cow-dung. The house has a kitchen, a 
hall and a bathroom, and a thatched roofto tie cattle. At the beginning of the research 
period, she did not have hens, goat or sheep. 
Sangavva was dedicated as a devadasi at the age of twelve as her elder sister had been 
married, her mother was pregnant, and her father died at that time. Her first partner 
stayed only a month, and she made a second partnership after a few months, with a 
man of the same Kuruba community, which has lasted several years. Her second 
partner is called 'goudar' because he has some land and a house. He querried her 
expenses every month, and met any shortfall. 
Her elder son was a bonded labourer with a farmer for six years. She explained: 
"They did not pay him wages, just food and clothes, and three lambs every year. 
They added one lamb each year, so in the last year of work there he got seven lambs. 
We used to rear those lambs, and sell them from time to time, I used that money for 
the marriage of my sons. Now my sons go for coolie and sometimes my mother goes 
too. My daughter-in-law has gone to her mother's place for delivery. Women's 
wages, from morning till afternoon, are Rs. 12($0.26) and men get Rs. 20 ($0.44) for 
working till 6 pm. We get coolie work for about seven to eight months a year, about 
four to jive days a week. " 
Her annual income was Rs. 37,489 ($833), or Rs. 7,498 ($167) per person in the 
-
household, providing a better standard of living than the other devadasis households 
discussed earlier, e.g. Lakshmavva. 
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She once applied for a loan ofRs. 5,000 ($111) to purchase a buffalo under the IRDP 
scheme, whereby 50% ofthe loan was subsidised, and the loan was repayable without 
interest over two years. Of the loan amount of Rs. 2,500 ($56), she received Rs. 
2,000 ($44), and Rs. 1,000 ($22) ofthe subsidy amount, leaving Rs. 2,000 ($22) kept 
by the middleman. She bought a buffalo for Rs. 1,500 ($33) and spent the rest on 
household needs. She kept the buffalo for six months, and because it could not calf, 
sold it for Rs. 600 ($13), again using the money for household expenses. She has not 
yet repaid the bank, which sent her a notice, and an officer visited her to claim that if 
she repaid, she would then be eligible to take another loan, which she doubted, 
claiming: "Yes, it may be true that if I repay they will give me another loan, but I 
don't have the money to repay; maybe if my son is able to repay then he will. " 
She bought seeds and fertilisers on loan, and repaid the loan before making the next 
purchase. She explained her reluctance thus: "Earlier my mother used to take the 
responsibility of the house, but now she is unable to travel to town, and I have to do 
so. My responsibility is to tell my children to go to work, to ensure provisions for the 
house, to decide upon what to get or not, and see to the consequences. Earlier, my 
mother used to take the responsibility and I was just cooking, going to coolie work 
and going to our farm. Now I take the responsibility of marketing the crops, getting 
fertilisers and manure, clothes and shop in the shandy. If there is money in hand, we 
can give and take easily, but now there is no rain and no coolie. It is difficult to 
maintain my responsibility, and I have to take debt to maintain my family in such 
situations. Responsibilities mean a hundred and eight worries. "She perceived loans 
as 'debts', and said: "When we don't have coolie work, when there is some health 
problem, for household purposes and when we have to travel, we take loans. " 
She did, however, take loans from the group. She explained: "I took three loans in 
the past two years, twice to meet household expenses and once to pay the examination 
fees for my son. The interest rate in the group is low, and when we face problems we 
can discuss it, and can repay it in instalments, this is the benefit of the group; if we 
take loan from 'outsiders' we have to pay the principal all at one time and the interest 
is also high." 
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By November 2005, she had two cows, one calf, five goats and six kids. She bought 
cartloads of white jowar hay and bundles of green hay for the cattle. The cows 
provided little milk, less than a litre per day, which was kept for home consumption, 
as was the goat milk. The goats were periodically sold to meet household or medical 
needs; the rates varied from Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,500 ($ 17 to $ 33) depending on their 
weight. To build her house, she sold four goats. 
5.1.4 Sufficiency and Prosperity 
The Story of Ran gamma 
Rangamma had a household comprising ten people, with seven earning members 
providing the household with an average monthly income of Rs. 7,881 ($175). The 
family had two acres of land, in two one-acre pieces, and both the husband and wife 
worked on the land, but it did not provide enough produce to meet its food needs 
alone as the couple had six children. In 1985, as Rangamma intended starting 
dairying, her parents gifted her a cow. When the cow had a calf and she could sell the 
milk, she was prepared to buy another head of cattle. At this time, in 1986-87, she 
took her first loan from a bank, of Rs. 1,500 ($33), which she repaid ahead of time, . 
and got a subsidy of Rs. 400 ($8.8). She maintained her cow and buffalo well, which 
provided three calves, and she sold the buffalo for Rs. 1,500 ($33). In this way, she 
managed dairying for over twelve years, and the herd grew to seven cows and four 
buffaloes by 1998. She used to make buttermilk and ghee (clarified butter), go to 
Koppal town and sell milk and milk products every day. It was from this income that 
she met the expenses for the marriages of her two daughters and the children's 
education. Then she became tired, as she had to travel long distances to collect 
fodder; and because, as the children grew, they became reluctant to take the cattle to 
graze en route to school, or fetch water and fodder. Her daughters married and left 
home, one son failed in secondary school, then took up construction work, and others 
too did not help with cattle care. She gifted five cows to her relatives, and sold all but 
one. Next she started a hotel in the village, but once again she was tired of being left 
alone, and cooking and cleaning. Her husband, who used to help her, took up the 
responsibility of building a temple for their village community; Rangamma· fell ill, 
and closed the hotel. For the past three years, however, the family erected a hotel 
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during the deepavali festival in November, and earned Rs. 1,500 ($33) to Rs. 2,000 
($44) per day, making a profit ofRs. 6,000 ($133) during this one week. 
After joining the SHG, she first took a loan of Rs. 1,000 ($22) for meeting expenses 
of a festival and buying gifts for relatives, and another of Rs. 2,000 ($44) for 
construction of her house. At the same time, she also took a loan ofRs. 5,000 ($111) 
for setting up a provision shop for her husband. This loan was taken through the 
group, and was offered by a MFI through the NGO. She repaid this loan fully and 
took another Rs. 5,000 ($111) from the same MFI for house construction. She used a 
chit fund9 of Rs. 5,000 ($111) for house construction. She also took a short-term loan 
of Rs. 5,000 ($111) from the group, to run a food business during the deepavali 
festival. Her son took a loan of Rs. 3,000 ($67) from his trader employer to fund 
house construction. The second son, Gururaja, earned Rs. 70 per day as a 
construction worker, the third son migrated out for a week at a time for construction 
work, and the fourth son worked as a driver in a police officer's home. The former 
two contributed Rs. 200 to 300 ($4.44-6.66) weekly and sometimes brought home 
mutton or provisions, while the youngest son brought Rs. 2,000 ($44) to 3,000 ($67) a 
year to the household. Rangamma's loan history highlights the fact of her having 
different sources of income, from the earnings of her sons, from savings made earlier 
by the household (in the chit fund) and from other businesses. These multiple sources 
provided her with the ability to borrow continuously from different sources. Her 
experience with banks and other formal sources was also positive. Her orientation 
towards taking loans was to return them as quickly as possible, and therefore she was 
able to take several loans for investing in assets and income generating activities. 
9 Chit funds operate like rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), whereby 
members pool in a fixed amount, and the pooled amount is allotted to one member every 
month, based either on need, or bidding, or on a draw of lots. 
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The Story of Kaveri 
Kaveri belonged to a relatively rich household from the dominant Reddy caste, with a 
good base of human capital, and an economically active father-in-law, husband and 
two younger brothers-in-law. The family cultivated 14 acres of land (owned 11 acres 
and leased three) of which five were irrigated, so they could grow crops for sale as 
well as home consumption. They had two buffaloes and two calves, too bulls and a 
dog. The entire milk produce of three litres a day was consumed at home. Her father-
in-law managed the lands and cattle, and all family income. Her husband was the 
vice-chairman of the village panchayat, had a groundnut trading business, and 
managed household finances along with his father, but was rarely at home. His 
younger brother worked on the lands and cared for cattle, and the youngest brother 
worked in a seed company, earning a salary ofRs. 2,500 ($56), of which he spent Rs. 
500 ($11) on bus fares and contributed the rest to the family. Kaveri calculated the 
household's monthly income as Rs. 9,108 ($202); which was probably an 
underestimation, as she did not know the full earnings of her father-in-law and 
husband. 
Kaveri was encouraged by her family to contest the panchayat elections. She sought 
the support of members of SHGs, promising them support from government schemes, 
tractor-loads of fodder, etc.; they campaigned in the villages for her, and she became a 
leader at the taluk panchayat. When she first became a leader, Kaveri was a novice in 
government, but later, she learnt how the various government schemes operated, and 
thus became a part of the 'system'. Her progress can be seen in Figure 5-5 below: 
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Figure 5-5: Dramatic Change in Condition and Position 
• Housewife; looked after children and household work 
• Husband worked as a partner; good income and very few 
loans 
• Kaveri did not go out of the home often 
• She benefited from SHG, through loans and leadership 
• She took loans for household consumption from the SHG 
• She became a leader, participated in politics (panchayat) 
• She started contributing to household income 
• She had to follow directions of her husband, about decisions in 
the 
• She aspired for better school education for her children 
• The family purchased land in Koppal 
• Economic change at home, increased earnings 
• Increased visibility due to political involvement 
• Husband started trading business through bank and group loan 
• Her brother-in-law left his job, reducing family income, then 
tried and failed 
• Main responsibility of the joint household fell on her husband, 
who incurred losses in business 
Her contribution was 20% of the household income, and she 
was other fami members for her efforts 
Her voice in the family was now heard; she planned household 
fami with her husband 
• She gained the capacity and confidence to take larger loans 
(over Rs. 15,000, ($333)) at 2-3% interest from external 
sources 
• She did not want to stand for Panchayat elections, but aspired 
for a seat in the State 
• She left the Sampark-initiated group, and formed and joined 
another BPL group, where she could access government 
schemes and from subsidies 
• She wanted to re-invest in the trading business and get back 
money lost by her husband 
• She felt that the experience in the SHG and later as a politician 
had given her new entrepreneurial skills 
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Kaveri took three loans of Rs. 1,000 ($22) each from the group, to meet household 
expenses. When the group got its first bank loan, she took Rs. 4,000 ($89) for a 
poultry unit for her brother-in-law. From the next bank loan to the group, she 
borrowed Rs. 5,000 ($111) for a retail shop, which supplemented a loan ofRs. 50,000 
($1, 111) that her husband took to open the shop. All these loans were from TGB, and 
unsubsidised. She wanted to take the next loan to construct a shed for sericulture. 
Over time, as her experience as a panchayat leader grew, she realised that only 80% 
of the members of an SHG needed to be below the poverty line to benefit from 
subsidised schemes, so she left her own group, and formed another with 17 SC 
women, and two relatives. She then obtained a subsidised loan sanctioned for this 
group, and when the loan was fully repaid, the group hoped to get a grant that the 
members would divide themselves. While Kaveri and her two relatives utilised the 
loans from the bank, others were expected to benefit from the subsidy later. Kaveri 
became more ambitious and corrupt, using her position in the taluk panchayat to 
secure resources for the village, but also recommended the non-poor for benefits 
intended just for the poor alone, and her husband also took commissions from those 
included in the list of people she recommended. She was able to use the credit and 
support from the group to set up a business to reach a higher base of both financial 
and human capital. She attributed her rise to her exposure to the SHG and credit, but 
more importantly to politics and the awareness and opportunities that her leadership 
position opened up for her. 
The Story of Mariyamma 
· Mariyamma experienced major livelihoods changes in the recent years. She was 32, 
her husband Siddappa was 37, and her daughter who was 14 studied in class eight. 
When Mariyamma married 16 years ago, she first lived in a joint family with her 
husband and his three brothers; they had 18 acres of land and three houses. When 
they separated from the family eight years ago, her husband Sidappa got "rathikuli ", 
the family granary, which was built on a 20 x 30 feet plot. The land was divided 
according to its quality. There were six acres of black soil, of which each brother got 
two acres. From another plot of four acres of black soil, they received one acre each. 
In addition, Mariyamma and Siddappa have leased three acres of land, so they farmed 
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a total of eight acres. During the year 2002-2003, they constructed a new house on 
land purchased several years ago. 
Mariyamma achieved asset-creation by building a new house, digging a borewell for 
irrigation, and purchasing bullocks for agriculture. The assets were financed through 
various loans from groups, relatives, moneylenders, and banks. She explained: 
"One major change in my life in the last jive years is that I constructed a new house 
which is big and comfortable enough for both my family and animals to live. I was 
happy that I could make this big house. After my family separated from the joint 
family, the household expenses have reduced and we were able to save money to 
spend on the construction of the new house. 
Last year I borrowed from several people, like my relatives, my husband's friends and 
from the group, for house construction. The loan from the group helped me to buy 
seeds and fertilisers in time. " 
She thought the turnaround in their life came from the separation from the joint 
family, continued access to land and the borewell that enabled an increase in 
agricultural income. Mariyamma's major income sources were outside loans (60%), 
agriculture (32%) and animal husbandry (5%). The major expense items were house 
construction (44%), agriculture (20%), household expenses (15%), 
travel/transportation (9%) and loan repayment (6%). 
The next major project was the building of her home, clearly linking availing outside 
loans and house construction. Mariyamma also used loans for agriculture and loan 
repayment. The main sources for running the household and other expenses were 
incomes derived from agriculture and animal husbandry. The annual income of the 
household was Rs. 96,353 ($2,141), an average ofRs. 32,117 ($714) per member. As 
she had eight acres of both dry and irrigated land and was growing commercial crops, 
they were able to generate 32% of the family income from agriculture. Out of this 
amount, 80% was from the wetland and from the sale of cash crops such as onion, 
chillies, cotton, and groundnut. The other 20% was from the dry land which produced 
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mostly food crops. Except for the months of September, March and May, when she 
took 'outside' loans, she got income from agricultural work. There were various 
reasons why Mariyamma was able to generate a decent and regular income from 
agriculture. Firstly, she has enough land and could procure irrigation facilities through 
loans. Her farming strategy was to grow multiple crops every season. She also 
possessed the ability to travel outside and sell the produce. The most significant of 
these factors was availing a Joan that enabled her to sink a bore weB and thus ensure 
irrigation. She said: "Because we now have a borewell, we can grow two to three 
crops a year and our income has increased. We don't have any difficulties in the 
family anymore. If we were not to have this bore well we would have to go to others' 
farms for work. Now we appoint labour on our field and we work mostly in our land." 
5.1.5 Linking Assets, Income/Expenditure and Loan Use 
The life and loan histories of women show that livelihoods were critically dependent 
on the level, quality and types of assets that each woman's household possessed, 
especially: landholding, number of people in the household, and cattle-holding. 
Lakshmavva and Nagavva were the poorest women, with precarious livelihoods, and 
could barely meet daily family food requirements. Shivavva and Parvathamma just 
managed to survive. Shivavva was landless, but had six family members with regular 
coolie income, while her younger son migrated for fishing to coastal areas and 
brought or returned lump sums of money to meet household expenses. Parvathamma 
had half an acre of land, but it was often uncultivable, and she managed her expenses 
from money donated from her son's salary and her partner's contributions. 
Rangamma, Mariyamma and Kaveri were relatively prosperous, with average 
monthly incomes of Rs. 7881 ($175), Rs. 8029 ($178) and Rs. 9108 ($202) 
respectively. Mariyamma and Kaveri had large landholdings, with up to three acres 
of irrigated land and six to twelve acres of rain-fed land. In both cases, agricultural 
income formed much of the family's income. In addition, both Kaveri and her 
husband held positions at the taluk and gram panchayat levels. 
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Landholding 
The size and quality of landholding is a major livelihoods determinant, and is also 
associated with caste and inheritance. The landless women, Shivavva, Nagavva and 
Lakshmavva, were completely dependent upon unskilled coolie labour, unless they 
had a skill that enabled earning. Six research participants had land varying between a 
half to a maximum of three acres of irrigated land and half to twelve acres of dry land. 
Irrespective of the size of their land holdings, women planned the cropping pattern to 
ensure food grains for household consumption and also commercial crops, as depicted 
in Figure 4-2. This gave them money to purchase other items like clothes, detergents 
and meet the medical and travel expenses. Agricultural incomes were subject to 
significant seasonal variation and also depended on the type of land, and all 16 
women of the Gallidurgamma group, Hosagondabala (Y ellamma and Shivavva' s 
group), belonged to the Madar (SC) community, and depended on coolie labour. 
They had two acres of government land for each household to rehabilitate, but the 
lands were flooded from the Tungabhadra dam for up to eight months a year. In the 
remaining months, members grew pulses and groundnut. The difference between 
yield on dry land and irrigated land depended on several factors like the amount and 
distribution of rainfall, cropping pattern, incidence of pests, technical management 
and human labour invested, as shown in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1. 
Cattle assets 
Those with more cattle-holding were able to earn more from either the sale of milk or 
animals or manure. Smaller animals such as sheep and goats helped meet intermittent 
needs for emergency cash. When animals were ill, non-productive or died, the 
household lost both current and future incomes. 
Human capital 
The size of the household is an important determinant of household income. Though 
there was no one-to-one correspondence between age and earning, those with most 
earning members could bring higher coolie incomes. They could utilise their own 
labour to save expenditures (e.g. labour for own land or building own house). When 
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the family was educated or skilled in some trade, they could take up activities like 
tailoring (Sushila), driving, trading, jobs that provided salaries (Rangamma, Kaveri), 
or earn migratory income as 
in the case of uneducated 
youth (Shivavva). Even if a 
household with more 
members had a lower 
average mcome per person, 
just living together itself 
produced shared economies. 
In addition, joint families 
were valued by the women as 
a source of integration and 
shared responsibility. 
''None of my relatives have helped me. In fact, 
I give them jumpers (blouse-pieces) as gifts 
when they come to visit me. When my children 
were married, I didn't even borrow 10 paise 
from anyone. As they are independent and 
earn themselves these days, I have stopped 
going out to do coolie work. But lhere is one 
thing- devadasis must have children - only 
then can they live. Otherwise, they might have 
to resort to begging." 
Yellamma 
Personal health was critical for determining the earning of the landless, who depended 
on coolie income. Women, particularly devadasis, faced health problems including 
backache, poor eyesight, leg pain, headache, body pain, white discharge, and stomach 
ache. Shivavva's husband had a leg injury, which did not improve for three months, 
after which he died, and her daughter-in- law suffered from TB. Rangamma's son 
suffered from chronic stomach ache and anaemia and died (having contracted 
HIV/AIDS). Sushila's twelve-year old daughter had an undiagnosed brain tumour left 
untreated for over four years. Parvathamma had chronic low abdominal pain since 
child birth, which prevented her from working. She suffered not only physically, but 
also faced stress and humiliation as 
villagers alluded to her devadasi 
' profession' as the reason for her 
illness. Most women, especially 
devadasis had undergone the 
family planning operation between 
the age of 20 and 30 years, despite 
objections from their partners or 
parents. These women were the 
''Most of my income was spent on 
medical treatment. First I spent Rs. 
5,000 ($111) on the treatment of my 
husband, for a wound inside his 
stomach In Hospet. Then I spent Rs. 
4,000 ($89) on the treatment of my 
grand-daughter for a tumour in the 
n~ck; she is now cured." 
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pnmary income earners for their families and returned to work within a week of 
delivery. When women and their family members fell ill, they could not earn and 
medical expenses further drained their incomes, but larger households could pay for 
the medical expenses. Thus, human capital, seen in terms of number of members, age 
profiles, education and health, determined the household's ability to earn, thereby also 
the capacity to take and return loans. 
The average standard of living was critically dependent on the level and types of 
assets held. The three most important assets identified here were human beings, land 
and money. In one validation meeting, the group discussed the relative importance of 
these different types of capital. Even after much discussion, women did not rank 
them, claiming that they needed both labour and money to cultivate land, and even if 
one resource was scarce, it too would affect livelihoods. When asked: "Would you 
not put money first, could you not manage everything else if you had money?", they 
replied: "No. We cannot eat money. Finally we need to eat rice and daal, which 
comes only from land and labour; money is needed to cultivate. " The diagram they 
drew is presented in Figure 5-6. 
Figure 5-6: Women's Livelihoods Assets 
The initial asset base determined the expenditures a household could afford i.e. the 
livelihoods level. The poorer households were short of cash, and therefore had a 
lower capacity to repay credit. Women with low levels of assets and incomes 
frequently took small loans to smoothen their household consumption. Lakshmavva 
and Nagavva took several loans, each of Rs. 250-300 ($4.44 .. 6.66), from the landlord 
quite regularly for household expenses, which they repaid with labour. 
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Women with higher incomes took relatively larger loans (between Rs. 2,000-40,000, 
($44-889) often used for asset creation, such as bore wells, trading shop and house 
construction, and crop loans (usually less than Rs. 2,000, ($44) for investment in 
agriculture. When all types of capital were taken into consideration, the total had to 
offer a surplus - either in terms of a family member's time, cash from an income 
stream, or the possibility of sale of an asset - for women to be able to absorb credit, 
and to enable further capital creation to take place. The analysis of assets, income and 
expenses, and loan histories shows that at the individual/household level of impact, 
the first levels of constraints are the economic ones, related to lack of capabilities 
(literacy, vocational skills), and assets (land and other assets). These create a vicious 
cycle that keeps the poor deprived, despite outside efforts to break it through income 
earning activities and assets. The poorest women did not have the capacity to absorb· 
credit. After gaining insight into the capacity for credit absorption, the analysis now 
moves to a discussion of the perceptions of women and their experiences in use of 
money from different sources. 
5.2 Analysing Sources and Uses of Money 
An analysis of sources of loans, whether formal or informal, was made on the premise 
that use and impact of loans may be significantly influenced by the source of money, 
which in tum influences the terms of lending (cost, repayment period and 
instalments). The social relationships of women with different lenders influenced the 
give and take of money in a critical way. The use of loans depended not only upon 
the level of women's own livelihoods and their capital base, but was also related to 
how it was first accessed. The sources of loans were considered in three broad 
categories: formal, informal, and loans from SHGs, as depicted in Figure 5-5. 
Figure 5-7: Spectrum of Loan Sources 
~ Informal SHGs Formal I ~--~~--~----;_ __ ~~ 
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Informal sources incluqed friends, neighbours, relatives, local provision shops, local 
agricultural input traders, local landlords, and moneylenders. Formal sources 
included banks and MFis, who offer subsidised or commercial credit. Loans from 
groups, i.e. from women's own savings, comprised a source that may be characterised 
simultaneously as both formal and informal. The SHG is an informal forum, in that it 
is an unregistered and unregulated financial institution. However, to the extent that it 
is initiated, organised and monitored by NGOs, and also maintains books of accounts, 
which is critical for linkages with formal banking institutions, it also takes on the 
characteristics of a formal forum. 
The loans from different sources each had different characteristics, which are now 
investigated further. 
5.2.1 Informal Loan Sources 
These could be clearly delineated into three categories, and money transactions with 
these three 'actor groups' were based on different socio-cultural relationships and 
value systems. The first category was friends and neighbours who provided soft 
loans. The second category included local provision shops and agricultural input 
traders who provided goods/inputs on credit, wherein the cost of credit (i.e., interest 
rate) was ostensibly zero but was possibly subsumed in the cost of the commodity 
supplied. The third category were moneylenders and landlords who provided loans 
on stringent and even usurious terms. 
Parvathamma had taken two loans of Rs. 5,000 ($111) and Rs. 2,000 ($44) from the 
landlord, and a third loan from the group, at 3% per month. She paid the loan from 
the landlord through coolie work on his farm. She explained the repayment patterns: 
"I do not get paid for coolie work every day. If four days of coolie wages are due, i.e. 
Rs. 15 ($0.33) per day, a total of Rs. 60 ($1.33), the landlord deducts Rs. 10 ($0.22) 
and gives me Rs. 50 ($1.11), with which 1 buy 2 kilos of rice, vegetables, jowar, and 
provisions for a week. It can take me two years to repay a loan in this manner. As 
there are three or four persons at home who can do coolie work, we can manage the 
household expenses and the loan repayments. When all four of us get coolie work, I 
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ask the landlord to adjust my full wages against the loan. We can use two people's 
wages for household expenses and two people's wages for repaying the loans. Two of 
us work for the same landlord, but another two work for different ones, so we can 
take two or three loans at the same time. I prefer to pay off smaller amounts first and 
then repay the larger loans. I also repay the interest from time to time on unpaid 
loans, so that the interest does not accumulate. " 
She had taken these loans in 2001; by 2004 she had repaid all loans to landlords, and 
had only the group loan to repay. Her management of the loans and their repayments 
showed how she maintained the financial relations with each lender, through a 
combination of partial and sequential repayments, along with balancing her household 
expenses through the overall cash inflows. 
Table 5-l provides the details of loans from the three categories of informal loan 
providers, i.e. the amount of loan, its use and cost and repayment terms and 
conditions. 
Table 5-l: Informal Loan Sources 
Source Amount: Use Terms & Conditions 
Small <500 ($11) 
Medium 500-2000 (SU-
45) Lar2e >2000 ($45) 
Friends/Neighb Small Emergency I Short term/ no interest 
ours immediate cash repayment 
needs 
Relatives Large (for high income House With or without interest, 
women) construction flexible/ fixed repayment 
Local provision Small Provisions Repayable before next 
shop purchase, no interest 
charged 
Local agri-input Large Fertilisers, Repayable before next 
traders pesticides, purchase, interest nil, or 
seeds included in price charged 
Local Landlords Small Household Repayable through own 
consumption labour or bonded labour 
Large Marriages of children 
Local Small Household High interest (I 0-15% 
Moneylenders consumption per month), assets 
Large Marriages hypothecated 
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Informal loans were taken to meet household consumption needs. Amounts were 
small, returned in short periods to friends or neighbours, and no interest was charged. 
Regular credit transactions with shops included taking provisions and agricultural 
inputs, and when an earlier loan was repaid, eligibility for further loans was created. 
Loans from friends and relatives were mostly benign and arose from mutual 
reciprocity. Regular credit arrangements with provision shops and agri-input traders 
were regarded as 'no cost' transactions as no interest was charged. Provisions were 
provided at the same price, whether on cash or credit, as village shopkeepers 
considered small credit to be a normal sales transaction. However, there was some 
ambiguity for input traders; the cost of credit could be included in the prices of inputs 
supplied. 
Loan relationships with landlords reflected a wide spectrum of features, from mutual 
dependency to exploitation, as depicted in Figure 5-8. For instance, Lakshmavva and 
Nagavva borrowed money regularly from their respective landlords for household 
expenses. Credit from the farmer landlord, when pledged with labour work, created a 
knowledge that he would have labour available when demand was high. On the other 
hand, the borrower women were assured of labour work in. the lean season, even if 
they did not get paid market rate wages. Another reason was that the loan against 
future labour was given without interest. There were also other seemingly benign 
features to this relationship. The landlord gave Yellamma lambs to rear, in lieu of 
keeping her son as a bonded labourer on his farm each year. She reared these as if 
they were her own and gifted to her. Yet, the position was ambiguous, as the asset 
still belonged to her landlord, who had to be consulted in case of sale to share the 
proceeds. The landlord also gifted her a cow after his mother died, and any donations 
he was required to make as part of religious ceremonies were always given to her. 
Yellamma used the word 'adopt' with respect to the landlord's relationship with her 
household. There appeared to be two different understandings working at the same 
time: that of 'bonded' labour where they felt constrained and tied to the landlord, and 
of 'adoption' where the farmer in fact committed to provide them with coolie work 
and support them. These may be seen as mirror concepts, working at the same time 
with the same person. 
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Figure 5-8: Nature of Relationship with Landlords 
!'Exploitative' relationship~ 
Bonded labour of children 
Loss of ornaments, land, 
animals 
l'Adoptive' or 'benign' relationship~ 
Gift of lambs each year of work with landlord 
Gift of cows in case of death in landlord's 
family 
From a market perspective, an agreement to work for a particular landlord may 
constitute a 'promise of preference' on either side, and an arrangement that contains 
market forces, which in the agricultural season would mean higher labour cost for the 
landlord and in the lean season would mean loss of wage labour for the woman. 
However, these relationships were rarely analysed in such terms, and women did not 
calculate any opportunity cost in terms such as higher wages. The social 
embededness of these exchanges in caste and religious rituals thus overshadowed 
their simple economic/feudal nature. 
Women did pay a high cost for credit from their landlords. Small loans, usually 
around Rs. 250-300 ($5.55-6.66) as in the cases of Lakshmavva and Nagavva, could 
be repaid through a labour commitment. Even though the financial interest cost was 
ostensibly minimal, it was often invisible rather than zero, as wage rates considered in 
lieu of adjusting loans were rarely discussed between borrowers and lenders. A 
longer-term labour commitment was required for larger loans, and when the 
Yellamma and Shivavva's sons had to commit to bonded labour between five to six 
years in order to pay off a loan of Rs. 40,000 ($889), there was little discussion of the 
boys' wage rate as such. Such loans were not taken for investment in productive 
assets like a cow or a small business, but to fulfil immediate consumption needs, or 
other social obligations. For the formal lender such social expenditure did not 
generate any income stream. To many women, however, there was considerable 
social pressure to abide by them, given that they also feared that their children may 
not otherwise find a partner if they did not spend on the marriage. This indicates the 
limits of these feudal relationships where loans to maintain the 'bonded' or 'adopted' 
families only prevailed on prohibitive terms. Indeed there were no observed cases of 
women taking loans for productive assets from local sources on such terms (also 
observed by Hulme and Mosley, 1996). 
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Short and medium term loans of varying size were also taken from moneylenders. 
Moneylenders provided credit on stringent conditions; higher interest rates, often an 
asset for security Uewels, vessels, animal, and land), even if this security had higher 
value than the loan. Many required that repayment be made in one single instalment, 
and if loans were not paid in time, they could confiscate the asset concerned. In this 
case, there was no ambiguity; moneylenders were regarded as high cost sources of 
credit, with a risk of loss of hypothecated assets. The reasons cited in literature for 
local moneylenders charging high interest rates are varied. The financial logic 
emphasises the risk in lending to the poor, especially in ecologically strained areas 
(Hulme and Mosley, 1996) while there are other transaction costs whatever the size of 
loan (Robinson 2001; Harper, 1998). The structural rationale emphasises the low 
bargaining power of the poor, and regards moneylenders as high cost and exploitative 
suppliers of finance. 
The findings confirm that poor borrowers in semi-arid areas can invest only in 
projects and enterprises which carry high risk of failure. High interest costs combine 
with other, more serious implications of taking loans from local moneylenders and 
landlords. Those borrowers from moneylenders risked losing their assets (land, 
animals, jewellery, vessels). Moreover, if the transactions were not in money but 
other factors (e.g. labour), it could create labour bondage (of adults and children, as 
seen in the case of Shivavva and Yellamma) which deprived the women of the 
freedom to use their family's labour for better earning possibilities. By contrast, those 
who had significant assets were not only able to raise loans, but were also able to 
improve the quality of human assets in the household, e.g. children could afford to go 
to school. Thus, the actuality of Koppal represents the financial logic of risk in 
lending to poor women on the one hand, but also bears out the socially embedded 
exploitative aspect of rural money lending on the other. This is also born out by 
emerging research in other contexts, where money gifts and other reciprocity are seen 
to conceal the hierarchical nature of social relationships (Guerin, 2006). 
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5.2.2 Formal Loan Sources 
This falls into three different categories: the experience with banks for subsidised 
loans, and that with banks and MFis for non-subsidised loans, as shown in Figure 5-9. 
Figure 5-9: Spectrum of Formal Sources 
~ Government Bank Loans MFI ~ 
Subsidised Loans Loans 
At one end were loans provided by banks under government schemes which target the 
poor and carried a 50% subsidy on loans. Unsubsidised loans by banks carried low 
interest, being repayable over three years, but were not linked to government schemes 
and carried no subsidy on the repayment of principal. At the other end of the 
spectrum were loans provided by MFis on commercial terms, i.e. 24% interest, and a 
one-year repayment period. 
Government Subsidised Loans 
In 1998-99, official norms required that banks lend money at subsidised rates to those 
women who belonged to households below the poverty line (BPL families). Three of 
the case study participants had availed of subsidised loans before 1999. Nagavva and 
Sangavva had experiences with the bank that involved giving bribes for taking 
subsidised loans. Five years ago, Sangavva had applied for a loan ofRs. 5,000 ($111) 
to the Tungabhadra Grameen Bank for purchase of a buffalo under the IRDP scheme, 
whereby 50% of the amount was subsidised and the rest repayable to the bank. She 
received the loan amount ofRs. 2,500 ($56) but from the subsidy of equal amount, the 
middleman kept Rs. 1,500 ($33). With the total of Rs. 3,500 ($78) that she received, 
Sangavva bought a buffalo for Rs 1,500 ($33) and spent the rest on household needs. 
This buffalo did not calf at all as the seller had apparently cheated her. She had no 
income from the buffalo, sold it, and used the money for household needs. The total 
amount ofRs 2,500 ($56) stands as overdue in her name. Nagavva who got a similar 
amount, could also not repay the money due to insufficient earnings, as explained 
earlier. 
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Eligibility for officially subsidised schemes (i.e. the BPL card) was often purchased, 
and households with more information and linkages accessed the schemes best. 
Further, the assets financed through these loans were purchased from vendors 
appointed by the middlemen/bankers/government officers, and were not of the quality 
that the women might have bought, if they had only purchased the animals 
themselves. Nagavva and Sangavva did not pay back the loans to the bank. Many 
women among the 120 SHGs managed by Sampark shared this experience. In several 
group discussions, women related their experiences with IRDP-subsidised bank loans 
as involving bribes, low quality of assets purchased by bank appointed agents, low net 
additions to income and also frequent defaults on loan repayments. 
Rangamma, however, had a positive experience. The banker, who offered her a loan 
for a buffalo, asked her to repay the full amount and only then would she qualify for a 
subsidy. The banker visited her regularly, maintained a good, respectful relationship 
with her, and provided her the guidance she needed to utilise and repay a formal loan. 
When she repaid well, he gave her the benefit of the subsidy. Ran gamma got this 
loan at a time when she needed to sustain a family of four young children. She 
expanded the animal stock to six buffalos from this one loan. She had a positive 
experience of the continued relationship of support, and duly paid her loans. 
In 2000, the government merged all the credit programmes under its integrated rural 
development scheme, the Swarnajayanthi Grameen Swarozgar Yojane (SGSY) and 
government-subsidised credit thereafter was channelled through women's groups 
(NABARD, 1999). Banks and RRBs provided subsidised credit to SHGs only under 
the SGSY scheme, wherein the government subsidised the loan to the extent of 50%. 
The SHGs now had to qualify on the BPL criterion. This meant that all except two or 
three members of an SHG had to be on the BPL list for the group to qualify for a 
subsidised loan. Sometimes NGOs and politicians used the provisions of government 
schemes to take the benefits of grants for themselves, as illustrated in Chapter 4, in 
the case where an NGO helped a local landlord to form an SHG with his bonded 
labourers and appropriate government grants and credit. Among these research 
participants, there was evidence of this from Kaveri, who formed a group of SC/STs, 
left her original group, and ensured that she and her two relatives were members of 
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this new group, so that they could benefit from the subsidised loans for SC/ST people. 
In the SHGs covered in the study, two groups of SC women received loans under 
SGSY scheme. The controls exercised by banks and government officers created the 
combined effect of unproductive assets and high debts for the women as in the case of 
Durgadevi group. This group in Mudhaballi had only eight members, and another 
devadasi group in the same street had seven members, but the bank needed to support 
a group with at least 12 members, so the two groups made a joint representation to the 
bank through Sampark. They were to receive credit, subsidised to the extent of 50% 
under the SGSY scheme. The loan was to be provided by the bank (State Bank of 
Hyderabad, which was also the lead bank of the district), and the subsidy by the 
SC/ST Corporation. 
The women wanted to buy buffaloes with this loan, but they had very small huts, with 
no shelter for the animals, so they requested the panchayat, and obtained sanction for 
a common shed to keep all the animals. These same women had earlier protested 
against a liquor shop in the village and had got it removed so when they needed land 
for cattle near their homes, the villager leaders (from the general castes) refused, and 
allotted space outside the village, ten minutes walk from their homes. Further, the 
bankers and government officials did not permit them to buy animals of their own 
choice from the local area (those would have been more acclimatised and sturdier), 
insisting that they buy from an outside market instead. The women wanted to buy the 
animals in September, when there was abundance of green fodder, but the credit was 
delayed until December, when there was no green fodder left. The bank and 
government officials, went on an appointed day, to an animal fare where the broker 
and technical officer had links, certified the animals and bought them. It was only 
after Sampark's intervention that these women were allowed to accompany them, and 
influence the selection of animals and their price. When the animals finally arrived, 
they were found to yield lesser quantities of milk as compared to local breeds. Fodder 
had to be brought in cart-loads from outside the village, at more cost. The animals 
were sickly after re-location, and five djed. To these women, the animals had to be 
cared for like family members, hence women lost wages on days they stayed home to 
do so. 
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The officials responsible for constructing the shed exceeded the allotted expenditure 
and in collusion with bank officers, booked these costs to the group loan. When the 
women came to know this, they asserted: "If we had been allowed to make the shed 
where we had wanted to, we would have made it to suit our needs, at lower cost, and 
would have saved the money paid for bringing the fodder. Now, with high costs, low 
yields, and loss of coolie as well, we are not able to pay back the loan to the bank. " 
They wrote a letter to the bank and government offices, but did not receive a reply 
from either, and therefore stopped repayments. In such an impasse, the women were 
listed as defaulters, while the government and bank officers were not held 
accountable. Moreover, the bank was suspicious of giving loans to the next few 
SHGs in the village, and other SHGs recommended by the NGO, thereby negativdy 
affecting other women's groups. 
There were interesting differences between the original scheme and actual loan 
disbursement, repayment, and subsidy-disbursement practices. The intention was to 
provide assets to poor families, in units that would provide significant and continuous 
income streams. The total loan sanctioned for an individual was Rs. 25,000 ($556), to 
enable each household to purchase two cows or buffaloes, so at least one could 
always provide milk, and increased cash inflows, which would allow for regular loan 
repayments. In fact, banks only released half this money: 'the loan portion', releasing 
'the subsidy portion' after the loan was fully repaid. Bankers used this method to 
ensure that the loan would be repaid. The original intention of supporting poor 
households was not considered. Local NGO staff also endorsed the bankers' position, 
believing that many women first needed to manage one buffalo before acquiring 
another. The field project manager of Sampark said: "We are convinced about this 
strategy because it ensures that the group members will utilise the loan well, and 
repay it. They will be responsible. There is a risk of misuse if amounts released are 
too large. And anyway people make their own adjustments. " 
The Gallidurgamma group in Bikanalli had certainly made adjustments. On hearing 
about the Durgadevi group in Mudhaballi, they decided to change. Both ~he loan and 
the grant were provided by the SC/ST Corporation, and the women negotiated to take 
all decisions related to asset purchases. When the Corporation released Rs. 15,000 
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($333) each for eight BPL women, the group distributed the money among 13 
women. They decided where to purchase the buffaloes from and contacted the 
veterinarian for insurance purposes. They spent Rs. 100,000 ($2,222) and saved Rs. 
20,000 ($444) for joint purchase of fodder. Two buffaloes died, the insurance was 
invoked, and loan amounts adjusted. One woman claimed that her buffalo had to be 
sold so she bought another, which was not yet yielding milk, so she had not started 
loan repayment. Three other members lacked enough cash for regular repayments. 
Yet, members collected money whenever women could repay, and the group made 
regular repayments. A third group of eight in Hosagondabala, Yellamma's group, 
from among SCs received a loan of Rs. 80,000 ($1,778) with a subsidy promised of 
the same amount when the loan was fully repaid. With this loan, four women bought 
a buffalo each, one a bullock, one goats, and two women took leased land for 
cultivation. They repaid the bank regularly, usually from wages, and also took short-
term loans from local sources so as not to default. The group was to discuss how to 
use any subsidy received, as is, they were likely to use it as revolving fund, or for a 
collective business. In cases where only part of the groups had BPL cards despite 
similar income levels, women combined two groups, and took the loan on the names 
of members with BPL cards and divided the total loan equally. This ingenuity of the 
groups enabled them to share benefits of external linkages in a more equitable 
manner, even though the administrative system had anomalies through which such 
distribution of benefits was not possible. These cases also demonstrate an ability to 
use innovative strategies to ensure equity, while at the same time fulfilling external 
conditions for taking loans. When they could exercise control and flexibility over 
money, they could sustain the group's 'joint liability' character. 
Of all the 33 loans taken by participants and their group members from banks under 
subsidised schemes, 14 had good repayments, while 19 remained partially or entirely 
overdue. An analysis of why people did not repay is given in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2: Analysis of Subsidy Loan Defaults 
Reason for Non One-time and not No link between Unproductive 
Payment continuing repayment of old investment 
, relationship loan and access to 
new loan 
Women ,, 
Lakshmavva and 14 Iii Misunderstanding bZJ 
others with banks, 
government 
Sushila Iii One time contact bZI 0 
Yellamma li1 Bribe paid bZI 0 
Sangavva li1 Bribe paid 1;,1'1 
Mariyamma Iii One time contact Ill 
In most cases where people received loans from banks through a subsidised scheme, 
the investment had yielded additional income. Repayment was influenced both by the 
interest and follow up by the bankers. For Rangamma, and the Gallidurgamma group, 
it was a relationship of trust with the banker/Corporation. When people had paid 
bribes to benefit, they considered the bribe a payment for having received the benefit, 
hence did not care about repayments. In most cases, it was a one-time contact of a 
transactional nature, between the woman (or her mediator or husband) and the banker 
(or a mediator), with no prior relationship with the bank or one formed as a result of 
this transaction. As subsidised loans were given as part of targeted programmes 
mandated by the Government, they were in fact one-time transactions and banks did 
not intend to have continuing loan relationships with their debtors. Where the debtors 
did not perceive the possibility of new credit following the repayment of the old loan 
there was no incentive for people to repay. The analysis suggests that labelling of 
non-repayers as 'defaulters' needs to be questioned. Non-repayment did not imply 
that women who did not pay the loans had less integrity, or less ability to pay, or that 
their investment had failed. No relationships of trust were created and therefore 
integrity did not come into play, or was even subverted/suppressed by rent-seeking 
practices of middle-men, bank and government officials. 
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Unsubsidised Bank Loan 
In the middle of the spectrum of the types of formal loans, Figure 5-9, were 
unsubsidised loans offered by the Regional Rural Bank (RRB) in Koppal, the 
Tungabhadra Grameen Bank (TGB). Typically, these carried an interest rate of 12% 
per annum and a repayment period of one to three years. TGB extended a new loan 
when the first one was repaid; thereby creating a client relationship that was based on 
good financial conduct and trust, as illustrated by the experience of Kaveri's SHG, as 
illustrated below. 
The Hemareddy Mallamma SHG in Chukanakal formed in 1999 with 11 members. 
Its first loan was Rs. 12,000 ($267) from TGB. Four members used it for agriculture 
and business. The group guaranteed the loan, paid interest of 12.5% per annum to the 
bank, but the four women paid at 24% per annum, thereby creating interest for the 
group. The women repaid the loan in ten months instead of the twelve months 
permitted, which also reduced borrowing costs. The bank then loaned Rs. 27,000 
($600), which was used by another four members of the group. This loan was also 
fully paid and the bank sanctioned a third loan of Rs. 50,000 ($1, 111 ). The total 
savings ofthe group came toRs. 24,140 ($536), from which they had given loans of 
Rs. 30,800 ($684) with their cumulative interest earning being Rs. 12,396 ($275). 
Even though members could not save regularly, the group still made profits due to the 
inter-loaning transactions and the margin earned on the bank loan. In the same way, 
Rangamma's group, the Kasturibai SHG got a loan of Rs. 20,000 ($444) from TGB 
on the same terms, which was also fully repaid on time. Several groups in the village 
received loans from TGB without subsidy. Two groups got Rs. 10,000 ($222) each, 
one group divided Rs. 1,200 ($27) each among eight members, and another group 
divided Rs. 1,000 ($22) each among ten members. They bought one sheep each. The 
groups paid back these loans in six months. They levied interest at 12.5%, which was 
the interest paid to the bank, and decided not to keep a margin for the group, to make 
individual profits. The women not only repaid these to the bank but also earned a 
profit margin for the group or individuals. This resulted in increased sizes of 
subsequent loans and successful repayments, creating projects for the banks as well as 
the SHGs. 
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While only two of the seven research groups received such loans in 2003, by 2005 all 
seven raised a total ofRs. 1.57 lakhs ($3,489) from the local RRB, TGB, ofwhich Rs. 
1.53 lakhs ($3,400) was repaid by August 2005. Further, in 2003, only 10 ofthe 120 
SHGs promoted by Sampark received loans, but by 2005, a total of 42 groups 
received unsubsidised loans. The SHGs indeed learnt from each other and started to 
give loans first to BPL members, with the rest of the group guaranteeing repayment, 
and once loans were fully paid, and also subsidy received, the group would retain it as 
revolving loan to be shared by all members, ensuring of benefits were equitably 
distribution among all. This practice slowly spread to all the villages covered by 
Sampark, with minor variations from group to group. Only one bank in Koppal taluk 
was able to create such a relationship; all 42 loans given to Sampark groups were by 
TGB. The other banks in the district continued to follow a targeted approach and 
loans to SHGs were limited to those mandated under subsidised schemes. Thus, 
though the RRB realised the market potential of lending to the poor, other banks were 
slow to offer regular credit and establish client relationships with SHGs. 
Unsubsidised MFI Loans 
Here one MFI offered unsecured loans to individuals at an interest rate of 24% (flat) 
per annum and repayment period of one year. Eight women from two SHGs, the 
Kasturibai SHG and the Durgadevi SHG opted to take this loan of Rs. 5,000 ($111) 
per woman. The loans were utilised for petty shops, agriculture and purchase of a 
buffalo, and were fully repaid. Overall, among groups managed by Sampark, a total 
of 120 women opted for loans from the first MFI, The Bridge Foundation (TBF). 
Another MFI required a security deposit and higher effective interest rate, therefore 
was not utilised at all. 
5.2.3 Group Savings Loans 
This research analyses savings of groups as an important source of funds for women, 
and how groups managed and perceived financial transactions from their own savings. 
This analysis is elabo~ated in Chapter 6, along with a discussion of group learning 
processes. 
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Summary 
Traditional microfinance tracks the use of money from a financial standpoint. This 
research took a longitudinal perspective and discussed the major changes in women's 
lives. The women first described the changes, then identified the factors that they 
considered critical to these changes, their livelihood, their position in the household, 
or wider community. This analysis showed that credit formed one factor among many 
that could effect positive change in women's livelihoods. Other factors included 
support from partners, improved skills, access to leadership positions to access 
resources, and size of family. There were also women who had limited benefit from 
microfinance, and some who had none of these possibilities who did not improve 
their livelihoods significantly during the study period, especially those who had low 
social positions and asset levels. 
5.3 Factors Affecting Use of Money 
The loans taken by SHGs in a particular microfinance programme operated by an 
NGO/MFI depend on several factors. These include demand and supply factors, 
which are not necessarily in equilibrium. The discussion of factors affecting use of 
money is also accompanied by the terms women use for money and how they classify 
it. Women refer to money as 'rupai ', a common term for money, as when they say 
"nanage ondhu savira ritpai sa/a kodi", meaning 'give me a loan ofRs. 1,000 ($22). 
They use 'duddu' and 'hana' for household transactions between family members, 
when they want to buy something, or check with another if they have money. These 
two words refer to small transactions, e.g. coins used for daily needs. The word 
'rokka' refers to large amounts of money, for example: "avaralli hechhu rokka 
ithhu ", meaning he has lot of money, or "hechhu rokka beku ": I need a lot of money. 
The word 'sampattu' refers to sources and assets, and also for money kept in the 
bank, fixed deposits, and jewels. Thus there exist words in the local language that 
signify amounts of money, and these words are also related to specific uses of money. 
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5.3.1 Relationship Lending 
Informal loans could be classified into three different types. The first - from friends, 
neighbours and relatives - was the most important and often provided interest free 
loans. On some loans, however, interest was paid even to these sources. The 
amounts varied from small to large (Rs. 100 - 40,000, $2.22 - 889) and the purposes 
varied from household consumption and social expenses, to agriculture and housing. 
The repayment period was often flexible. Size and purpose depend upon ability to 
borrow (and ability of peers to lend) therefore the income earning impact of these 
loans tended to be limited. The second source was local provisional shops and 
agriculture input traders. Any loans from them were taken mainly in the form of 
commodities purchased on credit. These loans were normally repayable before the 
next purchase and interest was often included in the price of commodities. These 
were perceived as normal commercial transactions and had the effect of easing cash 
flows of the borrowers. Women normally used the word 'Kaigada' for any money or 
commodity borrowed from friends, family members and relatives. For instance, if 
two kgs. of jowar was borrowed from a neighbour, the same had to be returned, or if 
Rs.500 ($11.11) was borrowed from a relative, the money had to be returned. The 
term literally means: hand-loan. 'Mungada' is cash advance taken without interest. 
The last source of loans included the local landlords and moneylenders. They often 
provided credit either on hypothecation of physical assets or human labour, including 
bonded labour of children and women. Clearly these intended to be limited to the 
borrowing capacity of the women in terms of their holding of physical or human 
assets. Women perceived these loans to be the most potentially exploitative. They 
referred to loans given against security of land, jewels, etc. for a limited period and 
with high interest, as 'vathi sa/a', with a clear understanding that if the loan is not 
paid in time, the 'vathi ', or security, would be taken instead of the amount repayable. 
However, when landlords gave gifts to poor families, these blurred the perception of 
the exploitative aspects of the feudal relationships, even though women did not fully 
control the assets so gifted. 
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Formal loans were also classified into three types, those subsidised by government, 
unsubsidised bank loans and loans provided through an NGOIMFI. Government 
subsidised loans were given only to families qualifying through being below the 
poverty line. Prior to 1999, individuals were targeted, where as after 2000 such loans 
were extended to women SHGs. An analysis of loans from different formal sources 
to SHGs is done through a consolidation in Table 5-3. 
Table S-3: Loans from Different Formal Sources (August 2003) 
Formal Sources Banks, RRB(TGB), MFI, Loans from 
Subsidised Unsubsidised Commercial SHGs j ~ 
Loans Loans Loans 
Number of Women 30 18 8 70 
Total loan taken 150,000 59,000 40,000 130,772 
Rs. ($) (3,333) (1 ,311) (889) (2,906) 
Repayment record Poor Good Good Variable 
The findings showed that inefficiency and corruption in purchase of assets led to non-
repayment. Even though corruption persisted in the allocation of the poverty 
certification, innovative group processes enabled poor women to access these loans. 
By contrast when the bank provided unsubsidised loans, it did so with apparent 
recognition of the groups' repayment capacities. The relationship that existed 
between bank and the group was one of service provider. Such loans were found to 
be paid back in time and sometimes ahead of time. The third type was unsubsidised 
and from MFIINGO often with an interest rate of 24% per month and the repayment 
schedules extending over a year. The processes were more transparent and the 
relationship was of equality, however the terms of these loans were often too stringent 
for the women to be able to use them . Production in the semi arid region of Koppal 
was problematic, and the women were not confident of repaying, so many ofthem did 
not opt to take these loans. 
'Sa/a 'is the common term used for loans. The women classify three different types 
sa/a from formal sources: 
1. Dheerga avadhi sa/a - Long term loan: This is the bank loan given for a 
period of four to five years, and repaid in half-yearly installments, e.g. loan for 
housing, tractor, pump-set, etc. 
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2. Madhyama avadhi sa/a - Medium term loan: refers to borrowing either from a 
bank or from moneylenders, for a one or two year period, to be repaid in half-
yearly installments, e.g. loans for crops, business, marriage, borewells, etc. 
3. Finance sa/a - Short-term loan: refer to all loans repayable within one year 
and in monthly installments. People refer to loans from their SHGs, SHG-
bank loans as 'finance sa/a '. 
While women preferred the first two, they did not opt for finance sa/a except from 
their group savings. 
5.3.2 Demand Related Factors 
There were several demand-related factors that influenced women ' s loan use. 
a) Potential to Take and Repay 
If there were many earning members within 
the family, this provided cash inflows 
from which the loan instalments could be 
paid. For instance, if the son went out for 
migration, he had access to lump sums of 
money, which enabled the family 
members in the village to raise loans for 
an asset. Women considered household 
capability for cash generation, and the 
"I always remind my children 
about loan so they try to give 
their maximum earning to me, 
otherwise they spend a lot and 
contribute less 'to theftlmlly. 
Even my children are concerned 
about a loan burden. So we take 
a loan only after a discussion In 
the family, so that everybody 
takes the responsibility to repay 
it., 
- Rangamma 
needs and capacities of all members of the 
household, before availing loans, thereby 
ensuring that use of loans was a household decision. 
b) Purpose 
As seen in Chapter 4, there were risks associated with the investments. Agriculture, 
for example, carried many ecological uncertainties, and few off-farm opportunities 
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existed for investments that suited the skills of women and their family members. 
This limited the productive use of credit in this semi-arid region where ecological 
risks formed a definitive constraint to credit off-take. Another mismatch in demand 
and supply of credit aroses from the conditionality of the purpose for which credit was 
available from formal sources. While women needed the money for household 
consumption and medical treatment, the credit available in the research area was 
'buffalo loans', the only subsidised scheme offered by the IRDP/SGSY. 
Loans were also needed to pay off earlier debts. Nagavva's parents asked her cousin 
and suitor to pay these if he wished to marry her, and he migrated to be able to do so. 
In this case, indebtedness was a reason for migration, but was also used to separate 
the two cousins, and retain parental control over their daughter's future time and 
labour. Thus the stories also highlight the way money is used to control intimate 
relationships, as elaborated by Zelizer (2005). 
c) Seasonality and Repayment Schedules 
Women preferred to take loans only when they actually needed it, while external 
agencies interpreted money kept in groups as 'idle funds' during the periods when 
loan demand was low (Sampark, 2000). The credit off-take was not the same 
throughout the year. The need for funds varied, and the inflows were seasonal too. 
Productive credit, usually taken for agriculture and animal husbandry, due to the 
cyclical nature of earning, demanded credit products where repayments were 
synchronised with the cash generation cycle of the project. Instead, commercial 
microfinance practice was stringent and expected uniform repayment, as evidenced by 
their providing loan three months late to the Durgadevi group, depriving them of the 
benefit of green fodder and making the asset more expensive. Thus, many poor 
women preferred productive credit terms that matched their seasonal cash inflows. 
The practice instituted in commercial microfinance, of weekly or monthly repayment 
instalments, is ostensibly based on the premise that poor women would find it easier 
to repay small amounts in regular instalments, than find large lump-sums at one time 
(Premchander, 2003; Rajagopalan, 2004a). Women's preferences were not so clear. 
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In some situations, they got regular deductions made by the landlord from their 
weekly wages, as in the case of Y ellamma. Yet, they also refused to take loans from 
TBF on these terms, and explained: "It is not convenient to repay the landlord and the 
external loan at the same time. We prefer to repay first one loan fully and then repay 
another. " The preference to repay one loan first as compared to another was also 
influenced by the possibility of taking the next loan, by the terms of that loan, 
especially the interest cost, and whether any labour bondage was attached to the loan. 
d) Cost of Credit 
It is often assumed that poor people need access to credit and that cost of credit is not 
a consideration (Harper, 1998). Micro finance specialists judge the prevalence of high 
rates of interest ( 5 to 1 0% per month) in rural areas to be evidence of high demand for 
credit. Rosenberg (1996) claimed that no one could point out a single example of a 
"microjinance programme that ran into trouble by driving away clients with interest 
rates that were too high." (Ibid: 1 0) 
This research does not support the argument of the financial systems approach that the 
poor can pay very high rates of interest. The experience of the NGO in this study was 
that when credit was offered at a rate of 2% per month, combined with uniform 
repayment instalments spread over a year, the poor did not take loans. Poor women 
took credit for income generation only if they could find good local opportunities for 
investment, the profitability from the new investment covered the cost of credit, the 
resulting cash flows permitted adherence to externally demanded repayment 
schedules, and if the risk of delay or default was thought to be low. By contrast, they 
took loans for household consumption and social needs, even at high costs, from 
lenders with whom they had long-standing relationships and where there was 
possibility of repeat loans. 
5.3.3 Mismatch of Demand and Supply 
This thesis finds that women did need productive credit to improve their livelihoods 
and the credit was needed on terms that were friendly to the ability of the poor to 
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repay. The demand for loans depended on the perception of risk and opportunities 
available and on terms of supply of credit. Women preferred the repayments to be 
linked to cash flows generated through the project in which the new loan would be 
invested. The agencies that supplied credit often did not see these risks as they were 
perceived by others. From their own perspective, they preferred regular and high loan 
off-take, so that the microfinance project could break even. This was witnessed in the 
credit models designed in Bihar and Koppal. In the latter case, women rejected the 
loan products that did not factor in the seasonality of their cash flows. This created a 
demand and supply mismatch. 
Microfinance supply was depicted across a continuum of offers, ranging from 
subsidised to commercial credit, as depicted earlier in Figure 5-9. Subsidised credit 
in Koppal was limited and offered only under government programmes. Banks 
provided subsidised credit only to the minimum number of groups that they were 
required to cover under these targeted programmes. Further, the number of such 
groups targeted was low compared to the number of groups formed in the district, 
resulting in inadequate coverage ofthe poor; therefore subsidised credit was limited in 
scale and ridden with inefficiencies as well as other problems like corruption. At the 
other end of the spectrum of loan possibilities was commercial microfinance, which 
was offered on terms that women could not afford to take, given their initially low 
levels of income and therefore low capacity to pay, and the lack of investment 
opportunities in the region. The middle range of the spectrum represented the huge 
market that was created by having women's groups as clients who provided risk 
coverage as well as cost reductions for the supplier institutions. TGB recognised 
women's SHGs as a potential market and extended credit to them based on a 
continuing relationship. The credit was offered on terms that were beneficial to the 
women, and the fact of good repayments enhanced the sustaimibility of the Bank. 
The constraints to expansion of such unsubsidised credit in this spectrum were 
inherent in the government's Service Area Approach, whereby each bank was 
supposed to service one specific geographical area, usually comprising a few blocks 
in a district. Banks responsible for particular service areas were not always as 
forthcoming as RRBs, and continued their conservative approach, denying normal 
credit to SHGs. Thus, the supply constraint was overcome only in the service area of 
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the RRB in Koppal, while it continued to persist in those areas serviced by private and 
conventional banks (as evidenced in Table 4-9). 
Thus, the amount of loan taken by individuals and groups depended upon several 
factors, and perceptions of these were different from the point of view of commercial 
microfinance practices. This is explained in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4: Factors and Perceptions Related to Value of Loan Taken 
Women's Own Perspective Commercial Financial 
Perspective 
' 
Seasonality , Take Joan when needed, and repay Matching of cash inflows and 
when cash is surplus outflows important for sustainability, 
% therefore seek uniform flows 
Project/ Agriculture is risky in semi arid Semi arid and remote regions become 
Enterprise and few income earning high cost regions and therefore not 
opportunities exist in non-farm attractive for commercial 
sector microfinance 
Initial Capital Those with higher asset base, Focus on poor gets diluted, services 
Base/Capacity steady income flows have higher provided to the 'economically active 
to pay capacity to pay poor' 
Repayment Women prefer three year Preference for weekly or monthly and 
Terms repayment terms and balloon uniform repayments, of equal 
repayments, or quarterly instalments 
'~ instalments 
Cost of Credit Preference for 12 to 24% Pegged at 24 to 48% effective rates 
Source of · Preference for 'own' sources, i.e. Savings viewed as source of finance 
Credit savings first, both NGO and for the MFI, and women's preference 
banks/MFis viewed as 'external' of 'own' sources not recognised or 
sources respected, even feared 
Women considered the risks from taking loans from external sources to be high; at the 
same time MFis perceived a high risk in lending to the poor, on terms different from 
those of commercial micro finance. 
Thus, an apparent paradox emerged whereby credit needs of poor women were unmet 
by the formal banking system as it is currently organised, while commercial credit 
offered through NGO/MFis was at terms that women did not opt to utilise. The 
mismatch related to the following aspects: 
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1. Lack of loans for consumption purposes 
2. Inadequate loans from the banking sector 
3. Incompatibility of terms of commercial microfinance with needs of women in 
semi arid regions. 
These findings indicate that while unmet demand for cred it existed, the ' financial 
products' available were not suited to women's needs and preferences, thus indicating 
a gap between what would meet women ' s livelihoods needs and the microfinance that 
was actually on offer in the rural informal or formal markets. 
5.4 Summary 
The above analysis highlighted certain facto rs critical in the use of loans: the initia l 
asset base, and the source from which the loan was taken. The nature of the source 
and ensuing relationship with the borrowers determined the terms of credit costs, 
repayment schedu les and therefore influenced the size and purpose ofthe loans. Th is 
is depicted in F igure 5- l 0. 
Figure 5-10: Determining Factors for Use of Loan 
Sources of Loan Socio-Cultural Context 
Freinds/ Relatives 
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:c ~ 
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Landlords did not charge an interest cost; however, when large loans were taken, 
higher costs were paid in terms of bonded labour of children. Small advances were 
adjusted against wages, and blurred the view on exploitation through wage rates. The 
binding and benefits arising from committed labour appeared as two faces of the same 
coin. Women stated a clear preference for freedom rather than committed labour for 
high season, even if the loans created a certain minimum employment during the lean 
seasons. Loans from landlords and moneylenders were taken to smooth consumption 
or to meet large expenses arising from social obligations (e.g. marriages). Loans from 
these sources were not associated with income generating activities or enterprise start-
ups. One reasons was the relationship between terms of credit and use of credit for 
IGA and micro enterprise. Women in the seven groups studied consistently denied 
credit offered on standard ' commercial microfinance ' terms, when the projects they 
en~isaged yielded seasonal income flows, a feature that Sam park staff said applied to 
all its 120 groups. This indicated an association between the following factors: 
• Terms of credit (i.e. interest, repayment period, frequency of instalments: 
supply related factors) 
• The opportunities available for businesses with steady as against seasonal 
income streams (i.e. feasibility: contextual factors) 
• The credit taking capacity of the women (i.e. asset, income stream and other 
factors determining capital: demand related factors). 
These are depicted in Figure 5-11. 
Figure 5-11: Factors Determining Use of Credit for Enterprise Start Up 
Su I~ 
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Thus, even if subsidised credit is viewed as a distortion of market forces, the market 
does not yet provide credit on terms that are acceptable to the rural poor, given the 
limitation of the external context of application and use of such money. Institutional 
delivery of microfinance needs to recognise the importance of trust, and create long-
term relationships before the poor are convinced about sustained access to loans, and 
offer effective demand for credit. The study of loans from informal and formal 
sources shows that factors that influence use of money are related to both demand and 
supply, which are influenced by the perceptions of the different actors concerned, 
creating anomalies in the type of credit demanded and supplied. In the spectrum of 
formal loans, the SHG-Bank linkage model that provides credit without subsidy 
appears as the emerging model with long term potential for change. It considers 
women as a market, provides loans without subsidies thereby removing possibilities 
of corruption, provides loans at a cost women can bear (12% per annum) and 
establishes long term relationships through repeat loans. This model is specific to the 
Indian microfinance scenario and has as its foundation women's SHGs who provide 
the link between poor women and the formal financial institution, the RRB. This 
highlights the importance of the new source of funds introduced by microfinance 
programmes, the SHGs. Analysis of savings, the processes in SHGs and the impact 
arising from different types of loans are now discussed. 
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Chapter 6 
Use of Money by Groups and Group Dynamics 
How women perceive and use money borrowed from external sources was mediated 
by the SHG in creating a bridge between individual women and formal institutions 
like banks/MFis . While being conduits for channelling external funds to individual 
women, SHGs create the possibility of using another source of money: women's own 
savings. 
The chapter is based on the following model : 
Figure 6-1: Group Processes and Dynamics 
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This chapter exammes the basic foundation of SHGs, namely accumulation and 
management of savings, which was the most important issue for the women. It 
elaborates the experiences of the seven different groups to which the case-study 
participants belonged, and others within and outside Sampark, to examine what this 
new forum means and how groups managed money. It illustrates how the group 
processes and dynamics provided experiences that Jed to women 'owning' these 
externally introduced organisations, i.e. managing them in ways to suit their own 
needs and preferences. The processes reveal the importance of social relations when 
women use and manage money. 
6.1 Generation of Savings 
The research questions relating to savings include: the role of savings, how women 
save, the implications of irregularity while savings, and the amount of savings 
concerned. The amount and regularity of savings was found to be determined as 
much by NGO rules as by women's own capacity to save. The factors which 
determined savings were the number of family members earning a wage, especially 
cash wage; whether coolie work was available that month, and the household 
expenses. The emergency need for medical and social expenses were the two 
important reasons of leakage that diminished women's ability to save, as illustrated in 
Figure 6-2. 
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Figure 6-2: Livelihoods Perspective of Savings 
Medical j _,/ 
~xp~~.::__( I House- I Household or 
I h,-,ld 
1 
social ~------- _____ , __ -- -~ -
Poor women saved from their own or their families ' coolie wages and many depended 
on wages from casual agricultural labour to make their savings. Thus, the regularity 
of savings depended largely on the availability of agricultural labour, and therefore 
varied according to seasons. These women found it difficult to save even very a small 
amounts of Rs. 5 ($0.11) on a regular basis and also faced the problem of alternate 
demand and use of cash within the household. Typically, they faced several 
competing uses of money. For instance, illness and other emergencies demanded 
immediate cash. Yellamma for example said: 
"This year we got one bag of horse-gram from the farm, which we have not yet sold 
because the rate has fallen. We have sown jowar, which is yet to grow. There was 
less rain, so the yield has been low this year. There is no coolie work this year 
because of low rains, so I go to my landlord 's house to work. My daughter-in-law is 
at home because for the past one month she has been sick. I took her to Kappa/ twice, 
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I have spent Rs. 150 ($3.33) but her fever has not yet reduced. Even my daughter 
Gayathravva is not well, she has rashes on her body, I took her to Koppal for a check 
up and spent Rs. I 00 ($2 .22). She is willing to work but there is no coolie work. 
Devappa, my son, is working on a food-for-work programme digging a pipeline. They 
don't pay cash, but have given one bag of rice instead, which I have used at home. 
No one in the family other than my son and I are earning, and due to pain in my limbs 
I stayed at home for four days. Later I went to Koppal and got medicine and the 
expense was Rs. 60 ($1 .33). This month I have had only hospital expenses. I have not 
saved any money in the group this month. For three weeks no one has gone for coolie 
work; instead I have taken Rs. 150 ($3.33) from the group, which I have to repay. 
Normally, my son, daughter-in-law and daughter also earn, so whatever my daughter 
earns, I save that money in the group. " 
Poor women tended to be irregular savers when cash was low as when illness reduced 
the chances of labour, or in the face of other emergency or household needs. 
Conversely, they saved more when they had regular inflows, but the overall pattern 
was erratic. By contrast women who had regular incomes, e.g., Mariyamma from 
agriculture, Sushila from tailoring, Sangavva from agriculture and labour, Rangamma 
from the provision shop and Kaveri from the trading business or government salary, 
did not find it difficult to save the mandated amount of Rs. 10 ($0.22) on a weekly 
basis. 
Among the savings groups in Kappa!, many women pegged the savings at a regular 
amount. Some started their savings with Rs. 2 ($0.045) per week, graduated to Rs. 5 
($0.11), and stabilised at Rs. 10 ($0.23) per week; few saved Rs. 20 ($0.45) or more. 
For instance, saving Rs. 1 or 2 ($0.02 
or 0.04) per day, and then adding the 
balance on the last day of the week 
meant they could save the amount of 
Rs. 10 ($0.23). Gonibasaveshwara 
SHG, Bikanhalli, (Nagavva and 
Sangavva' s group), had 16 SC 
" •... Now,four members have joined 
the group; they had been members In 
our group earlier hut they withdrew 
the membership and took their money 
back. Their savings were not on par 
with ours but now they are saving Rs. 
10 ($0.23) like us". 
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members of which five were landless and another ten were marginal farmers. They 
depended on work on their own lands and coolie work on other people's lands. They 
conducted meetings regularly, but the savings were irregular. In 2000, when there 
was no rain and little agricultural work, they were unable to make any savings for 
three months, and were irregular for another three months. Of the three groups that 
Sampark had promoted in Hosagondabala village, the Nulvi Chennaiah group, 
comprising of the Koravar community, migrated for four to six months every year to 
collect material for baskets that they made and sold. They did not follow the SHG 
methodology of meeting once a week of bringing in savings regularly and repaying in 
regular instalments the loans they had taken from the group. The SHG dissolved in 
one year; three members joined the another group. The Hemareddy Mallamma group 
in Chukanakal, Kaveri's group, had 13 members, of which two withdrew because 
they could not save regularly. Even among those continuing as members, savings 
were irregular due to health problems, lack of coolie work, and consequent shortage 
of money. The attendance at meetings was low where women worked night shifts, 
and when the leader, Manjula, married and left the village, the meetings stopped as 
there was no literate person to conduct them. Savings were erratic because earnings 
were erratic, and/or meetings irregular. In the Bharmalingeshwara group, 
Mariyamma stated: "We have not saved or repaid loans for the past six months. For 
the past three months we 
have completely stopped 
bringing money to the group 
meetings. There is no rain, 
no work, and no money to 
bring." 
However erratic the earnings, 
women claimed they were 
serious about savmgs. 
Lakshmavva' s group 
comprised of the poorest 
women, hardly able to 
Members of Paklravva 's group in Hyati village 
of Koppal contributed Rs. 10 ($0.23) for the 
group savings a mandated by the NGO, and 
brought an additional sum of Rs. 10 ($0.23) to 
their group meetings. They pooled this latter 
sum, amQuntlng toRs. 200 ($5) per week, and 
drew lots to allot an amount to each member 
every Witek. In thiS way, each woman got one 
lumpsum, and when each member received the 
mohey once, the process was repeated. This was 
a method different from the savings method 
mandated by the NGO. 'Women found that 
their own system of managing savings more 
efficient than the NGO's. They did not have to 
return all the additional savings. Instead they 
111 11 11m1 • ,., g, tJ tfHd, 
and there was no interest payment Involved. 
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sustain their families, but they still met regularly and brought savings. Bharmavva 
said: "Even if we face difficulties at home, we bring the savings. This way we know 
for sure that we are building up to an amount that we can use, either to pay off our 
loans to the group, bank or to someone else." There were also groups that saved 
more than the amount mandated and monitored by the promoting NGOIMFI, because 
they could then use it as they chose, as in an SHG in Hyati village, given in the 
accompanying box. 
The geographical context where the women lived was also important. There was 
drought in Koppal from 2001 to 2003, which led to low and irregular savings among 
many women ' s groups. Among the groups initiated by the local NGO, many 
members dropped out as they could not save regularly, and due to migration from the 
area, many groups were forced to dissolve. Of the 130 groups initiated by the NGO 
between 1998 and 2003 , 20 dissolved due to these factors. By external/NGO 
standards, these groups were judged to have neither regularity nor a good volume of 
savings, and perhaps even labelled as defunct (Premchander, 2002). NGOs tended to 
judge groups by the regularity of savings, and normally did not make allowances for 
other factors (seasonality of agricultural income, droughts, ill health, household needs 
and emergencies). NGOs also judged total savings to be an important indicator of the 
financial strength of the credit programme, believing that women should save only in 
the groups they facilitated, thus regarding use of savings outside NGO-managed 
groups with suspicion. These judgments arose from the following financial 
perspective, and raised concerns about the management of the financial programme 
(Figure 6-3). 
Figure 6-3: Financial Perspective of Savings 
High amount of 
saving + Regularity of savmg High Creditworthiness 
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Women, however, valued savings, and even if they could not save for several months, 
most groups continued to meet intermittently, as and when they could bring in 
savings, which kept the groups operational. This reflects the value they attached to 
their savings. 
6.2 Management of Money and Group Dynamics 
Women's management of their own money was directed at maintaining social 
relations and solving group conflicts with beneficial learning effects, but sometimes 
created financial risks. 
6.2.1 Use of Savings 
Microfinance interventions that operate through SHGs have introduced a new source 
of loans: the savings of SHGs. The common practice developed earlier by NGOs, 
when the SHG based credit methodology was still being tested, was for groups to 
deposit their savings with the NGOs or local banks. Loans to SHGs were then 
determined according to the savings deposited by the group (Sampark, 2000; Vyas, 
2003). The ratio of loan to savings was typically 2:1. There was usually an elaborate 
system by which the ratio of loans to savings would become 4: 1, 8: 1 and so on over 
successive loan cycles, reflecting the increased credit-worthiness of the SHGs over 
time. 
The groups in this research had control over their savings and the freedom to decide 
how to use or distribute these savings. Sampark did not collect women's savings as 
deposits, instead encouraged women to open bank accounts in the group name. The 
intention was to familiarise women with banking operations. Like several other 
NGOs elsewhere, Sampark encouraged groups to keep initial savings safe until 'group 
discipline' was established, (a process which happens normally after three to six 
months), and then begin to rotate their savings in small loans among themselves. 
Initially (1998-2002), many groups promoted by Sampark did not open bank 
accounts. They thought the cost of travel to a bank was high, and as they had l)everal 
livelihoods needs for which they could use small loans, they began to give each other 
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small loans from their savmgs to meet these. Also, women had to travel long 
distances to find banks. This was costly and since they themselves had credit needs, it 
was less expensive and more prudent to use it for meeting their own immediate needs 
for small loans. If the group was not planning to take a loan from a bank, it believed 
that it did not need to prove its creditworthiness, and therefore did not need deposits. 
For these reasons, groups preferred rotating the savings as loans (the practice of inter-
loaning) rather than keeping them as deposits. 
As SHG based credit became more accepted, bankers realised that women might not 
deposit money in banks, but rather practice inter-loaning, and therefore began to 
assess inter-loan transactions to determine loan-taking capacity of groups (NABARD, 
1999). Also, by 2003 some groups believed that they could access credit from the 
banking sector and opened and operated bank accounts in the expectation of obtaining 
subsidised loans. This trend was apparent in the Sampark groups by 2005. For 
instance, Sushila's group, Basaveshwara SHG of Mudhaballi, opened a bank account 
only in 2005, in the fourth year of its formation, in the hope of obtaining bank loans. 
A bank account also proved useful when women wanted to close the transactions, as 
in the case of Durgadevi group, when the women sought to collect enough money to 
pay off the bank loan and avoided being 'defaulters', or when they wanted to 
redistribute the money among themselves. 
Groups valued savings as a new source of money, as it constituted 'self-owned' 
capital, and took loans from group savings on a continuous basis. The details of 
savings, loans generated from savings, and interest earnings accruing to seven groups 
to which research participants belonged are given in Table 6-1. 
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Table 6-1: Details of Loans from SHGs (August 2003) 
''Group Name Nb. Age Savings Interest Loan Details 
f;c, 
of of the Rs. eamedRs. Cumulati Purpose Interest, 
Mem Grou ($) '($) ve Loans Repayment 
bers c' p Rs.($) schedule 
I . Gallidurgamma 10 2.4 12,000 2,530 6,600 Household 60%, 
SHG Hosagondabala yrs ($267) ($56) ($147) expenses, flexible 
(SC group) agriculture, repayment 
health and 
travel 
2. Durgadevi SHG 12 3.8 14,819 1,790 10,070 Household 24% 
Mudhaballi (SC yrs ($329) ($40) $224) expenses, flexible 
group) health and repayment 
travel 
3. Kasturibai SHG 13 3.8 16,960 5,589 29,435 Household 36%, 
Bahadurbandi (mixed yrs ($377) ($124) ($654) expenses, flexible 
SC and BC) agriculture, repayment 
health 
4. Hemareddy II 3.7 24,140 12,396 30,800 Household 24%, 
Mallamma SHG, yrs ($536) ($275) ($684) expenses, flexible 
Chukkankal (General health and repayment 
castes) travel 
5. Gonibashveswara, II 2 yrs 11,710 4,630 16,000 Household 60%, 
Bikanhalli (SC group) ($260) ($103) ($356) expenses, flexible 
health, instalment 
festival 
6. Basveshwara, II 2 yrs 9,800 2,000 3,767 Household 60%, 
Mudhaballi (Mixed ($218) ($44) ($84) expenses, flexible 
group) health instalment 
7. Baramalingeshwara, 16 2.4 24,650 17,308 34,100 Household 60% 
Bikanhalli (mixed yrs ($548) ($385) ($758) expenses, initially, 
group) agriculture, later 48%, 
health flexible 
repayment 
2003: Total (Rs.) 84 114,097 46,243 130,772 
Total($) 7 SHGs ($2,536) ($1,028) ($ 2 906) 
Nov. 2005: Total (Rs.) 1,38,790 3,98,890 
Total ($)7 SHGs ($3,084) ($8,864) 
Mar. 2006: Total (Rs.) 2287 24,00,693 6,02,426 54,17,574 
Total($), mem- ($53,349) ($13,387) ($120,390) 
150 SHGs bers 
The seven groups studied had given loans amounting to Rs. 130,772 ($2,906) and 
earned a total interest of Rs. 46,243 ($1 ,028), thereby augmenting their capital by 
35%, having rotated it as loans 1.14 times over two to three years. A later update of 
these figures, as of August 2005, showed that the savings had increased to Rs. 
1,38,790 ($3,084) and the cumulative loans had increased toRs. 3,98,890 ($8,864), a 
rotation of savings as loans 2.8 times. By March 2005, Sam park had 150 groups, with 
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2,287 women members, a total savings accumulation ofRs. 24,00,693 ($53,349), and 
the total interest earned was Rs. 6,02,426 ($13,387) where total loans given out from 
own savings were Rs. 54,17,574 ($1,20,390). This shows the collective accumulation 
of financial capital among the women over the six-year period when Sampark 
organised these groups. The financial capital created was impressive, despite low 
savings due to droughts and irregular earnings, and several groups had divided the 
savings and earnings during these years, and the SHGs also reduced the interest rate 
charged to individual members. Five groups charged interest rates ranging from 3 to 
5% per month; only two charged 2% per month. In the early years of formation of 
groups, women tended to peg the interest rate at 5 to 10% per month, the rate at which 
money was available in the local market. Over time, they realised that high rates 
prevented them from using credit, and hence reduced these to 2% per month. Some 
groups retained 5% per month to insure against defaults and to build up their own 
capital. The loans were typically small, used for household, medical, travel, 
agriculture, and festival expenses. In most cases, members regularly repaid only the 
interest, whereas the principal was repaid either when the loanees had money or when 
other members needed to take loans. 
The cost of loans became prohibitive for many members of the SHGs, leading to 
practices of loaning to non-members, with the objective of earning high interest. 
Some found that loans extended to non-members were not returned. Yet, most 
groups, especially those constituted of poor women, tried this alternative and lost 
money before they could be convinced against it. These are illustrated in a later 
section. Other factors leading to loans to non-members were the perceived needs of 
those who could not save in SHGs, and maintenance of social relationships. 
6.2.2 Loans to Members 
When loans were from group savings, women usually preferred 'balloon' repayments, 
where part of the principal or interest was paid regularly, but the full repayment was 
linked to the inflow expected from the project, once in three to six months, depending 
on its timing. For instance, they repaid agricultural loans at the time of harvest and 
sale of crops. In case of delays in repayment of interest or principal, groups did not 
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levy a penal interest charge. By contrast, loans taken from NGO/MFis had to be 
repaid in equal instalments, either weekly or monthly, and penal interest was levied 
from members in case of delay, and they were classified as 'defaulters' when in fact 
they only perceived their act as 'delay' and not as 'default'. In most groups, even if 
records were incomplete, women knew and kept track of the principal and interest 
amounts payable by themselves and others. These processes and dynamics are now 
illustrated with reference to individual group's own 'stories' of their experiences. 
Gallidurgamma SHG in Hosagondabala had members belonging to the Madar (SC) 
community (Parvatamma, Yellamma and Shivavva were members of this group). 
Formed on April 2000, it had sixteen women from the SC community, all engaged 
primarily in agricultural labour. Though the government had provided two acres of 
land to each woman as part of the devadasi rehabilitation scheme, these lands were 
flooded with dam water for six to eight months a year, and the women cultivated 
pulses and ground nuts in the remaining months. All group members were illiterate, 
and none could write accounts. For the first half-year, the group depended on 
Sampark staff even to attend and conduct meetings, and only one-third of the 
members attended when the staff were absent. During the following year, Sam park 
staff visited only once a month and the field officer claimed: "The members did not 
understand the objectives of a group, and did not follow rules and regulations. 
Instead, each one tried to explain her own difficulties and problems. " Later, they 
found a 13 year old boy studying in Class-6 who helped them conduct meetings 
regularly and wrote their books. 
In April2002, their savings and loan transactions were as follows: 
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Table 6-2: Savings and Loan Transaction of Gallidurgamma SHG 
Name Savings Loan details Outstandin2 
No No. Total Loan Repaid Interest Principal Interest 
of Rs . ($) amount paid Rs. Rs . ($) Rs. ($) 
loan Rs. ($) ($) 
I Parvatamma 880 3 1,050 150 605 900 195 
* ($20) ($23) ($3 .33) ($13) ($20) ($4.33) 
2 Shivavva* 830 I 300 
-
330 300 330 
($18) ($6 .66) ($7.33) ($6.66) ($7.33) 
3 Hanumavva 790 I 600 450 400 150 42 
($18) ($13) ($10) ($8 .88) ($3.33) ($0.93) 
4 Mallavva 830 2 300 300 87 - -
($18) ($6.66) ($6.66) ($1.93) 
5 Yellamma* 890 4 500 400 70 100 -
($20) ($11) ($8.88) ($1.55) ($2.22) 
6 Lakshmavva 670 3 400 100 125 300 190 
($15) ($8.88) ($2.22) ($2.77) ($6.66) ($4.22) 
7 Huligevva 630 1 200 200 165 - -
($14) ($4.44) ($4.44) ($3.66) 
8 Siddamma 860 1 300 - - 300 270 
($20) ($6.66) ($6.66) ($6) 
9 Lakshumavva 800 1 200 50 85 150 37.5 
($18) ($4.44) ($1 .11) ($1.88) ($3 .33) ($8.33) 
10 Durgamma 730 4 700 700 -
($16) ($16) ($16) 
Total 7,930 21 4,550 2,650 1,867 2,200 
($176) ($10 1) ($59) ($41) ($49) 
* Research participants 
Yellamma was the group leader. The group had given loans both to group members 
and non-members that had not been repaid for over a year. The group expected 
Sampark staff to recall these loans, who complained: "The group members do not 
insist on loan repayments, they expected Sampark staff to handle this issue. Even 
when we facilitate discussions to make a system for loan repayments, they start 
talking about their difficulties and protect each other. When we are absent from 
meetings, they do not even discuss loan repayments, they just collect the savings, 
disburse loans and go home. They are afraid to ask for repayments because each of 
them has loans to repay. They are also scared of breaking their relationships. They 
have given loans to non-members and none is willing to collect this money. In fact, to 
reduce their risks, they have now decided not to give any further loans, and have 
been saving in the bank. They now have Rs. 7,000 ($156) in the bank." 
The women felt that, as all had taken loans, no one person had any moral right to ask 
another to repay, saying: "Many of us have unpaid loans, so how can we ask another 
to repay." 
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The group had disbursed loans as per the needs of women, without fixing any specific 
repayment schedules. After April 2002, the group stopped giving loans, and asked 
members to pool money for a full division of cash, and by October 2002, they had 
collected all the dues and shared the entire money. The group reconvened the very 
next week, with three 
members dropping out 
and five new ones 
JOmmg. Parvathamma 
dropped out as she could 
not save regularly. She 
had Rs. 250 ($5.55) less 
than other members as 
savings, and could not 
repay loans taken. The 
group did not change its 
two leaders through the 
three years . Initially, one 
member, Chanamma, 
kept the actual cash 
herself, and her husband 
compiled the group 
accounts. He then took 
Rs. 500 ($11) without 
informing the members. 
The members quarrelled 
among each other but 
could not find an 
alternative accounts 
writer or cash-keeper, 
and thus asked Sampark 
Noorijan was the leader of a women's SHG in 
Bahadurbandi, largely comprising of women to 
whom she claimed to give beedi-rolling jobs. 
When they started saving in the group, women 
were excited to see their collective savings grow, 
and were able to take small loans from it. As 
savings grew, Noorijan took a loan of Rs. 3,000 
($66.66) and another woman, Paramma, also a 
large landholder, borrowed Rs 2,000 ($44.44). 
Noorijan did not repay the money on time to 
enable other group members to take loans. She 
also appointed her husband as the accounts 
writer, and gave him a salary of Rs 300 ($6.66) 
per month from the group funds, while her 
family also appropriated whatever interest the 
group earned from their loans. The group 
members thus found that their savings were 
locked up in a loan with Noorijan; if they 
continued to save, they gave her control but if 
they stopped saving, they would still lose their 
existing saving. This continued for three years, 
with Noorijan and Paramma appropriating the 
savings and interest, and also Rs. 10,000 ($222) 
that the group took as loan from the bank. After 
disputes, and several interventions by Sampark 
staff, the two leaders returned the women's 
savings, but by then women had lost Rs. 9,000 
($200) interest. They accepted this because they 
could not make her pay, and also because her 
husband was known to say 'mantras' (charms) 
that women feared, so they did not seek to 
recover the interest from her. The Sampark 
manager said that we discussed the case many 
times with other groups in the village, too, but no 
one was interested in getting things corrected in 
this group". 
staffto intervene. Then, Chanamma, who had a savings ofRs. 500 ($11) in the group 
adjusted the savings against the cash taken by her husband, repaid another loan, and 
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withdrew her membership. Five other members also left the group. Two had taken 
loans they found difficult to repay, so they adjusted these against their savings, paid 
up the balance, and found "release from such issues." Three others claimed they 
could not saveRs. 10 ($0.22) per week on a regular basis, and withdrew their savings 
and left. Next, another leader, Shivavva, became keeper of the group's money. She 
had also taken a loan of Rs. I ,050 ($23) and did not repay it for eighteen months. 
Once when she had Rs. 700 ($16) in hand, she gave Rs. 500 ($11) to her son, and did 
not inform others for the next three meetings, as they did not check the accounts. The 
cash shortage was discovered only when the Sampark field officer checked the cash 
balance. The group members did not blame Shivavva, but the Sampark worker 
insisted that another person keep the cash, and that the said person bring the money to 
the group every week to demonstrate the accounts to all members present. 
Sampark staff provided training on group management, after which the groups began 
to conduct regular group meetings and formulated clear working rules. Their savings 
were also more regular, often because they managed their finances better, and also 
because those who could not save regularly had already dropped out. The remaining 
ten members continued to pool savings and take small loans for emergency needs. In 
the first two years of opening the bank account, members had visited the bank only 
four times, to deposit, but not withdraw, their money. Then, with additional bank 
deposits, they hoped to collect enough (including expected loan repayments) to buy 
goats and sheep. 
The Gonibasaveshawara SHG, Bikanhalli, (Nagavva and Sangavva's group), set up in 
July 2000 with 15 SC members, had similar experiences with leadership and loan 
repayments. Initially, Sangavva, one oftwo group leaders, extended a loan to a non-
member, but other members disputed this and made Majavva, another member, 
responsible for cash. She too used the common fund without consulting the group, 
leading to another dispute. The initial experience of lending to non-members was 
negative, so it stopped such lending and rotated savings regularly as loans among 
members, keeping very little money at hand and none deposited in the bank for a long 
period. Members paid interest regularly, but only paid the principal when they got 
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large inflows of cash from sale of agricultural products, or other assets like goats. If 
they needed to borrow, those with borrowings repaid tlie principal amount over three 
weeks to enable further loans. 
The savings amounted toRs. 12,750 ($283) by December 2001, when earnings made 
through intra-group loans were Rs. 7,500 ($167). When women did not repay 
regularly, the group decided to dissolve and distributed all savings and earnings, each 
getting Rs. 850 ($19) of their savings and Rs. 500 ($11) as interest. To some this was 
a significant earning; they bought jewellery (earrings and nose rings), three bought 
sheep and others invested in agriculture. When the group dissolved, some dropped 
out, but others were inducted. Sangavva took a loan from the group and did not 
repay, she either missed group meetings or picked up disputes when she did, but when 
certain members supported her, the group split into two. The group did not stabilise 
in the second round, and had to be reorganised again when Sangavva had five old and 
10 new members from the SC community joining her, and another leader, Manjula, 
formed a group with 10 old members. When the groups split, each member received 
a Rs. 900 ($20) share of savings. The third time, Sangavvva's group had 15 
members, and a savings of Rs. 160 ($3.55) each in November 2003, but then held 
regular meetings and formulated new rules. This showed how the groups shifted and 
changed over time as they adapted to different conditions. 
The Kasturibai SHG, Rangamma's group, was established in June 1999, with 20 
members, none of whom were SCs. The group, which usually met at the house of 
Neelamma, also included her daughter-in-law Savithramma, who was its President. 
Neelamma who also controlled the savings, took most of the loan herself, did not 
maintain accounts, and appropriated any interest earned. She claimed religious 
leadership as she wore a 'thali' (pendant) given by the local priest (as explained 
earlier in Chapter 4) and therefore declared that the members did not have the 
authority to demand a written account of the group's finances, but had to accept her 
word for it. Members questioned this, went to Savithramma's home and asked her to 
control finances as she was 'educated'. Savithratnma came to Bahadurbandi, talked 
to the members, and at this time, 12 members formed a group with her, the remaining 
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staying with Neelamma. One more woman joined after six months, and paid up the 
additional savings to be at par with the group. Another member joined a year later, 
saved Rs . 20 ($0.44) per week, and contributed additional cash whenever she had 
some 'in hand ', until her savings were equal with that of the others '. By 2001 , each 
woman had Rs.1 ,158 ($26), ofwhich Rs . 1,060 ($24) was savings and Rs. 198 ($4.40) 
loan interest. Once the groups were split, their worth improved. Ten women took 
loans from group savings, at 3% per month, with regular repayments in December 
2001 , the loans taken by members from savings were as follows : 
Table 6-3: Loans from Own Savings: Kasturibai SHG 
Savings and Loan Details: Kasturibai SHG 
Sl. Name Savings Loans Loan Repaid Interest Loan No of 
No (No.) (Rs.) rep. 
I Thejaswini 730 - - - - - -
($ 16) 
2 Nethravathi 730 - - - - - -
($ 16) 
3 Savithravva 730 2 1,400 1,000 60 400 2 
($ 16) ($45) ($22) ($1.33} ($8.88) 
4 Jannathbi 740 I 1,000 1,000 180 - I 
($16) ($22) _l_$2~ J$4.0Ql 
5 Husenbi 710 I 300 - 81 300 -
($ 16) ($6.66) ($ 1.801 ($6.66) 
6 Huligemma 740 I 500 - 133 500 -
($I6) ($11) ($2.95) J$ II) 
7 Saroja 720 I 4,000 200 351 3,800 2 
($ 16) 
_($891 ($4.44) ($7.8}_ _i$84}_ 
8 Ran gamma* 740 I 2,000 2,000 60 - I 
($16) ($44) ($44) ($1.33) 
9 Shakunthala 720 2 1,700 1,000 115 700 5 
($I6) 
_(_$381 _(_$221 _(_$2.5~ _i$I61 
10 Mabubbi 740 2 1,100 100 288 1000 1 
($ I6) ($24) ($2.22) ($6.401 _($22) 
11 Mou lanbi 720 I 300 250 60 50 4 
($ 16) ($6.66) _i$5.55) ($ 1.33) ($1.11) 
12 Basamma 740 
- - - - - -
($ I6) 
13 Sharadamma 740 I 1,000 - 30 1,000 -
($I6) 
_(_$221 _i$0.6~ _i$221 
14 Shanthamma 20 - - - - - -
($0.44) 
Total, Dec. 2001 9,520 13 13,300 5,550 1,358 7,750 I6 
($212) ($296) ($ 123) ($30) ($172) 
Total, July 2002 16,960 13 29,435 5,589 
($377) ($654) ($ I2'!)_ 
Source: Group records in December 2001 *Research participant 
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By July 2002, savmgs reached Rs. 16,960 ($377), with cumulative loans of Rs. 
29,435 ($655), and interest earned Rs. 5,589 ($124). Accounts were maintained, and 
no loans were given to non-members. They took repeated loans from TGB and were 
able to keep up bank repayments. The experiences of Noorijan and Neelamma's 
groups were the first such cases, and were widely circulated by both women and 
Sampark staff, and later groups were warned accordingly. These experiences showed 
how some women used social beliefs about 'mantras' and sanctions, as that given by 
the 'thali ', to exert religious male authority over group members and misappropriate 
their savings and profits. 
In the Hemareddy Mallamma, group of Chukanakal, primarily constituting of general 
castes, Kaveri explained that the regularity of repayments of savings had increased 
once they took bank loans: "Now we have savings of over Rs. 30,000 (667) in the 
group, and each member has taken a loan from it at least twice, for household or 
medical expenses. This loan is returned in instalments, just as bank loans. Earlier, 
we used to repay over a three to six months period, whenever we had the cash. But 
now, after taking loans from the bank, we have started the same practice with loans 
from our savings. " 
Baramalingeshwara group in Bikanhalli, with Mariyamma as Secretary, was formed 
in April 2000 with 16 members, only three of whom were SC/ST. Twelve members 
owned land ranging between one to six acres, and one owned 14 acres, and most 
women did coolie work. Over 2 Y2 years, the groups saved Rs. 20,790 ($462), 
extended loans of Rs. 29,500 ($655), earning an interest of Rs. 8,912 ($198), at 4% 
per month, later reduced to 2%. Of the loans given, Rs. 24,150 ($53 7) had been 
repaid. Between members, 65 loans were extended, and 45 repaid. The group had 
fixed a minimum loan of Rs. 100 ($2.22), and a maximum of Rs. 4,000 ($89) and had 
an average attendance of 80% for meetings, and all except two members saved 
regularly. The group did have a bank account in the nearby village of Hiresindhogi, 
and members said it cost them Rs. 10 ($0.22) for each trip. The group was stable, with 
only one member leaving since its formation, she had a loan of Rs. 500 ($11), for 
which interest repayable was Rs. 20 ($0.44); these were deduced from her savings of 
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Rs. 650 ($14) and the balance then paid to her. The President, Secretary and 
Bookkeeper of the group were considered open and accountable to the group, and 
there was no change in its leadership. 
Loan repayments from savings were flexible. Members explained: "We do not have a 
fixed repayment schedule. We know each other well, and we wait till members repay 
loans on their own, there is no pressure. Often women pay when they sell their 
agricultural produce, and if someone has a long-pending loan, then we put pressure 
on her to repay at harvest time. We do not go to the bank very often, we rotate all our 
money as loans. Only when we don't have enough money, and a member wants a 
large amount, we then ask members to repay over the next three to four meetings, and 
then we collect the amount to meet the larger loan needs. " 
One Sampark field worker complained: "There is no repayment system! Even if I 
discuss setting up a regular system, they give reasons and justifications for one 
another and do not make timely repayments. Most of the loan from the group is used 
to pay for agricultural labour, fertilizers and pesticides. " 
Mariyamma claimed: "When the group was formed, all our husbands used to come and 
stand and watch the group operations. Now they have confidence in it. People in the 
village are also happy as the group savings are useful and the relationship with 
Sampark is good. Sampark has provided training in tailoring, agriculture and many 
other things for the improvement of women, so that we now know how to count and 
keep accounts and put our signatures. " 
Three members wanted to take a bank loan for sewing machines and other businesses, 
but the others wished to have an activity which all of them could start, they did not 
agree to take bank loans. 
This reluctance was found in other groups, too: when only one or two of the members 
sought to take external loans, or where other members were unfamiliar or unsure 
about projects. Rangamma wanted her group to take a loan for an auto-rickshaw for 
her son, and Yellamma wanted to start a vegetable business, but their groups could 
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not agree to take external loans for one or two large projects. Thus, extending loans 
and repayments were flexible, but sometimes there was internal discord, which 
prevented women were from taking loans for relatively large business ventures. 
6.2.3 Loans to Non-members 
What the women envisaged as the role of savings differed from what the facilitating 
agency, the NGO, held to be important. The experiences oftwo groups here illustrate 
how loans to non-members were as much to maintain social relationships, which also 
made recovery difficult, as to fulfil an 'obligation' to 'help' those in need. 
Sushila's group formed in 1998, with eight members, all belonging to landless 
households. The women did not attend the meetings regularly, but sent their family 
members, with the savings ofRs. 10 ($0.22) per week. The group leader lent this out 
at 5% per month to non-members. In June 2001, their total savings were Rs. 4,800 
($107) and interest earned was Rs. 1,600 ($36), thus giving each member Rs. 800 
($18) as a lump sum, including savings and interest earned, at the end of the year. 
Some group members had taken loans and had not repaid, which was adjusted at the 
time of closing the annual accounts. In June 2002, they accumulated savings of Rs. 
4,000 ($89) and the interest earned was Rs. 400 ($8.88). One debtor did not pay the 
principal, but there was still a profit on their lending operations as they kept the 
interest rate pegged at 5% per month. Three members dropped out when they started 
savings for the third time, and six new members joined. As soon as they pooled in Rs. 
I ,000 ($22) they disbursed Rs. 700 ($16) as a loan to a non-member on the guarantee 
of a group-member. 
By this time, Sampark staff disapproved, and stopped supervising them. The field 
officer said: 
"Right from the initial stages of formation, this group did not fully understand the 
concept of a SHG. The members did not meet regularly, though they sent someone to 
contribute the savings. The group did not appoint a President, but was managed by a 
Secretary who kept the cash and maintained the accounts. They did not discuss any 
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common issues, just did the savings and credit transactions. They sometimes took 
loans in between the days of the group meetings, and so, many members did not know 
all the group transactions. They did not open a bank account for nearly three years! 
Despite our advice, they lend money to non-members and did not even stop after 
losing money! The group divided and distributed its savings three times in the first 
three years of its operation. Sushi/a took loans very often and kept the group's cash, 
but she never had the time to do the bookkeeping. The members did not attend any of 
the training organised by Sampark. The accounts of the group were always in a mess. 
We got fed-up and now I have not gone to their group meetings for three months. 
The third time they reconstituted in 2005, they asked a young boy to keep their books. 
Sushi/a still keeps the cash, but the boy now maintains the accounts, and we have 
trained him, so the group is now more stable." 
The women, however, felt that they were poor, landless, and could not afford to take 
loans at 5%, but would continue to earn interest by lending their collective financial 
capital. Sushila continued to lead the group, and the members believed that they 
would benefit from it. This group was more interested in profits than in disbursing 
small loans to group members. Even in 2005, when the group opened a bank account, 
the members took loans, and if amounts of Rs. I ,000 ($22) to Rs. 2,000 ($44) were 
left unused, they sought non-members instead, in order not to lose out on potential 
interest, thus using the group as a surrogate moneylender. 
In 2005, the members also took more loans for household consumption, and for 
creating income-generating assets. Initially five members took loans for sheep. In the 
next round of loans, another five members bought two to five sheep each. As the 
women were engaged in coolie labour, they did not have the time to graze these 
sheep, and one man with five sheep of his own took the responsibility of grazing the 
whole flock of 30 sheep, at a charge of Rs. 30 ($0.66) each per month. This gave him 
a reasonable return on his time, and gave the women a chance to own sheep as 
additional assets which they would not otherwise have had. 
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The Durgadevi (Lakshmavva's) group in Mudhaballi had also extended loans to non-
members, primarily because the leader, Bharmavva, believed that as the group had 
savings, they were 'duty bound to help those in need'. She explained: "I gave loan to 
a person from the neighbouring village; he wanted to buy an auto-rickshaw. He took 
six loans of Rs. 4,000 ($89) to 6,000 ($133) from different sources, sold the auto-
rickshaw, and did not return the loan to any of his creditors. I went with four 
members of our group, six times, to get the money back. Once I went and stayed in 
that village for 21 days to recover the money. Finally, I brought back the Rs. 4, 000 
($89) which I had lent him. I had taken Rs. 2,000 ($44) from the group and the same 
from another person in the village to give him the money. Now the group has kept all 
the money, saying that they want to recover interest. I want them to return Rs. 2,000 
($44) so that I can pay off the other person. You tell me, is the group right, should 
they not let me clear off both the loans and forgive the interest, or wait for it?" 
Village men also used their social contacts with the SHG members to take and not 
repay loans. The sharing of labour to graze sheep, in the former case, is an example 
of how women used human and financial capital to create assets. The second case 
illustrates how women tried to balance both social and financial relationships. 
6.2.4 Flexibility and Problems with Loan Repayments 
The flexibility in repayment that women enjoyed because the loans were from their 
own savings, had both benefits and risks, which they dealt with in different ways, as 
we will see now. 
Baramalingeshwara, Mariyamma's group started in 1998 and accumulated savings of 
Rs. 24,650 ($548) until November 2003. Its cumulative loans were Rs 34,100 ($758). 
Of these, Rs. 15,000 ($333) was outstanding against members, but not regularly 
repaid. Group members kept these amounts outstanding, and did not pressurise one 
another for repayment. Their savings fluctuated according to seasonality of earnings, 
and the group continued to function, knowing that those with outstanding loans also 
had savings with the group, so that adjustments could be made at any time. 
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' 
In contrast with the financial perspective outlined above, which used amount and 
regularity of savings to assess the creditworthiness of women, the livelihoods 
perspective adopted here revealed that seasonality of savings and irregularity often 
arose from uneven income flows, and may not be indicative of a 'lack of discipline' 
per se, but rather of the insecure livelihoods of the members of a microfinance 
programme. In general, women valued savings and continued to pool group savings 
in periods of cash availability. 
The Durgadevi group, had eighteen SC women as members, mostly devadasis, and 
took a subsidised bank loan, with which fifteen members bought buffaloes. When 
they found repayments difficult, there were disputes: one buffalo died, and some were 
sold as unproductive, but some women then repaid the loans, others did not, using the 
money for household consumption or other assets. This created internal group tension 
and resulted in a splitting of group. The Durgadevi group had seven established old 
members, of whom only five were willing to repay the loan to the bank. They visited 
the bank several times to request permission to repay the loans individually, and 
certify that they were not 'defaulters'; as they feared that if they were labelled thus, 
their children could not draw government benefits. However, the bank officers did not 
respond to their request. The bankers treated the SHG as one client, and did not have 
a mechanism to recover loans from individuals who wished to repay to 'clear their 
names', but clubbed the good repayers and defaulters together, labelling the whole 
group and making it difficult for the women to reform their groups and regain access 
to bank credit. 
6.3 Multiple Meanings 
The practices of groups, as seen above, were different from what NGOs sought and 
expected. Groups had a different rationale and perspective about microfinance, which 
led to the different meanings they attached to savings accumulation or distribution, 
and dissolution and reformation of groups themselves. 
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6.3.1 Differing Meanings, Applications and Competing Interests 
The women assigned different meanings to loans from their own savings, as 
compared to loans from NGOs and other external sources. This was evident from the 
way they labelled own savings, applied loans from these, and managed them. 
Application of Own Savings 
In most parts of Jharkhand, own savings were referred to as 'baksa' money, or 'box-
money.' Women believed this money belonged to them, as against their borrowings 
from the NGO. 
To begin with, it was difficult for them to collect own savings, as the health of poor 
women and their family members was a potential drain on their income and assets. 
The absence of assets could lead to real hunger and indebtedness. Parvathamma 
could bear medical expenses only because her partner supported her. Shivavva took a 
loan for her husband's illness. These situations made the building-up of capital with 
women a very long-term process. In this scenario, savings offered a way for small 
individual resources to be pooled as a collective resource and be converted into 
capital for women. Thus, once the women learned to save, they developed their own 
practices to use these savings. 
Groups used NGO loans for what the latter considered 'productive' purposes. For 
instance, 84% of the NGO loans from CARE, Jharkhand, were used by women SHGs 
in agriculture and small businesses, and 16% were used for education of children, 
foodgrains and other household expenses, medical expenses, marriages and loan 
repayments. By contrast, women's own money was more for education, health, and 
household expenses in lean periods, marriages and repayment of loans taken at higher 
rates of interest as compared to group loans. The NGO microfinance project required 
that women invest the loan in a business, which would augment their incomes and 
improve their livelihoods. If money was used for anything except 'income generating' 
activities, it was considered 'unproductive investment'. Thus, in view of the NGO, 
money spent on education, health, and food was 'unproductive', and not eligible for 
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loan purposes. From the 'women ' s' perspective, however, medical expenses incurred 
today will enable income from farm labour ahead. A child educated now will enhance 
his or her livelihoods opportunities some years hence. These were "productive" 
investments for women. The NGO only saw as "productive" those uses of money that 
generated cash in a short time cycle, where women could repay the short term loans 
on the stringent terms established. It did not take the women's own perspective that 
investment in human health and welfare was 'productive' use. This emphasizes the 
importance of (administrative) categorization for the everyday management of money 
in the circumstances. 
Some groups calculated the total earnings 
from intra-group loans and divided the 
earnings among group members . This 
involved a division of both the savings 
and interest earned, after which the 
groups started savings again. External 
views on such practices of SHGs were 
often different. Sampark initially 
viewed this practice as detrimental to the 
interests of the women, as the NGO 
''My family members and I have 
acquired the savings haiJit after I joined 
the group and learnt to save. I saveRs. 
10 per week in the SHG, and my 
daughter saves the same amount in 
another SHG under a government. 
programme (Streeshakti). My husband 
saves Rs. 20 In a PIGMY scheme of a 
bank every day, and my son saves Rs 20 
per week in a recurring deposit at the 
post office". 
-Rangamma 
feared that the group would be evaluated lower in terms of creditworthiness if it were 
to be assessed by a banker. In contrast to the practice of Sam park, an NGO facilitator 
of the groups studied in Lohardaga district (Jharkhand) introduced the practice of 
calculating and distributing dividends from the profits of the group to women 
members . It recognised that the practice of sharing the earnings demonstrated the 
financial benefits of savings and credit operations, and helped motivate women to 
continue these at the local level. In the cases of both Koppal and Lohardaga, the 
groups were located in a semi-arid or remote region, with few opportunities for 
investing in income generating activities. Women saved until they collected a 
reasonably large sum (between Rs . 500 and 1 ,000, i.e. $11- 22), and then borrowed a 
similar amount at a time in the year when they could invest it better, either in 
agriculture or for a child ' s education. Thus, while the NGO tended to see retention of 
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creditworthiness as important, women did not regard a loan relationship with the bank 
as either possible or useful in the near future. Thus, women's rationale for savings 
differed from that ofthe NGO facilitator . 
Repayment of Loans from Savings 
In Jharkhand as well as in Koppal, women had different repayment practices for ' own 
money' as compared to ' NGO money ' or bank loans. The differences were as 
follows: 
Table 6-4: Different Repayment Practices 
Practices introduced by NGOIMFis Practices followed by groups with 
loans from own savin2s 
As facilitators, NGOs encouraged opening of Women did not see advantage in opening 
bank accounts, as this was a basic criteria on bank accounts, unless they later planned to 
which groups were assessed for loans from take bank loans 
banks/external sources 
NGO-MFis did not insist on accounts in banks, 
as they themselves conducted the financial 
transactions with the groups 
Better quality record-keeping Groups did not maintain suitable records 
for own funds 
Repayment instalments fixed by external Usually balloon repayments 
agency, usually weekly or monthly, very rarely 
a balloon payment, as in agricultural credit 
External agencies usually did not match loan Repayment linked to cash inflow cycle of the income generating activity, e.g. 
term with expected repayments 
agriculture, animal husbandry 
Interest payments and principal payments made Interest paid regularly or periodically, 
as per NGO determined schedules principal repaid only at end of loan period 
Penal interest levied on anything overdue as Usually no penal interest was levied, 
per rules set for external loans member gives reason for non-payment or 
delay 
Second loan may not be given until the first is Groups gave second loans from own 
fully repaid savings, even if first had not been repaid, 
where convinced of member' s need, or if 
the member held influence 
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It was found that repayment performance varied quite significantly depending on 
whether the loans were taken from own groups, government or banks, or NGO/MFI. 
Two primary reasons emerged for this: one concerning terms of credit, and the other 
to the relationships between the different actor groups: women ' s SHGs, banks, 
government and NGOs (Figure 6-3). 
Figure 6-3: Relationships between Women and Formal Sources of Loans 
Different 
Value 
Base 
Less flexibility in repayment 
Women mutually 
schedules 
Transaction and negotiation accommodate each other 
as base of interaction (no Flexibility in repayment 
trust, no mutual respect) schedules 
No long term mutual interest Mutual trust exists 
Gender based solidarity 
vis money sources exists 
• From different 
sources (actors, 
institutions) 
• Depending on how 
the money has 
been delivered 
• Depending on how 
the mutual 
relations ofthe 
providers and 
receivers of money 
Transaction as per have developed Accommodation of 
'system' of bribes to be • Depending on who 
paid are the receivers, members ' needs 
Rule ofThumb: 'Have e.g. women's Rule ofThumb: 'Take 
paid necessary groups tend to be as much as I can 
commissions so no need to responsible in return' 
repayments 
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The actor groups here are placed in two categories, with banks/ government 
organisations engaged in the delivery of subsidised microfinance as one group, and 
those who delivered unsubsidised credit (banks, MFis and SHGs) as another group. 
The ' rule of thumb ' for the former category appeared to be "Have paid the cost of 
benefit; no need to repay. " The ' rule of thumb ' for loans taken from the NGO/MFis 
was "Take what can be repaid. " Thus, the differences in the value base of the way 
credit was delivered by these actor groups resulted in a different repayment ethic. 
People valued relationships based on which other actors they dealt with, and the 
nature of the relationship emerging from them. A government-subsidised bank loan 
was a benefit to be accessed only once, based on their qualifying a poverty criterion, 
which could itself be purchased. A one time transaction and purchased eligibility 
could create a weak value base for the partnership between people and external 
agencies. By contrast, loans from NGOs, MFis or through regular credit transactions 
with banks were made on the basis of credit-taking ability, transparent processes, and 
the promise of long-term relationships. So, while loans under subsidised schemes of 
the government were not paid, NGO/MFI and regular bank loans were repaid . 
Further, when the relationships 
with the banks provided 
flexibility, groups returned the 
loan amount, so they could 
then obtain subsidies. The 
latter type of relationships 
involved the value basis, and 
risk of loss of face if they were, 
to default, encouraging high 
repayment performance of 
loans taken from or through 
NGO-MFis. Thus, 
relationships and values 
determined the loan repayment 
behaviour of borrowers. 
- Nagavva 
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The women in Koppal explained 'own' and 'outside' money thus: "We have 
benefited from the group because we can take a loan when we have a difficulty. But if 
we take loan from others, they ask us to pledge some security and ask us to be like a 
bonded labour to them, until we repay it. Instead of asking questions, we believe in 
others; we don't use our brains, so we are still poor from paying loans and high 
interest. So if we have our own money it is good for us; there is a lot of difference 
between group loans and outside loans. " 
"Outside, they give loans at high interest rates, we have to mortgage our gold, land, 
house and other documents for the sake of the loan and also, we and our children 
have to be bonded labourers for them. We have to pay the principal amount all at 
once. That is not the loan for poor people like us, so we find the group loan 
beneficial. There is no use taking a loan from outside. But the group loan is given for 
medicines, household expenses, seeds (agriculture) or any other purpose, like 
functions at home. Our lives have improved after taking loans from the group. " 
- Yellamma 
The groups typically depended on collective memory, rather than written records. The 
level of trust was high; there was confidence that members would repay. It was 
difficult to obtain record keeping registers and learn how to maintain them, or get this 
done by local literate men, girls or boys. However, lack of records did not mean that 
groups did not 'know' their transactions, which most could recall in detail. While no 
external person had any visible monitoring system in place, women often knew which 
individual member was expected to pay how much that week, because there was such 
demand for credit that the next person was already waiting in line. Where such 
demand for credit did not exist, loan monitoring tended to be weaker, and, monitoring 
systems were also weaker in established groups and with accumulated savings. These 
women saw little urgency about repayments and allowed individuals to resume these 
when they could easily do so. 
The perception of risk was also socially determined, and differed according to whose 
money it was. Money taken from friends, relatives and neighbours was seen as a 
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reciprocal facil ity, safe and flexible, and was often taken in amounts that women were 
most capable of returning, accord ing to their respective income levels. Some poor 
women were able to take relatively large loans due to flexibility in repayment terms. 
Loans from landlords and money lenders were seen as exploitative, or on terms that 
they would take only when fo rced to do so by their livelihoods needs, wherein these 
denote not only economic needs but also social expenditure that women considered 
obligatory or unavoidable. By contrast; they fe lt safe and less 'exposed ' managing 
their own money, and enough in control to determine the affordable terms. Trust 
between members assured them about loans taken from their own money. Thus, 
women's SHGs emerged as a ' closed ' and 'safe' place to take loans from. As the 
women themselves set the rules, they accommodated one another when needed. The 
rules were flexible and the members were accountable to one another, but not to any 
external agency. Their individual savings in the common fund of the SHGs provided 
them with a certain leeway in that they could set these off against loans taken from the 
group, thereby reducing the risk of ' non-payment' (Figure 6-4). 
Figure 6-4: Perception of Risk 
Perception of Risk 
fOur money, we can 
repay at our 
convenience' 
'What if we are not 
able to pay back?' 
When external loans were offered on terms not preferable to women, they opted not to 
take it. Thus, the loan amount, its use, and repayment depended upon whom the loan 
was taken from, the relationship that existed with the person or organisation, the 
familiarity with the loan methodology and the risks associated with the investment. 
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6.3.2 Importance of Social Relationships in the Management of Money 
In many of Sam park's groups in Koppal , women divided the full amount of savings as 
well as earnings, creating a zero cash-balance in the group, and enabling it to start 
again. In many cases, groups dissolved and were later reformed. 
In some cases, women members had 
taken small loans which they did not 
repay. When many group members 
had outstanding loans and 
repayments were not being made, 
other members could not 
subsequently take loans. Where the 
loan was given to a non-member and 
not returned on time, money was 
limited to a few people. Therefore, 
new loans became limited to the new 
savings being gathered. In order to 
solve this members 
''When some members repay regularly 
and others do not, we fight because 
ohiF the money of those who repay 
gets I'Otated; the others block money. 
Ifweflght more, members threaten to 
sell the buffalo and repay, but we also 
do not want members to do that. We 
have no doubt; we have the 
confidence that everyone will repay. 
Sometimes the women are struggling, 
but they will also repay. Two 
buffaloes of Lakshmavva died, so she 
is facing a difjlcult situation, but she 
wiU also repay." 
- Nagavva 
announced that the group would be dissolved so that the money could be divided. All 
members brought in money within three months and once the division was made, and 
the balance put at zero, they started pooling the money again. Often, such a group 
restarted the very next week. Groups' own development posed further issues, but by 
pooling capital, groups could dissolve without undue financial losses for individual 
women. Sometimes, one group reformulated into two separate groups, or with one or 
few members dropping out, and the rest simply continuing their transactions. As 
common group transactions were related to money, the simplest way in which to 
disengage the group was also through money. Practices such as dividing the capital 
and dissolving the group, at least temporarily, were ways in which women resolved 
social and leadership conflicts. 
The experiences of these groups highlight the importance of social relationships in the 
management of money. When women owed the group money, others did hesitate to 
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call for discipline, fearing the likely resentment of the debtor. If the NGO staff 
insisted on loans being returned, the members however did not then see this as a 
disruption of social relationships, as the NGO was perceived as an external agent, and 
expected to enforce financial discipline. But the groups hesitated to enforce such 
discipline internally. In some cases, groups changed their leaders and continued to 
save, as in the case of Mariyamma's group. In case the groups were not able to 
change leaders, they sought to limit damage and future risk by dissolving the group, 
and changing financial practices as well as leaders when they reformed the groups. 
This dissolution and reformation of groups were important social learning processes 
from a group dynamics perspective. 
While external agencies take 
only a financial perspective, 
they give little credence to 
women's own ingenuity m 
solving 
financial 
problems. 
leadership and 
management 
The facilitating 
NGO started with the mind-set 
that dividing up savings and 
bringing it to zero was unwise, 
as it depleted whatever capital 
women had created thus far. 
However, women believed 
they now had a system by 
which to recreate that capital, 
and the confidence to do it; 
"When a banker comes to assess the , 
group, and their savings are low ahd 
depleted, he will rate them low, and use it 
as a reason to sanction sub-sidised loan to 
, another group. Sampark groups will get a 
bad reputation. 
They do not listen to me, and thep do not 
maintllin discipline, but they ask for 
subsidised loans. It is very difflcult to 
manage these groups and satisfy their 
expectations." · 
~ - Sampark field staff 
- A group member 
therefore they did not see any risk in dividing up the entire capital of a group. What 
was more important to women was that they had acquired new skills in the 
management of savings and credit, and learnt a new methodology for creating 
financial capital. What others may see as capital erosion could thus be interpreted as 
(social) capital creation, and a step towards empowerment. Women particularly 
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valued the social capital they had created, e.g. the affinity within the group, the 
system of savings, and the skill in management of savings and credit. The differing 
perspectives about money management and group dynamics are explained thus: 
Table 6-5: Different Rationales for Money Management 
Divergence External Agents' Women's Perspective 
Perspective 
Lending to non- Risky, as they are not Not risky, as they are known to group 
members bound by group norms members 
and discipline 
Profitable, especially when group members 
are unable to absorb credit 
Pooling loans and Depletion of financial Sharing of benefits 
savings and dividing capital 
the capital Reduced risk of defaults and loss of capita l of 
each member 
Dissolution and Evidence of lack of Solution to exploitative or ineffective 
reformation of groups group cohesion and leadership 
stabi lity 
Resolution of conflicts among members 
Way to resolve old problems and start afresh 
Flexible repayments 'Lack of financial Own money less answerable to external 
of loans discipline' agency 
Collusion among group Allowing more members to repay at their 
members to de lay convenience 
repayments 
Continued circulation of money until others 
need it 
Opening of bank Evidence of knowledge No cash to deposit in the bank if a ll savings 
accounts and good discipline in circulate as loans 
micro finance 
Loss of a day's wages, and transport costs, 
Preparation of future involved in going to the bank 
loan from bank 
No need if there is little expectation or 
possibility of loan 
Joint liability for All group members can Over-exposure to projects of one or two 
repayment of group agree to take loans for women can be risky for other members 
loans enterprises of one or 
two members 
Group members must All members are equally poor and those who 
pay for the defaulting repay must not be penalised for those who do 
members not 
This analysis brings out the relevance of group dynamics and use of money. Women 
gained access to a new source of money - their own small savings - through groups. 
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However, SHGs were not a traditional indigenous forum, but a new one introduced by 
development projects. The internal management processes of these groups are 
indicative of the way in which the forum has become socially embedded . Thus, 
quality of leadership, socio-cultural factors, transparency and accountability systems, 
and trust emerged as elements that determined group dynamics and are indicative of 
the impact of microfinance. 
6.3.3 Impact of Savings 
The impacts arising from group loans are different from those arising from other 
informal and formal loans, and are depicted in Figure 6-5. The use of money by 
SHGs needs to be linked to the sources of money to which they have access, namely 
their own savings and external funds (from banks or NGO/MFis). 
Figure 6-5: Impact from Group Savings 
= 
Informal 
~ 
Q Impacts ~ Formal 
Ci-4 
Q Positive Higher income generation fl.l Group's • ~ 
• Consumption smoothening u 
a.. own Augmented capital base 
= • Q savings 
• Access to lumpsum 00 
• Creation of savings 'habit' 
• Increased creditability 
• Increased confidence 
• Increased awareness and knowledge 
• Improved money management skills 
• Improved negotiation skills 
• Increased self esteem 
• Increased mobility 
Negative • Increased vulnerability to loss of savings 
• Vulnerability to locally powerful/ corrupt 
leaders 
• Disagreements, quarrels and competition 
among members for loans 
• Risk of breaking social ties 
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These have very different implications, as they have different economic and social 
impacts, both of a positive and negative nature. Given that the impact of loans from 
formal sources was described before, this section will highlight the impacts arising 
from the use and management of their own savings. 
Women acknowledged that savings were 
the most important impact-generating 
feature of their participation in SHGs. 
They stated categorically that the greatest 
impact had been created by the 'savings 
habit' . It had enabled women to put 
money aside for their emergency needs, 
making them less vulnerable and more 
"Saving is very important to me. 
~Hani hanl koodldare hal/a, thene 
t!Jene koodidare taNhi' (small 
iirops tifwdter htdkiJ a mlglity 
ocean) so sm#ll savings Is of,reat 
use. I have benefited a lot after 
joining the group." 
- Yellamma 
confident about facing crises. Lakshmavva from Durgadevi group said: 
"Earlier we used to depend only on coolie work for our earnings. If there was no 
coolie work, we did not have any earnings, and used to starve on those days. After 
the formation of the group we got a loan and we bought one buffalo each. Now, one 
family member looks after the buffalo and others go for coolie work. The money 
earned by selling milk is an additional income of our families. Before the formation 
of groups we used to take loans from the Shavkar (landlord), who charges high 
interest and also asks to keep our children for labour in their house to compensate the 
loan. Now we borrow money from groups with less interest, which helps us to repay 
loan quickly. " 
The positive impact of savings was felt not only by the research participants, but also 
by other members of all the seven groups in Koppal. At the NGO level, the Sampark 
manager explained: 
"For all the SHGs taken together, savings increase by about Rs. 40,000 ($889) toRs. 
45,000 ($1,000) per month. Women use group loans for health, house repair, 
marriages, travel and agriculture. They use external loans for buffalos, sheep and 
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goats, and investment in agriculture, which includes digging borewells, obtaining 
pumpsets, electricity connection, and purchasing fertilizers and pesticides. They also 
use external loans for starting petty shops and businesses. " 
In the first phase of the research, several groups reported the practice of saving over 
and above the level mandated by the NGO, and these savings were used at the 
women's own discretion (Acharya and Premchander, 1999; Sam park, 2000). When 
women took loans from their own savings and the group retained the interest, it 
helped to augment group capital. Sav ings of women ' s groups represented their equity 
capital, and was therefore important for their empowerment, as well as an important 
indicator of the financial strength of a micro-finance project itself. The benefits and 
risks inherent in groups managing their own money are depicted in Figure 6-6. 
Figure 6-6: Access and Control over Savings 
Benefits Risks 
• Access to ' own' funds for loans • Risk of delay/ default by members/ 
• Free to decide leaders 
- Purposes of loan • Risk of delay/ default by non-
- Repayment schedules members 
-
Interest rates • Risk of members not repaying 
• Can lend to non-members properly 
• Can retain emergency cash • Risk of social disputes 
• Can manage seasonal demand 
• Capitalisation at group level 
• A share in the interest earnings of the group 
They had more freedom to decide the purpose of loan, interest rates, and repayment 
schedules. They could maintain cash balances, as per their estimation of emergency 
needs, or seasonality of the demand for loan from members. They cou ld loan to non-
members of groups and earn interest at 3-5% per month. However, such savings 
management by groups also carried risks . If non-members did not repay, there were 
disputes among group members. Such loans created a risk of loss of the principal, 
even though it also had the potential to earn more interest, and therefore increase their 
meagre capital. When women distributed the savings among themselves as loans, at a 
rea onable intere t rate of less than 2% per month, they were able to use it for 
smoothening fluctuating household consumption . When the interest rate was high, it 
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deterred poor women from taking loans. However, often groups provided the 
flexibility to repay when women found it more convenient to do so. This led to 'sub-
optimal' credit flows from the 'financial' viewpoint, but as it was their own money, 
and women viewed this as a valid action. Groups were a new forum, externally 
initiated, and introduced new activities which were hitherto unfamiliar to these 
women. It was a trial and error process by which certain women learned, and took 
decisions that the facilitating NGO would not support, such as lending money to non-
members and not making repayments on a regular basis. 
Women lost money if there was inequitable distribution of loans among them, if those 
who had borrowed did not repay, and if they had lent the money to non-members who 
had defaulted. Women's SHGs handled the collective money of poor women, and 
just as this created an opportunity to earn money, it also created vulnerability. This 
new forum of groups exposed women to new methodologies of handling money, a 
task for which they did not have the adequate capacity. This finding raises the 
question of whether it is ethical to introduce a new methodology that creates new 
vulnerabilities, without at the same time creating the capacity or potential to cope with 
the endemic risks accompanying it. In the case of Sampark, the NGO monitored the 
groups and repeatedly warned them of the problems of lending money to non-
members, and also monitored when their repayments became irregular. However, as 
the organisation was a 'facilitator' rather than 'provider' of microfinance services, it 
had only an advisory role, and women sometimes chose not to follow their advice, but 
preferred to prioritise and learn from their own experience. 
In a case studied in Ranchi, Jharkhand, the 'provider' NGO did not monitor the 
groups' management of their own savings, choosing only to monitor the credit it had 
given. In many cases, there was evidence that the group repaid loans, where rates on 
loans extended from women's own savings were low. The NGO was asked by the 
donor agency to become financially sustainable in its own lending operations, and the 
funding agency had invested in capacity building of the NGO to do so. Yet, neither 
the NGO nor. the funding agency had invested in the capacity building of groups to 
manage their own savings (Sampark, 2000). Similarly the capacity to manage 
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women's own savings was not created by many 'provider' microfinance organisations 
in Orissa. Instead, the MFis collected women's savings as security, and also as 
additional capital for loans. This exposed SHGs to the risk of not being able to deal 
with local emergencies. Alternatively, the external agency concentrated on the, 
provision and management of any credit they delivered, leaving women vulnerable to 
aspects of local leadership and social dynamics that again carried the risk of women 
losing their small savings (Sampark, 2003). The evidence indicated that though 
'facilitator' NGOs try to build local capacities of groups to manage money, they do 
not have the locus standi to enforce discipline that would safeguard women's savings. 
Therefore, the safety of women's savings in SHGs continue to be vulnerable to 
deviant group management and processes. 'Provider' NGOs, on the other hand, have 
more interest in their own financial sustainability, and tend to focus on aspects of the 
efficiency of their own operations rather than building groups' capacities for money 
management. 
6.3.4 Competing Interests 
The different meanings of money were evident in the understanding of the cash kept 
by women in the 'baksa' (box). Women's SHGs retained cash in the group, or in the 
'box'. The NGO in Jharkhand considered this to be 'idle cash', believing that this 
money could be easily utilised as a loan thereby yielding more return. If money was 
kept 'in the box', the NGO saw it as a lack of demand for loans. The NGO believed it 
had the ability to transfer money from 'net savers' to 'net investors' in much the same 
way as banks, and sought to transfer such 'idle' funds to groups seeking loans. 
Channelling the money in this way was judged as efficient use of funds. Women kept 
this money for emergency needs, including medical treatment of malaria, snakebites, 
accident victims, and so on. They saw seasonal fluctuations in the 'box cash' as 
normal, expecting to build it up slowly, so that when the agricultural season began, all 
women could take loans. If the amount was too small to meet all business needs, they 
build up the amount to be able to meet large needs by rotation. Sometimes, there was 
cash left in the box because it was difficult to deposit and withdraw from distant bank 
' 
branches. Women consequently did not perceive 'box money' as 'idle' but an 
important 'back-up' and a 'buffer' when they needed it. Thus, fund retention at the 
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group level enabled women to exercise more choices than would be allowed if it were 
collected together and used by the NGO/MFI. 
Four NGOs visited in the first phase of research, in Jharkhand, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh 
and Tamil Nadu, were known to be under pressure to become sustainable 
microfinance organisations. This called for more loans to SHGs, and increased access 
to the savings of SHGs wherever possible. In Jharkhand, once the groups were up to 
two to three years old, their savings were substantial, and the women had gained 
confidence for larger investments in businesses or other income-generating activities. 
So they used their own savings more and reduced their NGO loans. This created a 
problem for an NGO then poised for 'transformation', and its head exclaimed: "If 
women continue to take more and more loans from their own savings rather than 
from the NGO, we will have to keep on making new groups and derive all our income 
from small loans to new groups: a perpetual cycle in which we can never break even. 
We can become financially sustainable only if we mop up all the savings of the 
women's groups and rotate them through the organisation. " 
Another rationale extended by an NGOIMFI in Orissa was that, as women were 
illiterate, they did not understand complicated financial matters, and could not benefit 
from the scale, systems and leveraging of funds. It was, therefore better 'for them' to 
put their money in the hands of 'professionals', namely NGOIMFis, and derive the 
benefits through 'access to much larger loans.' As an NGO manager in Kalahandi 
district of Orissa put it: "Women are illiterate, they do not understand use of finances, 
we must make all the decisions for them." While some NGO heads and staff thus 
rationalised the move towards transforming themselves into MFis, others faced 
internal tensions. A field officer explained: "We used to sit with women and talk about 
their issues. After the micro-credit project started, it is only -'Give money, take 
money; Give loan, take loan'. The only work we do now is related to loans and 
money. There are no other conversations anymore." 
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The founder of an NGO in Uttar Pradesh that was planning transformation into an 
MFI, referred to another aspect of the tension that arose between the NGO and 
women's organisations. "We used to teach women to use their savings. We created 
federations that learnt to do so. Now we will collect all these savings to create a 
larger and profitable organisation for ourselves. How will we explain this to the 
federation members?" Another woman founder of an NGO engaged in microfinance 
in Tamil Nadu echoed this when she said: "We created clusters and federations of 
women; we taught them to retain a larger part of the profit at the local level. We 
encouraged them to question the NGO 's use of money. Now we want to take away 
more of their savings, and appropriate a greater part of the interest earnings- and 
become financially sustainable ourselves! They will question us about these changes; 
about the costs. How do you think I can explain this to women in our clusters and 
federations? They will feel let down. Do the funding agencies not see this, do they 
not realise they are pushing us in the wrong direction, undoing all we have done in 
the past in terms of building strong women's clusters and federations?" 
These statements highlight the competition between MFis and women-owned 
organisations to control the flow and profits from money management, and provide 
support for women's classification of money as 'own' and 'external'. 
6.3.5 Reconciling Women's Perspectives and NGO decisions 
The slow development of groups with a 'good discipline', the lack of control over 
money that women faced due to their illiteracy and social interactions, the frequent 
division of group savings, and the relatively low demand for external loans across 
Sampark groups together forced some to rethink microfinance methodologies in 
Koppal. When the NGO started, the initial plan was to form three levels of financial 
organisations: SHGs, clusters of six to ten groups each, based on geographical 
proximity, and a federation of all the clusters at the district level, as depicted thus: 
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Figure 6-7: Structure of Women's Organisations 
.. . . . . ... ......... .. . . ... Members .............. . .......... . 
Share capital contribution by each member for cluster association 
However, soon groups faced leadership problems, and had not established standard 
loan, interest and repayment practices. It was reckoned that creating collaborative 
organisations at a larger level, when even the basic units were not yet stabilised in 
terms of accountability and financial transactions, was premature. They therefore 
stopped forming a third layer, the taluk level federation, and instead concentrated on 
strengthening the groups in 2002-03 , and moving on to train the groups to form 
clusters in 2003-04. By 2004, 10 clusters had been formed, comprising 200 to 300 
women each, and each woman contributing Rs . l 00 ($2 .22) to the share capital. 
Women held several discussions about a common federation, as they were offered 
large amounts of credit to do so, but by then they had learnt to question NGO 
decisions as well. They had also learnt to rotate money at the group and cluster level, 
and realised that every layer, in terms of a second and third tier organisation, could 
also add administrative as well as financial costs . They debated the added value of 
incurring these costs, i.e. the benefits that would accrue by having a federation , which 
they would lose with just SHGs and clusters. Savitramma, leader of Rangamma's 
group and also at the cluster level, articulated their needs to Sampark as follows: 
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"Now we give loans from the group and earn interest of 2% per month at group level. 
When we take loans from the cluster level, we have to share the interest earnings with 
the cluster. If we introduce a third layer, the profit at group level cannot be retained. 
As the group members share the risk of non-repayment, we want to keep the profits at 
group level. So we do not want to have a federation for micro credit. What we now 
need from Sampark is to get us more grants and marketing linkages with the 
government so that we can start more businesses. " 
The field manager of Sam park, furthermore explained: "The women are right and we 
have stopped promoting the federation idea. We are now concentrating on 
strengthening the clusters. But it is very difficult to convince external agencies. If we 
approach them for bulk lending to the groups, they want to deal with the NGO. We 
have to show scale and volumes to be able to raise loan funds. If we keep hesitating 
to form a united forum of women at the taluk or district level, we will not become a 
visible force, and will not be interesting for external agencies. " The pull between 
external and local perceptions was clearly felt by the NGO manager, who tried to 
balance the two expectations and to achieve what he felt was 'progress' through the 
SHG-based microfinance initiative. 
These tensions are recognised in democracy and accountability debates which 
highlight that overtime NGOs usually confront the problem of role-reversal: from 
demanding of accountability to being targets (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). 
6.3.6 Role of Institutional Form 
The role of institutional form in the delivery of microfinance has been examined in 
literature from the point of view of the supply of microfinance (as discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3). The issue of institutional forms, when viewed from the perspective 
of sustainable demand for credit and use of money in ways that empower the 
members, takes different dimensions, regarding potential impact. 
The research was conducted in a context where the NGO, Sam park, was a 'facilitator' 
of credit linkages. It had limited funds for capacity building, which were spent on 
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technical, leadership and group management training. This had positive effects at 
individual and group levels, as illustrated in the following cases. The direct impact of 
training in technical and leadership skills was often positive and significant. For 
example, Sushila's training in tailoring helped her sustain her family. Kaveri was 
provided training in horticulture, following which she bought plants to put on her 
farm and homestead and increased the consumption of green leafy vegetables in the 
household. Sangavva received training from the agricultural department in seed 
conservation and has applied it to her benefit. Lakshmavva benefited from training in 
leadership, buffalo rearing and the conservation of hay. A workshop on natural 
resource management held at the village level benefited not only the participants but 
also several others in the village. Exposure visits to different groups not only gave the 
women new clues to better management of SHGs but also made them realise that they 
all faced common problems, e.g. alcoholism as a result of liquor shops in their 
vicinities. Visits of external people to the group have brought other opportunities for 
exchange of opinions and new lessons for women. One SHG debated the possibility 
of augmenting skills of women so they could earn from income generating activities 
like tailoring. On request, Sampark organised tailoring classes for the women and 
their daughters. While the daughters who were able to stay away from coolie labour 
attended these classes, the women who were sole earning members of their 
households could not find the time to acquire new skills. 
At the group level, SHG-management trainings helped to create capacities of groups 
to manage their own money and access credit from formal sources. The members had 
the power to decide whether or not to access loans and on what terms. The use of 
credit was therefore demand- dependent. Traditional impact hypotheses set forward 
to assess microfinance impact track the use of microfinance for micro enterprise 
promotion, leading to increased incomes and reduced poverty (Hulme and Mosley, 
1996). Such supply-oriented focus overlooked the possible situation that the primary 
objective of group formation may not be access to credit. If the objective of women 
in forming SHGs is to save and not necessarily to take external credit, a credit focus 
may eventually be misdirected. There is an empowering impact of retention, 
management and use of savings by women's groups. This empowerment derives both 
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from the fi nancial aspect of creation of capital at the group level as well as social 
capital created through group processes. Women need to be able to collect and control 
their own savings, and must at all times know the risks and advantages of a particular 
deployment of their capital, as well as have control of the expenses of the 
organisation. This requires an investment in bu ilding women ' s capacity to manage 
such organisations. Further, while profitability of credit and savings services 
provided through external agencies can be contingent on scale, women-controlled 
organ isations may benefit from being small and medium size. Thus, the institutional 
form of the NGO/MFI is important if seen from the perspect ive of ownership, contro l 
and management of finances. The divergence of the two perspectives of external 
agencies, namely financial services and empowerment perspectives, may be seen as 
two different paths (Figure 6-8). 
Figure 6-8: Different Perspectives, Divergent Paths 
Original Premise: 
Build SHGs of Women as 
Empowering Organisations 
SHGs choose whether to access 
loans, and how to use savings 
Build women's capacities to 
manage SHGs and finance 
operations and secondary 
institutions if needed 
Original Premise: 
A gap in demand and supply of 
micrormance 
Solution: Reorganise supply of 
financial services- savings and 
credit 
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If the starting premise is that there is a large demand/supply gap in microfinance 
which needs to be filled, the solution is to reorganise the supply of these services, 
often through the creation of sustainable MFis. In this approach, the role of SHGs is 
limited to reaching women in an explicitly cost-effective manner. Other empowering 
impacts of management of the services by women themselves are not considered 
important. However, if empowerment of the poor and of women is the objective, then 
womens' preferences and priorities for use of their own savings become important. In 
this case, a link to banks does not jeopardise this access and may be a preferred route 
to meet credit needs in excess of women's own savings. Further, the need for 
building women's capacities also becomes important. This indicates a need to build 
capacities at the group level, and also to create secondary or apex institutions e.g. 
federations or cooperatives. The empowerment approach calls for long-term 
investment in building people and NGO capacities. The conflicts between these two 
perspectives are not easy to resolve. On the one hand, as seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the 
supply of microfinance from the formal sector, and on reasonable terms, is indeed 
limited. On the other hand, when NGO/MFis offer credit on commercial terms, it 
also becomes too expensive and some women opt not to use it. This highlights that 
the importance of 'unsubsidised' model of credit by RRBs which women preferred 
was based on a long term relationship, and was growing in Koppal district during the 
study period 2001-2006. 
6.4 Implications for Empowerment Impacts 
The understanding of women's own management of their saving and their group 
dynamics shows how social learning processes fostered through SHGs create 
empowering impacts, at the individual, group and community levels. In tum, this has 
further implications for the type ofmicrofinance institution to be promoted. 
6.4.1 Groups Creating Social Capital 
Social capital improved by the process of women coming together, even in a research 
context where groups were weak in money management, where wotfien ditl not have 
the time to attend group meetings, and where the NGO provided little training. Social 
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impacts of SHGs and their savings and cred it activities were wide-ranging, as 
illustrated in Table 6-6. The analysis is inspired by the framework of Chen (1997), 
which classified three types of improv ing impacts: cognitive, perceptual, and 
re lational (as outlined in Chapter 2). An additional category of community level 
impacts was introduced to identify and emphasise positive actions that women had 
taken through their groups. 
Table 6-6: Social Impacts 
Cognitive • Increased awareness and knowledge 
Perceptual • Confidence in relating to bankers and government 
officials 
Relational • Status and recognition in family and community 
• Improvements in contacts among peers, through group 
membership 
• New contacts created, with banks and government 
officials, local leaders, businesses 
Community Level Impact • Wide range of community activities and influence 
At the cognitive level, women 
experienced an increase in awareness 
and knowledge, not only about money 
and its management, but also about their 
wider world, e.g. knowledge of 
government schemes, and how the 
"Now we feel comfortable to discuss 
and communicate with people. 
When someone visits our houses we 
are able to discuss why they have 
come, their projects and plans" 
- Mariyamma 
education or banking systems work. Their own judgements of these organisations 
changed and they developed more confidence to respond to, approach, and represent 
their needs and preferences to external agencies with whom they had never interacted 
directly before. They explained: 
"Before joining the group I didn't know anything. I did not have any idea of saving 
money and did not know how to count. I did not know that the saved money can come 
to our rescue. Now I have learnt about it and I have the courage to speak; I also 
participate in group discussions and I can also take decisions. " - Nagavva 
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"I gained knowledge about different aspects of functioning of groups, and about the 
savings and credit systems. I gained knowledge of banking procedures and bank 
loans. Now I can teach other new groups about group tasks and activities. I never 
had any idea about groups before joining one, now I have attended many training 
programmes in Koppal, Huvinala, Hosahalli, Hyati and Bahadurbandi. I had the 
chance to speak with and interact with different people. I came to Sampark office at 
least eight times in the past two years, and gained knowledge about group 
management, audit, business, etc. Now for some time Sampark has not provided 
new information and training, they are busy organising more groups. I am not happy 
to just have group meetings, I want training often."- Rangamma 
"Earlier I did not know anything about a group. When the staff came to our Keri 
(street) they talked about Sampark, SHG and savings. After they left our 'keri ', 
people said that these people have come to take our money so don 't pay any heed I 
was frightened by this, so I waited a bit. Once when I went to Halegondabala for 
coolie work, where a few members from another group were discussing about their 
group and savings. Then I learnt about the group concept and that savings will help 
us in times of difficulty. Earlier I had to beg my landlords if I needed a hundred-
rupee loan, and I also had to leave my sons as bonded labour with these landlords for 
any loan advance. Now I have escaped all of these since I am in an SHG. The 
members of the Mudhaballi group and our community have benefited a lot after 
forming the group, and can also get benefits under the government schemes. I want 
to come out of my poverty so I joined the group. If women work through SHGs, they 
can also come forward. If someone falls sick or if there is some function I take money 
from the group, but if I ask others they do not give in time, so by saving in the group 
there are lots of benefits and no problems. By becoming a member of a group, we 
gain knowledge about repaying loans, how to take loans and so on. In this way, I get 
knowledge about all aspects. After joining the group, I have also learnt to write my 
name, I have a bank account and I also know how to deal with bankers and do 
banking transactions. 
Every week we have group meetings and we discuss government schemes. Now, they 
are giving some loans from the SC/ST Corporation for doing dairy farming. The 
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sangha members are thinking of buying goats. For the past three years, after forming 
the sangha, we have not benefited from any scheme, so now we want to make use of 
this opportunity. If we get this scheme it will be very helpful for us. Nowadays no 
schemes come for the village as the elders of the village are not good. We are happy 
about the Sampark people as they have given us knowledge about the group. They 
have told us about going to Koppal to discuss issues about loans. Three members 
from our sangha will go and we will get the information. We have already informed 
the members to repay the loan in time if they take one. Earlier I did not have any 
information about bank or bank loan, but now after forming the group, Sampark staff 
gave us the information about the bank, loan from bank, how to get it by presenting 
the required papers and for what purpose to take it. Our bank account is in TGB 
Koppalfor the past 1.5 years. We have Rs. 8,500 ($189) in it. Since our money is in 
the bank, we have confidence in it, and also we know about bank officers as we go to 
the bank. We can get loan from the bank. " - Yellamma 
"Earlier, we did not know how to talk with people like the bank manager and those 
who work in 'official' places. We used to be scared to talk in public places. Now I 
am able to talk with group members, non-members, and have learnt how to convince 
government officers and bank managers. Because of group formation, we have learnt 
where to go, for which information. For example, when there was a need to get 
permission to get electricity for our dairy shed we went to the electricity department 
and got the connection. Now I am able to talk for a Kannada TV program in front of 
an audience without any hesitation. Earlier, we rarely went out of the village i.e. 
Koppal. Now we have been to Gulbarga, and big cities like Bangalore. 
This was not easy, I faced a lot of problems in the initial stages. I used to go to each 
house to convince the women to attend literacy classes so we could manage our group 
better. I used to leave in the evening and come back late at night. My husband 
punished me, saying that instead of helping the daughter-in-law with the cooking, I 
had gone visiting, so he did not allow me to enter the house, I had to sleep outside 
that night. My daughter came later with somefoodfor me, and then shejoined me on 
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these rounds. My husband punished us again, and we slept hungry. " - Bharmavva, 
leader, Durgadevi group 
She laughed as she related these incidents, and was quite convinced that she had done 
her duty as group leader, despite her husband's objections. Women also claimed that 
they received more recognition from their husbands and children for accessing loans 
and for acquiring new learning. Their own confidence in their abilities increased, as 
they felt they had developed the 'habit of savings' and could now create joint capital 
for themselves. The confidence building that takes place through groups cannot be 
easily explained. This researcher observed how slowly women came together, 
sharing first the money transactions, and then discussing other matters. They usually 
would not talk openly about domestic violence, yet they now made protests against 
such treatment within the household. For instance, Sushila's husband used 25% of the 
household income, all of which she earned, for alcohol, and would beat her to extract 
it from her. She gave it as she lives in a small house in a crowded neighbourhood, 
and felt ashamed if the neighbours heard their quarrels. Over the three years that she 
formed and led her SHG, she developed more confidence to stop giving money for 
alcohol. She said: "Now I refuse to give him money for drinks. I earn it for the food 
and education of my children. Let him earn the money he spends on drinks." 
They also become much more assertive regarding control over financial decision-
making. One group member said: 
"If we feel that the loan is for the family, then we take it from the group, but if we feel 
that it is only for the husband, then we do not even propose it to the group. We also 
involve the husband and family members in repayingthe group loans." 
More recognition and acknowledgement of women's needs and desires came also 
from the men leaders in the villages, who stated that women's groups had made them 
'realise that women existed'. Sangamma Pujari, a leader and the temple-priest of the 
SC community in Bikanhalli elaborated: 
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"We never really took women into account. We did not really see them, they were 
around, and that is all! Now at least we see our women as being there. They used to 
hide their faces, tighten their clothes about them, and move away when they saw us 
approaching. Now they leave their faces open, and approach us without any 
hesitation. They have begun to demand equal rights! They actually asked to use soap 
and coconut oil in their hair like men do. They said, you have to allow us. How is it 
that men can use soap and coconut oil and we cannot? We had to allow them to use 
these things! I used to get more respect then, now I hardly get the respect that an 
elder and leader should get." He said all this in a seemingly matter-of-fact way, 
feeling little rancour. It was as if these changes were inevitable and women were 
right to demand more equality, as male leaders acceded. 
Women were able to make 
representations to the government to 
remove local liquor shops, start bus 
routes, and appoint teachers to the 
village school. They contributed to the 
community by donating glasses, water 
filters, and furniture to village schools 
and cash for celebrations of festivals 
and cultural events. They planned and 
"We had a discussion about our 
community problems. We don't have 
a water facility and also poor people 
did not get BPL card, so I want to go 
to the gram panchayat office to talk 
about these with the secretary." 
- Yellamma 
carried out community activities like cleaning village roads and the vicinity of the 
drinking water wells. These activities generated more confidence among women 
because they were able to influence their immediate living environment and had the 
collective power to take action, and their status improved both as individuals and as 
groups. Women who could not afford loans for income generating activities, took 
Sampark grants and loans for their child's education. 
Such positive actions were limited to household 
and village domains, and did not challenge 
discrimination on the basis of caste in terms of 
eating and drinking with the lower castes, except 
occasionally when in Sampark training programmes. 
''All the members come for 
the meeting every week so I 
feel happy to go to the 
meeting." 
- Yellamma 
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This brings out the important effect of banking on social capital. The formation of 
' homogenous ' groups on the basis of castes and gender reinforces the low status of 
the group members, e.g. devadasis. Such homogenous composition has some 
benefits, but it also has major limitations, i.e. it is difficult to break out of the 
positioning at the lowest rung of the socio-economic-cultural ladder. If microfinance 
organisations create new opportunities for women to relate to one another beyond 
their SHGs, this would result in new social and economic linkages, which in turn 
would enable a break from traditional caste groupings, thus creating new forms of 
emergent social capital. Sampark enabled such augmentation of social capital by 
conducting capacity building workshops for women, and by linking the groups to 
banks. Education of children also helped improve the human capital and asset base of 
the household, and therefore its future capacity to absorb credit. 
Introduction of SHGs as forums for 
women created new soc1o economic 
spaces that allow for more individual 
aspirations to be met, emotions to be 
expressed, and improve self-esteem. The 
positive impacts evident at the individual, 
family and community leve l are proof of 
the SHGs' role in creating local capital. 
"When I first went to the hank, I 
did not have the courage to go 
inside, so I sat outside. Now I have 
the courage to go to a hank and 
also understand how people pay 
money to the bank and get money 
from there." 
This building of social capital takes place through social learning processes in SHGs. 
It is a trial and error process through which women learn. The manner in which these 
processes can be supported, monitored, evaluated, and enhanced needs to be viewed 
from a learning perspective. There is a need for the evo lution of a system suited to 
women's context specific needs and preferences, rather than the general application of 
externally devised 'best practices'. 
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Savings is the key financial activity that binds groups together, and their use reflects 
the needs of women. Group management of savings involved social processes of 
cooperation as well as conflict resolution. This left women open to risk of loss of 
money if their savings were mismanaged, or if some members, or non-members to 
whom they had lent money, did not repay. Non-repayment to banks also led to them 
being termed as defaulters, which meant denial of further subsidised support through 
government schemes. 
The greatest success of the group based methodology of lending has been the change 
in orientations it brought about at the macro level, in terms of inducing the 
government as well as banks to adopt it for reaching credit to large numbers of rural 
people. This change in the collective orientations led to greater receptivity and 
enhanced flows of credit from the banking sector to the rural poor. Thus, the 
'transforming structures' changed in a way to accommodate a new methodology for 
reaching the poor that has had cascading positive impacts. While the proliferation of 
microfinance has positive financial impacts at the individual and collective levels, it 
has also had negative impacts, such as increased vulnerability through group 
processes. 
Having looked at the three themes that influence the impact of microfinance in the 
previous three chapters, the next chapter restates and consolidates the conclusions 
from the research. It takes a broad livelihoods view of impact, discusses the barriers 
to greater impact, in terms of the orientations and values of different actors, and how 
these influence meanings and strategies with regard to money as a resource. 
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The purpose of this research was to understand microfinance impact from actors' own 
perspectives. The critical and interpretive research approach adopted a longitudinal 
case study methodology, in a semi-arid context, to explore how women use money 
and what meanings they assign to it given the different models through which it is 
delivered to them. 
The recent trajectories of different models and lessons learnt in 'development' work 
have brought varied actors to a point where each, for different reasons, converged 
towards microfinance as critical for poverty reduction (Joshi, 2003; Vyas, 2003). 
Microfinance was regarded as an improvement over traditional development banking, 
which had targeted the poor with subsidised credit, and proved ineffective (Zeller, 
2003a; Srinivasan, 2004). It combined various official poverty reduction schemes, 
which had not only proved costly, but also did not reach their target group (Karmakar, 
1999). Finally, it provided a way out of unsustainable and expensive donor funding, 
which had wanted to involve the poor as 'agents' rather than as 'targets' of 
development, and was keen on 'proving' its impacts (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; 
Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). Thus, at a time when the external environment no longer 
supported the 'welfare state' concept, microfinance provided a means by which actor 
agency would be restored, development investments would improve, and poverty 
impact demonstrated while delivery of financial services through women and their 
groups would enhance social capital and women's empowerment (Fernandez, 2006). 
This was the dominant policy model that led to unprecedented growth ofmicrofinance 
in India, as elsewhere since the mid 1980s (Lingam, 2006; Kalpana, 2005). 
The research questions of this thesis stated above emerged from the divergence 
between external and local perspectives about microfinance, as observed in a wide 
range of NGOs and women SHG members. Microfinance impact studies had tracked 
use of MFI loans, and their impacts at the household level. Further, positive impacts 
were emphasised in an environment which promoted neoliberal ideology and used 
'empowerment' discourse to justify the 'productive use' of women (Kalpana, 2005; 
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Rankin, 2006; Fernando, 2006a). The dominance of policy models was therefore 
evident in the context of microfinance (Townsend, 2003; Mosse, 2005). In order to 
deal with this, the research prioritised women's perspectives, and set out to discover 
what money means to women, as reflected in how they access, use and manage it, 
through a longitudinal study of ten women and their livelihoods, and the seven SHGs 
they had formed, located in a semi-arid regional context. The experiences of these 
women provided an understanding ofthe meanings assigned to money. 
The research highlights how women's agency or orientations and value base 
determine their strategies of money management and stewardship over other resources 
such as land, family members, and cattle, to improve their livelihoods. The 
conceptualisation of vulnerability that emerged from the fieldwork is discussed and 
the constitutive importance of language and meanings is analysed. This chapter 
reflects on the detailed findings and the conceptual learnings regarding women, and 
the impact of microfinance on their livelihoods, as well as the conduct of research 
itself. 
7.1 Effect of Livelihoods Context 
The research premised that the livelihoods context (ecological, economic, social and 
institutional) was an important factor in determining use and impact of credit, and 
thus studied these contextual factors. It explored how the availability, demand and 
impact of microfinance were related to the livelihoods context in which people reside. 
7.1.1 Ecological and Economic Constraints 
The ecological conditions of Koppal were compounded by loss of forest cover, 
ground water depletion, and increasing salinity of soils, which made agriculture risky 
and unprofitable. Irrigation has aggravated the problems of soil-salinity and ground 
water exploitation. An underdeveloped industrial sector, and lacks of other enterprise 
opportunities, resulted in low demand for commercial credit. Formal banking credit 
to SHGs was already limited and only one RRB had provided loans to SHGs outside 
of official subsidy. The current supply of credit did not meet the needs of those poor 
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households who had to migrate to ameliorate their indebtedness as Mosse et al (2004) 
also found. 
In Koppal, acute concern about household survival resulted in greater groundwater 
exploitation. Yet, reduced groundwater endangered the sustainability of local 
livelihoods in the long term. Thus, integrative strategies at the community level and 
collective problem solving efforts were needed. The official credit, which was 
targeted at households, did not address the ecological dimensions of semi-arid 
livelihoods. 
Other emerging research recognises that depressed rural markets limit the scope of 
microcredit as an income generating strategy (Wright, 2006). NGOs typically 
concentrate credit activities in those areas where the social and physical infrastructure 
is relatively well developed, and thus provide credit to better placed and better off 
groups compared with the poor located in interior and less developed areas 
(Fernandez, 2005; Fernando, 2006b). Conversely, those in remote areas were more 
reluctant to participate in credit programmes (EDA, 2006). While earlier microfinance 
impact studies do not consider the literature .that links agro ecological considerations 
with poverty (Jayaram and Srivastava, 2003), more recent literature makes a link 
between poverty, migration and indebtedness (Mosse, 2004), and this is developed 
here. 
The research found that credit directed at households may not solve the ecological 
problem but can exacerbate it, as the money is used for short-term solutions like 
borewells which increase soil-salinity. The vicious cycle of degradation of natural 
resources may only be reversed with different policies as well as natural resource 
management practices, suggesting a need for long-term subsidies and investments for 
regeneration of soil and water before substantial change in livelihoods can occur. 
Thus, the context-dependence of credit off-take is highlighted here, which contributes 
to the academic debate by indicating the limit of household-directed credit while 
raising the issue of community level solutions and funds to overcome ecological and 
market constraints. Though other research recognises the need for collaborative 
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approaches for ground water management (Ray and Bijarmia, 2006), both academic 
literature and development practice are yet to link the current credit methodologies 
with social relationships for alleviating contextual livelihoods constraints. 
It is therefore important to prioritise better returns from the asset base while raising 
skill profiles. The economic arguments for augmenting the physical, human, or 
natural capital of an area, and providing safety nets for the most vulnerable and poor, 
become relevant to creating sustainable livelihoods in these marginalised areas 
(Rosegrant and Hazell, 2000; Robinson, 2001; World Bank, 2001; Rutherford and 
Staehle, 2002; Sundaram and Tendulkar, 2003). 
7.1.2 Institutional Orientations and Values 
The potential impact of microfinance on livelihoods is mediated by the differing 
values and orientations of the actors concerned. Poverty was a qualification for 
accessing resources from government programmes (BPL cards). Other criteria 
included social exclusion: caste (SC/ST), age, widowhood, devadasi, and other 
disabilities. Actors could show 'poverty', or such eligibility as was needed, to access 
resources from external agents. However, it created more preference for, and 
dependence upon, external resources and accepting externally designed solutions, 
rather than individual responsibility. 
The administrative systems in Koppal, and the political actors involved (panchayat 
and legislative assembly leaders), were often either apathetic or corrupt. Although 
corruption was challenged by women's groups, both rent-seeking behaviour or 
'percentages' were viewed as part of the 'system' and accepted as such. Government 
officials and local leaders acted as intermediaries to distribute such 'benefits'. Many 
NGOs, too, identified such 'beneficiaries' and linked them with official schemes, 
while themselves imposing mediating charges, so that the poor were not equal 
partners in development. Government support was not seen as a legitimate right or 
entitlement of the poor (Sen, 1999), but as a 'benefit' which government 'provided'. 
Thus, the relationship that developed between the government and the poor was that 
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of 'giver' and 'receiver', or 'benefactor' and 'beneficiary', often in favour of the 
'benefactor'. 
Women and NGOs differed about what the NGO can and should do. Sampark valued 
'facilitation' and saw capacity development as important. Women agreed that the 
NGO had taught them how to save and manage in groups, but considered the financial 
linkages with banks and governments as more important, and complained that the 
NGO had not yet enabled them to access free government funds. This raised the 
question about the NGO's role itself. There were NGOs who complied with this 
'system', and channelled some 'benefits' to people while also appropriating some 
resources themselves. The dominant expectation from the NGO was to channel 
external resources into the village, and this shaped much discussion of what was 
'given', and how it was 'given' and 'received'. Thus, actor orientations were adapted 
to those of the larger administrative and political 'system', an important factor to be 
considered for any intervention strategy to improve the livelihoods of the poor. 
This pointed to an inherent weakness in the value base, whereby people did not move 
on from household to wider community based strategies of resource and property 
management. Administrative and political actors too did not consider the community 
but sought to increase their own earnings from the service delivery, and many local 
actors 'played safe' by following the 'system' of corruption rather than challenging it. 
In this way, only a few actors considered sustainability of the natural resource base 
important, while government efforts did not directly help poverty reduction. The 
value base of one set of actors was thus corruption oriented and they appropriated 
benefits originally meant for the poor. The strategies of the local population, on the 
other hand, were based on household survival and therefore not oriented towards 
those community solutions which could have been critical for achieving sustainable 
livelihoods. This is especially true given the prevailing conditions in this region, as 
depicted in Figure 7-1, using the AOP framework. 
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Figure 7-1: Values of Local and External Actors 
Apathy 
Corruption 
Inefficiency 
Value base not 
conducive to 
collaboration 
towards sustainable 
livelihoods or 
poverty reduction 
Depleting groundwater levels 
Saline soils 
Depleting common property 
resources 
Low agricultural productivity 
Few offfarm employment 
opportunities 
People work with 
household level 
livelihoods strategies 
Increased groundwater 
exploitation 
No community level 
coordination 
Low education 
High population 
Growing government 
presence 
Emerging literature about organisational learning and accountability emphasise the 
importance of integrating the value systems of NGOs, donors and state (Lewis and 
Madon, 2004), and how social learning processes and communicative action are 
needed for sustainable governance of natural resources (Rist et al, 2006). This 
research found such 'integration' difficult and highlights how an NGO has to choose 
between aligning with the larger structure to 'channel ' benefits to the poor, or play an 
activist ro le in challenging the structure itself. 
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7.1.3 SocioCultural Orientations 
This research found that the community was highly fragmented, with caste-based 
stratification, ostracisation practices, and orientations that marginalised the scheduled 
castes. Little change had occurred in Koppal, despite the existence of Dalit Sanghas 
and NGOs, and laws against untouchability. Though microfinance provided some 
economic support, wider social dignity was still denied to devadasi women, and to 
SCs in general. There were relatively few development interventions in Koppal that 
made a real difference to these social norms and practices. 
Zohir and Matin (2004) conceptualised wider social impacts such as changes in social 
relations and social organisations through conscientisation. This research found 
women stating that they now borrow less from the landlords individually, yet at the 
collective, community level, microfinance made little impact in caste discriminatory 
practices, with actors stating that they cannot break existing social relations because 
they are bound to landlords through economic dependence. 
Microfinance worked differently with SHGs, small collectives of women of 
homogeneous social composition. The concept of 'affinity' or 'neighbourhood' 
groups indicates a preference for selecting people with pre-existing relationships of 
trust used as a basis for building up financial linkages. Thus, microfinance 
programmes could even possibly deepen caste affiliations and reduce incentive from 
practitioners to ameliorate rural caste discrimination (Fernandez et al, 2000). Other 
research endorses the finding that government finds it easier to channel its benefits 
through caste based groups, which deepens caste divides in the name of "affinity", 
although there were cases of SHGs bridging caste-divisions through NGO initiatives 
(EDA, 2006). 
This research cautions that mainstreaming and treating devadasi women as village 
poor obscures the special issues that they face, (e.g. the specific isolation and 
deprivation of human rights) but having separate groups of scheduled castes, or 
devadasis can also isolate them, and thus deepen their existing social exclusion. The 
latter, however, is needed in order to improve access for SC women to state economic 
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support. Thus, strategies that mainstream socially excluded groups can also ignore 
them, while those that give special attention can further marginalise them. Emerging 
research recognises this tension. For instance, caste, marriage laws, practice of child 
marriage and literacy are all factors which determine women's autonomy and social 
participation (DANIDA, 2004; Sengupta et al, 2005), and that the balance between 
enabling women to access benefits, while still achieving greater solidarity can be 
difficult to achieve (Premchander and Mueller, 2006). 
This research finds that the expectation of impact on livelihoods, from a sector-
specific intervention like microfinance, has to be tempered with the understanding 
that significant impact requires more than microfinance alone, and other efforts are 
needed to make an impact on ecological and social constraints. Change in socio-
cultural orientations is essential before socially marginalised groups can attain 
sustainable livelihoods. 
The limits of microfinance in making wider impacts are evident elsewhere. In 
programmes in Peru, rather than create social structures based on unequal kinship and 
patron-client relationships, microcredit groups were instead ridden with internal 
competition, corruption by leaders, and reinforced existing hierarchies and 
inequalities (Bebbington and Gomez, 2006). Microfinance organisations did not 
intervene effectively, regarding group conflicts as non-intervention issue 'internal' to 
the groups. Claiming that financial sustainability was their primary objective, the 
NGOs lacked time, skills and systems for managing and resolving group conflicts, 
and also feared negative publicity. The result was to enforce rather than challenge 
power relationships in the wider community (Wright, 1996). Recent ethnographic 
research demonstrates that while microfinance could develop a collective social 
criticism of gender and class inequality, this hinges on whether such broad debates are 
promoted within microfinance programmes, which could institute a more normative 
agenda for development and facilitate more transformative interpretations of women's 
needs (Milgram, 2006). 
Fernando (2006b) takes examples from ASA and Grameen Bank to show how donors 
were apprehensive that emphasis on microcredit would be at the expense of 
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education, advocacy and structural reforms, and quotes Hashemi of Grameen Bank as 
warning that any shift of emphasis from conscientisation and social mobilisation to 
microlending would cause "demise of the conscientisation paradigm" (Fernando, 
2006b: 207). Researchers in the Indian context have also recognised that attention to 
social issues depended on the emphasis the promoter NGO attached to this issue 
(Reddy and Prakash, 2003). Thus, emerging literature also endorses the findings of 
this research that prioritisation of women's conscentisation and empowerment also 
needs to address social hierarchies and inequalities. 
7.2 Use of Money 
Microfinance impact literature has highlighted certain issues, but mostly addressed 
institutional concerns, without fully understanding the actors' perspective as 
recipients of money. This research shows that the use of money first depended upon 
the sources of that money, due to the values, like transparency, honesty, mutual 
support, on which the relationship between women and their creditors had been based. 
These relationships influenced the particular terms on which the money was available, 
and also determined the size of loans women could take, and the purposes for which 
they used them. It also finds that informal loans helped smooth consumption or 
enabled them to meet social or other urgent needs. However, there may be some 
exploitation inherent in availing of loans from some local informal sources. Most 
women used formal loans for the productive purposes expected by banks and 
MFis/NGOs. The poorest could not afford commercial credit, because they could not 
repay it on such terms (Sharan, 2000; Fernandez, 2003). 
7.2.1 Capacity of the Poorest Women to take Loans 
The livelihoods assets analysis (Chapter 4 and 5) demonstrated that women 
considered three types of assets equally important (land, labour and money), and that 
a surplus of human or physical capital was needed to take the new credit terms offered 
under commercial microfinance. Without surplus income, they could not take any 
credit that required uniform and regular repayments, especially for projects generating 
seasonal income streams. There were thus distortions in the credit market against the 
poor, who could only access credit from local informal sources at high rates of 
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interest, and at potentially exploitative terms, which made productive use of such 
credit difficult. Women took loans on these terms to meet their social needs (death 
ceremonies, marriages), and expenditures that they judged essential, rather than for 
income generating activities. Money for improving livelihoods was important, yet 
credit did not lead the poorest out of poverty, as they could not afford the credit 
offered. 
The inability of the poorest to participate in microfinance is now recognised in the 
emerging literature. One recent study found that drop out rates are highest for the 
very poor and lower among the wealthier women, and migration accounted for 40% 
of dropouts in Andhra Pradesh and Kamataka. Thirty percent of women who dropped 
out of SHGs studied in Orissa and Rajasthan stated their inability to save was the 
primary reason for doing so (EDA, 2006). From a livelihoods perspective, creation of 
SHGs could help women demand financial and non-financial services on terms better 
suited to their own priorities. Savings helped women convert small amounts of 
money into large lump sums, but the size of these savings was restricted by their 
limited ability to save. When women had full access to, and control over, their own 
savings, as did the participants here, they did not always abide by rules about 
regularity and use of savings, and could prioritise their own particular needs. 
Decision-making about use of money created social learning processes that were 
important in building up the social capital. This was also found in other research 
(Rajagopalan, 2004b; APMAS, 2005; Ranadive and Murthy, 2005). 
7.2.2 Impacts of Loans 
The impact of loans was analysed according to whether they were taken from 
informal or formal sources, and a third source identified separately was from 
women's own savings, or group loans. The impacts identified were both economic 
and social, and were also both positive and negative. This framework is depicted in 
the following diagram and is used for analysing microfinance impacts. 
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Figure 7-2: Framework for Impact Assessment 
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It was found that the use of the money borrowed depended on several factors. For 
instance, the risk was related to the source of money; women ' s own capital was less 
risky than loans taken from external sources, whether formal or informal. In this 
research, women took informal loans from neighbours, friends , and relatives, kaigada, 
to cope with short-term financial difficulties. Provision shops and agricultural inputs 
traders extended credit in kind. These facilitated household consumption and small 
investments in agriculture, leading to income generating impacts through agricultural 
produce or coolie wages. These transactions were based on socially embedded local 
ties, as they were from neighbours, friends and relatives, often from the same 
community, and therefore created positive reciprocity. However, they also tended to 
be limited by the capacity of providers, from the same economic strata as the 
borrowers themselves. Financial transactions were socially embedded, and existing 
social networks did not offer the financial capital to lift the poor out of poverty. 
Similarly, the seasonality of cash flows in a primarily agricultural economy made it 
difficult for the women to follow any uniform repayment schedule. Women ' s 
capacities to take loans and repay them were linked to the human capital of their 
family, which depended upon the number of family members and their respective 
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earning capacities ( i.e. education, skills, migration). Thus, capital base was a good 
indicator for formi ng the baseline and measuring the impact of credit against it. On 
the issue of purpose of loans, it was found that women needed consumption 
smoothening loans and took these from their groups on a regular basis . They were 
also tied into constraining labour arrangements with the landlord due to small loans 
taken for consumption or social needs. Finally, the costs· of credit and repayment 
terms were often too stringent to allow any margin on small , local and uncertain 
income generating activities. Therefore, the credit offered and the credit actually 
needed by poor women did not match, resulting in reduced credit usage from external 
sources. 
The impacts of formal loans are presented in Figure 7-3 below: 
Figure 7-3: Impact of Formal Loans 
Informal 
Formal \ = Impact (04 0 ~ Economic Social It-! 0 
~ 
~ 
v 
Access to (j Positive Income • ... • 
= generation 
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capacity 
• Employment 
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The po itive impacts of formal loans included income generation and asset creation. 
In cases where loans were given through honest and transparent processes, which was 
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often not the case, the poor gained mainstream benefits and continued access to 
reasonably priced credit through banks. Negative impacts ensued when subsidised 
loans were provided through corrupt government staff, bankers, technical personnel 
and local leaders. People risked loss of assets, which created a debt burden if they 
could not then repay the outstanding bank loans in their own names, with consequent 
loss of access to formal credit in future. By contrast, when banks provided 
unsubsidised and repeated loans to groups, they viewed SHGs as regular clients. In 
these cases women could start more than one enterprise that would really change their 
household income and employment of family members. 
Relationships and value bases shaped financial relationships. These relationships 
could be beneficial, neutral (transactional) or harmful (e.g. when they led to bonded 
labour, or to women becoming defaulters of bank loans) depending on the interaction 
between lenders and borrowers (i.e. whether it was rooted in feudal or agrarian 
relationships, whether money transactions were settled with labour or other goods 
given as security, and whether the relationship had a long or short term perspective). 
These women revealed a preference for a stable borrower-lender relationship, and this 
(namely the informal relationships with friends and relatives, landlords and local 
money lenders), they preserved for their most critical credit needs: household 
consumption and unavoidable social expenditure. Thus, in terms of an improved 
understanding of the meaning of money, this research endorses an integration of 
structural and cultural perspectives (Smelser, 1956; Zelizer, 1989; Baker and 
Jimerson, 1992). It highlights the importance of continuing relationships in 
determining the financial behaviour of both actors and their institutions. This is also 
highlighted in other studies where the terms and conditions attached to loans varied 
according to the relationship between borrowers and lenders, the urgency and amount 
needed, and availability of alternate sources (Fernando, 2006). 
In demonstrating the predominance of social relations, this research contributes to 
post development thinking which challenges the centrality of economic relations 
alone (Brigg, 2006). The research highlights the ideas which women themselves have 
about use of money and the management of groups, thus contrasting an 
anthropological view (women's own), with a more economic (external intervening 
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agencies') perspective about money. Taking a women's perspective gives different 
insights from the traditional supply side views of microfinance, and challenges the 
assumption that the answer to lack of capital lies in the supply of money through 
loans, which will then be converted into capital ultimately leading to poverty 
reduction. 
7.3 Group Dynamics 
This study explored the use of money by women, and how they managed own money 
as well as external borrowings. The social learning processes were studied to see how 
the women managed group dynamics to maintain both social and financial 
relationships. Thus, this study went beyond what impacts occur, to how these impacts 
ensue, and how women adapt SHGs to their own preferences and needs. 
7.3.1 Use and Management of Savings 
The amount and regularity of women's savings depended on the stability of their 
incomes. Those who regularly migrated attended group meetings only seasonally, or 
else tended to drop out of groups during migration, and had lower income and 
savings. Some groups stopped during periods when most women migrated but saved 
again when women returned. Loans from group savings were found to be more useful 
(by way of using money and earning profits) than savings deposits. The money 
management practices of groups were geared to the financial and social needs of their 
members (e.g. by allowing for flexible repayments and conflict resolution 
mechanisms), though sometimes negative impacts ensued, e.g. loss of money. 
Women's groups primarily learnt from their own immediate experiences, e.g. lending 
to non-members until they themselves lost money. Yet, they also learnt from each 
other, e.g. combining BPL members to take subsidised loans, and negotiating with 
banks and government greater freedom for selecting assets. Thus, social learning 
processes in SHGs had important potential empowering impacts. 
Leadership and money related conflicts were dealt with by pooling loans and savings 
and dissolving groups. When members or leaders had taken loans and not repaid, it 
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became more difficult for women, so they opted to dissolve the group altogether. 
Such dissolution was typically followed by an immediate reconstitution of the SHG 
and the exclusion of offending members. This method of handling money was a 
problem-solving mechanism that group members had developed themselves. The 
analysis of group processes revealed several means for resolving issues of leadership, 
distribution of savings and loans, and loan repayments, and demonstrated how an 
externally introduced organisational form, namely the 'self help group', was shaped 
and owned by women themselves. 
As most loans were delivered through SHGs, these groups gained significance as 
forums that create empowering impacts. Loans from both informal and formal 
sources could strengthen reciprocity and increase the creditworthiness of poor 
women. What the women themselves judged more valuable was how the groups help 
to create the 'savings habit' which increased capital accumulation. Another important 
factor was women's access and control over their own savings, which enabled them 
not only to apply the money for their own purposes (e.g. education and health) but 
also enabled the groups to retain the profits from the loans transactions to further 
augment financial capital. In this way the social capital (e.g. groups) enabled creation 
of financial capital, which led to a joint spiral in both. It was therefore not only 
money per se, but also group processes, which provided the dynamic forces for this 
spiral. For instance when leaders were not directly accountable, savings. were 
distributed and groups reformed. Thus, there was depletion in both financial as well 
as social capital; which is also cautioned by other empirical studies (Montgomery, 
1996; APMAS, 2001; 2003; 2005). 
SHGs were new forums introduced by external agencies, e.g. microfinance delivery 
organisations. The latter establish SHGs to fulfil their own agenda for 'cost effective 
delivery' of microfinance services (Weber, 2004; Rankin, 2006). External agencies 
would expect SHGs to take a joint liability for credit, meaning that if one member 
cannot pay, others take the responsibility instead (Stiglitz, 1990; Jain, 1996; Seibel, 
2000). This research found that SHGs in fact did not perform this role, and that if one 
woman was unable to pay, the others stopped repaying as well. 
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Women rated the savings developed through SHGs as having the greatest impact. 
The flexibility of practices relating to savings, and loan repayments from savings was 
able to accommodate specific needs and objectives of members of each group, as 
found by Rajagopalan (2004a). The meaning women thus assigned to money was 
different depending on whether they considered it their 'own' or 'external', and thus 
their loan sizes, uses, costs, and repayment practices varied according to the 
relationship with the lender. The process of pooling of savings in a group and rotating 
these as loans provided an opportunity for the women to create and use their own 
capital. This reduced dependence on external sources, whether formal or informal, 
and therefore 'own saving' was the single most preferred source of loans. 
Research credited women's groups with important empowerment impacts (Hashemi 
et al, 1996) including a greater sense of community, trust and reliance on the group 
during times of crisis, sharing of valuable social and market information, and adopting 
more positive social practices (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). The idea is further 
extended to conceptualise a change in power relations with higher authorities, brought 
about through cooperation, strength in numbers, confidence building, and 
coordinating to create change (Keister, 2000b). SHGs for microfinance delivery, 
based on networks beyond family and kinship groups, are considered to have weak, 
horizontal ties, with benefits in terms of expanding social and information networks, 
that enhance social capital (Putnam, 1993; Granovetter, 1994). These are considered 
to provide greater mobility and greater emotional and advisory support from group 
members for resolving household disputes, and reduced risks for individual and 
community members (Peredo and Chrisman, 2006). 
Other emerging literature now recognises the external/internal divide in people's 
minds (earlier categorised as 'hot' or 'cold' money) by how women prioritise 
repayment of 'external' over 'internal' loans (Reddy and Prakash, 2003). It also 
emphasises the role of savings in times of distress, as social insurance and for 
increased creditworthiness, leverage for external funds, and in earning interest 
(Rajagopalan, 2004a). Fernando (2006b) also shows different ways in which women 
lose access and control, over not only their own savings but also household assets and 
expenditures when they take 'external' loans. Other longitudinal case study research 
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also shows that many women in Bolivia were able to pay loans only by reducing 
household consumption, that social and structural factors affect use of money, and 
that impact assessment must shift focus from outcomes at the institutional level to 
those at the household level (Brett, 2006). Such research confirms the finding of this 
research about the meaning and association of money as 'own' or 'external' and the 
relationships between women, NGOs and women's SHGs. SHGs in this research 
appeared as organisations which women began to owh through processes of managing 
money and negotiating their way through disputes to arrive at more cohesive groups 
with better social and financial relationships. 
This became possible through a microfinance model that did not push external credit 
and a facilitator-NGO that sought to give women a choice -or a menu to choose from 
~ rather than offer only commercial credit. Where NGO interests did not compete 
with those of SHGs, there was a low need for control, allowing it to accept women's 
preferences. Other NGOs in India have adopted a similar strategy (PRADAN, 2006; 
Myrada, 2006). Women accepted some guidance from the NGO, too, when they 
stopped giving loans to non-members, or brought down their interest rates to enable 
poor members to take credit. However, divergent thinking on all issues was not 
resolved. The NGO upheld its strategy of non-corruption, while women continued to 
expect and demand higher flows of official 'benefits' to themselves. 
As more realise the potential conflict between the path followed by MFis under the 
influence of the neoliberal model and the need to achieve development goals like 
poverty reduction (Shylendra, 2006), further research is needed on the comparative 
impact of different models of microfinance delivery (UNOPS, 2002). This research 
highlights aspects of group dynamics which are not fully disclosed and also illustrates 
what money and its management means to women, in terms of the interplay of social 
and financial relationships in creating or resolving group conflicts. These are 
important contributions to existing knowledge in the field. Groups have potential for 
members to take collective action to address their mutual concerns, with greater social 
impact. It takes time, a protected space, and investment in capacity building for poor 
women's economic organisations to grow. This is endorsed by other research (IF Ab, 
2001; Rajagopalan, 2005; Guerin, 2006). 
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7.3.2 Women's Agency and Institutional Forms 
Women's own life stories suggested more active self-development. Women's agency, 
at individual and collective level, can enable them to negotiate larger spaces for 
action, and reduce the constraints they face. This research found intra-household 
gender inequities could be overcome to some extent through microfinance, where it 
led to increased self-esteem and confidence. Women participants were empowered to 
take decisive actions in their individual lives, like making choices of partners even in 
constrained situations, and taking decisions regarding family planning. However, 
they continue to bear the economic burden, and remain emotionally dependent on 
their parents, partners, and the community in general. Women's experiences, 
particularly those of the devadasis, were often traumatic from childhood. Social and 
gender inequities have resulted in debilitating practices like the devadasi system, with 
these women accepting their situation as 'secondary' to the partners' wives, or the 
mother's inability to get the widowed daughter married. This research found 
negligible change in social norms and attitudes, indicating low potential impact of 
microfinance on socio-cultural factors. The negative influence of gender on self-
esteem in Koppal is also documented elsewhere (George et al, 2005). However, this 
needs to be tempered by the finding that women who were devadasis completely 
stopped the practice in all of the 120 groups promoted by Sampark. 
Women's empowerment, in terms of more equitable relationships, can be aided by 
social learning processes in groups that enhance social capital. This was evident by 
how women managed groups, money, conflicts, and gave meaning to SHGs other 
than the one which was assjgned externally, namely that of 'joint liability for external 
loans'. Changing relations among actor groups (SHGs, banks, government, NGOs), 
and greater equity in these relationships, may be an important indicator of potential 
women's empowerment. Empowerment is expected to result from 'bonding' social 
capital, which arises from members' solidarity; 'bridging' social capital, which results 
from working on common agendas like enterprises; and 'linking' social capital which 
involves forging relationships with external institutions like banks, government and 
panchayats (Woolcock, 2000). The issue of how women's political empowerment 
demands more than just dealing with poverty reduction has also been debated 
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(Mayoux, 2001). The implication is that women's strategic needs may be better 
addressed by creating women-controlled organisations on the foundation of credit 
rather than just creation of more credit delivery organisations per se. 
The instrumentalisation and discipling of women and their households through 
microcredit can result in less freedom and autonomy for poor women (Lingam, 2006). 
Thus,-microcredit programmes frame women's empowerment "within the ideological 
and institutional parameters of capitalism" (Fernando, 2006b: 227-229). Special 
importance is placed on dalit women's political empowerment (Waghmore, 2005). In 
the microfinance models studied here, women could access their savings, and their 
experiences need to be supplemented with those of other microfinance models. There 
are, however, few studies which compare empowerment impacts across models, 
especially where women control and manage their sa~ings compared with those who 
do not. 
Discussions in the SHGs, their cluster associations, and Sam park staff all showed that 
a pre-determined structure of women's organisations, comprising two or three levels, 
could be inappropriate. In the specific case of Koppal, there was little standardisation 
of money management practices, and low credit absorption capacity, and women did 
not see the need or use of multi-level structures of credit organisations. Social 
cohesion and money management practices of SHGs were difficult to establish, so 
they considered the task of building each new tier of organisations problematic. They 
also believed that the administrative costs were high, and the corresponding risk and 
profit sharing low, and so did not want to have more than two tiers, comprising of just 
SHGs and their cluster associations. 
It is claimed that SHGs are too small to be financially sustainable and well-managed 
organisations. Some argue that women must have more access to assets and 
management and control over their own financial institutions in order to create 
empowering impacts, both financial and social (Bhatt, 2005). Challenging the view 
that NGOs and MFis must be prioritised over women's own cooperative institutions, 
Rajagopalan (2004b: 3-4) asks: 
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"In whose interest is it to continue to project the savings of rural women as 
"micro"? In whose interest is to continue to ensure that the savings do not get paid 
an interest? That the primary agency in which savings are being made, is kept 
small, and informal in nature? SHGs, small as they are, cannot offer women long-
term savings services. All that they can offer is to try and use the savings as 
collateral. It will be unforgivable, if we were to aim at women accessing the 
services of external agents, if this were at the cost of them building strong, inter-
generational institutions of their own - and if our efforts contributed to further 
flight of capital from their areas." 
There can be latent competition between those who manage federations and women 
members and leaders, with the former having a vested interest (continuity of their 
jobs) in not building capacities of women (Rajagopalan, 2005) and in some cases 
managers consider capacity building tasks as competing with the demands of their 
projects (Mosse, 2005). This endorses the finding that NGOs/MFI who seek to have 
financially sustainable microfinance operations may compete with the financial 
interests ofwomen and their SHGs. 
7.4 Concepts and Meanings of Poverty and Money 
The research begins with a consideration ofthe various conceptualisations of poverty, 
regarding literature concerning the overlap between social and economic 
categorisations - lower castes having greater representation among the economically 
weak sections. Economic thought also recognises the regional nature of poverty, with 
greater proportion of the poor living in semi-arid regions. Similarly, the gendered 
nature of poverty has been well documented. Here all the four categorisations were 
used to select poor women in a semi-arid region. 
7.4.1 Revisiting Vulnerability and Poverty 
In the livelihoods analysed here, there were vulnerabilities arising out of poverty and 
the introduction of the new forum, namely SHGs. 
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The first type of vulnerability stemmed from economic deprivation, gender, caste, and 
social categorisation (e.g. devadasi). This vulnerability was sustained by the apathy 
of institutional structures - banks, social and religious institutions, and the 
government - further endorsed by recent research in Koppal district (George et al, 
2005). The experience of being poor per se was not necessarily so stigmatising to the 
very poorest, especially the devadasis, who lived among others who were in the same 
situation, and whose status was not determined by material aspects of poverty alone, 
but by other parameters as well. For instance, Lakshmavva did not see poverty as a 
factor determining her status or vulnerability, but instead she resented her inability to 
be a 'wife'. She saw her 'powerlessness' in the social and gender rather than the 
economic sphere, assigning a different meaning to powerlessness and vulnerability 
than that considered in most microfinance impact studies, which take economic 
factors into consideration. Poverty here was closely associated with vulnerability, 
which has an element of 'powerlessness', and multi-dimensional, including 
ecological, economic, social, and gender dimensions, as also elaborated by Sen 
(1999). Other emerging research has also recognised that the poor experience 
multiple aspects of poverty (Narayan et al, 2000; Kabeer, 2005). Poverty and 
vulnerability were found to be related to asset levels, with human capital (in terms of 
the number of people in the household, literacy and skills) important to the asset base 
and credit-taking ability. This finding endorses other research which links literacy, 
education and skills with occupation, wages and poverty (Sundaram, 2001; Dreze and 
Sen, 2002). The potential for poor agro-ecological regions for greater reductions of 
poverty has increased attention to its regional dimensions (Jayaram and Srivastava, 
2003). The continued prevalence of caste-based prejudices, and the human rights 
violation camouflaged in poverty is highlighted in Dalit literature (Narula and 
Mac wan, 2001 ). Exclusive reliance on money to define poverty lines has been 
criticised as narrow, with the need to include nutritional levels and human capabilities 
(Pogge and Reddy, 2006) and other fundamental human needs like drinking water, 
shelter, shelter, sanitation and the cost of energy as well (Guruswamy and Abraham, 
2006). Thus, emerging research endorses the conceptualisation of poverty in this 
research as multidimensional and emphasises the link between gender, social, 
economic and spatial categorisations as determinants of asset holding of households, 
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their access to public resources, and the consequent impact on credit relationships that 
women are able to make. 
The second type of vulnerability, ansmg from the introduction of group-based 
microfinance, was related to the mechanism of collective savings, either in SHGs or 
with the NGO/MFI concerned. SHGs are a new forum, introduced in traditional 
settings, and carry a mix of external and local characteristics. Financial and 
managerial tasks are introduced by the microfinance interventions, and the 
effectiveness of these depends on the capacity building of the intervening agencies, 
but may prove difficult due to women's low literacy and education levels. Leadership 
quality and processes, influenced by both local and external factors, also create 
vulnerability, especially as pooling and common management of funds is a new 
activity that risks women's sparse savings. Other research, both in Bangladesh 
(Fernando, 2006b) and India (APMAS, 2006) acknowledges that women's group 
leaders can appropriate benefits. Concerns have also been raised that women lose 
leadership space in order to be 'good borrowers', along with opportunities to build 
personal and joint assets and to manage organisations, thereby rendering them more 
vulnerable to a larger 'loan adjustment game' (Rajagopalan, 2005; Bhatt, 2005). 
7 .4.2 Is Micro finance "New Money"? 
Money transactions in a traditional rural setting were largely individual, with different 
meanings assigned to money according to socio-economic relationships to the lender. 
The introduction of SHGs created new possibilities for women to join together, form 
new relationships between themselves, with banks and the government, and the NGO 
facilitating the group formation. These groups were embedded in village social 
structures, yet still had the potential to challenge existing norms and thus change 
relationships. These relationships were: 
i) Towards one another, as they met regularly and conducted informal 
financial transactions that took on a semi-formal form through NGO 
monitoring and official recognition; 
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ii) Towards village social structures, as they begin to work for better school 
education, health or transport services, closing of liquor shops; and 
iii) Towards the informal and formal sources of money, in terms of erosion of 
earlier and formation of new relationships. 
These are arenas where 'new monies' are being created. These findings validate 
Zelizer's (1989) view that, individuals, institutional and social aspects influence the 
meaning of money, and also extends it to postulate that new structures and new 
relationships change meanings of money. The use of such new money, e.g. in 
creating social capital, creates possibilities for changing institutional structures, by 
making them more responsive, holding them more accountable, and improving their 
attitudes towards the poor. 
7 .4.3 Language and Meanings 
Reflection on the divergence between external and local perspectives rmses the 
question of which issues are relevant to debates (Brigg, 2006). For instance, the 
tension between outreach to the poor and sustainability of the MFI were well enough 
recognised (Berenbach and Churchill, 1997; McGuire et al, 1998; Christen, 2001; 
Mahajan, 2005). However, official project documents still assumed that it was 
possible to achieve such divergent objectives (CARE, 1997; 1999). This Jack of 
recognition undermines the nature of the conflict (Sampark, 2003). It overlooks the 
different processes inherent in achieving the two objectives, of which one was closer 
to the interests of poor people (outreach), while the other reflected the aim of donors 
in the context of time bound projects (institutional sustainability). Thus, discourse 
and presentation can obscure problems of practice and also the values of development 
(Mosse, 2005). The language of 'empowerment' has arguably been appropriated by 
those who promote the neoliberal model and use microfinance to meet ends of capital 
expansion (Weber, 2004; Rankin, 2006; Lingam, 2006), and the concept and language 
of money has also been gender biased (De Geode, 2005). 
Discourse represents the meanings we convey, and meanings of words can differ 
across time and cultures (Wilber, 2000). The local and external perspectives of 
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practices in money management can differ quite significantly, and are indicative of 
what meanings are attached to these different terms by local women as against 
meanings attached by external development agencies. These differences are 
summarised in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1: Financial and Women's Perspectives 
Financial Perspective Attributed Characteristics Women's 
Perspective 
' Idle' funds Cash retained with groups 'Emergency' funds 
'Consumption' Expenses on health, education 'Investment' 
'Subsidies' Subsidised credit 'Investment' in asset creation 
'Credit ' to be recovered Loans 'Debt' to be repaid 
'Joint liability' groups Groups 'Savings and credit' groups 
Sustainability ofMFis Sustainability ofMF services Sustainability ofSHGs 
Distinction between Money and Credit 
The Koppal women make a distinction between money and credit. Credit (sa/a), or 
external borrowing, is to be repaid . However, loans from own savings are seen as 
'our money' (namma duddu) and thus there is greater freedom in repayment. Further, 
the understanding of 'own' has both an individual and collective dimension 
(Fernandez, 1994). To the extent to which any individual woman collected savings in 
the group, she considered it as her ' personal' money and deemed it her right to not 
repay a loan she took from the group, up to the full extent of her individual saving. 
As women pool in their savings, extend loans, repay into the group, and the pool 
continues to grow through savings and accumulated interest, the relationship to this 
accumulated amount grows to be as a 'collective' sum. When subsidised official 
loans involved 'commissions' (luncha) , women did not consider it sa/a, as the 
' promise to pay' had been undermined by bribes or other loan conditionalities. This 
highlights that not all money is credit, as conceptualised by Ingham (2006), who 
considered all money as constituted by credit and debit re lations, having a promise to 
repay. Here women differentiate between monies received in many ways. 
Emerging research in other countries also shows how "debt is permeated with 
spiritual, moral and legal meaning" (Ferraro, 2004: 77), and also that this can have 
negative consequences at the household level (Brett, 2006). 
321 
--------------------'C~h.:.:a:.ocp-=-te:..::r_7'-':_Conclusions and Reflections 
Cash Retained with Groups 
Money kept as cash balance in groups, in excess of that rotated as savings, is now 
termed 'idle funds' in microfinance practice (CARE, 2000), in a less preferred 
condition than when in 'rotation' and earning interest. From the women's 
perspective, however, excess cash balance was referred to as 'rashi' (wealth), 
indicating the significance of that money as a reservoir to be drawn when needed. 
Classical economics recognises the liquidity function of savings (Robinson, 2001 ). 
However, the financial perspective in current microfinance practice has the goal of 
financial sustainability of the NGO/MFI and marginalised the preferences of women, 
wherever it privileges the goal of institutional sustainability over that of 
empowerment of women, and provides the rationale for MFis to access and control 
'idle' funds of women for their 'better and more effective rotation'. 
Expenditure on Health and Education 
Investments in health and education continue to be seen as 'consumptive' rather than 
'productive' loans, as they may not generate immediate cash flows from which to 
repay the loan. From the women's point of view, such expenses are not consumption 
but investment. This was first recognised in literature by Hulme and Mosley (1996), 
. 
but the relevant financial instruments have only recently been changed (Premchander 
and Prameela, 2006). 
Subsidised Credit 
Another anomaly concerns 'subsidised credit'. The argument for not providing 
'subsidies' has been justified on the assumption that they create market distortion 
(Yaron, 1992; Mahajan et al, 1998). However, just as 'debt' and 'credit' can be 
considered as two sides of the same coin, so can 'subsidy' be considered the converse 
of 'investment'. An initial input in the interest of long-term independence is often 
seen as 'investment' (Nissanke, 2002; Hendricks, 2002). This is just as valid in the 
case of poor households, who need investments in asset creation to become 
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financially sustainable (Dunford, 1998). The same subsidy that is not considered 
justified for the poor is justified for the MFI, using the rationale of long-term MFI 
sustainability (CGAP, 2002). Thus, the same argument that enables donors to stop 
'subsidising' the poor also enables them to shift the subsidy to delivery organisations. 
Donors have moved to 'investing' in intermediary organisations rather than investing 
in the 'poor' (Weber, 2004). 
Groups 
The term SHG implies self-help, but practitioners may use groups only for savings 
and credit activities, as evidenced by lack of capacity building support to SHGs. With 
such changes in the groups' role there has been no corresponding change in discourse, 
thus creating a discrepancy between espoused terminology and other practice. This 
has been highlighted in recent research, which emphasises that external agencies 
regard women as 'recipients' of inputs such as group formation, credit, and training. 
They ignore the agency of poor women and do not bring their potential to perceive 
meanings and act according to own motivations into programme planning and 
delivery (Premchander and Prameela, 2006). 
Sustainability of Microfinance Services 
Most discussion on the concept of sustainability inherently incorporates a normative 
understanding of what it is. A typical supply-driven perspective assumes that the 
sustainability of financial services is related to the financial sustainability of the 
microfinance delivery institution (Mahajan et al, 1998; Sinha, 2000). By contrast, this 
research accorded priority to sustainable management of resources by local actors. 
Women greatly valued their collective ability to augment their own resources, to 
leverage external resources (banks), and to manage their own finances. Therefore, 
even though the sustainability of microfinance services has been defined as the 
continued provision of financial services (Varon, 1992; Otero and Rhyne, 1994), the 
meaning of sustainability for the external and local actors differs. These meanings 
have different implications for the design and implementation of microfinance 
programmes. For instance, when supply of credit through sustainable MFis is 
323 
____ Chapter 7: C()Eclusions and Reflections 
prioritised, the programme would invest in the capacity building of MFis, whereas 
when women's empowerment through managing own savings and loans is prioritised, 
programmes would invest in the capacity building of women and their organisation 
(Rajagopalan, 2004b; 2005). Moss (2005) also offers evidence that capacity building 
of local institutions required attention and resources that were considered to distract 
from project delivery and its targets. 
Thus, 'languaging' can draw attention away from what is important to women, by 
assuming that what is important to local actors and to external organisations is one 
and the same. Women were not concerned with institutional/ financial sustainability; 
their immediate concern was with having credit for their priorities, on reasonable 
terms. The discourse of external agencies, and claims about 'microcredit empowers 
women', both obscure the differences between women and external priorities. They 
obscure two things: one, that poor women opt not to take, because they are not able to 
afford, high cost credit; and that external and women's own money management 
practices are directed at different objectives. It points to the appropriation of the 
language of 'gender equity' and 'empowerment' to further the objectives of external 
intervening agencies, which has also been validated by emerging research (Weber, 
2004; Fernando, 2006; Rankin, 2006; Brigg, 2006). 
The resolution of such issues can only be done on the basis of further research on how 
much donors invest in building sustainable MFis versus building women-owned 
financial institutions. 
7.4.4 Official/ Unofficial Blind Spots 
The neglect of the government is evident in many instances such as: ignoring of 
devadasis, prevalence of child marriages, not recognising BPL families because the 
couple were under-age as per law, and not recognising the extent of school-drop-outs, 
also evidenced in the current research in Koppal (George et al, 2005). These are all 
examples/processes that highlight the lacuna that exists between the process of policy 
formulation and grassroots realities. 
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The different meanings assigned to terms can be problematic. For instance, the word 
'credit' has positive connotations, in terms of enabling investment, yet women assign 
to it a binding connotation of 'debt', or a commitment to repay. Ignoring the 
responsibility that microcredit enjoins upon women to repay is at the risk of not 
understanding that what external agencies call 'credit' also carries the meaning 'debt' 
for women. This phenomenon has recently been highlighted in the increased number 
of farmer suicides in the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka due to high 
indebtedness to MFis (Shylendra, 2006). 
National credit policies, which place SHGs in the informal sector, do not bring them 
under any banking regulations, and have not recognised the financial risks that are 
inherent in these new forms of association, especially for poor women. The banking 
sector and the government have formally recognised these as channels of credit, and 
permitted them to have informal savings. However the proliferation of unregulated 
SHGs also puts poor women's savings at risk, calling for further guidelines and 
measures (Premchander and Prameela, 2006). 
In the Indian context, both the subsidised credit and the commercial microfinance 
models relegated the poor to the margins by making credit too costly for them. 
However, the emergence of the third model of SHG-Bank linkage offered a way out 
by linking traditional development banking with new market orientation. It allowed 
women's SHGs to retain their own savings while banks extended credit. This 
scenario is very different from Bangladesh, for instance, where MFis take and control 
women's savings. Here different models of credit delivery suggest that MFls cannot 
take away women's deposits unless authorised by banking laws to do so. This has 
created the potential for further transformation and change among all the actors 
involved: banks, government, NGOs, and community. 
A new forum, through which financial services are delivered, namely the SHG, has 
enabled solidarity among the disadvantaged. Group based finance appears as a 
strategy that could deepen or bridge financial and structural inequities (e.g. by making 
caste based groups) and much depends on the actual interventions themselves. 
However, minimalist credit is based on the neoclassical model, and therein lies the 
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contradiction: how can a forum that is created to exploit the existing social and power 
relations, work to change those structures? Being based on existing social hierarchies 
and divisions, group-based minimalist microfinance rewards those with higher asset 
levels, more than the poorest, as the former have larger credit taking capacities. 
7.5 Final Reflections 
The empirical validity of the divergent perspectives of interventionists and local 
people has lately been endorsed by similar studies in different parts of the world 
among practitioners and researchers (Dunford, 1998; Hendricks, 2002; Nissanke 
2002; Fernando, 2006; Guerin, 2006). This research contributes to this debate 
through an in-depth analysis of values of women and their SHGs into the discourse, 
and meanings of money and its different uses. Its major contribution lies in providing 
insights into group dynamics and how groups resolve conflicts and assign different 
meanings to different 'monies'. It bridges the gap between the understanding of 
women's SHGs (Wilson, 2004; Fernandez, 2005; EDA, 2006) and the understanding 
of the current context of group-based microfinance delivery. 
7.5.1 Impact Assessment Frameworks and Methodologies 
The predominance of supply-oriented studies of impact of microfinance has led to an 
overemphasised concern with causal relationships, and continued engagement with 
problems of fungibility and attribution. Addressing these problems is difficult using 
quantitative techniques (Cohen and Gaile, 1997; Sebstad and Chen, 1996). There is a 
need to supplement the causal paradigm with the relational paradigm, and study 
microfinance with models that explain relationships across structures, organisations, 
households and individuals. This research suggests a need to move towards more 
people/women oriented impact assessment methodologies, with greater attention to 
their livelihoods needs, and the types of impact they look for and value. Indicators 
chosen should be relevant for and articulated by them. The research methods which 
then become relevant are both qualitative and quantitative. Longitudinal studies and 
life histories are of particular benefit, as these provide further insights into women's 
lives a:nd better livelihood choices. Mapping of local contextual factors is needed to 
study impact of forces changing in the external environment to enable a judgement of 
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cause-effect relationships and processes of the intervention. Yet, attribution of 
impact to different forces remains problematic. Finally, even if impact of a 
specialised service like microfinance is to be mapped, the unique methodology 
followed in this research shows that more holistic studies are needed, and they should 
take a livelihoods perspective rather than a orthodox financial or organisation 
management perspective. In viewing how meaning of money derives from and how 
its use reproduces or changes identities, values and social relations at local and 
national scale, the research contributes to a better formulation of money as a potential 
change agent. 
7 .5.2 Livelihoods Frameworks 
Multiple research frameworks group livelihoods aspects in different ways to provide 
insights, and, given their socio-cultural and political embeddedness, lend prominence 
to different analytical levels. In this research, these frameworks helped to analyse 
concerns ofthe marginalised, especially women, and to assess external and household 
level factors that affect both supply and demand for money, and determine how 
money is situated in a specific economic, ecological, institutional and socio-cultural 
context. Policies are formed at the macro level, but the process unfolds differently in 
each specific context, highlighting context-dependent meanings of money. Using the 
three frameworks led towards a livelihoods assessment approach for analysing 
conflicts arising from interface of different life worlds. The questions that arose relate 
to who will decide which perspective will prevail, and whether only local actors are 
responsible for their voices to be heard, or should all development actors ensure that 
the former have representation and voice (Freidman, 1992; Long and Long, 1992). 
The approach called for flexibility, autonomy, self-determination and control of the 
poor, especially women, over the financial system designed for them. 
7 .5.3 Gender Sensitive Research Methodology 
Gender sensitivity is seen in its adherence and commitment to gender equality, as 
indicated in Figure 7•4. It leads to different political stand points about the use of 
development projects as 'interventions' whereby the 'intervening' agents seek to 
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change the people and context ' intervened ' upon. Gender sensitisation is a process of 
partnership and learning created through interactive processes that change both the 
' intervener' and the ' intervened ' . Such political agendas need to be recognised and 
brought into the discourse of both research and practice. This must be done while still 
dealing with strained li~elihood situations, such as poverty, ill health, low education 
and awareness, caste status, and domestic violence. Thus, the need for creating 
research processes wherein there is space for women ' s voices to be heard was given 
priority here, as is now also emphasised by other research (Premchander and Mueller, 
2006). 
Figure 7-4: Gender Sensitive Research to Practice 
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The participation of women in research was constrained by their acute lack of time, 
which was taken up by vital life maintenance tasks (Premchander and Menon, 2006). 
If research is a learning process these women rarely have the time to participate in it. 
The question is whether, given this context, research must insist on women's 
participation, or continue to talk to men as the representatives of their households. 
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Gender sensitivity in research is a value, not a matter of convenience and practicality. 
If the researcher asks for women's time, and this is important to the quality and 
validity of its results, the responsibility arising from it is to provide a reasonable 
return for their time. The recommendation here is that time and commitment needs to 
be made to looking for appropriate practical contributions of every research that uses 
the time and knowledge of poor women. 
7 .5.4 Further Research 
This research was undertaken in the context of one model of microfinance delivery, 
i.e. with the NGO as a 'facilitator', not a 'provider', of loans. The comparative 
impact of different models of microfinance delivery merits study to understand their 
differential impacts. 
There is a need to understand better the nature of acute poverty, and what it means to 
those who experience it. Currently, this issue is much debated, and includes issues of 
rights, entitlements and of experiencing development as a process that frees the poor 
from several constraints and gives them rights as citizens (Sen, 1999; Narayan et al, 
2000; Kabeer, 2005). However, measurements of poverty by most development 
agencies continue to be money related (Douglas and Ney, 1998; Guruswamy and 
Abraham, 2006; Pogge and Reddy, 2006). Further research is also needed on local 
moneylender relationships, to understand the role of rural credit suppliers, namely the 
inputs-trader, the provision shop, the landlord and the pawnbroker. There are 
significant differences among these relationships and a differentiated understanding, 
incorporating both money and non money exchanges, can better inform the current 
thinking and planning of micro finance supply initiatives. Other relevant questions are 
regarding the differences between moneylenders and commercial microfinance. The 
high interest rates charged by commercial microfinance are often viewed as necessary 
for coverage of risks on non-repayment; moneylender practices of high interest rates 
are based on the same logic. Moneylenders foreclose on securities in case of non-
repayment, while MFis call on joint liability of groups to fulfil the condition of full 
repayment. Further research is needed to see the ground level impact of such 
practices imposed by MFis, and emerging research already highlights collusion 
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between NGOs and money lenders to the detriment of the poor (Rankin, 2006; 
Fernando, 2006; Brett, 2006). 
This research, using an actor-oriented approach, highlighted several macro level 
issues related to power structures and institutional interactions in the field of 
microfinance. These issues would lend themselves to understanding the emergence 
and transformation of financial relations in terms of power, competition and 
institutional forces (Keister, 2002; Biggart and Delbridge, 2004). This research also 
underscores the need to understand money through semiotics, and using the discipline 
of linguistics in the exploration ofthe meaning and use ofmoney. 
There is also a need for more in-depth research into the nature of civil society 
analysed in terms of groups and networks, and their values, livelihoods strategies, and 
negotiation and learning processes. It identifies a need for further research into 
situations of environmental degradation, which will illuminate the potential for 
collective and collaborative action towards enhancing sustainability. The need for 
studying social orientations is paramount as this has the potential to break the 
strongest barrier to equality and human rights, that of inner orientations and beliefs of 
people. Bhuiyan et al (2005) endorse this direction when they call for examining 
theoretical issues about why the process of 'norrmalisation' is not more challenged or 
dismantled. Rist et al (2006) also indicate the need for case studies to explore 
barriers and potential for communicative action. 
The progression of high input agriculture into low returns, degradation of soils, 
depletion of groundwater, and the conflicting perspectives between livelihoods 
sustainability at the household level and sustainability of natural resources at the 
community level, all need to be tracked over long periods of time. 
7.6 Relationships and Benefits for Women 
The researcher here made a long-term commitment to development, and also had the 
intention to find ways of providing practical benefits to the local community f~om the 
research process. The relationships and benefits arising to the researcher, women 
participants and the local community are now discussed. 
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During the research partnership, women became more emotionally attached to the 
process of sharing as well as to the researcher, and reportedly missed the 'friendly 
meetings' when the frequency of interaction reduced after data the collection phase. 
The researcher consciously found the time to continue meeting the research 
participants, despite other work engagements. These processes of sharing emotions 
and joint learning from life stories of women led to building relationships between the 
researchers and the women, and motivated both to take more positive action to 
improve their own and other women's lives. These relationships and common values 
provide a foundation for freedom and enabling of women's agency. One striking 
result of this research was a realisation how women could benefit from consolidated 
learning from their own past experiences and discussion of future aspirations. It was 
evident that despite being marginalised economically, socially, culturally, and through 
religion, none had dedicated their own daughters as devadasis. Their life stories 
included courageous decisions at different stages of their lives, whether it relates to 
choice of partners, birth control measures, or taking financial risks. The incidents in 
their lives reinforce a belief in the capacity of poor women to bring positive changes 
not only in their own lives, but also in those of others in their community. 
Researchers and development agents need to take more serious cognisance of the 
agency of women and their potential for courageous and collective action. 
The women claimed that they had benefited in several ways from participating in the 
research. The charts and diaries collected stayed with the women; the researcher only 
copied such information. Findings were not only shared in workshops, but 
spreadsheets were brought back and openly discussed. This called for a reciprocal 
responsibility to ensure tangible benefits to the women research participants, which 
was later fulfilled by obtaining grants for education of the poorest children, a credit 
fund for education, local organisation building and linkages for official credit for 
sustainable management of land and water resources. 
Researchers cannot escape from ethics even when applying a supposedly value free 
research method. Whether at the moment of setting the research issue, or when 
dealing with participant interactions, certain ethical choices are always present. 
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Taking into account that development research forms part of the development agenda, 
it is necessary to decide how to balance the different expectations raised by the 
research process. Experience showed that compensating the cooperation of the 
participating women individually may have contradicted their own ethics and those of 
the facilitating NGO and researcher. An ethically acceptable solution to the dilemma 
could be found due to the NGO's institutional commitment, which allowed it to 
integrate the process of development research as a means for improving reciprocity 
between local and external actors through a better mutual understanding, and efficient 
use of the capabilities and resources of all the actors involved. This in turn implies 
that research must select people and institutional partners who are willing and able to 
give continuity to the relationships. 
7.6.1 Continuing Divergences and Limits to Collaborative Support 
Collaborative action between external and local actors is not, however, always 
synchronous, or can be made so: there remained continuing divergences. The 
research used an NGO as a base, and there were also emerging divergences in 
women's perspectives and those of the NGO. One concerned the realisation that the 
NGO emphasised financial over other ways of empowerment, so that certain issues 
were not addressed directly, such as gender differentials in agricultural wages, child 
marriage practices, health and hygiene, or the caste discrimination practices followed 
in the villages. 
The findings raised the question about the limits of microfinance. The NGO 
introduced education, mental health support and vocational training for women and 
their children, but encountered some resistance with respect to land-based income 
generating activities and sustainable agriculture. These raised a dilemma for the 
NGO: if they were to foster long term ecological sustainability, this would demand 
working with the more endowed people in the villages, who controlled land 
ownership. The poor had a low ability to absorb productive credit, and would need 
long time periods for impact and development of new pathways. These issues were 
articulated and discussed within the NGO, which opted to continue to·work with the 
margina.Iised sections, but also realised that this limited its potential for impact on 
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livelihoods beyond the limited resources it could access for this target group via 
official and external agencies. 
7 .6.2 Reflections on the Process of Research 
This research spanned issues from macro to micro level, and accorded priority to 
women as agents of change in their own livelihoods. Their participation and 
cooperation arose over three years. These women perceived their situation not as a 
closed world from which there was no exit, but as a limiting situation, which they 
could nevertheless transform (Freire, 1970). The research had the effect of providing 
more 'liberating' education, with women expressing their situations of being 
marginalised, and then even over the relatively short period of research, making 
efforts to release themselves from the financial and physical dominance that they 
faced in their households. 
I was in touch not only with the women, but also with two of the authors of the 
livelihoods frameworks used. I was also able to exchange my experience of applying 
these frameworks with others who had used them. This helped me to understand the 
potential and limitations ofthe frameworks, by applying them. The continued contact 
with practitioners, reviewers and researchers helped me realise how their perspectives 
were shaped, and how their own livelihoods were linked to the growth of the 
microfinance industry. The problematic aspect of these relationships between 
researchers/consultants/advisors and the sponsors was highlighted (reference -news 
paper article). By becoming aware of the influence of such linkages, I opted to 
concentrate on the demand side, as my own engagement and concern was and 
continues to be for improvement of lives of poor women. 
7.7 Subsequent Developments 
During the period of writing the thesis, a consortium of six donor agencies, including 
CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, GTZ and USAID, commissioned a 
study covering Self Help Groups in three States of India, exploring several of the 
aspects outlined here. Several further research studies have also been commissioned 
to understand group dynamics better. At the policy level, I was asked to head a 
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research project to examine empowerment impact of microfinance policy and 
programmes, and to help design microfinance programmes that enhance women's 
empowerment. 
I was offered a fellowship by the National Centre of Competence North-South, a large 
international research project, headquartered at the Centre for Development and 
Environment, University of Berne, to deepen my own work and support other 
researchers with gender sensitive and actor oriented research methodology, in 
different parts of the world. This afforded me an opportunity to work with other 
research scholars to jointly improve the quality of both research and its practical 
orientation and application. 
Three private foundations have extended support for Sampark's livelihood support 
initiatives in Koppal. This helped me honour the commitment I had made, to meet the 
expressed needs of poor women: education of children, skill training for employment 
or enterprise for school drop-outs, and community based emotional counselling 
support through women's SHGs. 
Through these linkages, I will be able to maintain my profile as researcher-plus-
practitioner and enhance my own personal experience of trans-disciplinarity (Hurni et 
al, 2004; Hirsch, 2006), i.e. linking research and action in a mutually reinforcing 
learning cycle. I have felt a deep personal transformation, and am now a more 
politically aware person, both as a researcher and as a development practitioner. With 
these new perceptions and orientations, I hope to apply my skills again to positively 
influencing poor people's lives, especially those ofmarginalised women. 
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Appendix I : NGOs Details and Impact Literature 
Appendix 1 
NGOs Details and Impact Literature 
1 NGOs visited in Phase 1 
During the research period, several NGOs were visited for conducting impact studies 
and getting an overview of the aspects studied, the methodologies, tools and the 
indicators used by them. The organisations visited are listed in Table A 1-1. 
a e - : T bl All 0 rgamsahons lSI e e v· ·t dB tw een 1998 d 2003 an 
Or~~:anisations, Year Focus of Discussion and Remarks 
Milk Unions in Valsad district • Women's savings and credit groups have been accepted as the 
(Gujarat) and Malabar district channel for women's empowerment 
(Kerala) (1998-99) • Impact indicators are different from the perspective of the NGO 
and the groups/ women 
NGOs in Orissa, Andhra • Supply and demand side issues were different 
Pradesh, Kerala (6) • The group was seen as a means to an end. Group and NGO 
Coverage: 6 NGOs, 6 groups processes determined many aspects that influenced impact. Yet, 
(1998) impact per se was traced at individual and household levels 
Workshop with 25 NGOs, and 2 • NGOs and fund ing organisations discussed issues of financial 
funding agencies (FWWB and sustainability, interest rates, impact and ownership of institutions 
USA !D) on micro credit ( 1999) • NGOs related tensions at field level, especially the pressures of 
government programmes vit iating the atmosphere. A donor 
representatives opined that women's ownership and management 
was not re levant to deliver-y of financial services 
30 groups in Ranchi district of • Indicators of impact were sustainabil ity of cred it operations at 
Bihar (now Jharkhand , a NGO level , group savings, attendance, women's contribution to 
separate State), through 2 income, and financial decision making 
NGOs (1999) 
4 groups and 3 NGOs visited in • Tribal area, very poor people in remote areas where micro credit 
Bastar, Madhya Pradesh (2000) had limited relevance 
Workshop in Kappa!, • Natural Resource Management was the focus of the programme 
Bikanhalli vi llage, I NGO, I 
vi llage, 25 participants (200 I) 
Case studies of I 0 women, in • Exploratory work, spanning family and work life, income and 
depth case studies from 5 expenditure analysis . Study also at group level 
villages in Kappa! district • Quality of data varies for each woman, non-standardised but good 
(200 1-2003) in-depth information given by women, validated also through 
intermittent workshops with them 
3 workshops with vi llagers in • NGO, group and family level observations 
Bikanhalli , follow up of • Observed role ofNGO, group members, and v illagers action with 
livelihoods workshop (200 1- regards to resource management 
2002) 
2 NGO.s, 2 federations and 4 • Discussions with funding and apex agencies, NGOs, federations, 
groups (2002) groups, individual women 
UNOPS review, SFMC project • Understanding role of groups and federations in savings and credit 
implemented by SIDBI (2002) • Tensions between NGO staff and management clearly discernible, 
UNOPS review, North East and pressure of transformation on NGO quite clear 
(2003) 
3 NGOs in Orissa, 10 groups in 
2 districts (2003) 
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The details of several visits made to women and NGOs outside the study area, 
through conferences, workshops, and group settings, is listed in Table A 1-2. 
Table Al-2: Number ofNGOs and Groups Visited During Research Period 
Particulars Number 
NGOs for detailed discussions, field visits 25 
NGOs through workshops 25 
Groups visited 70 
Women covered through group discussions 750 
Women participants in longitudinal study 10 
These reviews of impact studies and fie ld level discussions with a wide range of 
institutional and local stakeholders in microfinance helped clarify the divergences that 
existed in perceptions and perspectives, and thus formed the basis of the delineation 
of the research themes as outlined in Chapter 2. 
2. Literature- Reviewed Indicators and Tools 
During the research period, several impact studies were reviewed to get an overview 
of the aspects studied, the methodologies, tools and the indicators used by them for 
impact assessments. Twenty impact studies, of which 18 were donor initiated, are 
listed in Table A 1-3. 
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Table Al-3: Review of Selected Microfinance lA Studies 
Or~anisation Studied Year Country Donor A~ency 
SHARE, MYRADA, 1999 India Friends of Women's World 
PRERANA Banking FWWB, as funding 
agency 
South Asia Poverty 2002 India, Andhra UNDP 
Alleviation Programme Pradesh 
(SAPAP) 
CYSD I 1996 India, NOVIB, OXF AM 
Bhubaneshwar 
CYSD2 2001 India, Ford Foundation sponsored 
Bhubaneshwar Action Research Project with 
SHARE 2000 India, Andhra Universities of Bath, Sussex 
Pradesh and Reading, UK 
PRADAN (Dhan) India, Madurai 
ASA 1999 India, Trichy Chairman, ASA initiated 
ASA 2000 Bangladesh ASA, donor supported 
The Bridge Foundation 1990 India TBF initiated 
China Women 's Income 2000 Canada Canadian Cooperative 
Generating Project Association 
UNICEF (FOP) 1998 Egypt SEEP, AIMS studies 
KATALYSIS 1998 Honduras Freedom from Hunger 
Reseau des Caisses 1997 Mali 
Populaires du Burkina Freedom from Hunger 
(RCPB) 
Workers' Bank 1998 Jamaica AIMS 
SEWABank 2000 Gujarat, India AIMS 
Grameen Bank 1998 Bangladesh Grameen Bank 
Bangladesh 
BRAC-T 1997 Bangladesh BRAC, donor supported 
BRAC II 1999 
Proshika, two studies 1998 Bangladesh Proshika, donor supported 
2002 
CETZAM 1999 Zambia DFID 
2000 
CARE Manual 1995 Bangladesh Only manual made, no 
information on its 
implementation 
Many of these above studies used several participatory tool s that helped to analyse 
one or more aspects of microfinance impact. A listing of the major tools is g iven in 
Table Al-4. 
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Table Al-4: Tools 
• Internal learning systems • Loan and savings use 
• Action learning workshops • Decision making matrix 
• Means test • Gender division of labour and resources 
• Impact survey mapping 
• Exit survey • Mobility mapping 
• Focus group discussions • Happiness mapping 
• In-depth interviews • Caste discrimination mapping 
• Impact survey • Chapatti diagramming 
• Client exit survey • Wealth ranking 
• Client satisfaction survey • Pictorial diary 
• Client empowerment survey • Diagrams 
• Life story interview 
These tools were compiled from 51 studies, which ranged from impact studies of 
specific projects to methodological reviews. They included: Guijit and Cornwall, 
1995; CYSD, 1996; BRAC, 1997; Mayoux, 1997; PRADAN, 1997; UNDP,1997; 
AIMS, 1998; Proshika, 1998; Blank, 1998; Grameen Bank, 1998; Nigam and 
Manowar, 1998; ASA, 1999; Cheston and Reed, 1999; BRAC, 1999; CETZAM, 
1999; Chen et al, 1999; Bayes, 1999; Chen and Sondgrass, 1999; Roche, 1999; ASA, 
2000; ICMC and PRIZMA, 2000; CCA, 2000; AIMS, 2000; CETZAM, 2000; 
Baumgartner et al, 2000; SHARE, 2000; CYSD, 2001; AIMS, 2001; CASHPOR, 
2001; CMF, 2001; FWWB, 2001; Mayoux, 2001; MYRADA, 2001; Cheston and 
Khun, 2001; Murthy et al, 2002; Schurmann, 2002; ASA, 2002; TBF, 2002; UNDP, 
2002; Andharia, Dand and Mayoux, 2003; Johnson, 2003; Wilson, 2003; Copestake, 
2003; Noponen, 2003; Brody, 2003; Deshpande et al, 2003; Mayoux 2003a, 2003b, 
2003c; Sinha and Patole, 2003; Menon, 2003; Atkinson, 2004. 
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3. NGOs in Koppal District 
The 17 local NGOs working in Koppal district are listed in Table A 1-5. 
Table Al-5: List of NGOs in Koppal District during Research Period 
Sl.No. Name of the NGO 
I. Bharatiya Agro Industries Foundation (BAIF) 
2. Chetana Foundation 
3. Ekalavya 
4. Guru Shikashana 
5. Institute for Rural Development and Education Society (IRDS) 
6. Jnana Bharati Education Society 
7. Mahi la Samakya 
8. Manju Shree 
9. Olekar Education Society 
10. Outreach 
11. Pastoral Service Institute (PSI) 
12. Sam park 
13 . Samuha 
14. Sarvodaya 
15. SHARE 
16. Swayam Krutha Sangha 
17. VIKASA 
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Appendix 2 
Questionnaires and Codes for Analysis 
This Appendix details: 
1. The semi-structured questionnaire that was used to collect information from 
the ten women case study participants 
2. The questionnaire that was used for collecting information on the facilitating 
NGO, Sampark, and the information collected 
3. The codes used for analysing the information in the case study interviews and 
narratives. 
1. Questionnaire for Women Participants 
Demographic Details 
1. Name of woman 
2. Name ofvillage 
3. Taluk 
4. Name of parents' village 
Family Details 
5. Name of husband/ father 
6. Married/ Unmarried/Widow/Separated 
7. Members of the household (details of age, dependent or not, children, school-
going children, disabilities) 
Land and Assets 
8. Totalland 
9. Irrigated/ Uri-irrigated/ Uncultivable (plot sizes, location, including land in other 
village, if any) 
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10. Who owns piece of land or in whose name the land is registered? 
11. Land taken on lease for cultivation or given out on lease 
12. Equipment (plough, tractor, other) 
13. Livestock (cows, buffaloes, bullocks, chicks, pigs, goats, etc.) 
Cultivation and Income 
14. Seasonal calendar of crops sown. On which piece of land? How much is 
harvested? How much is kept for home consumption/ seeds? What are the 
earnings? How long is the food grain kept? How long does the cash earned last? 
What is the family's work pattern during the period soon after harvest as opposed 
to when the food stocks are low? 
15. Crop details Uowar, ragi (minor millet), peas, other vegetables, oilseeds, pulses, 
etc.) 
16. Income and activities of members (trading, craft work, tailoring, watch making, 
hair processing, selling cow or buffalo milk, etc.) 
Migration/ Bonded Labour 
17. Is any member of the family working as a bonded labourer? With whom? Since 
when? Details of the need that led to the bondage. 
18. Has any family member migrated? If so, where, for what periods and for which 
activity? Earnings during the migration period? Does one person go or does the 
whole family migrate? What is the effect on children's education during this time? 
If the woman stays back with children, how are her expenses met? 
Other Family Details 
19. General well being of family, education levels, etc. 
20. Comments on relationships within the family as observed 
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Aspirations 
21. Where does the family want to reach? What are the woman's own aspirations for 
herself and her family members? 
Use of Natural Resources 
Land 
22. A detailed land use chart with each woman/ household, to find out land use and 
earning pattern 
23. Fertiliser and pesticides used, and whether these are organic or chemical. For 
which crops are these used, and in what quantities? 
24. Has land degraded in any observable way over the past ten years? (e.g. soil 
salinity) 
25. Problems perceived by the family relating to agricultural productivity? 
26. Impact of uncertain rains on farm management strategy? 
Water 
27. How much water does the family use every day, for what purposes (bathing, 
cleaning cattle, washing vessels, cleaning house, cooking, drinking, etc.)? 
28. Within the family, who uses the water, who fetches it, how much does each 
member use and for what purpose? 
29. From where do they get the water for each purpose? 
30. Are there any common tanks in the village or nearby? 
31. Who has provided these sources (traditional common ownership, common usage, 
government provided, privately dug and owned, etc.)? 
32. Any caste restrictions for ownership and usage of private or common sources of 
water. 
Forests/ Any other Common Property Resources 
33. Did forests exist anywhere near the village? How long ago? How did they 
disappear? 
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34. Have there been traditionally protected common grazing lands near the village? 
What is their condition now? How are they used? 
35. Rivers, if any, or how is the water from the Tungabhadra dam made available to 
the villagers? 
Labour 
36. Deepen details of family's use of labour, discussed in earlier sessions. 
37. Does the woman have control over her own labour? Who decides whether or not 
she would go for casual farm labour on a particular day or not? What are the 
factors influencing these decisions? 
38. Does the woman participant have access and control over her children's labour? 
39. If a child in the family is not going to school, why? Is the child (female or male) 
required to do family chores, child-care or farm labour? Who decided that she/ he 
should drop out of school and do this work? When? 
40. How much labour does the family put in, including all the members taken 
together? 
Cash 
41. General details about how monetised the village/ talukl district economy is. 
42. Which transactions take place in cash, and which are done through exchange of 
labour and other commodities (e.g. systems like crop sharing, water sharing are 
part of non-monetised transactions)? 
43. Separate seasonal calendar for earning and expenses, and a different one for crops. 
It includes 
• What are the expenses and income for different crops? 
• What are the sources of resources to meet these expenses? 
• On what items has the money earned been used? Or how has the money 
earned been spent? 
44. The woman/ family will record as much as possible of this exercise, and the 
emphasis will be on learning from it and enjoying it. This is also a part of the 
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process of ensuring that the information is valid and has been triangulated (with 
the chart on crops and land usage, and by other family members). 
Relation of the Woman with the Group 
45. When did she join the group? 
46. Why did she join the group? 
47. Total savings of group and of individual women 
48. Loan taken from the group, how it was used, how much was returned, any 
over dues? 
49. Details of her attendance in group meetings, participation, leadership, etc. 
50. Her perception of benefits from joining the group, and disadvantages/ 
difficulties arising from doing so, if any 
51. Aspirations ofwoman, children, and family members 
52. Other non-material aspects shared by the woman about her family 
1 Questionnaire for the Facilitating NGO 
1. Name and address of organisation 
Sam park, 120/ A, 1 th Main, KHB Colony, 51h Block, Koramangala, 
Bangalore- 560095, Karnataka, India. 
Ph: +91-80-25530196, 25521268, 
Tel fax: +91 -80-25529557, Email: sampark@sampark.org,Web: www.sampark.org. 
2. What is the stated mission of the organisation? 
Sampark's mission is to improve the livelihoods and condition of the rural poor by 
facilitating people's initiatives and management in the sectors of education, 
sustainable natural resource management (SNRM), micro credit and micro enterprise. 
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3. Year of establishment 
Registered as a charitable organisation under the Karnataka Societies Registration 
(1960) Act in 1991. 
4. Location ofwork 
Kappa! district, Karnataka, India. 
5. The sectors in which Sampark operates 
These include micro finance, education and vocational training, mental health 
support, skill training and water conservation. 
6. When did the organisation start working with microfinance? 
Sampark started savings and credit activities in Kappa! through women's self help 
groups from 1999-2000. 
7. What is the total number of villages, groups, and members? 
The number of villages and the details about groups is given in Table A2-l. 
Table A2-1: Coverage of Sam park's Work in Koppal 
Year SHGs Mens Groups No. ofWomen No. ofVillages 
1999 20 - 600 
2001 120 - 1700 
2003 180 - 2700 
2004 160 8 2500 
2006 147 10 2396 
8. Total staff 
Field office: 6 Full time and 3 Part time staff and 10 Animators 
Head office: 5 Full time and 5 Associates 
8 
15 
25 
35 
40 
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9. Total operational expenses per year (2004-05) 
Field Office Rs. 600,000 ($ 13,636) 
Head Office Rs. 800,000 ($ 18, 182) 
Total Rs. 1,400,000 ($ 31 ,818) 
SIS 
These expenses include all the activities of Sampark, including those of its 
microfinance programme. 
10. Does the NGO provide credit to SHGs, provide bank linkages, or both? 
Sampark encourages banks and departmental linkages directly to the groups and 
cluster as priority, but wherever these are not possible, Sampark lends to such groups 
through clusters. 
11. Sources from which the NGO has received credit, between 1999 and March 2006. 
a e - : re 1 m ages T bl A2 2 C d't L' k 
Institutions Amount in November 2004 Cumulative Amount in 
March,2006 
TBF Rs.4,27,000 ($ 9,408) Rs.4,27,000 ($ 9,408) 
KSWDC Rs.3,00,000 ($ 6,666) Rs.3 ,00,000 ($ 6,666) 
Cluster loan/Sam park Rs. 1,00,000 ($ 2,222) Rs. 11 ,66,200 ($ 25,915) 
sources 
Banks (directly to Rs. 6,00,000 ($ 13,333) Rs. 16,44,200 ($ 36537) 
groups) 
Total Rs. 14,27,000 ($ 32,432) Rs. 35,37,400 ($ 78,608) 
12. Sources from which NGO has received grants for the MF programme 
Sampark has not received any large grants for its microfinance programme, though 
about one fourth of the expenses of group formation were supported in 1998 by a 
small grant from DFID, and during 1999 to March 2004 by Karnataka State Women 's 
Development Corporation (in turn financed by IF AD and World Bank financed 
programmes). 
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13. What is the interest rate that members and groups pay on loans? Is it kept 
standard or does it differ depending on the source of funds? 
Sampark plays a facilitation role in the micro finance programme. SHGs are 
organised in clusters of five to six groups. Sampark links the groups to banks or 
raises loans based on the needs of groups and clusters. The money is transferred 
directly to the accounts of the SHGs or clusters. Clusters then provide the loan at a 
standard interest rate of 24% to groups and the groups fix a rate of interest on loans to 
members, which is usually between 24 - 36%. 
14. Do the savings stay with the NGO or the group? Are they also rotated as credit? 
Is the purpose different for the loans taken from external sources? 
Each SHG collects the savings from its members during the weekly meetings, and 
rotates the savings as credit among the members. Such loans are often used to meet 
the expenses of health, education, festivals, agricultural inputs and small businesses. 
15. Does Sampark maintain separate accounts of the MF operation, its costs and 
earnings? 
Sampark has only bank transactions (transfers) in the micro finance operation, and 
does not engage in cash transactions with SHGs. The clusters and groups maintain 
the records and books for the MF operation, costs earning etc. They make loan 
repayments to banks directly, without involving Sampark. In cases where help is 
necessary to access the money from another financing agency, e.g. TBF, Sampark 
collects the money from the cluster and repays the instalments due for which it keeps 
separate accounts. The overall capacity building expenditure is not, however, 
allocated separately to microfinance. 
16. Financial viability ofthe MF operations 
The clusters/groups do not pay/bear any ofthe administration costs of Sam park. They 
manage their earnings and expenses and usually make a profit at the group and cluster 
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levels. The profit is added to the common fund in groups and clusters. Sampark 
bears the operational costs for supporting the capacity building of women and their 
SHGs through its own resources. 
17. Kinds of services provided to groups 
These included group organisation and training, exposure visits, confidence building, 
leadership development, information on government schemes, help with opening bank 
accounts, bank linkage for credit to groups, skill trainings (e.g. Kasuti hand 
embroidery, pickle making and brick making etc.), business start up training, and 
marketing linkages for some products. 
18. Sam park's experiences and lessons in the field of MF 
Lessons about development of groups: Sampark started its fieldwork in 1998 and it 
took six months to convince women about savings and form three SHGs in June 1998. 
Slowly, when they saw the operation of these three groups, women themselves came 
forward and formed new SHGs. Over a period of time even men from a few villages 
requested Sampark to help them in forming men's groups. Women members of older 
SHGs have now taken on the role of promoting SHGs and Sampark is involved in 
building their capacities to become sustainable in future. 
Lessons about management of MF operations and sustainability of MF operations: 
During the initial years, banks were unwilling to provide funds to SHGs, and at this 
time, Sampark provided credit directly to the members of SHGs. As Sampark 
managed this operation, the groups did not take responsibility for the repayment, and 
Sampark lost money. The SHGs and clusters perceived no role for themselves and 
did not keep any financial margin to cover their operational costs. After this 
experience, Sampark decided to limit its role to that of a facilitator. Its strategy now 
involves linking SHGs and clusters directly to formal sources of finance, resulting 
good repayment rates and capital generation for women-owned institutions. 
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Lessons about whether MF/s, NGOs or women-owned organisations should do MF 
operations: Sampark's experience has led it to a strategy whereby the NGO 
concentrates on development work rather than running parallel financial operations. 
It sees its role as an NGO in linking the SHGs to local banks and other external 
financial institutions. 
2 Codes for Analysis 
ATLAS.ti is the software that was used to analyse qualitative data often indepth case 
studies of women participants. A set of eighty two codes that are used to analyse the 
relationship between and among research themes are listed below: 
1. Advance loan 
2. Agricultural_ practice 
3. Agricultural_ expenses 
4. Assets_ expenses 
5. Attitude _perceptions 
6. Awareness_ knowledge 
7. Bank loan 
8. Business details 
9. Business_ expenses 
I 0. Business_ family _responsibility 
11. Business motivation 
12. Business skills 
13. Changes_ in_life 
14. Child education 
15. Climate 
16. Collective Orientation 
17. Community_ relationship 
18. Credit_gift to others 
19. Cropping_ pattern 
20. Cultural_ aspects 
21. Family_ planning 
22. Family_ background 
23. Family_migration 
24. Future_aspirations 
25. Gender_ decision_ making 
26. Gender education 
27. Gender_leadership 
28. Gender_responsibility 
29. Gender social 
30. Govt Economic 
31. Group Assessment 
32. Group_awareness 
33. Group_changes 
34.Group_changes 
35. Group_community 
36. Group_decision 
3 7. Group_ family_ changes 
38. Group_leadership 
39. Group_loan 
40. Group_loan_recovery 
41. Group_ objectives_ activities 
42. Group _partiCipation _responsibility 
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43. Group_problem_solving 64. Loan economic 
44. Group_records 65. Loan _purpose 
45. Health economic 66. Loan_repayment 
46. Health issues 67. Loan utlisation 
4 7. Household_ expenses 68. Natural resources 
48. Income _agriculture 69. Natural resources difficulties 
49. Income cash 70. Natural resources utilisation 
50. Income cash business 71. Non_ money credit 
51. Income kind 72. Outside_group_loan 
52. Income labour 73. Personal_profile 
53. Income livestock 74. Relatives loan 
54. Income loan 75. Research_methodology 
55. Income_partner 76. Savings_economic 
56. Infant_mortality _rate 77. Seasonal calendar 
57. Labour_expenses 78. Social_aspects 
58. Land_pattern 79. Socio economic 
59. Landlord Loan 80. TBF loan 
60. Literacy _level 81. Village_profile 
61. Livestock_ expenses 82. Water use 
62. Loan benefits 
63. Loan differences 
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